

**BSHP Annual**

**Conference**

**2024**

**The University of Liverpool Philosophy Department is delighted to welcome you to the British Society for the History of Philosophy’s Annual Conference. Sessions will take place across four lecture theatres and a GLEX space, with registration and refreshments in the Atrium, all within the Central Teaching Hub.**

**Day 1: *Monday 08/04/2024***

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TIME** | **Lecture Theatre A** | **Lecture Theatre B** | **Lecture Theatre C** | **Lecture Theatre D** | **G-FLEX** | **Atrium** |
| **12:00** |  |  |  |  |  | REGISTRATION |
| **12.30** | WELCOME |  |  |  |  |  |
| **13:00** | KEYNOTE 1 FRISBEE SHEFFIELD[*Socrates, Arendt & the Ethics of Conversation*](#_Frisbee_Sheffield,_Socrates,) |  |  |  |  |  |
| **14:30** |  |  |  |  |  | COFFEE |
| **15:00** |  | PANEL 1 [*SMRP: Merging of Traditions*](#_1._MERGING_OF) | PANEL 2 [*Women on Logic & Language in the c20th*](#_2._Women_on) | PANEL 3\* [*Tito Magri’s Hume’s Imagination (with opening & closing comments from Magri)*](#_3._Book_Panel:) | PANEL 4 [*Transcendental Freedom & Experience (with extra discussion)*](#_4._Transcendental_Freedom) |  |
| **17:00** |  |  |  |  |  | END |
| **18:00** |  |  |  |  |  | CONFERENCE DINNER (LEAF)  |

**Day 2: *Tuesday 09/04/24***

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| **TIME** | **Lecture Theatre A** | **Lecture Theatre B** | **Lecture Theatre C** | **Lecture Theatre D** | **G-****FLEX** | **Atrium** |
| **09:30** | KEYNOTE 2:BETH LORD[*Divine Equality from Neoplatonism to Spinoza*](#_Beth_Lord,_Divine) |  |  |  |  |  |
| **11:00** |  | PANEL 5 [*SMRP: Logic & Science*](#_5._Logic_&) | PANEL 6 [*SSHAPP: Anscombe vs Austin*](#_6._Anscombe_vs) | PANEL 7[*Neglected Early Modern Minds: Cordemoy, Cavendish & Baxter*](#_7._Neglected_Early) | PANEL 8[*Science vs Philosophy*](#_8._P:_Science)   |  |
| **13:00** |  |  |  |  |  | LUNCH |
| **14:00** |  | PANEL 9 [*SMRP: Metaphysics & Epistemology*](#_9._Metaphysics_&) | PANEL 10 [*Women & Logic in the C20th*](#_10._Women_&) | PANEL 11 [*Common Notions, Universal Experience in C17th Natural Philosophy*](#_11._Common_Notions,) | PANEL 12[*Identity, embodiment, & second nature in Cavendish, Spinoza, & Hegel*](#_12._Identity,_embodiment,)  |  |
| **15:30** |  |  |  |  |  | COFFEE |
| **16:00** |  | PANEL 13 [*SMRP: Powers*](#_13._Powers:_SMRP)  | PANEL 14[*‘Common Sense’ arguments against anti-realism*](#_14._‘Common_Sense’) | PANEL 15 [*Puzzles about Shape*](#_15._Puzzles_about) | PANEL 16 [*Hegel*](#_16._Hegel)  |  |
| **17:30** | KEYNOTE 3:ALISON STONE[*Frances Power Cobbe and Animal Ethics*](#_Alison_Stone,_Frances) |  |  |  |  |  |

**Day 3: *Wednesday 10/04/2024***

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TIME** | **Lecture Theatre A** | **Lecture Theatre B** | **Lecture Theatre C** | **Lecture Theatre D** | **G-****FLEX** | **Atrium** |
| **09:00** |  |  |  |  |  | COFFEE |
| **09:30** |  | PANEL 17[*Ancient moral & political thought*](#_17._Ancient_moral) | PANEL 18 [*Anscombe's The First Person*](#_18._Revisiting_Anscombe’s) | PANEL 19 [*Sympathy & Virtue*](#_19._x_Sympathy) | PANEL 20 [*Virtuous Epistemology*](#_20._Virtuous_Epistemology:) |  |
| **11:00** |  |  |  |  |  | COFFEE |
| **11:30** |  | PANEL 21 [*Ancient Logic & Science*](#_21._P._Ancient) | PANEL 22 [*First & Second Nature*](#_22._P._First) | PANEL 23 [*Mary Shepherd’s Realism*](#_23.__Mary) | PANEL 24 [*Evaluating Liberalism*](#_24._P_Evaluating) |  |
| **13:30** |  |  |  |  |  |  LUNCH |
| **14:30** | KEYNOTE 4:SANDFORD SHIEH[*Hylomorphic Aliens*](#_Sanford_Shieh,_Hylomorphic) |  |  |  |  |  |
| **16:00** |  |   |   |   |   | COFFEE |
| **16:30** | AGM |  |  |  |  |  |

**ABSTRACTS**

**KEYNOTES**

### **Frisbee Sheffield, Socrates, Arendt & the Ethics of Conversation**

Can talking and thinking about the virtues make us better, even when that activity is result-less? This paper explores Hannah Arendt’s use of Socrates to answer that question. It argues that if thinking and talking are done in dialogue, then it can improve. What Arendt may have seen is that dialogue is not a value-neutral practice; it has values built into its successful operation. Plato’s Socratic dialogues show that attention to what we owe our conversational partners in dialogue gives rise to behaviours that express justice, moderation, courage and so on. There is an ethics to Socratic conversation and learning to talk to one another in dialogue, or to own selves in thinking, can foster an orientation to the ethical content of such discussions and thereby support our ethical endeavours.

### **Beth Lord, Divine Equality from Neoplatonism to Spinoza**

One way that equality is understood in early modern thought is as equivalence. Equivalence has a clear geometrical meaning, but it has a metaphysical sense too. In both contexts, as I will discuss, equivalence is a way of thinking sameness and difference together. Equality, in this sense, is neither uniformity nor identity, but a sameness that involves difference and relationality. In this paper I will discuss how this concept is used to understand the nature of God by Neoplatonist philosophers and by Spinoza. I will look at how some Neoplatonists conceive God as being equal to himself, and how a similar notion of equality plays out in Spinoza’s conception of substance and its attributes. Spinoza’s God, on this way of thinking, is not to be understood as the undifferentiated “one”, but rather as dual, relational, and equal.

### **Alison Stone, Frances Power Cobbe and Animal Ethics**

In this talk I introduce the nineteenth-century philosopher Frances Power Cobbe, who was the leader of the Victorian movement against vivisection, or animal experimentation. I focus on Cobbe’s arguments in her 1875 essay ‘The Moral Aspects of Vivisection’. In the first half of the essay, she treated vivisection as a consequence of the rise of science, which was driving out religious and moral constraints. In the political struggle at this time to pass legislation regulating vivisection, Cobbe was pitted against Darwin, and she concluded that this exposed the problems of Darwinism: if we treat human beings as just another species of animal, it follows that we are entitled to act on self-interest and exercise power over other weaker species, as in animal experimentation. In the second half of her essay she tried to refute all the defences of vivisection. The main defences were utilitarian, but she argued that really utilitarians ought to oppose vivisection. Finally I will comment on the contemporary relevance of Cobbe’s views.

### **Sanford Shieh, Hylomorphic Aliens**

Kant and Frege both oppose basing logic on psychological principles.  However, recent scholarship has significantly qualified our understanding of Kant’s opposition.  In particular, on hylomorphic readings of Kant’s conception of logic, logic concerns the form(s) of our cognitive faculties or powers.  I will make a case that, from Frege’s perspective, the hylomorphic Kantian conception of logic remains psychologistic. The case is based on a reading of parts of the Foreword to volume 1 of Frege’s *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*.  For the past 40 years, discussion of this text has often involved Frege’s consideration of the possibility of beings whose deductive processes seem entirely different from ours, beings whom Thomas Ricketts dubbed “logical aliens.”  I suggest that Kantian hylomorphic logic leads to the possibility of a sub-species of logical aliens I call “hylomorphic aliens.”  The application of Frege’s arguments to hylomorphic aliens indicates that one deep source of his disagreement with Kant over the nature of logic is a disagreement over how, and whether, Kant’s notion of self-consciousness can substantiate the objectivity of logic.

**DAY 1, 15.00-17.00**

### 1. MERGING OF TRADITIONS. SMRP SPONSORED SESSION

Medieval philosophy weaves together many textual traditions, as this session illustrates, by looking at the epistemology of a beguine nun, the surprisingly Platonic undercurrents of John Buridan, and the interaction between Jewish and Renaissance exegesis.

**Tatiana Barkovskiy, ‘Marguerite Porete on the epistemically and ontologically transformative dimension of love’**

Marguerite Porete’s exploration of love, based on the beguine’s systematic critique of reason as a tool of cognition, unveils its epistemically transformative nature. Unlike many medieval mystics who emphasised the corporeal and worldly aspects of love, perceived mostly as an emotion or emotional experience, Porete viewed love as a nuanced intertwining of a transcendent metaphysical force with a cognitive power that surpasses earthly existence by guiding human behaviour, fostering virtue, expanding understanding in a way that overcomes the limitations of language and logic, and serving as a fundamental principle and goal of all being. Indeed, the Poretian “*amour*” represents an inherently philosophical term that blends different concepts, both original and taken from other sources — most notably the scholastic notion of divine *caritas* intertwined with the *amor* of the courtly tradition, as well as the ideas of a full self-surrender and the subsequent dissolution of self in union with the divine. As such, it transcends mere human emotion and points to the Neoplatonic ascent with a unique emphasis on experiential union, thus challenging the idea of a distant divine which, in its Christian source, is understood to be entirely transcendent. It is at once transformative and intimate, but, importantly, it not only *transforms* but itself is *transformed* from worldly to divine. The soul arrives at the connection with the Godhead precisely through this inherently divine love, and, by surrendering to its personified form — Fine Love — it experiences a profound transformation through which it is able to access a form of knowledge that transcends reason and directly participates in the divine. In emphasising the epistemologically transformative nature of love, Porete challenges traditional notions of knowledge, both rational and empirical, rejects reason as the ultimate instrument of cognition, and asserts love as an active, cognitive force capable of bringing about profound changes in one’s soul.

**Jack Zupko, ‘Certitude, Firmness, and Truth: The Psychology of Knowing in John Burida’**

John Buridan (c. 1300-61) is well known for his defense of the possibility of empirical knowledge against the skeptical, anti-Aristotelian arguments of Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1295-1369).  But underlying his reply is an account of the psychology of knowing that brings together elements from both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic models of intellectual cognition.  In this paper, I explore some of these elements, arguing that Buridan’s understanding of the certitude of empirical knowledge rests on Aristotelian foundations, though it is ultimately shaped by a Neoplatonic blueprint originating in Calcidius and the medieval tradition of commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*.

**Massimiliano Tinini, ‘Bible and Exegetical Tradition in Yehudah Abarbanel’s *Dialoghi d’amore*’**

My proposal is committed to provide a novel contribution to the relationship between the *Bible* and exegetical tradition in the Renaissance, focusing on the work of Yehudah Abarbanel, also known as Leo the Hebrew. We can hypothesize that in Abarbanel’s *Dialoghi d’amore* there is the influence of the Latin version of *Vulgata*, in addition to the presence of the Hebrew *Bible* mediated by the Sephardic exegetic tradition, where Maimonides' commentary stands out. In this sense, Abarbanel’s goal is to get the attention of Christian readers as his main public. On the other hand, Abarbanel is a great translator from Latin and he is able to cleverly disguise his translations within his work. Furthermore, another hypothesis would be that, alongside the *Vulgata* and the Hebrew Biblical cannon, Abarbanel uses Latin versions of the sixteenth-century *Bible*. To investigate further, it would be necessary to understand the circulation of the texts in Neapolitan, Florentine, and Roman cultural circles. For these reasons, the work of Abarbanel can be read and interpreted as a bridge between Jewish communities and the humanistic cultural environment of the Renaissance.

The analysis of concepts that shaped the thought of Yehudah Abarbanel in relation to exegetical traditions is possible with the support of the rich academic literature in the fields of Biblical studies and Jewish philosophy from the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. It is necessary to historically examine the cultural horizon of the Italian Renaissance in order to reconstruct the context where philosophical synthesis of Abarbanel was carried out. The core of the research methodology is based on textual analysis that requires the comparison between different parts of the main source (*Dialoghi d’amore*) with the critical bibliography. Results obtained are going to be interpreted according to a philosophical perspective.

**Amos Edelheit (Maynooth University), ‘Florentine Aristotelianism and Scholasticism in the Renaissance: The Case of** **Niccolò Tignosi (1402-1474)’**

The specific nature of Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy as it was practiced in Florence during the second half of the fifteenth century and its complicated relations with Renaissance humanism and Neoplatonism is still largely *terra incognita*. In this paper I intend to focus on the activity of Niccolò Tignosi, who taught Aristotelian philosophy and medicine at the University of Florence in Pisa from the end of the 1430s. Although Tignosi started his academic career in Perugia his period in Florence seems the most significant part of his career and all the works that we have of him today were written during this period. Tignosi attracted some scholarly attention in the past being regarded as one of the scholastic mentors of Marsilio Ficino; yet in this paper I shall try to establish the position he held among Aristotelian and scholastic philosophers as it is presented in his response to the detractors of his commentary on the *Ethics*.

### 2. Women on Logic and Language in the Twentieth Century

This symposium will continue the discussion of important contributions by female authors to twentieth-century thought about logic and language in the Western tradition. For many years work by women in these fields was under-researched and suffered from comparative neglect. The history of formal and philosophical logic, and the history of logic-driven fields like early analytic philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and the intersection of philosophy and linguistics have by tradition been culturally coded as masculine. This has had detrimental effects both on the philosophical reputations of individual women and on the diversity and richness of debate in the philosophical fields themselves. A body of scholarship from the last decade or so, which has focussed on recovering and revivifying the contributions of female philosophers, has gone some way to addressing these issues. However, there is still much work to be done.

The papers in this symposium will uncover the reception of work by a number of women of the early and mid-twentieth century in their own time, and consider how this work can and should now takes its place in contemporary debates. The individual papers in this symposium concentrate on the work of a range of philosophers and logicians, but share the common aim of restoring female thinkers’ ideas to their rightful place in the history, as well as the current practice, of logic and language.

**Siobhan Chapman, ‘Helen Knight on language and art’**

In this paper I will consider some of the philosophical writings of Helen Knight (1899-1984), concentrating on her pioneering work at the intersection of language and aesthetics. Knight was at the centre of British analytic philosophy in the 1930s; she served on the executive committee of the Aristotelian Society, for instance, and contributed to the first issue of the journal *Analysis*, alongside figures such as Ayer, Braithwaite, Moore, Ryle and Stebbing. However, she has received little attention in canonical histories of analytic philosophy; if she is mentioned at all she tends to be labelled, and explained away, as a ‘disciple of Wittgenstein’. I will review important work (e.g. Knight 1930; 1931; 1936) in which she analyses the language of art appreciation in relation to its everyday usage, proposing this process of analysis as a vital tool in aesthetics. I will argue that in this work she prefigures more celebrated work on the relationship between art and ordinary language (e.g. Hampshire, 1952; Gallie, 1956; Sibley, 1959). Like these later thinkers, Knight calls for attention to distinctions in the application of terms as a crucial method for the clarification of concepts in the description and evaluation of art.

**Sophia Connell, ‘Alice Ambrose’s philosophical method’**

Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz has been known mainly as a follower of Wittgenstein. Given that Wittgenstein’s philosophical positions are hardly transparent and lend themselves to a variety of different interpretations, this characterisation of her philosophy is uninformative. In this paper, I discuss the nature of her own philosophical methodology and the positions she argued for and supported in her work. Ambrose was uniquely placed in the history of analytic philosophy. She attempted to discover what Wittgenstein was conveying to students in his middle period. She helped him to express his views; she then typed up and distributed them because she thought them important and insightful. In these efforts, and her extensive notes of Wittgenstein and Moore’s lectures, Ambrose learned and imbibed these philosophical viewpoints first-hand. They were new to her and radically different from the topics she had learned before. From this position, she synthesized and looked back on this period of teaching and learning for most of the rest of her career. Ambrose applied various of her own interpretations of the philosophical approaches recommended by Moore and Wittgenstein to many difficulties that these more well-known philosophers had not themselves worked through, including those posed by thinkers in the philosophical past. I will provide various illustrations of this methodology and its results in papers from the 1940s through to the 1980s. In particular, I consider how Ambrose sought to disentangle seemingly intractable difficulties in the philosophy of mathematics and in metaphysics by insisting on a distinction between mathematical/philosophical versus empirical propositions. Focusing on meaning as use, Ambrose argues that once we understand the different ways in which language operates, there is no reason to deem it inadequate for its purposes; but philosophers often reach beyond these purposes and must be rescued from seeming contradiction and confusion.

**Maheshi Gunawardane, ‘Susan Stebbing as a foremother of informal logic’**

Susan Stebbing (1885–1943), Great Britain’s first female professor of philosophy, was an educator, a forerunner of critical thinking, and an intellectual thinker with a fondness for argumentation and evidential reasoning. Regrettably, Stebbing has been overlooked in particular by historians of informal logic, resulting in a gap in the literature of critical thinking from the 1930s to 1960s. Moreover, Stebbing and her philosophical works have been disregarded due to the infancy of the history of informal logic. Though Stebbing does not use the term *informal logic* explicitly, I argue that she is practising informal logic in her critical thinking texts such as *Logic in Practice* (1934), *Thinking to Some Purpose* (1939) and *Ideals and Illusions* (1941).

I argue that Stebbing’s contributions to informal logic are significant, including the discovery of fallacies such as the ‘No true Scotsman’ and ‘Definist fallacy’, which were originally attributed to men. Additionally, while the term ‘socially situated’ is frequently discussed in informal logic papers, only one volume written by Janssen Lauret (2022:54) discusses Susan Stebbing treating her thinkers as being ‘socially situated’ which I hope to delve deeply into. Through her work on informal logic, she becomes an exemplar in ‘socially situated’ reasoning and thinking by considering social factors such as gender, race, groups, and nationality in a modern context.

My paper aims to recognize Susan Stebbing as a foremother of informal logic during the period of 1930 to 1960. Stebbing becomes an exemplar in the field through her work on critical thinking, detecting logical fallacies, evaluating arguments, and socially situated thinking and reasoning. By addressing the gap in the literature and exploring Stebbing’s views on informal logic, critical thinking, and social situatedness, my paper provides valuable insight into this influential philosopher’s contributions to the field.

**Frederique Janssen Lauret, ‘Ruth Barcan Marcus’ contributions to modal logic’**

In the mid-twentieth century, analytic philosophy took a sharp turn away from its previous strong adherence to descriptivism (Frege, Russell) and antimodal extensionalism (Russell, Quine, early Carnap) and towards the direct-reference theory of names, the necessity of identity, and the many and varied applications of quantified logics of modality. All three had come into the analytic mainstream through the works of one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit all three to Kripke, or modal logic to Carnap and the others to Kripke (Ballarin, *SEP* 2021), or even modal logic to Carnap, necessary identity to Quine (Burgess, *Synthese* 2014).

Ruth Barcan (later Ruth Barcan Marcus) published the first quantified modal logic in her mid-twenties, and proved the necessity of identity (Barcan, *J. Symb. Logic* 1946, 1947). Barcan approached quantified modal logic as a calculus, proof-theoretically. Her system therefore did not assume quantification over possible worlds, as in Kripke’s now more common treatment, and her well-known Barcan Formula (really a schema) did not imply a possible-world model with constant domains as a result, although Barcan later considered such an interpretation (Barcan Marcus, *Synthese* 1961). I read Barcan’s 1946-47 modal logic in the context of her wider philosophical views, specifically the empiricist nominalism which informed her arguments for direct-reference theory, which in turn informed her views on identity. I argue against Burgess’ contention that Quine rather than Barcan proved the necessity of identity.

In this paper, I further argue that Barcan Marcus’ versions of direct-reference theory, necessary identity, and quantified modal logic were not inferior, but in fact superior, to Kripke’s. First, since she viewed modal discourse about *actualia* as counterfactual descriptions of actual objects, and modal discourse about *possibilia* as lengthy but false Russellian descriptions, her view is ontologically parsimonious. Second, Barcan’s account of necessity of identity according to which only directly referential names can flank the identity sign has advantages over Kripke’s ‘rigid designation’ account

### 3. Book Panel: Tito Magri’s *Hume’s Imagination*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022

Tito Magri’s recent book is a major and comprehensive study in one key aspect of Hume’s philosophy, namely the imagination. This panel will discuss different aspects of this fine book.

**Tito Margri: Opening Remarks**

**Marina Frasca-Spada, ‘The point of view on the *Treatise*, Book 1 in Tito Magri’s *Hume’s Imagination*’**

Underlying its systematic table of contents, Book 1 of the *Treatise*looks, in fact, very unsystematic in its discussions; but in his *Hume’s Imagination* Tito Magri uncovers in it the the point of view that allows to reconstruct its order and organisation. That point of view is unlocked by Magri’s sustained focus on the imagination and the roles Hume attributed to it in the constitution of human experience.

**P J E Kail, ‘Animals and Naturalism and Hume’s Imagination: Comments on Tito Magri’s *Hume’s Imagination*’**

 Tito Magri’s *Hume’s Imagination* seeks to present a unified account of a central aspect of Hume’s philosophy as presented in the *Treatise*, namely the imagination. One of the ends served by Magri’s account is to show how this account of Hume’s imagination relates to how we understand his naturalism. Here I supplement Magri’s account by offering some context to Hume’s vocabulary of the imagination, its relation to animal models of cognition, and how this relates to the understanding of naturalism.

**Alessio Vaccari, ‘Hume's Idea of the Self and Personal Identity: Comments on Tito Magri’s *Hume's Imagination*’**

Magri’s book is crucial to Hume’s scholarship because it provides the first systematic account of the imagination in Book I of the *Treatise*. In my comments I will not discuss the general features of Magri's account or how this affects the general interpretation of Book I of the *Treatise*, but I will focus on the more specific matter of how his reading of the imagination addresses the issues concerning the idea of the self and personal identity that Hume discusses in T 1.4.6 and the Appendix to the *Treatise*. In particular, I want to consider the following three issues: 1) the problem of whether or not the idea of the self and personal identity is a purely philosophical idea; 2) the role of resemblance and causation in creating the fiction of the identity of the self over time; 3) the nature of the dissatisfaction that Hume expresses in the Appendix to the Treatise with his explanation in T 1.4.6.

**Tito Magri:** **Responses**

### 4. Transcendental Freedom and Experience

In this symposium, we put forward four papers looking at transcendental freedom in, and after, Kant.

The symposium begins with an account of the development of transcendental freedom from the 1760s, where we learn more about the history of Kant’s idea that our freedom involves an *absolute* spontaneity.

We then turn to two papers, which both consider how we might discover transcendental freedom in experience. These papers engage with a recent suggestion from Palatnik (2022), that we can have practical cognition of others’ freedom. Both papers argue that her suggestion does not quite work. The second paper proposes a solution, drawing upon Kant's treatment of reflective judgment and organisms in the third *Critique*. The third paper is less optimistic, and makes the case that we cannot know transcendental freedom in experience, and that this causes serious problems for Kant’s practical philosophy.

Finally, we turn to think about freedom after Kant. The last paper in the symposium explores the Kantian idea of rational self-determination in more detail. In particular, it considers the thought that nature itself might exhibit rational self-determination, and thinks through what this would mean for our freedom.

**Lucia Volonté, ‘Kant on Transcendental Freedom: An Analysis of the Notes on Metaphysics from 1760s’**

In this paper I examine Kant's early conception of transcendental freedom, focusing my analysis on the *Notes on Metaphysics* from the 1760s.

Seminal works have been devoted to the pre-critical notion of freedom. However, Kant scholars such as Düsing (1993, 2019), Klemme (2018a, 2018b), and Schönecker (2005) limit their investigation of pre-critical transcendental freedom to the Silent Decade and consider the *Pölitz Lectures on Metaphysics* (1775) as the main source.

Although the *Pölitz Lectures* provide a comprehensive and precise characterisation of transcendental freedom in terms of absolute spontaneity, they are not exhaustive for the development of the concept throughout the pre-critical period. I argue that the concept of transcendental freedom in the *Pölitz Lectures* represents the final stage of Kant's progressively deeper understanding of the relationship between freedom, free actions and their determining grounds.

After illustrating Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom during the Silent Decade, I trace the development of this concept by focusing on the *Notes on Metaphysics*. Especially his remarks on the metaphysical concepts of necessity and contingency show that Kant accounts for transcendental freedom as a third way of explaining the existence of things and actions: namely, according to inner intellectual grounds, which are necessary but contingent with respect to the natural series of causes.

Accordingly, transcendental freedom amounts to spontaneity: the capacity to act from an inner principle. In analogy to divine freedom, which is perfect spontaneity from intellectual motives, Kant characterises the freedom of finite rational subjects as the spontaneity of which one is conscious (R 4220) and the capacity for self-determination, i.e., to determine actively from oneself, according to intellectual grounds (R 4227).

Precisely on this account, Kant further develops his notion of transcendental freedom as absolute spontaneity: the “property of beings for whom the consciousness of a rule is the ground of their actions” (R 4904).

**Álvaro R. G. Barredo, ‘How to find a free being: reflective judgment and the sensible signs of freedom’**

Kant’s doctrine of the intelligible status of rational beings is, at the same time, the key to his overall theory and a source of puzzlement to readers ever since Kant’s time. If we owe our rational nature to a ground beyond possible experience, it seems that we can never attribute rationality, let alone a free will, to any of the beings we encounter in the world. In this paper, I revisit this problem and I argue that, while never explicitly addressed, Kant has the tools in his philosophy to give an account of how we can attribute freedom to phenomenal beings: reflective judgment, as presented in the third Critique, can bridge the gap between sensible and intelligible realms, insofar as it presents certain phenomena to us as requiring a supersensible ground for their possibility.

To begin with, I briefly go over the problem in question with Kant’s theory of freedom: freedom necessarily lies beyond possible experience, yet we can only ever hope to cognize appearances. Then, I consider some recent attempts at bypassing the issue by characterizing the attribution of a free will from a practical standpoint (McCarty, 2009; Palatnik, 2022), and conclude that the practical standpoint alone cannot suffice to judge any specific phenomenal being as exhibiting transcendental freedom. I go on to present an interpretation of Kant’s theory of teleological judgment, building on Breitenbach’s (2014) analysis of symbolization. When we judge organisms, I contend, Kant claims that we are committed to positing an intelligible ground that may account for their individual possibility as phenomena. Finally, I build an argument Kant could plausibly endorse through which we may judge certain organisms who exhibit ostensibly rational behaviour as being free in the transcendental sense.

**Joe Saunders, ‘Invisible Freedom: Epistemic and Practical Problems with Kant’s Theory of Freedom’**

 Transcendental idealism precludes knowledge of freedom in experience. In the face of this, through the fact of reason, Kant finds an ingenious way for us to have first-personal awareness of our own freedom. This allows each of us to know that we are free. However, the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism render transcendental freedom invisible in experience.

The invisibility of freedom threatens to generate practical problems for Kant. For our moral practices require us to treat free beings differently from non-free beings, to mitigate our judgements of responsibility when someone lacks freedom, and to morally educate potentially free beings, amongst other things. In this paper, I consider two recent attempts to avoid these problems, and argue that neither of them are wholly successful. In the end, I conclude that if freedom were invisible in experience, that would be a serious epistemic and practical problem.

I begin by looking at some recent work by Karl Schafer (2023), who provides a detailed account of how the fact of reason does afford us some important knowledge about things-in-themselves and freedom. I agree with him on this, but argue that this knowledge is not enough. For transcendental idealism leaves us with a serious asymmetry between the first and third personal knowledge of freedom.

I then move to consider a recent response from Nataliya Palatnik. Palatnik (2022) notes that the that the fact of reason already requires us to be able to recognise other free beings. She also contends that practical cognition affords us this knowledge. I am sympathetic to these post-Kantian ideas, but think that they are in serious tension with Kant’s own commitments concerning the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism.

**DAY 2, 11.00-13.00**

### 5. Logic & Science. SMRP sponsored session

The session showcases various intriguing issues in medieval logic as well as theory of science, arising in the Islamic and the Latin traditions.

**Peter Eardley, ‘Theology and the Parts of Logic in Later Medieval Philosophy’**

As is well known to students of the period, Thomas Aquinas argued that theology is a demonstrative science. Although it takes its premises from the mysteries (or ‘articles’) of faith—as opposed to relying on evident knowledge—theology can nonetheless generate the highest cognitive state of *scientia* with respect to its conclusions. How so? Although the principles on which theology is based derive from God’s revelation of himself and must therefore be taken on faith, they are nonetheless more certain than even the self-evident principles on which the other sciences are grounded, since the latter rely on natural human reason, which is fallible. The former, by contrast, rely on the *scientia* of God and the blessed, which cannot err. Theology is therefore a demonstrative science, albeit a subalternate one, which takes its principles from the conclusions of a higher science.

 By the fourteenth century we find theologians challenging this account, perhaps the most famous of whom was William of Ockham. Although it is possible that God could infuse evident knowledge of the truths of theology into certain individuals, in the ordinary course of affairs this does not happen. For ordinary mortals, theology has to do with truths that are taken on faith as opposed to grasped with evidence. For a discipline to count as a demonstrative science both its principles and its conclusions must be evidently known, which, according to Ockham, is not the case with theology. Perhaps as practiced by God and the Blessed—who presumably have evident knowledge of such supernatural truths as the Incarnation—theology is a demonstrative science. For us, however, it is not.

 What happened in the period between Aquinas and Ockham to cause such skepticism about the status of theology as a science? My paper will argue that the reintroduction of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* into the Latin West in the mid-thirteenth century played a crucial role. I will suggest that it was Aquinas’s pupil Giles of Rome (1247-1316) who noticed that if the cognitive habit that forms the basis of theological reasoning is faith—which involves assent to a proposition at the command of the will—then the part of logic most closely associated with theology is rhetoric, which also relies on voluntary assent, rather than demonstration, which relies on evident knowledge. The pressing question for theologians like Ockham thereafter became how to preserve the dignity and supremacy of theology in relation to other disciplines now that theology could no longer be considered a demonstrative science, and therefore apparently lower on the traditional hierarchy of the Aristotelian parts of logic than disciplines such as metaphysics.

**Pree Jareonsettasin, ‘How to decompose an essence: Kilwardbian genus-differentia definition in context’**

Many medieval Aristotelians were engaged in the essentialist project of reducing modal, classificatory, and scientific truths to true claims about the essence of objects. The success of this project requires a precise account of what one is committed to in making these essence-claims. Many also treated the attribution of a genus-differentia definition (GDD) to an object as a paradigmatic type of essence-claim. What is the scope of GDD? When is a GDD true? In this paper, I examine Robert Kilwardby's answers to these questions in the context of his metaphysics and semantics. Though Kilwardby defends the traditional position that only substances have a definition, he seemingly inconsistently applies GDD to characterise the essences of many non-substantial objects, including the syllogism. I vindicate Kilwardby's consistent and broad employment of GDD by showing that and how successful GDD-attribution reveals the metaphysical constitution of the object defined. Kilwardby argues that by considering non-substantial objects, e.g. triangle, *apart* from their modifying a substance, we may consider them to have essences and essential forms. I then show how successful GDD signifies the constitution and ordering of these forms within any object's complete essential form. I illustrate Kilwardby's analysis by showing how he understands the GDD-attribution: 'man is a rational sensible mortal body'. I thus advance our understanding of how a foundational component of the medieval essentialist project works.

**Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, ‘Dashtakī's Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Synthesis of the Earlier Solutions Proposed by Ṭūsī and Samarqandī’**

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages.

### 6. Anscombe vs Austin. SSHAP sponsored session

The personal antagonism between Austin and Anscombe are well-known. There are also explicit philosophical antagonisms, stemming in part at least from Anscombe’s readings of Wittgenstein. This symposium explores these explicit philosophical oppositions, as well as possible tacit, unarticulated agreements on language and our life with it, the ordinary, assertions and performatives.

**Sofia Miguens, “‘I will show you things we humans do”—Where Anscombe and Austin diverge’**

Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachael Wiseman (2022) report that Anscombe once exclaimed, in outrage, of Austin, ‘To think that Wittgenstein fathered that bastard!’. It is not clear what she meant. Wittgenstein did not father Austin: Austin was responding to an Oxford tradition that simply did not go through Wittgenstein (Kalderon and Travis 2013). But what could possibly annoy Anscombe so much? What is so different about Wittgenstein, that she herself tries to pursue, and cannot be found in Austin? After all, the touchstone of both Wittgenstein and Austin’s philosophies is what we humans do, and how that relates to ordinary language. Here I try to gather elements that explain what could annoy Anscombe so much. I use examples from Austin’s and Anscombe’s respective ways of opposing sense data theorists, their exchange on pretending, and their descriptions of action. I try to bring out what Anscombe saw as Austin’s forgetting of life within our ‘life with language’. Her annoyance arose at least partly from how such forgetting, which she thought permeated his deflationary stance as well as his opposition to metaphysics.

**Jean-Phillippe Narboux, ‘Assertions and Performatives: Anscombe vs. Austin’**

In a typescript from the early seventies, Anscombe issues the following diagnosis about Austin's generalization of the notion of a speech act beyond the sphere of so-called 'performative utterances': ' "I promise" was usefully labelled a performative by J.L. Austin. Subsequently, attempts were made by him and others to extend this insight far beyond the limits within which it can be made clear and is useful.' (Anscombe, "Belief and Thought", in Logic, Truth, and Meaning, p.170) In Anscombe's view, Austin spoils his own insight insofar as he ends up erasing the contrast between assertions and performative utterances. In this paper, I propose to unpack and assess Anscombe's criticism of Austin in "Belief and Thought"' in light of its grounds and implications.

**David Zapero, ‘A Difference of Form’**

According to Intention, ‘there is a difference of form between reasoning leading to action and reasoning for the truth of a conclusion’. The difference is one between two kinds of reasoning. How does it bear on the notion of reason? Does the (supposed) existence of such a difference mean that there is a capacity (reason) that can be deployed in two different ways? Or that there are two distinct capacities? These are the questions to be raised, and partly answered, in the talk. The treatment will draw on some remarks of Austin’s in ‘A Plea for Excuses’.

**Eylem Özaltun, ‘Two ways of taking the ordinary seriously’**

It is reported that Anscombe and Austin disliked each other and rarely (“Pretending” 1958) engaged directly with each other’s work. Their philosophical agreements and disagreements are not worked out in their own writings explicitly. A comparative analysis of their work is left to us. In this presentation I aim to compare their views on knowledge and action, and their methods of investigation. I aim to explore how their respective methods of investigation shape the content of their work. For this comparison I will focus on “Other Minds” (1946), “A Plea of Excuses” (1956), and Intention (1957). I will bring out the similarities between Austin’s views on perceptual knowledge in “Other Minds” and Anscombe’s views on practical knowledge of what one is doing in Intention. I will show that not only the views, but the methods employed to arrive at these views are similar in taking seriously the ordinary demands for account and justification in everyday dealings and the language employed in voicing and addressing such demands. Then I will show that Austin’s method evolves considerably between “Other Minds” and “A Plea of Excuses” and the emerging method is at odds with Anscombe’s. I will argue that the methodological difference is also reflected in the differences of their views on action.

### 7. Neglected Early Modern Minds: Cordemoy, Cavendish & Baxter

**Tobias Sanoval, ‘Going through the motions: Memory and Remembrance in Cavendish’**

Margaret Cavendish’s conception of memory has been fairly neglected in the recent increase of historical writings on her natural philosophy. In this paper, I taxonomize various notions of memory within her system, focusing primarily on what appears to be a crucial distinction between what she calls ‘memory’ and what she calls ‘remembrance.’ Writers who have briefly mentioned memory in Cavendish, notably Michaelian (2009) and Lascano (2021), conflate memory and remembrance into a single unified capacity that permeates into all things. However, separating these two notions, I will argue, better sheds light on Cavendish’s view of mental categories and her overall metaphysical picture.

Cavendish’s vitalist materialism maintains that nature consists solely in an infinitely expansive corporeal matter. Additionally, all matter has powers of self-motion, self-knowledge, and perception, even if we cannot understand how rocks perceive. Recent research has shown that although Cavendish ascribes these powers to all things, we have no reason to suppose different things manifest them similarly. Perception in animals, for instance, occurs via what she calls ‘patterning,’ which Peterman (forthcoming) has argued is Cavendish’s attempt to propose a fully material and naturalized account of mental representation. But Cavendish is clear that patterning is only one kind of perception that exists in nature, meaning that while we should see animal perception as representational, we should see non-animal perception as much less robust. Georgescu (2021) makes a similar move regarding Cavendish’s conception of self-knowledge. These sentiments, I believe, can be extended to her distinction between memory and remembrance: contra the previous accounts, we have no sufficient reason to blend animal and non-animal memory and remembrance into a single shared capacity.

I begin by supporting the lexical point that, for Cavendish, ‘memory’ and ‘remembrance’ refer to two different actions that natural things may perform. I then argue that, in animals, remembrance takes two forms. The first refers to the recollecting of past objects and experiences that were initially perceived and “stored” through the process she calls “memory.” The second kind of animal remembrance refers to the repetition of actions done by the animal’s parts via some natural tendency, e.g., the heart pumping blood. Non-animals, on the other hand, only have the latter form of remembrance, e.g., a plant photosynthesizing. And the fact that some remembrances do not require memory displays why these two action types should remain distinct for Cavendish. In separating these capacities, we gain a clearer understanding of the various abilities she attributes to aspects of nature and, thus, nature as a whole. Further, these conclusions offer extra support for Peterman’s and Georgescu’s general claim that Cavendish, when ascribing powers to nature, does

not ascribe them similarly to different kinds of things.

**Anna Ortín Nadal, ‘Cordemoy and the Cartesian analogy between language and perception’**

Cordemoy’s Cartesianism ranges from strict observance (as in his adherence to substance dualism and mechanism) to surprising unorthodoxy (as in his defence of atomism as a logical consequence of the Cartesian conception of material substance), and it has also room for a rich development of theories deriving from Descartes’ principles. The expansiveness of Cordemoy’s Cartesianism is particularly clear in A Physical Discourse on Speech, where, starting from Descartes’ claims in Part V of the Discourse on the Method, he provides a comprehensive analysis of language that includes a study of its physiological conditions and arguments for its status as the differentiating mark of the human mind. There, Cordemoy introduces an analogy between language and perception (DPP 21-3) that has received very minimal attention. The objective of this paper is to show the relevance of this analogy in three related points. (1) First, just like Descartes had done in the Treatise on Light, Cordemoy employs the language analogy not only to reinforce dualism, but also to introduce an important point regarding the difference

between our sensory ideas and their physical causes. Namely, that if the words we have created, being conventional and entirely different from the things they signify, are able to regularly induce the mind to form the appropriate ideas, the ‘Author of Nature’ should be all the more capable of having instituted a relation of signification between physical and mental states. This reading will show that the typically Cartesian focus on dissimilarity (instead of substance heterogeneity) is key for a more nuanced understanding of Cordemoy’s motivations for body-mind occasionalism. (2) Second, Cordemoy states that this linguistic understanding of perception, of which the use of words is an aspect, reveals the ‘secret of the union’ of mind and body (DPP 22). The passage looks enigmatic but, in parallel with Descartes’ associations between language and perception, it reveals a common theme in both authors. Namely, that a relation of signification is the most successful strategy for explaining substance interaction with a genuine causal agent: the mind, for Descartes, and both God and the mind for Cordemoy. (3) Third, more generally, an examination of Cordemoy’s use of the language analogy reveals an unmapped aspect of his Cartesianism that, in turn, strengthens the importance of language for Descartes’ own interactionism. Descartes’ views on language are sometimes omitted from systematic reconstructions of his project, and the language analogy is often dismissed as a figure of speech. However, in Cartesians like Cordemoy (and in Arnauld and Nicole’s Logic), we see that there was a concrete conception of Descartes’ linguistics that also connected with the explanation of body-to-mind interaction (i.e., sensory perception). All in all, this paper offers a careful assessment of the role and metaphysical import of the language analogy in Cordemoy’s Discourse. It proposes a textually supported reading that links Descartes and Cordemoy in a way that is novel and informed by the intellectual context.

**David Bartha, ‘Baxter on Dreams, Imagination, and Common Sense’**

Despite recent efforts to expand the canon of early modern philosophy, the philosophical contributions of Andrew Baxter (1686/1687–1750) are still generally overlooked in the scholarship. Baxter’s sustained and influential criticism of Berkeley, his metaphysical views concerning the inertia of matter were only rarely—and often very briefly—discussed in the literature (and most notably by Bracken and Yolton many decades ago). But it is perhaps more surprising, especially in light of Coleridge’s high praise, that his unique and elaborate thoughts on dreams have received even less attention. In a more than 200-page essay, examining various conceptions and reports of dreams, he concludes that all our dreams are produced by external spirits. In this paper, I aim to do three things.

First, I analyse his conception of dreams, and clarify the structure and force of his argument concerning their origin. Understanding how his argument works by eliminating the alternative hypotheses and what background principles it is relying on (for instance, concerning simplicity as a theoretical virtue, the nature of causation or the impossibility of unconscious mental activity) might render his puzzling conclusion a little bit more digestible. I also note how rich his phenomenology of dreams is, emphasizing features such as the passivity, creativity and strange familiarity of our dreams. His account is also significant in terms of clearly demarcating dreaming from imagination. As such, he not only proposes a more fine-grained faculty psychology than many of his predecessors. But Baxter’s straightforward contrast between imagination and dreaming also exposes some philosophical problems concealed by conflating them. For instance, it makes it really conspicuous that Berkeley faces (but does not address) a problem when trying to squeeze the apparently passive dreams into his distinction between the reality of (passive) sense perceptions and the unreality of (active) imagination.

Second, I raise and address a tension in Baxter’s own account with regard to the dream argument employed by sceptical authors. On the one hand, he is committed to the subjective indistinguishability of dreams and waking perceptions (at least, while we are experiencing them) just as, if not more than, any of his predecessors. On the other, he thinks no sceptical consequences should follow from this. I aim to explain how Baxter, invoking semantic externalism, argues that *global* scepticism is self-defeating while not denying that, *locally*, dreams might appear just as real as our waking experiences.

Third, I aim to clarify how his regular appeals to the “plainest common sense of people” squares with his rather counterintuitive conclusion regarding the origins of our dreams. The first move is to appreciate his distinction between common sense principles and prejudices (often propagated by philosophers). Moreover, even if not obvious to everyone as such, his conclusion is meant to respect common sense principles, including our trust in the evidence of our consciousness, and our standard reason to believe in the existence of other minds. As he claims, if one rejects his conclusion regarding dreams, one cannot consistently dismiss the most anti-common-sense view ever, solipsism.

### 8. Science vs Philosophy

**Alessandro Taverniti, ‘Before and After Cousin. From the Construction of a Historiographical Model to the Rising of a New Image of Philosophy in Nineteenth-Century France’**

In the paper I ’m proposing, I would like to focus on a consolidated historiographical model regarding nineteenth century French philosophy, and on the role it played in the rising of a new image of philosophy. The division of the century into two halves, before and after Cousin, is made through the criticism of Cousin's spiritualist eclecticism. In turn, the main criticisms addressed to eclecticism became the pivotal points around which to build a new image of philosophy for the second half of nineteenth century France.

The body of texts in which we witness the construction of this historiographical model, as well as the elaboration of the first thought programs for a new philosophy, consists of the reports and reviews on French philosophy published immediately after Cousin's death in 1867 If Ravaisson's *La philosophie en France au XIXème siècle* is the one that most influenced the future di rection of French university philosophy, the importance of Taine's *Les philosophes classiques du XIXe siècle en France* and Renouvier's *De la philosophie en France au XIXe siècle* should not be forgotten

In the first part of my paper, I will focus on the main criticisms addressed to Cousin's spiritualist eclecticism. Firstly, eclecticism would lack originality and creativity. Secondly, Cousin is reproached for the abstraction of his dialectical procedure. Then, one of the biggest accusations against eclecticism is its total disregard for scientific knowledge. These criticisms of Cousin converge in the consideration of eclecticism as a rhetorical discourse. To consider eclecticism as pure rhetoric, useful at best to entertain the varied audience of the Sorbonne, is to deprive it of any philosophical character. Cousin's eclecticism would therefore not be true philosophy.

In the second part of my paper, I will consider the fortune of these criticisms of Cousin and the historiographical image they imply. The conception of a nineteenth century split in two, in which the first half of the century would be lacking in philosophy, is passed on and spread through the reports and reviews of French philosophy published in the following years. This section will consider texts by Theodule Ribot, Émile Boutroux and Henri Bergson.

 In the third part of my paper, I will focus on the role that these criticisms of Cousin's eclecticism played in the positive elaboration of a new image of French philosophy. If eclecticism lacked originality, French philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century developed under the banner of creativity. The abstract dialectic of absolute ideas of reason is replaced by philosophies that consider the concrete aspects of reality, both physical and psychological. Finally, while Cousin's spiritualist eclecticism did not take scientific knowledge into account, later thought programmes make the collaboration between philosophy and sciences one of the fundamental aspects of the new image of thought that is being shaped.

**Filip Adolf A. Buyse, ‘B. Spinoza and J.P. Müller: The Dutch Philosopher and the German Physiologist’**

It is hard to believe that, in recent publications, nobody has systematically examined why “the father of contemporary physiology” quotes so explicitly from Spinoza’s work and refers to it at different stages of his impressive career. This is even doubly remarkable, given the fact that during the last decades there has been so much interest in Spinoza’s philosophy among contemporary biologists (Antonio Damasio , Henri Atlan and Jean Pierre Changeux included) who argue convincingly that the Dutch philosopher (1632-1677) anticipated modern biological thinking. Likewise, it is amazing that Spinoza’s name is completely absent in all the important biographies of Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858).

This paper aims at filling in this striking gap by investigating the link between Spinoza’s sensory philosophy and Johannes Peter Müller’s sensory physiology. The idea that philosophy in general (and Spinoza’s views in particular) did only play a significant role in an early stage of Müller’s career will be contested. In the first section, it investigates where and when J.P. Müller mentions Spinoza. In the next section, it tries to find out - based on an examination of his early work Uber die phantastischen Gesichtserscheinungen (1826) as well as his magnum opus - Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1837 & 1840) - why the charismatic professor at the University of Berlin applies the ideas of the Dutch philosopher rather than those of other influential early modern philosophers.

Several reasons will be explored. First, there is the historical reason. The young J.P. Müller argued that he needed a philosophy to ground his new physiology. Obviously, Spinoza’s philosophy was a plausible candidate given that Spinozism was very influential at the University of Bonn. Second, there is an ontological reason. J.P. Müller wanted psychology to be integrated into his physiology. Spinoza‘s philosophy allowed him to bridge the gap between the mental and the physical since, in Spinoza’s view, mind and body were one and the same thing conceived from different attributes. Third, there is Spinoza’s theory of affects. It will be shown that Müller was directly influenced by Spinoza’s theory of affections in his well-known Law of specific Nerve Energies and in his innovative theory of hallucinations and religious apparitions. Fourth, J.P. Müller mentions Spinoza in the context of his view on animals having emotions. And fifth, J.P. Müller refers to Spinoza’s philosophy in the context of his discussion of the methodology that should be applied in his new physiology and science in general.

 Müller’s main work Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1837 & 1840) was in 1845 translated into French, and between 1838 and 1842 into English, so that his ideas spread out rapidly in Western Europe. Consequently, this paper will help not only to clarify the relationship between the influential Copley-medal winner and Spinoza, but also that between Spinoza and the myriad physiologists who were subsequently indirectly inspired by his work, and their students such as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). In sum, it demonstrates how Spinoza’s philosophy played a significant role in the history and philosophy of science.

**Peter West, ‘Philosophy is not a science: Margaret Macdonald on the nature of philosophical inquiry’**

Although there are signs of a growing interest in the work of Margaret Macdonald (1903-1956) (e.g., Kramer 2021, Vlasits 2021, Whiting 2022), she remains a somewhat peripheral figure in the history of analytic philosophy. Yet, there is a case to be made for thinking that she was in fact one of the central figures in the development of the analytic tradition in Britain. Along with Susan Stebbing (her PhD supervisor) and Gilbert Ryle, Macdonald founded the journal Analysis, which she edited from 1948 to 1956. Along with Alice Ambrose (a fellow student), she was also responsible for the publication of Wittgenstein’s Blue and Yellow (or Brown) Books.

What might the story of the origins and development of analytic philosophy look like if Macdonald were rightly recognised as one of its main characters (alongside the likes of Russell and Moore)? An analysis of Macdonald’s writings on philosophical method suggest that the answer is: Very different. In her 1953 paper, ‘Linguistic Philosophy and Perception’, Macdonald uses the case study of (analytic) philosophical debates about perception to demonstrate that the kinds of hypotheses defended by philosophers are quite different from those of scientists and mathematicians. While a mathematical hypothesis ought to be trivially (i.e., analytically) true, a scientific hypothesis, according to Macdonald, is the kind of proposition that can be verified or falsified by experiment. But crucially philosophical hypotheses, Macdonald argues, do not fall into either of these camps. It is not possible to carry out an ‘experimentum crucis’ to verify or falsify the claims of various philosophers of perception. For that reason, philosophical hypotheses are neither scientific nor mathematical.

What’s more, Macdonald claimed that philosophers engaged in a particular debate (e.g., the philosophy of perception) do not actually disagree about the phenomena (e.g., all parties agree that there are veridical and illusory experiences), they simply disagree on how best to articulate those phenomena. On that basis, Macdonald arrives at the surprising conclusion—surprising, that is, for those well-versed in typical narratives about the aims and method of analytic philosophy—that philosophy is much more like an art than it is a science. In her own words, “Philosophical theories are much more like good stories than scientific explanations.” And philosophical disagreements, according to Macdonald, really boil down to different ways of articulating phenomena, or what Macdonald calls different “emotional attitudes.”

In this paper, I will argue that an analysis of Macdonald’s metaphilosophy reveals that at least one figure at the forefront of the ‘analytic’ movement did not accept the image of analytic philosophy as something akin to a science. Furthermore, I conclude that revisiting Macdonald’s views on philosophical inquiry, and undoing the neglect of her work, might open up new approaches to the question of what philosophy is – and what it could be.

**DAY 2, 14.00-15.30**

### 9. Metaphysics & Epistemology: SMRP sponsored session

This session deals with some of the most basic metaphysical and epistemological issues of the medieval period: The temporality of creation, the problem of universals, and representationalism.

**Zita V. Toth, ‘Creation and causal powers in the Early Scholastic tradition’**

It was taken for granted for much of the medieval period that God created the world. But did that creation happen in time, or is this claim reconcilable with the possibility that the world is eternal? Moreover, if God did create the world, does God also conserve it in existence? How should we conceive of this conserving activity? These hosts of issues were especially problematic for the early Scholastics since as some of them recognised, Aristotle had thought to prove that the world is eternal. How can Aristotle's arguments be reconciled with theological doctrine? While the later thirteenth-century story of the debate about the eternity of the world is relatively well known, its early scholastic background has not yet been sufficiently explored. In this paper, I present some forerunners to the later medieval discussions, by examining the views of Alexander of Hales, Roland of Cremona, and Philip the Chancellor

**Erman Kar, ‘Evaluation of the Problem of Universals in the Medieval Age with Aristotelian Realism’**

The question of whether universals have an exact reality is one of the most important problems in the history of Medieval Philosophy. During the Middle Ages, this problem was analysed by the ecoles. *Realism* defines that universals are entities that precede physical bodies, i.e. particular entities, and they transcend them. *Nominalist* doctrine, on the other hand, claims that universal concepts consist of words or sounds expressing the commonality and similarity of particulars. The approach that creates a new alternative to both opposing views and brings an important analysis of the status of universals in Scholastic doctrine is called *Aristotelian realism.* According to this approach, universals co-exist with particulars and universals are immanent in them. Moreover, universals cannot have a separate and transcendent existence, as Platonic rigid realism claims, their existence depends on particular entities and their definition through them. According to Platonic Realism, there are universals and they have a structure that is ontologically separate and independent from the singular physical bodies.

For this reason, examining and solving the problem of universals also requires the examination of Aristotelian and Platonic existence-knowledge teachings. The aim of this study is to examine the foundations of the philosophers' questioning about the nature of universals through Aristotelian realism. Firstly, the question of what is the universal, which is the object of reason, and whether universal concepts have objective realities will be analyzed through the conceptual terminology of the problem of universals. Secondly, the emerging ecoles on the problem of universals in medieval thought; realism, Aristotelian realism and nominalism will be discussed. Finally, the approaches of medieval philosophers to the question of whether universals have an exact existence will be examined in the perspective of Aristotelian realism, and in this context, the effects of Aristotelian teaching on medieval philosophy will be evaluated.

**Peter John Hartman, ‘Varieties of Anti-representationalism in the High Latin Middle Ages’**

According to most contemporary philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists, representations are an essential part of our thoughts about the world, although there is a great deal of debate as to the nature of such representations. However, a minority position rejects such representationalism, although, again, there is a debate about what exactly we should replace it with. On some views, for instance, thought about the external world is direct: I am directly acquainted with chipmunks and the weather such that I do not need a representation to think about chipmunks and the weather. On other views, thought is a matter of skilful coping: thinking about chipmunks is skilfully coping with a world in which there are chipmunks in the vicinity, and skilful coping does not require representations.

As today, so too during the High Latin Middle Ages (1250–1350). While the dominant view, and the one most often discussed in the secondary literature, is representationalism in one form or another, there were also a surprisingly large number of anti-representationalist alternatives being explored. In the first part of my talk, I will distinguish various forms of medieval representationalism — from the conformality theory of representation defended by Aquinas, Scotus, and others, to the causal theory of representation defended by Ockham and others. In the second part of the paper, I turn to various forms of anti-representationalism, distinguishing two main forms: the presence-theory of thought, whose primary proponent is Durand of St.-Pourçain, according to which thought is a matter of direct acquaintance, and the skills-first theory of thought, according to which thinking about the world is a matter of skilful embodied engagement with the world in such a way that representations, as traditionally defined, do not play an essential role. This view emerges in the works of Prosper de Reggio Emilia and certain anonymous authors, although it is not clear if anyone conclusively endorsed it. I close with some reflections on the prospects and pitfalls of this last view.

### 10. Women & Logic in the C20th

Not only do women often face barriers to entry into the field of logic, whether mathematical or philosophical, in the present day, they are often excluded or erased from the study of the history of logic. This proposal aligns with the aim of the BSHP to solicit papers and symposia on "currently under-represented philosophical traditions, periods and thinkers" by looking at contributions of women to the development of logic in the 20th century. Our three papers discuss three different women, but all contain the same red threads of the ways in which women have been excluded from the study of both logic and the history of logic, and what the importance is of recovering historical women logicians and the impact this can have on contemporary logic research and teaching.

**Teresa Kouri Kissell, ‘Susan Stebbing's Common Sense Approach to Critical Thinking’**

Stebbing was an impressive philosopher, who expressed a particular view about common sense and its role in critical thinking and logic that has not yet been fully developed in the literature. I start by providing four traits Stebbing implicitly uses in her writing on common sense in order to characterize the notion for her. For Stebbing, common sense was public, needed no justification, and commonsense beliefs served as the basic data for both science and metaphysics. Most importantly for our purposes here, common sense was context-sensitive in a particular way. Whether a statement is a commonsense belief depends on the purpose to which we are directing our thinking in that context. This notion of common sense is essential to Stebbing's preferred metaphysical method: directional analysis. Using the purpose-dependent nature of commonsense, we can see how we might use directional analysis to improve teaching in a critical thinking classroom.

Looking at Stebbing's work in *Thinking to some Purpose*, we can get a sense of how directional analysis could be useful for critical thinking, and how common sense was essential to the kind of critical thinking proposed. I will show how we might incorporate directional analysis, and its basis in commonsense beliefs, into the classroom, by providing an example of an assignment that can both meet many of the Student Learning Outcomes typically associated with a critical thinking class, and can make use of directional analysis.

**Giulia Felappi, ‘“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity”: Dorothy Wrinch on the all-important role of logic’**

In 1914, while attending Russell’s lectures at Trinity on *Our Knowledge of the External World* (Wrinch 1914), Dorothy Wrinch was introduced to the logical-analytic method and immediately made it her own. Since then, in all the rest of her career as a philosopher and also during her career as a scientist, Wrinch kept believing in the “all-important” role that Russell’s logic could play in our knowledge of the external world, so much so that Wrinch is usually considered as a “follower of Russell” (Grattan-Guinness 2000, 435), as “Russell’s ‘best’ apprentice in that she was the apprentice who most thoroughly embraced his philosophical program and practiced it throughout her intellectual contributions in mathematics, biochemistry, and philosophy. In short, her practice matched Russell’s creed.” (Elkind 2019, 36).

This should not be taken to mean that Wrinch blindly believed everything Russell maintained, though. Quite the contrary, in this paper we will see that while she full-heartedly endorsed the overarching Russellian project, in her letters to Russell, she in fact also criticised him on some crucial issues. In particular, we will look at a letter written in 1918 in which Wrinch discusses the relationship between logic, possibilities and impossibilities.

As Baldwin stressed, Russell “never provides a logical construction of possibilities … on this topic, regrettably, Russell left a fundamental gap in the execution of his ‘logical-analytic method of philosophy’.” (2017, 168) We will see how Wrinch attempted at starting to fill that fundamental gap, by urging that logic’s role is all-important also because it can provide us with some modal and structural truths about the constitution of the world, which also constitute indeed pieces of knowledge of the external world.

### 11. Common Notions, Universal Experience in C17th Natural Philosophy

A dominant narrative in the history of the philosophy of science is that the development of the scientific method during the seventeenth century led to the eventual exclusion of non-specialised understandings of the natural world. The establishment of formal scientific institutions (such as the Royal Society); shift from an Aristotelian to an experimentally-centred definition of ‘experience’; and development of formalised methods of experimental reporting—transformations recounted by, among others, Stephen Shapin (1994)—all seem to support the conclusion that science become less trusting as the century progressed. Our papers, which all contribute to the ongoing project NOTCOM (ERC AdG, 2023-2027, Maison Française d’Oxford) on the history of seventeenth-century scientific consensus, nuance this narrative. We do this by recovering the appeals to common notions and universal experience in the works of several philosophers of the period: some well-known (e.g. Francis Bacon), and others less known and still understudied (e.g. Sir Kenelm Digby, Thomas White, and John Sergeant). Each of our papers explores how these scholars argued strongly for the necessity of appealing to non-specialist knowledge and experiences of the natural world in their philosophies. By recovering how they argued from common experiences and notions, alongside the obstacles they faced in doing so, our panel enriches our current appreciation of the various ways in which seventeenth-century scientific agreement could be constructed. It will achieve these aims by investigating three specific themes.

First, each paper will examine how appeals to common notions and non-specialist experience in seventeenth-century philosophy were used to demonstrate the insufficiencies of previous philosophical methods, whilst demonstrating the novelty and reliability of new philosophical conclusions. For example, paper one ‘“A most plaine and easie conception wherein all mankind naturally agreeth”: Common Notions and the Role of Understanding in Sir Kenelm Digby and Thomas White’ examines how common notions (which Digby’s *Two Treatises* (1644) defined as those ‘which springeth immediately and primarily from the thing it selfe’, p. 5) were used by both men to criticise scholasticism as too disconnected from non-specialist understandings of the natural world—a fault which their natural philosophies rectified.

Second, each paper will discuss the various methods by which seventeenth-century philosophers theorised more inclusive models of philosophical and natural philosophical agreement. For example, paper two, ‘The Three Sources of Ordinary Experiences: A Baconian Legacy’, will discuss how Bacon deployed a typology of experience in order to promote a philosophical method which paid more attention to *historia naturae errantis* (‘vulgar’ and folkloric experience) to offer a novel, more rigorous method for determining which kinds of vulgar experiences could be philosophically supported and incorporated into robust and inclusive models of philosophical agreement.

Finally, the panel will investigate the obstacles to inclusivity and appeals to common notions in seventeenth-century philosophy. For example, paper three, ‘John Sergeant on Natural Notions and Common Heads’, investigates the difficulties Sergeant faced in using common linguistic usage as a criterion for universal notions, whilst simultaneously arguing that, on a metaphysical level, such notions are *guaranteed* to be true.

**Niall Dilucia, ‘“A most plaine and easie conception wherein all mankind naturally agreeth”: Common Notions and the Role of Understanding in Sir Kenelm Digby and Thomas White’**

Sir Kenelm Digby and Thomas White were seventeenth-century natural philosophers and allies who intensely disliked scholasticism, which they saw as too metaphysical and disconnected from common experiences of the natural world. Accordingly, they blended reformed Aristotelianism with corpuscularianism to build scientific agreement on everyday language. A central element of this strategy was their arguments from ‘common notions’—which Digby defined in his *Two Treatises* (1644, TT) as those ‘naturall and plaine notion[s], which springeth immediately and primarily from the thing it selfe’ (TT, 5). White in his *De mundo dialogi tres* (1642, DM) takes his definition of place *ex simplici…sensu generis humani* (DM, 43).

In this talk, I explore Digby and White’s use of common notions to achieve two things. First, I comparatively examine the distinctive ways in which both philosophers used common notions to divorce an intellectually unsatisfactory scholasticism from a salvageable Aristotelianism, verifiable through common experience. I therefore broaden our understanding of how far trust in the experiences of non-learned individuals played a role in new philosophical attempts to find fresh ways of generating scientific agreement.

Second, I examine the role that the faculty of ‘understanding’  played in this process. Digby suggests that the non-philosopher’s understanding is valuable, as it can reliably and independently convert sensory apprehension into common notions, which ‘hee findeth clearely in his understanding’ (TT, 6) without relying on imaginary concepts. White also castigates excessive reliance on imaginary concepts formulated in the philosopher’s understanding (cf. *An Exclusion,* 1665, 22). My talk will explore how far these philosophers believed that the non-philosopher’s faculty of understanding was more reliable than the philosopher’s in reasoning scientifically and founding scientific agreement.

**Louis Rouquayrol, ‘The Three Sources of Ordinary Experiences: A Baconian Legacy’**

It is trite to say that experience is part of building scientific consensus. But different sorts of experiences lead to different kinds of consensus. Bacon uses two criteria to classify experiences.

(1) The *Novum Organum* (aph.119) distinguishes experiences according to their quality: (a) *leves et vulgatae*, (b) *viles et illiberales*, and (c) *subtiles ac mere speculativae*. Bacon claims that the renewal of natural philosophy depends upon a general reconsideration of experiences (a).

(2) *The Advancement of Learning* distinguishes experiences following their sources: history ‘of nature in course, of nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought.’ Bacon acknowledges that the third one represents the best example of familiar and vulgar experience (a), while *historia naturae errantis* is only vulgar in the sense that it spreads ‘fables and popular errors’ and ‘history of nature in course’ in the sense that it already exists in books ‘in good perfection.’ Bacon at the same time stipulates that experiences, whatever their sources (arts, folktales, books) and quality, should not ‘be kept apart and separately treated’ (*Aphorism on the Composition of the Primary History*, §ii) and he shows a clear preference for *historia mechanica*.

In this talk, I discuss this Baconian typology of experiences, the kind of consensus each type of experience aims to achieve, and the relevance of this typology to understanding the emergence of a new concept of experience in early modern science. I intend to focus on a type of experience that will play an important role in Mersenne, Descartes, or Hobbes, *viz.*, ‘history of art… drawn… from a number of crafts and experiments which have not yet grown into an art properly so called, and which sometimes indeed turn up in the course of most ordinary experiences, and do not stand at all in need of art.’ (*ibid.*, §iv).

**Eric Sheng, ‘John Sergeant on Natural Notions and Common Heads’**

In the same circles as but a generation younger than White and Digby, John Sergeant (1622-1707) also makes appeal to universally shared notions, common sense and common linguistic use in philosophical argument. This paper starts with some examples of such appeals by Sergeant, before considering two main questions: How are such appeals supposed to have force given Sergeant’s epistemology? For Sergeant, a notion is the object of cognition as existing in the cognizer’s soul. The ‘metaphysical verity’ of notions, and the ‘formal verity’ of self-identity propositions involving them, are guaranteed, and are the ground of all science; Cartesians and corpuscularians err in building from mere suppositions. Corporeal notions, being effects of like causes (external objects) operating on like subjects (humans’ senses), are common to all humans. Thus, at least in corporeal matters, whether a putative notion is universally shared is a criterion that it’s indeed a notion. Moreover, since notions are the meanings of words, common linguistic use indicates what the universally shared notions are. Difficulties with the application of this theory to Sergeant’s practice in appealing to common language and notions, and with what Sergeant thinks about spiritual notions, are discussed.

What is the particular importance for Sergeant of the ten Aristotelian categories, for which—rather than for universally shared notions in general—he generally reserves the term ‘common notion’? According to Sergeant, every notion falls under one category or, as he says, ‘common head’. Under each common head, more general notions are divided into, and are more intrinsically knowable than, more specific notions, and there’s one most general notion, the common notion. Since the less intrinsically knowable is grounded in the more intrinsically knowable, Sergeant’s theory, while allowing many notions to be universally shared and metaphysically true, safeguards the explanatorily foundational status of the Aristotelian categories.

### 12. Identity, embodiment, and second nature in Cavendish, Spinoza, and Hegel

This panel brings together scholars working on how embodied motivating mental states – e.g., desires, affects, imaginations, religious faith – contribute to the person’s identity, on the one hand, and can be transformed through discourse or practice, on the other hand, in different figures of the history of philosophy. The panel aims to foster a creative discourse on how focusing on less studied aspects of the work of canonical authors of the history of philosophy can contribute to the revision of how these authors are represented in the canon.

The notion of second nature has been part and parcel of the philosophical tradition, at least since Aristotle. The term refers to socially constructed habits constituting an identity that either transforms or complements the subject’s identity defined by its biological species. Habits are embodied mental states and dispositions that can motivate action without the need for further rational deliberation. For example, the subject’s preference for eating carbohydrates can be seen as part of her evolutionarily shaped first nature. In contrast, her preference for eating hamburgers can be seen as part of her socially constructed second nature. Both of these mental states can motivate actions without further deliberation but do not necessarily bring about actions as a reflex movement. The subject can very well decide otherwise and commit herself to intermittent fasting.

If speech acts are considered as actions, the scope of second nature can cover most of the reasonings of the human subject. In the linguistic practice of a community, making utterances in a specific sequence can be met with quasi-instinctive approval, whereas in another community, with quasi-instinctive disapproval. If it is foundational for the subject’s identity that she takes herself to be rational – i.e., to accept only inferences that align with some norm – identity and second nature are closely aligned. The embodied mental states constituting second nature constitute a frame of mind that is itself not a belief and, therefore, not an obvious target for revision of belief. At the same time, this frame of mind is very much characteristic of who the subject takes herself to be. As motivating mental states and dispositions discriminating between desirable and undesirable, this frame of mind also has ethical significance.

For this reason, a central task of any critical philosophy is to reflectively highlight those mental states that constitute such a frame of mind and to critically assess whether accepting them contributes to human flourishing and social peace. Cavendish, Spinoza, and Hegel developed critical philosophies aiming to revise practices constituting oppressive second natures by developing discourses and practices empowering the subject to become active rather than being passively determined by her society. What are the limits of rational discourse in empowering the subject to revise her second nature, according to these authors? What are the means by which oppressive and empowering habits can be distinguished? Is it possible to rationally aim at revising second nature if it amounts to transforming one’s identity? These are the questions raised by the speakers of this panel.

**Luce de Lire, ‘We are all hermaphrodites! A Cavendishian intervention’**

In my paper, I argue that Margaret Cavendish was an early modern queer feminist materialist. We see what that amounts to if we examine her use of the term “hermaphrodite”.

To Cavendish, everything is matter and each thing is constituted by a pattern of auto-motion. First, I show that once several patterns mirror each other, they are being altered. Cavendish calls these altered things “Hermaphrodites”. But really, pretty much every particular Cavendishian thing mirrors other things. Thus, hermaphroditism is neither an exception, nor is it an external imposition. We are all hermaphrodites.

Yet the term “hermaphrodite” is itself an intervention aimed at changing the motivational pattern of Cavendish's readers. For the British Early Moderns used “Hermaphrodite” to describe, among others, LGBTQI people, but also women suspected of trans femininity due to their allegedly male lifestyle, such as women poets like Cavendish herself. Furthermore, the term is emotionally charged and couched in a distinctive paradigm of scientific visibility. Cavendish can thus expect an emotional reader-response from her readers. In Cavendishian terms, her readers’ auto-motion would change in a particular way. Cavendish's methodology is thus not only aimed at the truth, but at literally moving its readers. By turning everybody into a hermaphrodite, I argue, the text, in contemporary terms, aims to queer its readers: it equalizes them (materially!) with outsiders and the oppressed (here: LGBTQI people). In a way, Cavendish, by queering her readers, also inscribes her own materiality into that of her readers. I will illustrate this with passages from her novel “the blazing world”, bound in one book with her “observations on experimental philosophy”. Cavendish thus offers a genuinely queer, genuinely materialistic vision of philosophical writing: one that moves people in the right way. In this sense, I argue, Cavendish is really the mother of European queer feminist materialisms.

**Oliver Toth, ‘Turning passions into actions in Spinoza’s philosophy’**

One of the most infamous propositions of Spinoza’s Ethics is E5p3, which announces that the human mind can turn passions into actions by forming adequate ideas of them. An action is an effect of which the human mind is an adequate or complete cause, whereas a passion is an effect of which the human mind is an inadequate or partial cause. The gist of E5p3 is thus that the human mind can change its causal relation to an affect by understanding the affect. Spinoza’s claim in E5p3 is dismissed in the literature because it is impossible to retroactively change an effect’s causal history. Passions are like injuries: if an external cause has already brought about an idea in the human mind, it is impossible to change the causal history of the idea later (Bennett 1984, 336; LeBuffe 2012, 92; Lin 2009, 270).

This paper interprets Spinoza’s claim in E5p3 in the context of his conatus doctrine. According to E3p7, the conatus is the essence of the individual, which discriminates between what is beneficial and harmful for the individual. Inadequate ideas represent strivings alien to the subject because they do not promote the subject’s persevering in being. By contrast, adequate ideas represent the subject’s own striving because they promote its own persevering in being (Kisner 2011; Lin 2019). A passion is thus a mismatch between what one takes to be beneficial and what one has done. Since what one has done is done, the only way to turn the passion into action is by changing what one takes to be beneficial, i.e., good (Renz 2022). This amounts, however, to a transformative experience (Paul 2016) or conversion (Boros 2017; Carlisle 2021) since it entails changing the direction of one’s conatus and, thereby, one’s socially constructed identity (Zourabichvili 2023).

**Martina Barnaba, ‘Humans and their Embodiment: Hegel’s *Habitus* between First and Second Nature’**

This contribution aims to investigate an important element of Hegel’s second nature theory, that is the concept of *habitus* in its constitution and problems. Second nature, according to Hegel, is that sphere of rational, social, and even political relations in which humans emancipate themselves from the biological necessity of the organic first nature, remolding at the same time that very same naturality. At the center of this development, we find the *habitus*, which is the result of the *Bildungsprozess* that elevates humanity from mere animality by turning natural sensations and immediate feelings into practices. The *habitus* presents itself both in the subjective Spirit, in which we observe how humans develop in their individual postures and attitudes, and in the objective Spirit, where the habits objectify themselves in social practices of recognitive interactions and second nature becomes the social structure that provides us with customs and ethical behavior. In this sense, the embodiment of habits confers humans a “destiny” which is again not merely biological but also spiritual, and therefore free, rational, and mediated.

Regardless of the clear constructivist element that is at work in the shift into second nature, Hegel, however, still considers first nature as a point of departure for our individual and collective development. Moreover, first-natural features like automatism and unconscious repetition resurface at the level of second-natural habits when the latter crystallize themselves in mechanical acts and social impositions: “habit makes human a slave”. This apparent contradiction can be comprehended and perhaps solved by invoking Hegel’s rational critique, that is, humans’ capacity of rational discourse, which allows them to abstract from habitual practices and social customs to acknowledge them for what they are and finally criticize them.

**DAY 2, 16.00-17.30**

### 13. Powers: SMRP sponsored session

The concept of a causal power is central to Latin medieval Aristotelianism. Medieval thinkers employ it to understand causal interactions in the natural world, arguing that change generally involves the mutual manifestation of an active and a passive power. They also draw on the concept of a causal power in their accounts of material objects, which they view as composites of matter and substantial form. Thus, they describe matter as a power or potency to receive substantial form, and they take a substantial form to bestow upon the hylomorphic composite a number of powers to engage in acts characteristic of the composite’s natural kind.

**José Filipe Silva, ‘Active potency of matter ca. 1240-1280’**

Among the many questions that intrigued late medieval natural philosophers were those related to the nature of matter and its relationship with potentiality. In particular, authors from this period inquired about whether matter is pure potentiality or has in itself a certain degree of actuality, and what is the nature of that (active) potentiality: privation of form, aptitude to receive a form, or inclination to be perfected by a form? In this paper, I attempt a taxonomy of the active potency of matter found in early commentaries on the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle written at Oxford in ca. 1240-1280.

**Can Laurens Löwe, ‘Albert the Great on the Soul as Operation’**

It is well known that Albert the Great takes the soul’s powers to be distinct from the soul itself. But how did Albert think of the soul if it is not a power? He adopts the Aristotelian view that it is an actuality of the body. However, he interprets this view in profoundly un-Aristotelian terms. Rather than describing the soul as a first actuality comparable to sleeping and the possession of knowledge, as Aristotle did, Albert thinks of it as a second actuality comparable to waking or the exercise of knowledge. As he writes in *Summa theologiae* I, tr. 3, q. 15, the soul is an actuality in the sense of “an essential operation . . . which is life.” He adds that through this operation “the soul unceasingly busies itself with the body, and so it is said to be an act like being awake.” In short, the soul is a kind of activity for Albert. The first goal of this paper is to examine the nature of this activity, which I will link with Albert’s theory of vital spirits. The second goal is to show that this account of the soul requires Albert to view the soul as a power after all, namely, as a power to vivify the organism. But, I argue, this power is unlike ordinary powers of the soul such as sight or the intellect. For while these powers are actualized episodically, the power to vivify is perpetually actualized throughout an animate being’s life.

**André Martin, ‘The Activity of the Soul and the Causality of its Objects: Gonsalvus of Spain and the Influence of Peter John Olivi**

Peter John Olivi is oft characterized as having a particularly radical view concerning the activity of the soul in cognition/appetite. The soul’s cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes from which even their most basic acts are produced; in contrast, external corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any direct effect on these “higher” powers. Olivi’s view can appear to be untenable, either leaving external objects completely outside of psychological explanation or requiring some novel type of cause outside of the typical medieval-Aristotelian causal framework. However, in this paper, I seek to alleviate this concern by considering Olivi’s response that the object can still be considered a “broadly efficient cause.” In particular, I look at how this same view is endorsed by Gonsalvus of Spain, one of Olivi’s students. I argue that Gonsalvus takes a more diplomatic approach, despite endorsing essentially the same view, showing that their shared active view of cognition/appetite can safely fit into a wider medieval-Aristotelian causal framework with some further explanation. As I explain at the end of this paper, this interpretation of Olivi, alongside Gonsalvus, helps put later active views of cognition/appetite (e.g., from John Duns Scotus), and their own qualifications, into a more complete context.

### 14. ‘Common Sense’ arguments against anti-realism

**Emily Thomas, ‘G. E. Moore’s Common Sense Time Realist, Presentism, and A Theory’**

This paper explores the development of early analytic philosopher G. E. Moore’s realism about time, focusing on his 1910-1911 lectures, later published as *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. It offers a new, three-part reading of Moore: he marshals Common Sense to advance new arguments for time realism; he offers the earliest sustained defence of presentism in the history of English-language philosophy; and, just as Bertrand Russell is known as the ‘father’ of B-theory, Moore should be known as the ‘father’ of A-theory. I have discovered a 1909 archival letter showing that J. M. E. McTaggart took Moore to be an A theorist.

The paper is structured as followed. Following introductory material, §2 digs into *Main Problems.* I argue that its Common Sense time realism is packaged with presentism and A-theory: Moore is explicit that past, present, and future are integral to time, and only present things exist. §3 argues that Henry Sidgwick’s 1905 posthumous *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant* was a major source of Moore’s newfound views. I show there are deep similarities between the realisms of Sidgwick and Moore on time, in their conclusions and in their lines of argument. Moore was closely familiar with Sidgwick’s 1905 *Lectures*, for he reviewed the book in 1906, discussing its pertinent arguments. Sidgwick also hints at presentism and A theory, perhaps borrowing from Hermann Lotze.

§4 investigates the legacy of Moore’s views on time. §4.1 argues that Moore bundled the rejection of anti-realism about time with the rejection of British idealism, setting the stage for vociferous 1900s idealist-realist battles over time.

§4.2 argues for the importance of Moore’s place in the history of presentism and A-theory. Although English-language philosophers prior to Moore have occasionally defended these positions, their remarks are always extremely scanty; in contrast, Moore argues for a detailed, explicit position.

§4.3 considers Moore’s influence over subsequent debates. With regard to B-theory, I argue that Russell’s 1915 paper “The Experience of Time” was partly a response to Moore. Russell read the then-unpublished typescript of Moore’s *Main Problems* in 1911, two years before he drafted this paper. With regard to A-theory, I show that Moore’s characterisation of A theory and presentism as ‘commonsensical’ remain current today, and may have descended from him. For example, Iris Murdoch’s 1970 *Sovereignty of Good* popularised Moore’s Common Sense time realism as follows: ‘McTaggart says that time is unreal. Moore replies that he has just had his breakfast.’ Moore’s contributions to the philosophy of time warrant recognition.

 **Andreas Vrahimis, ‘Stebbing’s critique of anti-realism’**

Within the recent revival of interest in Susan Stebbing’s work, she has been commonly interpreted as a representative of the Cambridge analysts defending a Moorean conception of directional analysis. Nonetheless, Janssen-Lauret (2022) has challenged this hypothesis by examining a series of papers from the 1920s which demonstrate that Stebbing should also be credited with developing a variety of original positions in the philosophy of science. Janssen-Lauret characterises Stebbing’s overall outlook as a defence of a form of (non-naïve) realism. This paper will trace the development of Stebbing’s realism in her critical engagement with different positions in the philosophy of science, where she systematically opposes different varieties of anti-realism. As far back as 1912 in her *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism*, Stebbing criticised both Pragmatism’s instrumentalist tendencies, as well as the French Voluntarists’ methodological appeal to intuition, e.g. for both failing to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of whether Euclidean geometry can describe reality. This earlier work will inform Stebbing’s critical reception of Whitehead’s philosophy of nature during the 1920s, in which context she would begin to develop her own brand of realism. While she grows increasingly dissatisfied with the trajectory followed by Whitehead after 1929, the realistic attitude she had defended in her early papers is maintained throughout subsequent work, including e.g. her account of the significance of logic for scientific methodology, her various defences (and eventual abandonment) of directional analysis, and especially her critique of scientists’ anti-realist muddles in *Philosophy and the Physicists*

### 15. Puzzles about Shape

**Szilvia Szanyi, Is Shape Real? Controversies over the Nature and Reality of Shape in the Works of Vasubandhu and his Commentators**

The classification of sense objects (*viṣaya\_*), especially visible objects (*rūpa*), is a controversial issue in ancient Buddhist philosophy, with a significant part of the debate revolving around the nature and reality of shape (*saṃsthāna*). This dispute is documented most notably in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its auto-commentary (*bhāṣya*) ascribed to the philosopher Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE), and its sub-commentary by Yaśomitra, the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which outline various arguments put forward by the proponents of the Abhidharma traditions in order to prove or refute the ultimate existence of shape. The controversial status of shape is also attested in another work attributed to Vasubandhu, the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, as well as in Sthiramati’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaka*, the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*. Although Vasubandhu does not engage in this debate in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, Sthiramati reuses or further develops some of his arguments from the *Abhidharmakośa* (*bhāṣya*) and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* against the reality of shape.

The purpose of this paper is to expose the dynamics of the Abhidharmic debates over shape and unpack the laconic arguments we find in the above-mentioned treatises. To get a better idea of the backdrop of the dispute, first I look at the intricate Abhidharmic classification of visible objects, with a special emphasis on the kinds of shapes enumerated in Vasubandhu’s works. After presenting the various positions on the ontological status of shape, including the Sautrāntika reductionist view that shapes are mere superimpositions on certain arrangements of colour, in the main section of the paper I analyse the various Sautrāntika arguments raised against the Vaibhāṣika position that shape is a real, irreducible visible entity. Studying this debate is essential not only to gain a more complete understanding of Abhidharma metaphysics. It also illuminates important aspects of the Abhidharmic theories of perception, such as their views on common sensibles or the relationship between perception and inference. Finally, as I point out at the end of the paper, appreciating the Abhidharmic debate over the reality of shape also sheds more light on the cryptic arguments Vasubandhu puts forward in his idealist Yogācāra work, the *Viṃśikā*.

**Yining Wu, ‘The Shape of Water -- Conway’s Interpretation on Water and The Conception of Corporeality’**

The conjunction between water and hardness is not alien to us. People use the hardness of water referring to the high amount of minerals dissolved in the water. But to say the water is even harder than the minerals could be puzzling. Anne Conway notes that the water is not a simple and homogenous thing; instead, the water consists of many other gross and stony parts. Yet Conway suggests that these other hard parts “have their Original and Birth from the Waters springing from the bottom of the Earth” (*The Principles* VII.1). The water is constituted by the smallest bodies with the invisible and impalpable grossness or hardness like no other created things. According to Conway’s metaphysics, the only substance of the created world has both attributes of spirituality and of corporeality-- the two attributes only differ in degrees. Whether a thing looks like more of a body or more of a spirit, depends on which of the attributes takes a larger portion in its makeup. Besides, being more spiritual means more subtlety, agility or lightness, while being more corporeal means more darkness, denseness or hardness. Then if the water has the maximum hardness among all creatures, the water is in effect the most corporeal thing, that is, the least spiritual, least subtle, or least light thing in the world. Even a piece of stone possesses more spirituality than the water.

The result from Conway’s demonstrations on water is a bit counterintuitive-- how could the water be the hardest thing in the world? In other words, how to understand that the water is the most corporeal thing in Conway’s world? To unravel the puzzle of Conway’s water is essentially connected to Conway’s conception of corporeality. Commentators have noted certain features of being corporeal in Conway, for example, “extended, divisible, and impenetrable” in Broad (2003), “dense or ‘thicker’” in Hutton (2018), “density”. in Borcherding (2021), “darkness” in Hope (2022), as well as “‘dark’ and ‘condensed’” in Lascano (2023). Nonetheless, these characterizations still seem too metaphorical. To say that the water is the most corporeal due to its darkness and denseness does not conduce to a clearer understanding. We need to further cash up these metaphorical terms so that we can better understand the conception of corporeality. As the water is considered the source and origin of all other less corporeal beings by Conway, the water in effect stands closest to the pole of corporeality. While the opposite pole -- the unreachable extreme of spirituality-- is God, the corporeal pole of water is less explicit in text and in need of more investigations.

In the paper, I first give a brief summary on the literature explaining Conway’s substance of creatures and the attribute of corporeality. Then I show how the terminologies of corporeality in Conway relate to each other as well as how to conceive the metaphors. At last I use the clarified terminologies to resolve the puzzle of hard water.

### 16. Hegel

**Lauri Kallio,** **‘The logical course of history. Ferdinand Lassalle and late Hegelianism’**

The paper discusses two talks by Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64). Besides Karl Marx (1818–83) and Friedrich Engels (1820–95), Lassalle was one of the key figures in the early socialism. Just like Marx and Engels, Lassalle studied G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy in Berlin in the first half of the 1840s. His relation to Hegel and Hegelianism turned out to be notably different than Marx' or Engels'.

Although Lassalle had aimed at the position of "Privatdozent", he never had a formal position at the university. Yet, after he had published his major work on Heraclitus' philosophy (1858), he was in-vited to join the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin), which was founded by Hegel's former students in 1843. Lassalle gave two talks at the meetings of the society. It is fair to say that these talks were his main appearances on the scientific stage.

The first talk (1859) elaborates Karl Rosenkranz' (1805–79) work on Hegel's logic. The other talk (1862) thematizes J.G. Fichte's (1762–1814) philosophy and his significance for German national-ism. I argue that there is a continuation between the two talks. In the first talk, Lassalle argues that the course of history is logical and rational. In the second talk, Lassalle exemplifies that the logical course is visible in the recent history of Germany. The second talk comments on Fichte's famous work *Addresses to the German Nation* (*Reden an die deutsche Nation*; 1808) in particular.

In his talks, Lassalle defends the radical thesis that it is principally possible to predict the course of history. The logic of history is to be found in Hegel's so-called subjective logic. Rosenkranz had changed the structure of subjective logic in his extensive reform of Hegel's logic. Lassalle is highly critical of Rosenkranz' reform. According to his view, Rosenkranz forsakes the very core of Hegel's philosophy. Lassalle thus ascribes a fundamental role to logic.

Moreover, Lassalle emphasizes the similarity between Hegel's and Fichte's philosophy of history. He claims that Fichte was able to predict, e.g., the fall of Napoleon's reign on the basis of reasons, which Hegel later expounded in his logic. The logic behind the fall of Napoleon is to be found in the category of logical chemism, Lassalle explains.

Lassalle also underlines the close connection between Fichte's nationalism and his philosophy. It is his view that Fichte and German idealists all reflect German national spirit. Nationalizing German idealism in this way is controversial, since – \_as I will argue –, e.g., Fichte's or Hegel's relation to German nationalism was anything but straightforward.

Generally speaking, Lassalle received a poor reception to his Fichte speech. In the aftermath of his talk, Lassalle left the society. It was not published in the journal *Der Gedanke*, the organ of the Berlin society, but as a separate booklet (1862) in Berlin. Lassalle passed away unexpectedly two years later.

**Tatiana Llaguno Nieves, ‘Redressing our Relation to Nature: The Ethical Vision of Hegel’s Causality of Fate’**

This paper proposes addressing the problem of the environmental crisis through a reading of Hegel’s “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate”. Hegel’s views on life and nature have been understood by his interpreters as fruitful for thinking the question of sustainability, but not much attention has been paid to his early ethical ruminations. Alison Stone has focused on Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature (2005, 2010), Wendall Kisner on his Science of Logic (2008), and Klaus Vieweg on the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (2020). I defend that the ongoing scholarly debate on the usefulness of Hegelian philosophy for addressing contemporary challenges such as natural exhaustion, would greatly benefit from a careful reading of Hegel’s early writings. I do so by making two claims.

First, I maintain that Hegel’s early worries about positivity can aid us in understanding what goes stray in our current form of life. In “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate”, Hegel is interested in criticizing obedience to abstract commands, and in defending law’s righteousness as “issuing from life” (SC 237). If humans ignore this fact, Hegel tells us, they recognize over themselves a lord before whom they are impotent and who stands above them, alienating “from themselves all the genii in which [they] are united” and putting “nature in the hands of an alien being” (SC 240). While Hegel first identifies the problem of positivity with the Jewish law, he admits that Jesus’ mission also ends up trapped in the positivity that it once rejected. If in objective commands what is lost is the subjective, my claim will be that modern capitalist societies, and the type of power they create, can be understood as producing a similar logic to the one scrutinized by Hegel. By reifying our social relations, capitalist societies trap us in a lifeless movement, in which the necessary dynamism between the subjective and the objective disappears, and in which a sustainable and metabolic relation with nature becomes impossible.

Second, I propose that Hegel’s notion of the causality of fate offers an ethical vision that is particularly fruitful for thinking our current crisis, suggesting an ethics based on our profound condition of dependence. As a matter of fact, for Hegel, “those versions of morality that embrace the idea of independence, as does Kantian moral reason, fail to be moral because, in truth, they are works of theoretical and not practical reason” (Bernstein

2001). By following Hegel’s discussion of crime –according to which “to act against another person is to destroy my own life” (Bernstein 2003, 394)— I make an argument for conceiving our crimes against nature in a similar vein. Importantly, Hegel’s law does not aim at imposing an external power to others and to nature, rather it aims at a “reunification of the injured life,” at redressing suffering, understood here as “a longing for what has been lost –the harmony of the whole” (Rose 2009, 165).

In sum, the paper contends that, together, Hegel’s notion of positivity and his ethical view on the causality of fate, provide a fruitful philosophical framework from where to develop a dialectical naturalism that sets the basis for a sustainable form of life.

**DAY 3, 9.30-11.00**

### 17. Ancient moral and political thought

**Matthew Duncombe, ‘The Origins of the Liar, the Sorites, and Some Less Popular Paradoxes’**

The Liar Paradox (‘This sentence is false’) and the Sorites Paradox (1 grain is not a heap; 2 grains are not a heap,…, so 10,000 grains are not a heap) are some of the most enduring paradoxes. But they are not obviously philosophically related: a solution to one need not give you a solution to the other. So, it is perhaps surprising that they were invented by one philosopher of the Megaric lineage, named Eubulides, in the second half of the 4th century BCE. Although scholars have long attributed to Eubulides the Liar and Sorites (and other less well-known paradoxes, particularly the Veiled Man, the Horns, the Bald Man, the Electra), no one has been able to divine a plausible origin for these famous paradoxes.

In this paper, I argue that Eubulides introduced them to indirectly defend a certain semantic claim, endorsed by the Megarics and others: ‘things can be spoken of only with their own proper logos’. I’ll briefly outline and motivate this semantic claim and then go on to show how the four paradoxes might arise from rejecting it. I show how the ancient versions of each of the Liar, the Sorites, the Veiled and the Horns paradoxes rely one speaking of one and the same thing in two different ways. But speaking of one and the same thing in two different ways is precisely what is ruled out by the Megaric semantic claim. If this is right, we can suppose that the paradoxes originated as an indirect argument for the Megaric semantic claim: if you reject it, the argument would run, you face the paradoxes; if you accept it, you can solve them.

 I will then go on to argue that this motivation for the origins of these paradoxes is not only philosophically possible, but historically plausible for two reasons. First, recently discovered evidence for Eubulides, preserved only in Arabic sources, shows that Eubulides may have deployed the Megaric semantic claim in his discussion of Aristotle’s conversion rules for syllogistic premises. Second, I reinterpret a key piece of evidence where the Stoic logician Chrysippus discusses the ‘Megaric questions’. IN the face of recent scepticism, I defend the identification of these ‘Megaric questions’ as the Eubulidean paradoxes. This gives us reason to think that the Megarics not only posed these questions, but also may have offered a solution to them.

**I Xuan Chong, ‘Practical truth and the unity of virtues in Aristotle’**

In Aristotle, “unity of virtues” (UV) is the idea that the (ethical) virtues are mutually entailing: if one has any of them, one necessarily possesses all of them. This presentation sketches a new (hitherto unexplored) argument for UV in Aristotle.

First, I argue that one can have proper virtue (κυρίως ἀρετή) only if one attains practical truth (1144b1-30). As I interpret it, while the “assertoric” conception of truth and falsehood is useful in characterising particular true judgments (Crivelli 2004), practical truth also refers to the robust cognitive achievement the excellent (wise) practical intellect attains in relation to the (relevant domain of) reality - in this case, εὐπραξία or faring well (Broadie 2019). The practical intellect that attains such practical truth can then make and justify one’s excellent (σπουδαία) choices (Morison 2019). This explains a) how temperance preserves wisdom (1140b11-21), and b) how wisdom is needed for being virtuous (esp. 1144a10-20, 1139a30-35). I briefly contrast my account of practical truth with the accounts found in Olfert 2017 and Pakaluk 2010, both of which fail to fully appreciate how grasping “truth” in Aristotle’s sense involves giving a true explanation (Nielsen 2019).

Second, I argue that attaining practical truth necessarily implies possessing all the ethical virtues. For attaining practical truth ultimately concerns our nature as practical rational beings (Richardson Lear 2004), and such nature cannot be teased apart into different parts (cf. Charles 2015, 2018). Just as theoretical truth appeals to our nature as theoretical rational beings (1141b5-10; 1177a20-21), practical truth encapsulates our nature as practical rational beings. Further, practical truth explains how Socrates is wrong in thinking that the ethical virtues are simply knowledge (1144b18-30): although practical truth also signifies cognitive achievements, it is “truth in agreement with correct desire” (1139a30), and as such needs confirmation from the desiderative soul.

I argue that my account is uniquely successful in defending Aristotle’s view on UV. According to one popular argument, UV is true because wisdom allows the agent to perform the best action, and performing the best action reliably across different situations requires possessing all the virtues (Irwin 1988, Müller 2004). But this works for only some set of virtues but not others. My account does not have a similar problem because attaining practical truth as practical rational beings cannot be compartmentalised. According to another popular account, UV is true because to be wise is to have holistic knowledge about human goods, and that implies having all the virtues (e.g. Badhwar 1996; Cooper 1998; Gardiner 2001; McDowell 2002; Russell 2009; Sorabji 1980; Wolf 2007). But this fails to explain Aristotle’s rejection of Socratic Intellectualism. Finally, according to Gottlieb 2009, it is unity of the soul that explains the truth of UV (in a way reminiscent of Republic IV and Gorgias 507a-c). But this fails to appreciate the importance of the notion of “choice” (cf. Anscombe 1981, 2005), which arguably underlies Aristotle’s argument for UV.

### 18. Revisiting Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’

Anscombe’s paper “The First Person” (1981) is notorious for its claim that “I” does not refer. Anscombe tells us, for instance, that “‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all” (p. 32). Much of the subsequent discussion of Anscombe’s paper has centered on that claim. Anscombe’s view has been rejected as, for instance, “barely credible” (Peacocke 2008:60) or “difficult to understand at all” (Kripke 2011:312). A minority accepts the no-reference claim, even extending it to other expressions such as proper names for people (Rödl 2020, Haddock 2022). This symposium moves away from that shared focal point, and towards an understanding of what we take to be the deeper issues in Anscombe’s rich and interesting paper. In particular, the symposium will explore the following questions:

* How should we situate “The First Person” in its historical context? What kind of project is Anscombe pursuing? What live philosophical questions, at the time of Anscombe’s writing, may have informed her argument? What is the relationship between her view and that of Wittgenstein, who also says that “‘I’ is not the name of a person” (PI §410, see also §404)?
* What exactly is Anscombe’s topic? Many have understood “The First Person” as presenting a philosophical analysis of the first-person pronoun. But the paper’s title is simply “The First Person,” and from the opening discussion of Descartes’ cogito onwards to its end the paper veers towards issues in the philosophy of mind. What new light can we shed on the paper by reading it through this last lens? What does Anscombe tell us about the phenomenon that, in our language, finds expression in the first-personal pronoun?
* What is Anscombe’s positive view on I-thoughts? Much of “The First Person” is negative in character: “I” does not refer, as it neither refers to my body, nor to a Cartesian Ego, nor to any other object; “I” is not to be understood by appeal to a distinctive mode of presentation; “I am E.A.” is not an identity proposition. We focus on uncovering Anscombe’s positive view, in its own terms. What is distinctive about our I-thoughts, as she understands them? What is their logical structure? (Considering both I-thoughts such as “I am in pain,” that express “unmediated conceptions of states and activities” (TFP 34), and I-thoughts that superficially resemble identity-statements.) How do I-thoughts relate to the linguistic behaviours that give expression to them?

**Marie McGinn, ‘Anscombe and Wittgenstein on “I”’**

Anscombe’s attack on the idea that ‘I’ is a referring expression is undertaken within the context of a Fregean model of sense and reference, and more generally within a Fregean conception of the content of an assertion as the thought that it expresses: Anscombe is concerned to elucidate the logical content of I-thoughts. What is striking about Anscombe’s argument is that, although it comes to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein – ‘“I” doesn’t name a person’ (PI §410) – Wittgenstein’s treatment of the issue is completely different from Anscombe’s. This reflects the fact that Wittgenstein had shed the Fregean conception of the logical content of assertions as something that is grasped by the mind, and he no longer believed that Frege’s conception of logic is adequate to capture the logic of ordinary language. In abandoning the idea of meaning as a propositional content and replacing it with a dynamic conception of meaning as use, Wittgenstein’s conception of naming, or reference, had also undergone a sea-change.

This paper will investigate how Anscombe’s account of ‘I’ fits with that of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s approach can make Anscombe’s claim that ‘I’ does not refer to the person speaking look less mysterious, seen as belonging to an approach which has abandoned the idea of a propositional content and recognises that the logic of our everyday language is more complex than a Fregean conception allows for. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s approach preserves Anscombe’s key idea that it is this use of ‘I’ which manifests self-consciousness, while being a much better fit with the grammatical investigation Anscombe undertakes in *Intention*, and with the account of intentions, motives and the nature of intentional action that she offers there.

**Sophia Arbeiter, ‘Between the A-users and the Solipsist’**

Anscombe’s paper on the first person is perhaps best known for its notorious claim that “I” does not refer. This is an unfortunate emphasis. Rather than look to Anscombe’s discussion for a contribution to the semantics of indexicals, I recommend reading it as belonging squarely to

the philosophy of mind. Anscombe seeks to illuminate our use of “I” by means of a contrast case, introduced in

the following passage:

Imagine a society in which everyone is labeled with two names. One appears on their backs and at the top of their chests, and these names, which their bearers cannot see, are various: “B”, to “Z” let us say. The other, “A”, is stamped on the inside of their wrists, and is the same for everyone. (TFP 24)

These “A-users” help us see that “I” is not merely a special name, used by each person to refer to herself. To really understand what Anscombe is up to, however, we need to introduce another character: the solipsist. This is a subject who does not conceive of herself as one among many;

she is rather, as Anscombe puts it in her introduction to the Tractatus,“the point from which everything is seen.” I explain and defend the proposal that Anscombe situates us, and in particular our way of being minded, between the A-users and the solipsist. Our use of the term “I” is distinguished by the way that it overcomes the limitations of each of these characters.

**Madeleine Levac, ‘Anscombe’s positive account of I-thoughts’**

Anscombe makes the suggestive claim that we learn to have I-thoughts (TFP 34). What does this mean? For the beginnings of an answer, we can notice a distinction that runs, somewhat submerged, through her paper. Our I-thoughts, as she describes them, have a two-sidedness; they both express and report on our states and doings. The first issues from an “unmediated,” nonobservational awareness of what is going on with us. The latter explains the public, shareable character of our descriptions: we use predicates like “is standing,” “is in pain,” and so on, which we also apply not only to ourselves but also to others. I bring out the way that I-thoughts unify these two functions by a discussion of Anscombe’s account of statements of the form “I am EA”—statements which, she emphasizes, do not express an identity. With Anscombe’s positive account of I-thoughts in view, I interpret the story with which she closes her paper. A man falls from a carriage, but asks, “who is it that fell out?” With this example, Anscombe shows us that what is distinctive in our use of “I” is a feature that would emerge whatever the details of our linguistic practice—even in a human language that lacked the first-person pronoun altogether.

### 19. Sympathy and Virtue

**Keith Green, ‘Sophie du Grouchy and Adam Smith on Sympathy with Hatred’**

I will critically examine Sophie de Grouchy’s apparent disagreement with Adam Smith’s view about sympathizing with another’s hatred. It is not clear in Letters on Sympathy Letter §4 with which specific claims of Smith’s she takes herself to disagree. I will seek to address that partly textual question. Sophie de Grouchy argues that where one sympathizes with another’s hateful passions (including, but surely not limited to envy and revenge), it is one’s ‘relations’ with a person who is feeling and expressing hatred toward another that must explain why one sympathizes with her hatred rather than feeling pity or concern for the target of her hatred. I will argue, however, that Smith is not clearly committed to the idea that there is any ‘general’ sympathy with others’ hatred; and that such a view is not implicated in his account of moral sentiments constitutive of blame, or motivations to resist wrongdoing or evil. I will argue that, in fact, Sophie de Grouchy’s own account of the more social and circumstantial motivations to sympathize with others’ hatred can be accepted as a constructive intervention into Smith’s account of sentiments that motivate resistance to wrongdoing or evil without the implication of hatred.

**Alessio Vaccari, ‘Mill's Notion of Virtue. Duty, Sympathy, and Well-Being’**

Unlike David Hume and Adam Smith, Mill does not offer a systematic treatment of the content of the virtues that can be gleaned from the observations scattered throughout chapters 2, 3 and 5 of Utilitarianism. My paper has two aims. The first is to outline Mill’s theory of virtue. In particular, I argue that virtue is not merely a habit of action, but a motivational disposition that cannot be isolated from human sympathy and practical rationality. The second is a discussion of different virtues. I argue that, in addition to the motive of duty, Mill recognises an important role for more partial motives that realise vital dimensions of individual well-being.

### 20. Virtuous Epistemology: Coming to know the world through Limits

Epistemology concerns the evaluation of our epistemic states, norms, and practices. Traditionally, these have been understood in doxastic terms, with knowledge and belief being seen as mental states that involve the acceptance or endorsement of certain propositions. According to this picture, the central locus of epistemic analysis and evaluation is doxastic attitudes such as believing, judging, or accepting. The doxastic view sets the agenda for most issues in epistemology including justification, evidence, testimony, epistemic value, inquiry, and so on. This mainstream picture results in a view of epistemic agency which links the acquisition of knowledge to the conditions under which questions about what to believe are settled.

In this symposium, we explore the limitations of this picture by drawing on three figures: Plato, Jami, and Murdoch, and consider alternative approaches to understanding epistemic agency that move beyond it. There are two common themes in our symposium. The first is a more complicated account of the relationship between the acquisition of knowledge and moral psychology and the second is the provision of a picture in which the acquisition of knowledge can be non-discursive or non-propositional. One of our main aims is to illustrate the insights our theme offers to contemporary virtue epistemology. By drawing on resources from three different periods—ancient Greek philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophy, and modern Anglophone philosophy—in conversation with literature in contemporary virtue epistemology, we hope to widen the parameters of virtue epistemology by introducing new frameworks for thinking about epistemic agency and sketch out how authors in earlier periods might provide additional paradigms for thinking about epistemic goals such as “understanding” and the epistemic virtue of humility.

According to the authors we draw on, epistemic agency is limited by factors related to moral psychology. For instance, for all of them, the acquisition of genuine knowledge requires a process of looking beyond one’s own limits. In turn, this calls for a virtue-related response to acquiring knowledge in which epistemic virtues and moral virtues are intricately linked, resulting in a unified axiology that expands the scope of epistemology. This convergence of epistemic and moral virtues, by addressing desires and motivational structures for knowledge, places our work in “virtue responsibilist” literature as opposed to virtue reliablism (which deals with reliable truth-conducive properties such as good

sight, memory, and logical reasoning capacities (Sosa, 1991)).

We particularly focus on the use of metaphor and imagination in acquiring knowledge that goes beyond “justified true beliefs” to the consideration of epistemic and moral traits that promote understanding and wisdom (Greco 1993a, 521; Zagzebski 1998, 618; Baehr 2008, 3–4). Through this focus, we propose the widening of the scope of virtue epistemology by 1) putting present and past conceptions into conversation 2) including non-Western philosophical traditions and 3) incorporating interdisciplinary sources—mathematics in Platonic theory of limit, the use of metaphor in Jami’s poetry, and the insights on the “ego” in Murdoch’s moral psychology.

**Erin Choi, ‘The Significance of the Platonic Theory of “Limit” for Contemporary Virtue Epistemology’**

The concept of "epistemic limit" has historically been understood as the limits of knowledge in the individual subject from Cartesian doubt and the Kantian limits of reason to the feminist and social epistemologists’ critiques of individual knowledge and the post-structuralist critique of certainty in post-Kantian philosophy.

The epistemic limit I am interested in this paper, however, is the application of limit to the features of excess in belief-formation. I will explore how the application of limit (peras) plays a role in bringing about knowledge (episteme) by using Plato's theory of limit (influenced by Pythagorean metaphysical mathematics) which locates the good in the limited and the evil in the unlimited (NE 1006b28-31). For Plato, limit not only recognizes finitude but also brings about virtue, knowledge, and their components such as order, harmony, and measure. Following Plato's theory, I propose a way of thinking about limit as contributing to epistemic successes that relate to Platonic knowledge such as "cognitive contact with reality" (Zagzebski 1996) and understanding (Kvanvig 2009). I will thus illustrate that Plato's theory of limit provides important insights for contemporary virtue epistemology.

First, I will argue that limit, according to Plato, brings order to the subjective desires and feelings of the "lower parts" of the soul (thumos) that distort one's perception of reality (Phaedo 66c). I will then argue that limit, as a basis of measurability and clearness (Phil.27d) can be applied in bringing precision to hyperbolic terms such as "all of x" and "always x." Lastly, I will illustrate that limit puts a boundary onto the domination of one ideology or truth-claims and puts an end to the “conflict of opposites” (Phil.25e) thereby making room for other ideas and seeing different ideas in relation to one another. In conclusion, I suggest that Plato’s theory of limit has both epistemic and moral significance, contributing to virtuous ways of coming to know the world by disrupting the egoistic interpretations that lead to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007).

**Muhammad Sami, ‘Humility and the limiting nature of forms in Jāmī’**

The assertion that knowledge is good raises questions about the relationship between epistemology and ethics. Such a relationship is acknowledged by many historic and contemporary philosophers, yet it is one thing to acknowledge it and another thing to explain it. The latter endeavour arguably takes us from the realms of ethics and epistemology to that of ontology.

In this paper, I focus on one particular virtue, humility, and situate its relation to the acquisition of knowledge within the philosophy of the 15th century Persian polymath ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī. After clarifying the role he ascribes to ‘forms’ as delimitations on the Absolute that make its perfections perceivable, I argue that his ‘ontology of delimitation’ makes humility a necessary condition for the acquisition of knowledge. I also build on Jessica Frazier’s (2019) application to religious philosophy of Heidegger’s notion of ‘guiding foreconception’ in order to illustrate how, for Jāmī, metaphor is a particular kind of delimitation-through-form that facilitates the acquisition of knowledge where discursive reason cannot.

First, I first show how on Jāmī’s ontology of delimitation humility is an individual’s response to an ontological reality. Second, I show how the ancient epistemological principle that ‘like is known by like’ is interpreted on this ontology. Third, I argue that the said ontology and epistemology necessitate ‘unselfing’ as a moral path culminating in coming into contact with reality. Finally, I present the role Jāmī ascribes to metaphor in bringing an individual to the recognition of the ontological reality that makes her humble.

With these conclusions in mind, I explore two possibilities opened up by Jāmī philosophy in relation to Iris Murdoch’s: (1) notion of ‘unselfing’ and (2) her assertion that metaphors are ‘fundamental forms of our awareness of our own condition’ (1967).

**Adham El-Shazly, ‘Humility and the Limits of Moral Understanding in Iris Murdoch’**

In this paper I develop Iris Murdoch’s notion of moral understanding and the pivotal role humility plays in its achievement. I aim to show (1) Murdoch’s account as a strong contender to recent accounts of moral understanding, and (2) articulate her underlying conception of epistemic agency and its limits.

Some philosophers think moral understanding is knowledge of why an action is right or wrong (Riaz 2015, Sliwa 2017). Others think moral understanding is an ability to explain why an action is right or wrong (Hills 2016). Core to Murdoch’s moral philosophy is the rejection of a conception of morality that reduces it to actions or rules for action. Instead, she prioritises a conception of morality where

the locus of moral activity is vision, or a ‘subject’s total way of looking at the world’. I argue that an alternative view of moral understanding follows from this conception.

First, I argue that according to Murdoch moral understanding is not a matter of propositional knowledge or ability to explain or infer moral propositions, but a matter of having apt moral perspectives. These include, among other things, apt conceptual schemas, metaphors, attentional and inquisitive dispositions. These have an important moral but also epistemic status in Murdoch’s view. Second, I explain how for Murdoch humility is a precondition for moral understanding. To her, the ego and fantasy distort genuine moral understanding by distorting our perspectives, for instance by directing away our attention from the good and inhibiting moral imagination. Humility is required to free the epistemic limitations imposed by our ego.

According to this picture, humility is at once a corrective moral and epistemic virtue, thus playing a central role in her view of moral understanding and her overall notion of epistemic agency and its limits. What results is a picture of epistemic agency not as essentially a matter of rationally responding to one’s reasons for belief (or action), but a continuous effort to form a good vision against a backdrop of the limits of the human ego, giving us a rich picture of the relationship between moral psychology and epistemology

**DAY 3, 11.30-13.30**

### 21. Ancient Logic and Science

**Benjamin Wilck, ‘Why a Point Cannot Be Part of a Line: Mereology in Aristotle and Euclid: Mereology’**

In this paper, I reconstruct Euclid’s notion of parthood as dimension-restricted, or intra-dimensionalist. This allows me to answer the following question. The endpoints by which a line is limited, or indeed any of the infinitely many points on that line, is somehow on that line. But are those points parts of the line?

I offer a novel answer to the ancient question of whether or not a point can be part of a line and, in general, whether a geometrical limit can be part of its host magnitude. Advocates of the view that geometrical limits cannot be parts of their host justify that view by the fact that limits are lower-dimensional than their host. While this is correct, it fails to explain why a difference in the number of

dimensions excludes parthood.

My objective is thus to explain why objects belonging to different dimensions cannot entertain parthood relations with one another. Specifically, I show that Euclid’s conception of parthood entails such an explanation.

Let us call ‘mereological inter-dimensionalism’ the view that a geometrical limit can be part of its higher-dimensional host, and ‘mereological intra-dimensionalism’ the view that parthood obtains exclusively among objects that are extended in the same number of dimensions. While a point can be part of a line according to inter-dimensionalism, the intra-dimensionalist will reject this because a point is lower-dimensional than a line; a point is in fact not extended in any dimension.

Euclid works with an intra-dimensional notion of geometrical parthood, in which case his geometry excludes points from being parts of lines. But why should parthood be restricted to the same number of dimensions? Why can a lower-dimensional object not be part of a higher-dimensional one?

It is usually assumed that the view that no point can be part of a line is implied by the denial of geometric atomism – the view that any magnitude is composed of indivisibles, such as a line of points. Thus, Aristotle’s refutation of geometric atomism in Physics VI.1 is usually taken to imply the view that a point cannot be part of a line. Accordingly, some commentators take the fact that Euclid’s geometry presupposes that geometric atomism is false to imply that a point cannot be part of a line also for Euclid.

Against this, I maintain that while geometric atomism indeed implies that points are parts of a line, the inverse is false.

Rather, I suggest that the reason for denying that a limit can be part of its higher-dimensional host lies in the fact that, for Euclid, any part must be – by his own definition of parthood – less than its whole. No geometrical limit is less than its higher-dimensional host, though: any limit is incomparable in size with its host, in which case a limit cannot be less than its host.

As a result, Euclid’s notion of parthood provides a simple but striking justification of mereological intra-dimensionalism – the view that parthood is restricted to items of the same number of dimensions.

**Mariane Oliveira, ‘Scientific method, “pre-scientific notions”, and nominal definitions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics’**

Aristotle opens book B of Posterior Analytics with the claim that everything we investigate is equal in number to what we can know. There are four types of questions we must investigate: to hoti (the statement of a phenomenon or "that something is"), ei estin (the question for existence or "whether something is"), to dioti (the question for the reason why or "why something is"), and tí esti (the question for essence or "what something is").

The problem arises because at the end of the four question-types method suggested in B 1-2, Aristotle states that the question for ti esti, or "what it is," and to dioti, or "why it is," are answered by the same argument. In B 3-7, the so-called aporetic chapters, both formal relations and the objects of definition and demonstration (the ways of answering ti esti and to dioti), are analyzed. In this way, Aristotle puts the identification of the answer about what is something and why it is in check and arrives at the limiting case that is impossible to define by any inferential method. In B 8-10, it will be necessary to draw another method to show the ‘what it is’ (the essence).

The hypothesis I shall argue for is divided into two parts. The first is based on a careful reading of B1-2, which privileges the four types of questions to determine the stages of a method that the enquirer must follow. I will focus mainly on the role of what I call "pre-scientific notions" as founders of this investigative path. The second part focuses on chapters B 3 and B 7 of the "aporetic" chapters. The aim is to show how these chapters present the difficulties (aporiai) for the definer -which aims to be able to present "what it is" and "the reason why" through the same argument.

My argument will run as follows: (i) pre-scientific notions allow us to answer the question to hoti - recognition of the phenomenon- since they are statements of what Aristotle calls "what a name signifies" (cf. B 7; B 10); (ii) thus, they provide the starting point for investigation by satisfying a fundamental assumption: the recognition of existence; concluding that (iii.a) these notions can stand as pre-scientific because they are characterized as some property of the essence, and (iii.b) the meaning of these properties can be understood without any previous scientific knowledge, which allows the definer to move from a certain ignorance to scientific knowledge. This reading allows us to formulate part of the answer to the aporia of B 7

**Ákos Tussay, ‘Stasis and logismos in Archytas’ thought’**

The fifth century BCE witnessed a socio-moral crisis in ancient Greece. The validity of certain conventional beliefs about the physical world started to get questioned and eventually rejected, and the impact of these scientific discoveries exerted considerable influence on moral and political thinking as well. This phenomenon is often referred to as the so-called nomos-physis problem which is mostly associated with the crisis of the Athenian democracy. Though most surviving sources are linked to Athens, the problem was not some Athenian peculiarity. In this paper, I consider a somewhat different formulation through Archytas’ solution for the ethico-political dilemmas raised by the nomos-physis problem. Archytas, a contemporary of Plato and one of the last major ancient Pythagoreans, argues in Fr. 3 (Stob. 4.1.139) that once numerical calculation (logismos) was discovered, it stopped civil strife (stasis) and increased concord, because it is by means of calculation that we seek reconciliation in our dealings with others. Although Fr. 3 is not too specific about Archytas’ sense of logismos, I believe some additional insights could be drawn from On Law and Justice (Stob. 4.1.135–8; 4.5.61) attributed to Archytas, and ultimately depending on a debate between him and the Sicilian hedonist, Polyarchus. I argue that it is the nomos of On Law and Justice which helps to approximate the Archytean idea of logismos, for just like calculation, the nomoi prompt equitable actions by way of enhancing the citizens’ moral consciousness and by bringing an organised living about.

**Andrea Buongiorno, ‘Being per se v being per accidens in Metaphysics Δ7’**

Of all chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Δ7 presents us with a uniquely comprehensive distinction between uses of the verb ‘to be’. Overall, the chapter indicates that something might be said to ‘be’ in either of four ways: per accidens [1017a8-22]; per se [1017a22-30]; by being true [1017a31-35]; either potentially or actually [1017a35-b9]. This distinction is undeniably fundamental to several areas of Aristotle’s philosophy, including his ‘first’ philosophy or metaphysics: as an indication, Aristotle customarily refers back to it at several critical junctures of the central books of the Metaphysics, like E2 [1026a33-b2], Z1 [1028a10-11], Θ1 [1045b27-1046a1], and Θ10 [1050a34-b2]. However, it is also notoriously difficult to interpret. A particularly controversial aspect of Δ7 lies in Aristotle’s attempt to distinguish the per se from the per accidens use [1017a7-30]. These lines have sparked widely different interpretations, which might be grouped under two main headings: some commentators (like Kirwan) take Aristotle to distinguish between two uses of the existential ‘is’; others (like Ross) take him to distinguish between two uses of the predicative ‘is’, namely between the ‘is’ of non-essential and the ‘is’ of essential predication. However, both lines of interpretation face insurmountable textual difficulties. In this paper, I offer what I take to be a considerably more plausible alternative, by drawing on Aristotle’s discussion of per se and per accidens predication in the Posterior Analytics. On this basis, I will reject the existential in favour of a predicative reading of Δ7’s distinction between per se and per accidens ‘being’. I will also reject the specific version of the predicative reading which is advocated for by Ross, who treats the above as a distinction between essential (or per se1) and non-essential (or per accidens1) predication: e.g. between statements like ‘a human is an animal’ and ‘a human is cultivated’. I will defend an alternative predicative reading, which treats the above as a distinction between genuine (or per se3) and non-genuine (or per accidens3) predication. In a nutshell: something is said to ‘be’ per se iff an attribute is predicated of a substance; something is said to ‘be’ per accidens iff an attribute is predicated of a non-substance. For example: something is said to ‘be’ per se when a human is said to ‘be cultivated’, whereas something is said to ‘be’ per accidens when a just thing is said to ‘be cultivated’. Crucially, these two uses of ‘to be’ are not only distinct but also hierarchically interconnected: indeed, predicating an attribute of a non-substance involves predicating an attribute of an underlying substance, but not conversely; for instance, cultivation is truly predicated of a just thing in virtue of being truly predicated of an underlying human, but not conversely. To sum up: the per accidens is grounded in the per se use. This insight allows us to overcome a possible objection to my proposal, arising from the presence of a per se3 predication (‘the human is cultivated’) in the per accidens section of Δ7.

### 22. First and Second Nature

**Ellie Robson, ‘Mary Midgley and Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism’**

 Mary Midgley (1919-2019) is a thinker notoriously difficult to place into a clear philosophical context for various reasons including the fact that Midgely herself expressly resisted placement into any philosophical category or ‘ism’ *whatsoever* (she only ever described herself as a “pluralist”). Midgley’s intellectual isolation has undoubtably contributed to the general oversight of her work within both contemporary philosophy and the history of Twentieth Century philosophy. To combat this, my paper argues that one plausible and unexplored avenue for Midgley’s reception is within the contemporary programme of meta-ethics known as ‘Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism’. Commonly associated with the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Alastair MacIntyre, John McDowell, and others, Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can be broadly categorised as an attempt to found ethics on claims about human nature. Within contemporary scholarship, Midgley is not typically associated with this meta-ethical programme.

My paper has two main aims. First, I argue that Midgley’s thought has a clear historical claim to the early development of the Neo-Aristotelian movement taking place in 1980s. Her interlocutors are established members of the tradition, and she shares influences with these established members (e.g., Midgley uses Peter Geach’s attributive sense of the good in the same way as her undergraduate friends Foot and Anscombe). In the early development of this programme, there are also scattered references to Midgley’s work. For example, John Cottingham (1983) describes Midgley as ‘one of the most eloquent spokespersons for the new naturalism.’ \_

Second, and more philosophically, I argue that Midgley’s meta-ethical framework satisfies enough of the criterion for Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism such that if we are going to associate her with any tradition, it should be this one. This second aim will of course depend on how we want to use the concept ‘Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism’—something scholars are in disagreement about. Using criterion established by Martin Hahnel’s *Aristotelian Naturalism: A Research Companion* (2020), I argue that we can engineer the concept ‘Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism’ as a family-resemble concept (rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions) and in doing so show that Midgley’s naturalism sufficiently resembles the concept.

There are various upshots of my reading of Midgley as a Neo-Aristotelian Naturalist. First, my reading suggests that new perspectives offered by an examined Midgleyan naturalism can be productive to ongoing contemporary debates in Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism. What’s more, my paper suggests a possible avenue for using our philosophical concepts to bring underappreciated and minority philosophers (such as women) into contemporary debates.

**Evan Thomas, ‘Different Knowledges in Different Kinds and Sorts of Creatures: Cavendish Against Descartes on Animal Minds’**

Margaret Cavendish ascribes sense and reason to animals and other nonhumans (GNP 18). Cavendish contrasts her views with René Descartes’s, whom she reads as denying both sense and reason to nonhumans. In the Philosophical Letters, Cavendish responds to Descartes’s famous argument that animals lack sense because they lack language. Cavendish objects that the different parts of the human body have sense and reason despite lacking the ability to speak (PL 113-114). This paper addresses the problem that Cavendish’s defense of animal sense presupposes her picture of the human body and thus appears to beg the question against Descartes. I show how Cavendish defends this picture against Descartes by insightfully

critiquing a Cartesian mental transparency thesis, and the Cartesian theory of the senses.

 In order to appreciate Cavendish’s defense of her view that the human body has sense and reason, it is necessary to first elucidate Descartes’s argument against animal sense in his November 23rd 1646 letter to Cavendish’s husband, the Marquess of Newcastle. Descartes there argues that much human behavior is produced by an insensitive automaton by citing examples where we act habitually while lacking awareness of any thoughts governing our behavior (AT IV 573/CSMK 302). But animals “imitate or surpass us only in those of our actions which are not guided by our thought” (AT IV 573; CSMK 302), so we have no reason to ascribe thought to animals.

 Cavendish discusses similar examples in all of her major philosophical works (WO epistle in between pg 26 and 27; GNP 61; PPO 79; OEP 150-152). But whereas Descartes accounts for habitual behavior with the hypothesis that the human body is an insensitive automaton, Cavendish accommodates these examples with her distinction between the sensitive and rational degrees of matter. Moreover, she defends this account against the Cartesian view with two different arguments.

 The first argument targets Descartes’s assumption of a mental transparency thesis according to which we are aware of all the thoughts governing our bodily motions. Cavendish compares this to assuming that an object before blind eyes does not exist (PPO 19-20). The fact that we lack awareness of knowledge governing a motion does not prove the nonexistence of such knowledge. Cavendish explains that we lack awareness of some of the perceptions of our body because not all of these perceptions are composed into a unified locus of awareness (GNP 50-54; OEP 47-48). The second argument targets Descartes’s theory of sense. Descartes divides sense into three grades, the first of which is purely mechanical. Cavendish argues that the senses inform the mind, and that consequently they must have knowledge (PPO 80; OEP 153). A mechanical grade of sense, however, lacks knowledge and so is unable to perform this function.

 To conclude, this paper shows how Cavendish defends her view that the human body has sense and reason against the Cartesian, and, thereby defends the view that animal bodies do too.

**Konstantinos Chatzigeogiou, ‘Naturalising the Mind and Spiritualising Nature: F. J. E. Woodbridge and The Objective Mind’**

Frederick Woodbridge (1867-1940) was instrumental in the development of American naturalism and the decline of idealism, being a key figure, alongside John Dewey, in the neglected tradition of ‘Columbia Naturalism’. Woodbridge further held important institutional roles, establishing The Journal of Philosophy and serving for a considerable period of time as Columbia’s Dean of Graduate Faculties. Many of his students, notable American philosophers such as John Herman Randall Jr., Herbert Schneider and Irwin Edman, revered him and built upon Woodbridge’s intellectual legacy.

Despite producing a decently-sized corpus, Woodbridge’s philosophy remains understudied. In my talk, I will attempt to partly fill this lacuna by providing a contextual analysis of Woodbridge’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed. I will begin with a brief overview of the American philosophical context in the first few decades of the 20th century, a period where various forms of idealism are retreating and realist, naturalist and pragmatist alternatives are steadily gaining ground. I will then examine Woodbridge’s ferocious attack on the Cartesian/Lockean (and various offshoots) representational view of human experience, whereby the mind is construed as an internal or private domain, in which ideas, sensations, sense-data, etc., serve as intermediaries between ourselves and the world. Although flirting with extreme forms of behaviourism in the elimination of all kinds of inner mentalistic notions, Woodbridge’s orientation is especially striking, being both overtly metaphysical and anti-reductionist.

I will conclude my presentation with an analysis of Woodbridge’s 1926 monograph, *The Realm of Mind*. In that work, Woodbridge synthesises his previous insights, forming the idea of The Objective Mind, a mind different from that studied in psychology. The Objective Mind’s ideas are not ‘mentalistic’, but propositions. Reducing that mind to the brain is futile, as the brain is merely one of the structures that can be isolated for systematic theorising. The Objective Mind is simply thought coextensive with a subject-matter. It is an implication of the truism that we do think (i.e. express propositions) about nature in its various aspects. Evidence for The Objective Mind should not be sought in the brain, let alone in a private immaterial mental realm, but rather in the intelligibility and malleability of nature, captured both in our socially-preserved bodies of knowledge, our cultural artifacts and our social institutions. The Objective Mind, although presupposing human bodies with the ability or capacity to think, is strictly speaking ‘out there’, a ‘realm’ no less natural than the rocks and the stars.

### 23. Mary Shepherd’s Realism

If Shepherd’s main philosophical task is obviously to vindicate the reality of causes and material objects, the way she does it and the kind of realism she actually endorses may be a matter of debate.

The four talks presented below take part to this debate and try to clarify Shepherd’s position by addressing four basic questions:

(1) How does Shepherd defend realism? On what kind of argument, presented as stronger than Reid’s, does she ground our natural belief in external existence? The talk addressing this question (“Shepherd’s Criticism of Reid’s Theory of Perception”) confronts Shepherd to Reid’s theory of first principles and to Priestley’s abductive argument in favor of realism. It finally maintains that Shepherd’s own argument for realism must be characterized as transcendental.

(2) What are her specific reasons for departing from the direct realism of her days? The talk addressing this question (“Shepherd’s Analysis of Natural Confusions in Perception”) shows that if Shepherd and Reid share a methodological and a meta-philosophical background concerning the nature of philosophical analysis, they differ in its application. The main source of their opposition is located in their divergent analysis of the meaning of ordinary talk concerning objects and their qualities.

(3) What kind of realism does she endorse? By a close confrontation of Shepherd and Kant’s criticisms of Berkeley and Hume, the talk addressing this question (“Shepherd’s Refutation of Idealism”) endeavors to show that she succeeds better than him in defending a realism of relations, rather than a realism of an unknown thing-in-itself.

(4) What is Shepherd’s deeper purpose in defending realism and how is this purpose specifically served by this defense? The talk addressing this question (“The Use and Meaning of Analogy in Mary Shepherd’s Thought”) insists on Shepherd’s religious interest in defending realism. Drawing on her use of analogy and her comparison of our perception with the way algebraic signs signify their objects, it is shown that Shepherd’s final purpose is to claim that the external world points to God just as our perceptions point to an external world.

**Claire Etchegaray, ‘Perception and Inference to the Best Explanation. Shepherd's epistemological critique of Reid’**

The starting point of Shepherd’s epistemology of perception is a rigorous refutation of Hume’s scepticism concerning the senses developed in the essay “On the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy” (chap. 1-3). For this reason, she may be seen as siding with the Scottish common-sense philosophers Thomas Reid. This however raises the question whether they agree on the basic tenets of the epistemology of perception.

Since, according to Shepherd, our belief in the external world is based on latent reasoning, part of the answer to this question depends on the role she gives to this kind of reasoning. Following recent commentators, I argue that, for Shepherd, reasoning is an inference to the best explanation (IBE). She calls this type of reasoning latent because in everyday life it is not necessary to articulate it, even though our belief in the external world depends on it. The aim of this paper is to get a better grasp of latent reasoning and to assess the importance of this notion for Shepherd’s epistemology of perception.

My hypothesis is that Gilbert Harman’s analysis of “belief based on the inference to the best explanation” can help us understand the role of latent reasoning in Shepherd. Harman famously argued that such an inference does not need to be conscious; according to him “belief based on such an inference” means that if we would be asked why we believe in the external world we would articulate an inference of this kind. Nevertheless, contemporary references should always be used with caution and the meaning of Shepherd’s latent reasoning must be understood in context. I return to the parallel with Harman after a contextual evaluation of Shepherd’s IBE.

I argue that Shepherd’s epistemology should be compared both with that of Reid and that of Reid’s adversary, Joseph Priestley. On the one hand, Thomas Reid argued that the perceptual belief in the external world is non-inferential. On the other hand, Priestley put forward an abductive argument to justify our belief in the existence of an external world. In my view, Shepherd goes beyond and manage to avoid their pitfalls.

I start with an outline of the stakes of the current debate on alleged Reidian aspects of Shepherd’s epistemology (Folescu vs. Bolton). Then I will show that Shepherd’s main epistemological critique of Reid echoes a point that was made earlier by Priestley. Thirdly, I will recall the main weaknesses of Priestley’s epistemology of perception in light of Reid’s insights. In the fourth part, I will show why Shepherd’s latent reasoning overcomes those weaknesses and why Harman’s analysis throws light on her concept. I will conclude with a general qualification of Shepherd’s epistemology.

**Benoît Gide, ‘Shepherd’s Analysis of Natural Confusions in Perception’**

It appears to Shepherd that “What Reid calls common sense and considers erroneously to be a sense or instinct, is no more than an observation of the simplest relation of our ideas.” She thus describes perception of external objects as “a mental vision”, and maintains “that reason (or the observation of the relation of our simple sensations), does as a new sensation of the mind, give evidence of unperceived existences”, or “that the relations of various sensations generate conclusions, which become new sensations or perceptions, and which […] afford an

evidence of the existence of the exterior objects to which they refer”.

But, beneath the opposition of their doctrines of perception, Shepherd and Reid share a broader methodological and meta-philosophical background: both aim at describing the formation of natural beliefs and denounce some of the natural associations and confusions generating false perceptual beliefs: on the one hand, Shepherd intends to “dwell upon the method nature takes with all men”5 , adding that the understanding of it “requires a philosophical examination to separate [the] natural junction of thought’ that is made in it; on the other, Reid’s insists that the general project of an analysis of the mind as “an enumeration of the simple and original principles of our constitution” requires that “we must become like children again, if we will be philosophers: we must overcome this habit of inattention which has been gathering strength ever since we began to think”.

We’d like (1) to highlight where Shepherd and Reid part ways in their diagnosis of the natural confusions concerning sensible qualities of material objects, and then (2) maintain that this is where the main or first motive of Shepherd’s criticism of Reid’s concept of common sense lies.

**Raphaël Pierres, ‘Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism’**

Recent direct realisms (Meillassoux, 2006; Ferraris, 2009; Gabriel, 2013; Benoist, 2017) criticizes the indirect realism of Kant. But Kant does not have a monopoly on indirect realism: a renewed attention to Shepherd’s position could open new avenues.

In the “Refutation of Idealism” inserted into the Critique of Pure Reason after the Garve-Feder review (Ferrari, 1964; Guillermit, 2008), Kant intends to show that temporal determination requires the position of a permanent external referent, which remains undetermined. This answer, however, is in tension with the primacy given to the a priori form of the internal sense in the “Transcendental Aesthetics” (Nabert, 1924; Dreyfus, 1968; Longuenesse, 1993; Piché, 2000; Malabou, 2014). Kant insists that our concepts of time and space are not derived from the experience of relationships, but only insofar as they are a priori can they allow to forge universal laws (Benoist, 1996; Ferraris, 2009). Then, how the thesis of the inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself can avoid falling back into idealism (Muralt, 1958; Rousset, 1967; Rivelaygue, 1992)?

Shepherd's discussion of Hume (Atherton, 2005; Paoletti, 2011; Bolton, 2019; Landy, 2020; Folescu, 2021; Tanner, 2022) and Berkeley (Atherton, 1996; Rickless, 2017, 2022; Peterschmidt, 2022) proves to be more effective. Her causal conception of perception is tempered by an analysis of causality that introduces the idea of a synchronicity of cause and effect within a theory of causation as a compositional determination relation (Bolton, 2011; Fantl, 2016; Lolordo, 2019). Shepherd allows us to remove certain ambiguities of the refutation of idealism (which posits an external object of uncertain status, between external phenomenon and thing-in-itself) but also of the transcendental aesthetics (regarding the application of the a priori form of time to actual causal relations) by suggesting that the experience of the relations between phenomena teaches us something about the relations between things. Thus, the only alternative to an indirect realism that holds the radical inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself is not a direct realism that makes perception an immediate access to the real. This realism of relations is a key to an effective refutation of idealism.

**Pierre-Luc Desjardins, ‘The Use and Meaning of Analogy in Mary Shepherd’s Thought’**

Both at the beginning (chapter I, section II) and at the very end (chapter VII, section I; chapter VIII) of her Essay On the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy, Mary Shepherd claims that the arguments she puts forth in order to establish the existence of an external universe (i.e. a universe that exists independent of our minds) are relevant to the discussion of God, Creation and religion in general. These remarks echo her observations on Hume’s theory of causality, which, according to her Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, engenders disbelief and

atheism.

To Shepherd, it seems the interest of science and reason in establishing the existence of an external universe and in guarantying our access to it converges with that of religion and faith Indeed, it appears Shepherd’s reasoning in her Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy not only aims to provide a correct understanding of reality and human perception, but also to make apparent the similitudes between the type of arguments that can ground an individual mind’s belief in the existence of an external universe, and those that can establish the existence of God. Both our access to external objects and our capacity to prove the existence of God rely on an argument from analogy, insofar as neither our access to God nor our access to external objects is direct. According to Shepherd, the relationship between our minds and the external objects is similar to the one between the algebraic signs and that which they signify (chapter I, section II §7; chapter II, section I); our perceptions, then, point towards the existence of external objects much in the same way algebraic sings indicate the quantity they express, and much in the way Creation points towards the existence of a Creator.

This talk proposes to sketch the way Shepherd’s concept of “analogy” allows her to present a unified understanding of the interest of reason and of religion in demonstrating the existence of an external universe.

### 24. Evaluating Liberalism

**Thomas Schramme, ‘Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of individuality’**

Wilhelm von Humboldt is mainly known, in the English-speaking world, as the author of The Limits of State Action (originally published in 1851), which itself is regarded widely as a kind of libertarian manifesto. However, the underlying theory of individuality is less well known. In this paper, I offer a close scrutiny of Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of individuality. My interpretation makes use of numerous additional studies and letters, including many that have not been translated into English. I aim to show that Humboldt's account is special in some respects, most importantly in that he assumes a predestined origin of individuality. In other respects, he shares ideas of many modern liberal thinkers. Altogether, I believe Humboldt deserves more direct scholarly attention, as his theory highlights possible political divergences despite the superficially shared belief in the value of individuality.

**Hina Nazar, ‘Mary Astell and John Locke: A Revaluation’**

This paper seeks to reassess Locke’s importance to early feminist thought by reassessing the seventeenth-century philosopher Mary Astell’s engagement with his work. A High Church Tory thinker, Astell now enjoys a secure place in a growing canon of early modern women philosophers but the feminist recovery of her work that began in the 1980s views her almost universally as a militant critic of Locke’s liberalism, empiricism, and commitment to religious toleration. However, as Mark Goldie notes in an important recent revaluation, scholarly depictions of the Astell-Locke relationship as a battle between the “father” of liberalism and the “mother” of feminism have perhaps more to do with postmodern feminist scholarship’s ambivalence about liberalism than Astell’s distaste for Locke’s writings, which she typically cites respectfully. This paper builds on Goldie’s insights but shifts attention away from the epistemological concerns he finds central to the Astell-Locke connection, focusing instead on ethics as a particularly important area of shared interests. It also builds on the recent work of Jacqueline Broad, who has identified ethics, rather than politics or epistemology, as the basis of Astell’s feminism, which Broad characterizes as far less rationalist and far more committed to a virtue ethics tradition than has been recognized. But while Broad turns to Descartes’s Of the Passions of the Soul (1649) to develop a better understanding of the extra-rational constituents of agency in Astell’s ethical understanding, I argue for the interest of Locke’s motivational hedonism and its accompanying claims for the moral significance of education and habituation. In her writings of the 1690s—A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Parts I and II (1694, 1697) and Letters Concerning the Love of God (1695)—Astell identifies the good life as a life of the “highest Epicurism” because it enables agents to experience the pleasure that comes from realizing their full potential as deiform or Godlike beings. I direct attention especially to Chapter IV of Serious Proposal II, Astell’s most systematic philosophical work, in which she develops an account of the will and its determination that bears remarkable and yet under-recognized parallels to Locke’s account of the hedonic will in the chapter, “Of Power,” in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Building on Locke’s language of “uneasiness,” “suspension,” and “true happiness,” and agreeing with him about the importance of moral motivation and pleasure to any account of ethics, Astell argues, like Locke, that moral rectitude requires that agents bring enduring pleasures to bear on their quest for momentary, sense-based happiness. Unlike Locke, however, Astell highlights the importance of self-esteem as the most enduring of pleasures, a pleasure that, as Serious Proposal I indicates, is denied to women in patriarchal society. Reopening the question of Astell’s engagement with Locke’s writings, this paper offers the first sustained comparison of Astell and Locke as moral thinkers, and it argues also for the methodological importance to feminist scholars of opening up our understanding of feminist foremothers as far more open-minded and eclectic than we sometimes give them credit for.

**Tom Bailey, ‘Kant and the Settler Contract**

*1. The nomad-settler passage*

“The question arises, however: in newly discovered lands, may a nation undertake to *settle* (*accolatus*) and take possession in the neighbourhood of a people that has already settled in the region, even without its consent?

If the settlement is made so far from where that people resides that there is no encroachment on anyone’s land, the right to settle is not open to doubt. But if these people are shepherds or hunters (like the Hottentots, the Tungusi, or most of the American Indian nations) who depend for their sustenance on great open regions, this settlement may not take place by force but only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding their lands. This is true despite the fact that sufficient specious reasons to justify the use of force are available: that it is to the world’s advantage, partly because these crude peoples will become civilised (this is like the pretext of by which even Büsching tries to excuse the bloody introduction of Christianity into Germany), and partly because one’s own country will be cleaned of corrupt men, and they or their descendants will, it is hoped, become better in another part of the world (such as New Holland). But all these supposedly good intentions cannot wash away the stain of injustice in the means used for them. Someone may reply that such scruples about using force in the beginning, in order to establish a lawful condition, might well mean that the whole earth would still be in a lawless condition; but this consideration can no more annul that condition of right than can the pretext of revolutionaries within a state, that when constitutions are bad it is up to the people to reshape them by force and to be unjust once and for all so that afterwards they can establish justice all the more securely and make it flourish.” (*The Doctrine of Right*, 6:353)

*2. The anti-colonial reading (Niesen, Flikschuh, Ajei, Ripstein, Stilz, Lo Re)*

1. Interpretive claim: Nomads as non-state peoples, property claims, and Kant restricts the duty of state entrance in a major anti-colonial move.
	* Kant’s property/possession argument in *The Doctrine of Right*:
		1. Assertion of (coercible) rights claims, e.g. to property, in the state of nature
		2. Rights claims unilaterally obligate others e.g. to refrain from interfering with property
		3. This violates equal freedom
		4. To avoid this, rights claims must be reciprocal and enforceable
		5. A general united or omnilateral will is necessary to legitimate rights claims
		6. Therefore, it is a universal (and coercible) duty to enter the state
2. Normative claim: Contract (in contrast to force) in is unproblematic, open, free, and non- (or even anti-)colonial and as such is worth developing further in contemporary theory in light of (neo-)colonialism.

*3. Kant’s Systematic Problem, Our Interpretive Question*

Kant’s systematic problem:

* The moral possibility/ permissibility of contract, as a form of possession, requires omnilateral legitimation by the state: “a bilateral but still particular will is also unilateral” (*DR* 6:263).
* The nomads and settlers are not part of the same state – are not united with the same omnilateral will – so a nomad-settler contract should be impossible.
* Yet without the nomad-settler contract Kant fails to bring the nomads and settlers under rightful relations and the system of right is incomplete at a global scale – threatening total collapse.

Our interpretive question:

* Given Kant’s systematic problem, we might say he choose to complete the system of right ‘illegitimately’ through the morally impermissible means of contract, perhaps because completing the system of right is the project of *The Doctrine of Right* and overwhelmingly important.
* The interpretive question is why does Kant appeal specifically to contract in the nomad-settler passage as his means to do so?

*4. The Settler Contract (Pateman, Mills)*

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Domination contract theory – the original contract is multifaceted, including the social contract but also the suppressed sexual, racial, and settler contracts:

* Domination contract theory reveals apparently free and equal contracts to systematically create relationships of subordination, e.g. in Pateman’s analysis, the marriage contract appears as a free contract between a man and a woman, but theorising the sexual domination contract reveals the systematic role of marriage contracts in creating the subordinating relationship of woman/wife to husband/man.
* A theorisation of the world but also a framework for interpreting the history of political thought: “The state of nature and original contract are powerful political fictions and their power derives from the fact that they have had purchase on and have helped create the modern world.” (Pateman, “The Settler Contract”, p. 55) As a result, domination contracts are often obscured in interpretations of the classical texts of the original contract.

The Settler Contract as a ‘language of political thought’:

* The Settler Contract - *Terra Nullius*: Indigenous peoples declared non-existent, and lands declared a state of nature which awaits the original contract and the institutions of the modern state both in history and in political thought (Hobbes, Grotius, Locke, Vattel, etc.)
* Developed my Early-Modern European political philosophers in response to the question of how Europeans and non-Europeans should interact which constrains, limits, and channels to way thinkers think.

An answer to the interpretive question: Kant mobilises The Settler Contract as a language of political thought:

* Caught in his systematic problem, contract appears as a readily accessible means of negotiating the nomad-settler interaction in the context of the tradition of political philosophy of which Kant is a part. So, he reaches for it.

*5. Re-assessing the nomad-settler passage*

This answer to the interpretive question also provides an answer to Kant’s systematic problem but at the cost of the normative anti-colonial potential of the nomad-settler passage:

* The settler’s sovereign omnilaterally legitimates the contract – the nomads are recognised as juridical equals under the laws of the European sovereign and subordinated to the settler’s state.
* Through the nomad-settler contract, the nomads demand mutual recognition of their contractual possession claims as juridical equals, as a result they become subject to the coercible universal duty of state entrance and accede to the expansion of European sovereignty over them.
* The nomads agree to the subjugation contract, the terms of the sovereignty that they are subsequently governed by are already set and in action in the European state the terms of European sovereignty are already set and in action – The nomad-settler contract “presupposes, extinguishes and replaces the state of nature” all at once (Pateman, “The Settler Contract”, p. 67).
* Why not a new mutual civil union between the nomads and the settlers? This is impermissible for the settlers who would have to dissolve the civil union between themselves and act as ‘revolutionaries’.

Conclusion: Against the anti-colonial reading’s normative claim – when read in light of The Settler Contract, the presence of contract in the nomad-settler passage is not sufficient to ensure it is free nor to make it a promising basis for development in contemporary political theory.

**Ruben Noorloos, ‘Van den Enden on Chattel Slavery’**

Franciscus van den Enden, who is perhaps best known as Spinoza’s Latin teacher, also wrote two political tracts. His *Short Account of the New Netherlands* contains a short and vehement rejection of chattel slavery. The aim of this paper is to analyze and contextualize this rejection. While Van den Enden’s views have been noted before, they have not been analyzed in detail(see Klever 1992, 37-9; Israel 2006, 608-9; Paijmans2020, 16-20).There are several reasons why his critique deserves more attention, however: itis notable forits vehemence and its un-conditional nature; for having been formulated very early in the Enlightenment, by an out-spoken proponent of Dutch colonial expansion; and for its being anchored in a political philosophy similar to Spinoza’s.

Van den Enden gives three arguments against slavery(KVNN 26). First is the economic argument that the use of enslaved people will lead to less prosperity than that of free labor. The second is that “insofar as Christianity is a religion of reason”, it opposes slavery because it “is in conflict with all human justice and compassion” and is motivated by greed.

The third and most important is that chattel slavery “contradicts our free nature and government” (KVNN 26).I interpret this claim by drawing on his other political text, the *Free Political Propositions*. Slavery contradicts “our free nature” because everyone naturally (i.e., constitutively) seeks their own advantage, and this holds prior to any obligation they may have (e.g., VPS 1/138). As a result, no one can be obliged to entirely forego the pursuit of their advantage; hence no one can rightfully be enslaved. Unlike in the Roman law tradition and authors like Grotius and Locke, who allow for enslavement of those who had (for example)committed capital crimes, for Van den Enden any enslaved person would, as long as they live, have the right to revolt against their masters. Van den Enden here draws on views with parallels in Spinoza’s account of promising in TTP 16 and his *conatus* doctrine.

The principle extends to free government. The state must respect every citizen’s “equal freedom” (*even-gelijke vryheit*) because no one is bound by its laws unless this benefits them (see VPS 4/143-4). Enslavement violates this contract and cannot exist in a free state(VPS 10/158-9).The enslavement of people further is inadvisable for pragmatic reasons, as the inequalities it produces endanger the stability of the state and, for Van den Enden, inevitably tend towards revolution(VPS 10/159-60).Notably, Van den Enden takes the rejection of political slavery (under monarchy) to categorically imply that of chattel slavery. Hence this appeal to his audience :“to us free Dutch,” as members of a republic, slavery should be “completely abhor-rent” (KVNN 26).

I close by making two claims about Van den Enden’s importance for historical discussions of slavery. First, his radical rejection of slavery is an important reminder of principled and philosophically sophisticated rejections of the practice, like that of Leibniz (Jorati 2019). Second, although Spinoza’s claim in TTP 16.10 that slavery is incompatible with the nature of the state has often been read metaphorically or as a reference to political slavery alone, I claim that a comparison with Van den Enden’s views suggests that it may extend to chattel slavery as well.