

**British Society for the History of Philosophy Annual Conference 2021**

# **Women in the History of Philosophy**

**20<sup>th</sup>-23<sup>rd</sup> April 2021**

**Online via Zoom, hosted by Durham University**

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## Conference Schedule

<b>Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> April</b>			
16:00-18:00	Women in the History of Philosophy: A Workshop on Methodological Issues		
<b>Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup> April</b>			
10:30-11:00	Opening address		
<b>Session 1</b>			
11:00-13:00	<p><b>Vulnerability in the Thought of 20th-Century Women Philosophers. 1: Violence and Vulnerability</b></p> <p>À. Lorena Fuster (University of Barcelona) – Genealogies of Vulnerability: Mapping from the Perspective of Women’s thought</p> <p>Pau Matheu (University of Barcelona) – Vulnerability and Fragility in the Thought of Simone Weil</p> <p>Stefania Fantauzzi (University of Barcelona) – Taking Part of the World. Violence, the Pre-political and the Impolitical in the Work of Hannah Arendt</p> <p>Andrea Pérez Fernández (University of Barcelona) – Violence and Creation in the Work of Hannah Höch</p>	<p><b>Women Philosophers and Twentieth-Century Pragmatism</b></p> <p>Dan Taylor (Open University) – Jane Addams and Sympathetic Knowledge</p> <p>Helen Thaventhiran (University of Cambridge) – “(Exit Pragmatist, exulting.)”: Vernon Lee and Victoria Welby in the Margins of Philosophy</p> <p>Andreas Vrahimis (University of Cyprus) – Susan Stebbing on Bergson and Pragmatism</p> <p>Joel Katzav (University of Queensland) – The Philosophy of Grace de Laguna (or, Grace Beyond Analytic and Continental Philosophy)</p>	<p><b>Croatian Women Philosophers: An Overview</b></p> <p>Luka Boršić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – First Two Croatian Women Philosophers</p> <p>Ivana Skuhala Karasman (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – Two Modern Croatian Women Philosophers</p> <p>Matko Gjurašin (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – Two Croatian Women Philosophers on Free-Will</p> <p>Ana Maskalan (Institute for Social Research, Zagreb) – Women Feminist Philosophers in (ex) Yugoslavia: Being at the Crossroads between East and West</p>
13:00-14:00	Lunch		
14:00-15:00	<b>Keynote: Marilyn Fischer (University of Dayton) – Imperialism’s Critics: Jane Addams and the Comte-Inspired British Intellectuals</b>		
15:00-15:15	Break		

<b>Session 2</b>			
15:15-16:45	<p><b>The Physics and Metaphysics of Émilie Du Châtelet</b></p> <p>Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) – The Disharmony of Leibniz and Du Châtelet</p> <p>Caspar Jacobs (University of Oxford) – Du Châtelet: Idealist About Extension, Bodies and Space</p> <p>Joseph Anderson (Allen University Columbia, SC) – Du Châtelet Against Atomism but Not Atoms</p>	<p><b>Biography and Historiography</b></p> <p>Rodolfo Garau (Università Ca' Foscari) – Historicizing the History of Women Philosophers. Three Early Modern Cases: Mainly on Marguerite Buffet's, but also on Pierre Gassendi's, and Giles Ménage's, "Histories" of Women Philosophers</p> <p>Tatiana Kolomeitceva (independent researcher) – Bringing Back Women Philosophers into Russian History of Philosophy: Natalia Vokach</p> <p>Maria Rosa Antognazza (King's College London), presented on behalf of Marco Paolinelli – Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908-1990): An Impenitent Metaphysician</p>	<p><b>Political and Moral Philosophy in Twentieth Century Europe</b></p> <p>George Bocean (Durham University) – Marxism and Sexual Revolution in Early 20th Century Russia: The Theoretical Contribution and Role of Bolshevik Feminism on Marxist Theory and the Question of Women's Emancipation in Russia</p> <p>Charles des Portes (University of Leeds) – The Eros of Freedom: Hannah Arendt's Hermeneutic Phenomenology</p> <p>Christopher Thomas (Manchester Metropolitan University) – Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention</p>
16:45-17:00	<b>Break</b>		
17:00-18:00	<b>BSHP AGM</b>		
<b>Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup> April</b>			
<b>Session 3</b>			
10:30-12:00	<p><b>Mind, Metaphysics, and Epistemology in Early-Modern Britain</b></p> <p>Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin) – Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Human Nature and the Lockean Distinction between Person and Man</p>	<p><b>Vulnerability in the Thought of 20th-Century Women Philosophers. 2: Contingency and Freedom</b></p> <p>Elena Laurenzi (University of Salento) – Contingency, hope and freedom. María Zambrano on the</p>	<p><b>Women on Logic and Language in the Twentieth Century</b></p> <p>Siobhan Chapman (University of Liverpool) – Susan Stebbing: Philosophy, Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis</p>

	Benoît Gide (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) – From the “Natural Suggestion” to the “Super-Induced Sensation” of the External World Shepherd’s Realism – Against Reid’s?	Spanish Republic and Civil War  Fina Birulés (University of Barcelona) – Contingency and Storytelling in Hannah Arendt  Teresa Hoogveen (University of Barcelona) – Contingency, Action and Natality: Françoise Collin Reads Hannah Arendt	Frederique Janssen-Lauret (University of Manchester) – Ruth Barcan Marcus and Quantified Modal Logic  Andrea Reichenberger (University of Paderborn) – Discovering Philosophy Behind Logic and Mathematics: Lessons from Rózsa Péter’s “Playing with Infinity”
12:00-12:15	Break		
<b>Session 4</b>			
12:15-13:45	<b>The Mary Midgley Archive, Durham University Library</b>  Andrew Gray (Durham University)  Liz McKinnell (Durham University)  Verity Birt (Northumbria University and Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art)  Amber Donovan (Durham University)  Ian James Kidd (University of Nottingham)  Yiota Vassilopoulou (University of Liverpool)	<b>Women Philosophers in Late-Medieval and Renaissance Humanism</b>  Ana Rieger Schmidt (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) – Christine de Pizan’s Philosophical Sources  Favola Visco (Università degli Studi dell’Aquila) – Cereta: Strength, Stubbornness, Struggle  Marina Christodoulou (University of Edinburgh) – Equality Used to be Superiority: The Paradigm of Lucrezia Marinella and Henricus Cornelius Agrippa	<b>Nature and Perception in the Work of Margaret Cavendish</b>  Jonathan Shaheen (Ghent University) – The Philosophical Fancy of Cavendish’s Blazing World: An Allegorical Interpretation  Laura Georgescu (University of Groningen) – No True Disorder, No True Order: Regularity and Irregularity in Cavendish’s Philosophy of Nature  Peter West (Durham University) – Thinking in Colour: Margaret Cavendish on Conception, Perception, and Existence in Nature
13:45-14:45	Lunch		
14:45-15:45	<b>Keynote: Sophia M. Connell (Birkbeck, University of London) and Frederique Janssen-Lauret (University of Manchester) – Why Forgotten? Women in the History and Pre-History of Analytic Philosophy</b>		
15:45-16:00	Break		
<b>Session 5</b>			

16:00-18:00	<p><b>Women in the History and Philosophy of Science</b></p> <p>Trevor Pearce (UNC Charlotte) – Feminist Philosophers of Evolution: Antoinette Brown Blackwell and Frances Emily White</p> <p>Francesco Nappo (UNC Chapel Hill) – Mary Hesse on Materiality and Analogy</p> <p>Joshua Fischel (Millersville University of Pennsylvania) – Monsters, Meteors, and Metaphysics: Lorraine Daston’s Recasting of Modernity</p> <p>Cristina Chimisso (Open University) – Hélène Metzger on the Role of Emotions and Habits in Scientific Knowledge</p>	<p><b>Ayn Rand and the History of Philosophy</b></p> <p>James Lennox (University of Pittsburgh) – Introduction</p> <p>Gregory Salmieri (University of Texas, Austin) – Ayn Rand and Aristotle on the Standard of Value</p> <p>Lisa Downing (University of Birmingham) – An Unimagined Encounter: Rand with Foucault</p> <p>Robert Mayhew (Seton Hall University) – Ayn Rand on Atheism, Religion, and Values</p> <p>Ben Bayer (Ayn Rand Institute) – Ayn Rand’s Defense of Abortion Rights Vs. Contemporary Kantian Defenses</p>	<p><b>Recovering and Teaching the Thought of Ancient Women</b></p> <p>Caterina Pellò (University of St Andrews) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: A Case-Study from the Pythagorean Tradition</p> <p>Maria Protopapas-Marneli (Research Centre for Greek Philosophy, Academy of Athens) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: The Case of Hipparchia</p> <p>Jana Schultz (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: The Case of the Neoplatonic Philosophers</p> <p>Katharine O’Reilly (King’s College London) and Branislav Kotoc (King’s College London) – ‘Old WivesTales’? Challenges and Opportunities in Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy</p>
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**Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> April**

**Session 6**

10:30-12:00	<p><b>Phenomenology and the Emotions in the Twentieth Century</b></p> <p>Pia Valenzuela (Catholic Institute) – Magda B. Arnold's Work on the Integration of Philosophy and</p>	<p><b>Iris Murdoch and Analytic Philosophy</b></p> <p>Ana Barandalla (independent researcher) – Murdoch on Freedom</p>	<p><b>Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Economics</b></p> <p>Janelle Pöttsch (Paderborn University) – The Economic Thought</p>
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	<p>Psychology Perspectives on Human Emotion</p> <p>Ronny Miron (Bar-Ilan University) – The Circle of Nothingness: The Problem of the Phenomenological Beginning and the Possibility for Metaphysics</p>	<p>Amber Donovan (Durham University) and Sasha Lawson-Frost (independent researcher) – Murdoch on Wonder</p> <p>Lesley Jamieson (Queen’s University) – How Iris Murdoch Does Moral Philosophy</p>	<p>of Harriet Taylor Mill (1807-1858)</p> <p>Alan Coffee (King's College London) – Catharine Macaulay and Anna Laetitia Barbauld: Reassessing the Impact of the “Republican Viragos”</p> <p>Nicolai von Eggers Mariegaard (Kingston University) – The Politics of Virtue: Feminist Theorists in the French Revolution</p>
12:00-12:15	Break		
<b>Session 7</b>			
12:15-13:45	<p><b>Ethics and Emotions in the British Analytic Tradition</b></p> <p>Miranda Boldrini (Sapienza University of Rome) – Iris Murdoch in the Analytic Tradition: A Different Epistemology for Moral Philosophy</p> <p>Elizabeth Drummond Young (University of Edinburgh) – Shirley Letwin on Individuality and Moral Practice</p> <p>Eleanor Robson (Durham University) – Delimiting the Ethical Domain: Midgley as a Supplement to Foot</p>		<p><b>Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Women Logicians</b></p> <p>Sara Uckelman (Durham University) – What Problem Did Ladd-Franklin (Think She) Solve(d)?</p> <p>Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton) – Dorothy Wrinch on Judgment as “a very complicated phenomenon”</p> <p>David Loner (University of Cambridge) – Alice Ambrose, David Foster Wallace and Philosophical Folk Wisdom in <i>The Broom of the System</i>, 1979-1987</p>
13:45-14:45	Lunch		
14:45-15:45	<b>Keynote: Peter Adamson (LMU Munich) – Finding Their Voices: Women in Byzantine and Latin Christian Philosophy</b>		
15:45-16:00	Break		
<b>Session 8</b>			

16:00-17:30	<p><b>Anne Conway on Time, Process, and Generation</b></p> <p>Jonathan Head (Keele University) – Considering Anne Conway as a Process Philosopher</p> <p>Jessica Tizzard (University of Connecticut) – Anne Conway on Finite Creatures and Infinite Progress</p>	<p><b>Women in Ancient Philosophy and Women Philosophers on the Ancients</b></p> <p>M. Alexandra Valadas (Michigan State University) – Tracing back Gender in the Kepos through Leontion, the Epicurist hetaira</p> <p>Dorota Dutsch (UCSB) – “And the Famous Theano...” Rethinking the Canon with Panthea of Smyrna</p> <p>Sara Diaco (University of Tübingen) – Simone Weil and the Classics</p>	<p><b>Feminism, Morality, and the Passions in Early-Modern Europe</b></p> <p>Ariane Schneck (University of Bielefeld) – Elisabeth’s Influence on Descartes in the Correspondence and the Passions of the Soul</p> <p>Kathleen Cook (University of Pittsburgh) – Anna Maria Van Schurman as Philosopher and Feminist</p> <p><b>Who Counts as a Philosopher and Why? On the Text Tradition Catalogues of Learned Women (Denmark and Germany, 1650-1800)</b></p> <p>Anne-Sophie Sørup Nielsen (University of Copenhagen) – Female Philosophers as “Learned Women”: A Critical Examination of the Genre <i>Gelehrte Frauenzimmer</i></p> <p>Sabrina Ebbesmeyer (University of Copenhagen) – What Makes a Princess a Philosopher? Or: Elisabeth of Bohemia sans Descartes</p>
17:30-18:00	Closing address		

## Preconference Workshop

### Women in the History of Philosophy: A Workshop on Methodological Issues

The workshop will discuss some of the methodological issues which have emerged as the history of women's contribution to philosophy has developed and expanded in recent years. Panel members will share insights and problems encountered from their own work. Questions to be considered include the implications for the historiography of philosophy and whether research on women's philosophy from different periods requires different methodologies, best practice for the future. Open discussion with all participants will follow the panel contributions.

#### Speakers

Sarah Hutton (University of York)

Caterina Pellò (University of St Andrews)

Alison Stone (University of Lancaster)

Rachael Wiseman (University of Liverpool)

## Keynote Talks

### Marilyn Fischer (University of Dayton) – Imperialism's Critics: Jane Addams and the Comte-Inspired British Intellectuals

Jane Addams's writings between 1900 and the commencement of World War One present puzzles. Why do passages from British writers such as Frederic Harrison, John Morley, and L.T. Hobhouse keep popping up? While working on *Newer Ideals of Peace*, why did Addams tell her editor, "The book moves slowly.... Hobson has really said it all in his 'Imperialism,'" when Hobson's book is a critique of British imperialism and *Newer Ideals of Peace* is primarily about U.S. domestic municipal reform? And why does Addams's conception of democracy seem to shift between *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902) and *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907)?

The key to answering these questions is to locate Addams as a participant in a small discourse community of Comte-inspired British intellectuals. These writers recast Auguste Comte's conceptions of science and of Humanity (always capitalized) within an evolutionary framework. They used Comte's central ideas to construct critiques of imperialism and develop new conceptions of international morality. Addams drew inspiration from their work in constructing her versions of the same.

In the first section I describe this discourse community and introduce the Comtean concepts the participants used. In section II I develop Addams's critique of U.S. imperialism against foreigners without, juxtaposing her writings with those of Harrison and Hobhouse. In section III I present Addams's critique of imperialism against recent immigrants as foreigners within the U.S., for which Hobson and Morley served as inspiration. In section IV I sketch out features of Addams's, Hobson's, and Hobhouse's projected international ethic. Finally, in section V I present Addams's critique of imperialism against African Americans as outsiders within, for which she adapted material from Harrison and Hobhouse.

### Sophia M. Connell (Birkbeck, University of London) and Frederique Janssen-Lauret (University of Manchester) – Why Forgotten? Women in the History and Pre-History of Analytic Philosophy

The history of philosophy in the analytic tradition is largely a story of male endeavour, written by men. As Russell writes about Moore in his Autobiography 'he fulfilled my idea of genius...In the world of intellect, he was fearless and adventurous'. This consciousness of conquest and discovery was confidently held by the men in charge, those who ran the clubs, gave the prizes and fellowships, and controlled the publications. Over the years since the beginning of the emphasis on analysis, philosophy of language and logic in our discipline, the story that these men told themselves and each other has become the one that we tell about them. And this has to change.

In this talk we will present an alternate history, one which includes many women from the earliest work on logic and philosophy of mathematics, to the later development of analytic techniques and arguments, women who were marginalised professionally and personally, their role and ideas seldom acknowledged, and their work seldom recognised; women who were instrumental in the publications

of those famous men we know so well, particularly Wittgenstein, and in establishing and maintaining the growing success of analytical philosophy both in the UK and the USA.

Each of us will take two thinkers, one early, one later, to illustrate the struggle to express their philosophical ideas and the reasons why these ideas are still so little discussed amongst philosophers and historians of philosophy. Sophia Connell will consider the work of the Irish philosopher, Sophie Bryant, the first woman to gain first class honours in Mental and Moral Sciences at the University of London in 1878. Bryant wrote papers on logic and psychology in the journal *Mind* while working as a school headmistress in North London and supporting women's education and suffrage. The second thinker Connell will consider is Alice Ambrose, Wittgenstein's only PhD student, without whom we would not have the *Brown Book*, whose tireless work in academic circles to secure the integration of analytic trends is seldom recognised or remembered. Frederique Janssen-Lauret provides insight about the life and work of E.E. Constances Jones, early mistress of Girton College, whose work rivalled Frege and who was denigrated by Bertrand Russell amongst others. Janssen-Lauret will also explain the role that Ruth Barcan Marcus played in the development of modal logic, and why this has been obscured.

### Peter Adamson (LMU Munich) – Finding Their Voices: Women in Byzantine and Latin Christian Philosophy

This paper explores the rhetorical devices used by female thinkers in medieval Christianity, to establish themselves as authors worth reading and taking seriously in a male-dominated intellectual landscape. It is argued that women authors resorted to two types of strategy. Some adopted a "voice of transcendence" by claiming to speak for a superhuman, divine authority. Others adopted a "voice of humility" by conceding that men have the authority to speak in normal kinds of discourse, e.g. scholastic philosophy, but contending that, paradoxically, the lowly status of a woman allowed them to convey certain fundamental truths that should be known to all. Figures in focus include Macrina, Anna Komnene, Hildegard of Bingen, Mechthild of Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete, and women Renaissance humanists like Christine de Pizan and Laura Cereta.

# Session 1

## Vulnerability in the Thought of 20th-Century Women Philosophers. 1: Violence and Vulnerability

### Introduction

The papers offered in this symposium form part of the research project “Vulnerability in Women’s Philosophical Thought. Contributions to the debate on present emergencies,” and are selected from the studies that the Seminar Philosophy and Gender-ADHUC at the University of Barcelona has been carrying out over more than 20 years around the work and thought of early 20th century women philosophers. Vulnerability has been a core theme in ethical and political debate since the beginning of the 21st century. At present, the discussion of the meanings, values and sites of vulnerability represents the latest turn taken by analyses of violence, both of contemporary modes of violence, structural or circumstantial, and on ways of resisting this violence.

In the past century, however, whether by necessity or through commitment, the women thinkers active in the first half of the 20th century, as they were living through the period of the greatest violence in European history, identified early on the dangers which both new and old attitudes brought for the world and humankind (Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt, María Zambrano or Rachel Bespaloff, in addition to some artists, amongst them Hannah Höch). On the basis of this awareness they also affirmed, in an unprecedentedly radical way, human beings’ ineluctably relational condition. We have organised this symposium because we consider that these philosophers’ reflections can shed light on our current concerns from alternative perspectives. On the one hand they help us to grasp different facets of more contemporary affirmations of the constitutional interdependency of subjects (Judith Butler, Adriana Cavarero); and on the other they contribute to identifying the forms of violence which we have inherited from this recent past, at the same time as their thinking helps us to reorient the way in which violence itself is theorised and conceptualised in current philosophy and political theory. Thus this symposium has a twofold aim:

- (1) it will attempt to draw up a possible cartography of the current paradigm of vulnerability in order to bring to light the differing genealogies of thought on vulnerability in philosophy and the social sciences which have come to converge in this paradigm (paper 1); and
- (2) It will try to demonstrate the specificity and singularity of the reflections of: (a) Simone Weil on the “inadmissible” vulnerability characterising human bodies and souls and its intimate nexus with the concept of *la malheur* (paper 2); (b) Hannah Arendt on the relation of violence to politics, the field where the relational quality of the world is revealed to natal, plural beings (paper3); and (c) Hannah Höch, in her artworks, on the material and ideological violence to which women’s bodies and lives are subjected (paper 4). The overall objective of the symposium is to highlight the vital importance and originality of these women thinkers’ reflections on vulnerability, fragility and violence, in contrast with their disturbing absence from current debates on these topics.

## À. Lorena Fuster (University of Barcelona) – Genealogies of Vulnerability: Mapping from the Perspective of Women’s thought

Vulnerability emerged at the beginning of the 21st century as a central concern in ethical and political theory, largely due to Judith Butler’s work. Butler stresses that the term has a positive connotation, absent from its usage in the social sciences and everyday language, when it refers to the radically interdependent constitution of subjects. On the basis of this realisation, this paper attempts to retrospectively trace a hitherto undrawn cartography of the different genealogies of thought around the concept of vulnerability which developed in the matrix of 20th century philosophy and which have enabled us to see vulnerability in this light. Among these genealogies we pay special attention to that stemming from the “hidden tradition” of the women thinkers active in the first half of the last century. These are theorists whom Butler does not bring into her own work on vulnerability, unlike Emmanuel Lévinas, the explicit inspiration behind her theories in this area. For this reason, to end on we will briefly outline the interesting coincidences, and no less interesting distances, between her writings and those of other women philosophers such as Simone Weil and Hannah Arendt, whose significant contributions to theory will be the subject of the following papers in the symposium.

## Pau Matheu (University of Barcelona) – Vulnerability and Fragility in the Thought of Simone Weil

This paper sets out to show that some texts by the French philosopher Simone Weil (1909- 1943) can help us to reflect on vulnerability and its ethical-political implications. The human condition, as Weil argues in various writings from the years 1938 to 1942, involves being exposed to necessity, a mechanism dominated by force which bears no relation to human purposes and endeavours. The human being, exposed to this mechanism, can be destroyed at any moment. Also, according to Weil, this extreme fragility is almost impossible for us to accept, since humans, fearful of the absurdity of this blind mechanism, take refuge in lies, in an imaginary world which we appear to control and where there is a relationship between our efforts and our wellbeing. Weil’s concept of affliction (*la malheur*) refers specifically to circumstances which tear this illusion apart and force us to recognise our vulnerability. She argues that human thought tends not to recognise affliction but rather to reject it with hatred and contempt because contact with it reveals the fragility of the human condition. Due to this tendency human societies pay no attention to the vital needs of the afflicted, abandoning them to their fate and blaming them for all types of evils. In order to prevent this injustice, Weil’s view is that we need to find a method that enables us to pay attention to affliction, which inevitably involves accepting the vulnerability of our condition. Such recognition will not be the immediate effect of an act of will, abnegation or heroic sacrifice, but the result of a long and gradual transformation in which the delight we find in contemplating the world’s beauty plays a fundamental role.

## Stefania Fantauzzi (University of Barcelona) – Taking Part of the World. Violence, the Pre-political and the Impolitical in the Work of Hannah Arendt

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the issues of war and violence in Hannah Arendt’s thought, drawing on articles published in the newspaper *Aufbau* between 1941 and 1945. In these texts, Arendt

argues for the organisation of a Jewish army to engage in the struggle against Nazism. Here I attempt to show that this call for a Jewish army is not in contradiction with the separation between power and violence that Arendt posited in other writings.

With this objective, I will compare *Aufbau's* writings with *On Violence* and with *Was ist Politik?*, and I will try to interpret this comparison by means of the concept of impolitical, elaborated by the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito. Through the application of the category of the impolitical to Arendt's theory of violence, I will interpret the dichotomy between politics and violence as a powerful tool for understanding the condition of human beings in the world. Here, it is not only a matter of considering her claim in favor of a Jewish army as the result of a specific historical context, but also of seeing how these positions spring from a will of transformation of the same context: to define the political and to be active in the public scene.

### Andrea Pérez (University of Barcelona) – Violence and Creation in the Work of Hannah Höch

This paper considers Dadaist Hannah Höch's (1889-1978) reflections on violence in the photomontages, collages and writings she produced between the two world wars. It starts from the artwork "Mother" (1930), which reinterprets a photomontage by her fellow- Dadaist John Heartfield, "Forced supplier of human material". Heartfield used the image of a pregnant working-class woman against the backdrop of a dead young soldier to denounce the way that women's bodies were reduced to machines for the mass production of soldiers and low-paid workers. Höch changed the title, removed the corpse and placed a Kwakiutl tribal mask over the woman's face, leaving only the mouth visible, thereby radicalising Heartfield's violence by (1) disrupting the archetypal character of the representation, and (2) focusing attention on the woman's condition as a mother rather than a victim, impotent in the face of death. Also (3) she shows us that women's bodies are an ideological battleground. In other words, Höch refuses to see the woman as an idea with a circumscribed meaning constructed from the perspective of the European male gaze, as for example were the Weimar-era "New Woman" and the "proletarian woman" of the revolutionary artists. In her work, the female presence is associated with an abrupt, unforeseen destabilization of the status quo. Her technique, mutilating and *violating* fragments of the existing world, not only annihilates established reality, but prefigures the existence of possible new worlds, at the same time charging this rupture with a positive connotation, imbued with savage irony. Her art contains, amongst other things, concrete and irreverent responses to a world which, as she herself observed, was unacceptable to anyone with a minimum of sensitivity.

### Women Philosophers and Twentieth-Century Pragmatism

#### Dan Taylor (Open University) – Jane Addams and Sympathetic Knowledge

This paper explores the contribution to participatory democratic theory of Jane Addams, an early 20<sup>th</sup> century American Pragmatist philosopher and social reformer. While Addams is justly feted today as a pioneer of social work, the underlying philosophical commitments of this are less alighted on, while her contribution to a progressive tradition of 'social morality' remains underappreciated (in contrast to say John Dewey). Addressing this, this paper highlights what Addams called 'sympathetic

knowledge', a form of political theory and citizen-sociology that, by its analysis, emphasises three bases for knowledge: community, participation and identifying tangential injustices.

The first part begins by contextualising Addams' uniquely situated, practical political commitments. Over some years she established the Hull House settlement, which first provided local clubs and classes and then, in response to need, established the city's first public playground, gym and bathhouse. Addams lobbied for rubbish collection, restrictions on child labour and for children's education, and against racial discrimination and political corruption. She lived alongside the poor and learned from them, pursuing a concept of democracy that could bridge theory and practice. Over the course of her work, particularly in *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902), she reflected on the failures and strengths of efforts to assist the communities to which she had dedicated herself, emphasising the importance of shared inquiry.

Against a modern condition of 'anxiety' and loneliness, Addams envisions a form of democracy that began at the level of the locality and the communal, grounded in recognising our interdependence. With this would arise a *democratic knowing*, whereby people would come to learn about each other, and policy would be directly informed by the needs, beliefs and feelings of all citizens, particularly those dependent on public services and traditionally excluded. Boundaries between observation and participation, expertise and everyday knowledge are blurred. Individuals are empowered through participation in shared inquiry, in a novel contribution to participatory political theory that can be bridged back to Mill and Rousseau, and forwards to Carol Pateman. Addams particularly emphasises non-judgemental, active listening. This 'new affinity for all men', akin to what Kant called cultivating an 'enlarged mentality' in the third *Critique*, leads to a more accurate and sympathetic view of others, and in turn improves the knowledge and resources provided, indirectly empowering the community again.

Sympathetic knowledge also involves facing up to the uncertainty of the political, which can never be morally pure or free from hypocrisy – indeed it involves the rejection of the moralisation of politics, or its reduction to a zero-sum game of 'rational self-interest' (an oxymoron in terms) – in favour of recognising our basic equality and difference. Something more concerned with relations, than individual rights. It's similar to what Gillian Rose had in mind with what she called a 'good enough justice' in *Love's Work*, one that could face up to impossibility of bridging the middle of individual behaviour and judgement and hectoring moral absolutes. The lasting aim of this paper is to bring this good enough social ethics into view.

### Helen Thaventhiran (University of Cambridge) – "(Exit Pragmatist, exulting.)"<sup>1</sup>: Vernon Lee and Victoria Welby in the Margins of Philosophy

Vernon Lee's adversarial book of philosophy, *Vital Lies* (1912) gives an excoriating account of William James's will-to-believe Pragmatism and celebrates C.S. Peirce by contrast. Prominently reviewed and listed in the *New York Times*, 'Hundred Best Books of the Year' for 1913, it has now all but vanished from histories of pragmatism. Not even revisionist histories (Seigfried's *Pragmatism and Feminism*, for example) allow space for Lee. One of Lee's correspondents who shared her Peircean perspective, Victoria Welby, also remains in the margins of philosophical history. Welby, the founder of 'Significs', corresponded intensely with Peirce across the years 1903-1911, and found him significant new

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<sup>1</sup> Stage direction from *Vital Lies*. Vernon Lee is a pseudonym for Violet Paget.

readers; Vailati, Russell, Ogden. Her personal library (Senate House Library, London), also shows her filling the margins of her copies of James's books with dissenting notes or 'adversaria'.

This paper dusts off *Vital Lies*, alongside Welby's marginalia, to give an alternative history of the European reception of American pragmatism in the early twentieth-century. Its aim is not solely historical, recovering from obscurity and from the archive materials infrequently considered. I also consider some arguments for alternative forms of reading. James and Peirce are familiar combatants in one of the perennial battles of philosophy: whether to accept or repel readings under the category of attention that is 'style'. If we turn to the margins of this pragmatist battle we may find new ways to think about doing philosophy that escape the James/Peirce impasse. Both Lee and Welby pay acute attention to the language of pragmatism, turning figurative scrutiny on its prose and challenging James and Peirce on the smallest units of diction or image. For example, Welby makes Peirce think hard about the phrase 'brute action' by which he explains Firstness, and Lee offers a critique of James's corridor metaphor for Pragmatism (borrowed from the Italian philosopher Papini, whose 'Florentine Pragmatist Club', in turn, took significant inspiration from Welby's writings on metaphor in *The Monist*). Their reflections contribute in lively ways to thought about what linguistic 'pictures' can and can't do in philosophy and may, this paper suggests, constitute an unexplored part of the pre-history of the reception of Wittgenstein's remarks on pictures holding us captive.

Both Welby and Lee offer styles of thought for pragmatism that are alternative to the standard forms of published discursive prose; for Welby, an epistolary philosophic community and virulent marginalia; for Lee, experiments in philosophical dialogue and drama. (*Vital Lies* is a prologue to her 1915 pacifist allegory, *Ballet of Nations*, in which philosophical concepts—Idealism, Truth—come to life in a fierce denunciation of war.) By reading these women on the margins of pragmatism with attention to questions of 'style', this paper hopes to restore liveliness to certain philosophical and political questions.

### Andreas Vrahimis (University of Cyprus) – Susan Stebbing on Bergson and Pragmatism

When Henri Bergson visited the United Kingdom in 1911, his public appearances were reported by the press and he was greeted with widespread popular enthusiasm. This would eventually lead to a series of responses by British philosophers, including Bertrand Russell's well-known 1912 criticism of Bergson, as well as answers to it by Herbert Wildon Carr and Karin Costelloe-Stephen.<sup>2</sup> This presentation will examine L. Susan Stebbing's overlooked contribution to this debate.

Commenting on Bergson's British reception, Stebbing opens her 1914 book on *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* by noting that initial enthusiasm had 'now given place to a criticism no less indiscriminating and, perhaps, equally unjustifiable'.<sup>3</sup> Stebbing's critique of Bergson, undertaken in what was originally her M.A. thesis written in 1911-1912, intended to correct the excesses of previous criticisms, highlighting instead those aspects of his work whose importance survives such objections.<sup>4</sup> Stebbing's is perhaps the most extended treatment of Bergson's thought produced by any philosopher associated with the analytic tradition (and anything approaching a complete analysis of her account would exceed the bounds of our current inquiry). It should, however, be noted that Stebbing had not

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<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Andreas Vrahimis (2019), *Sense Data and Logical Relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell's Critique of Bergson*, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*.

<sup>3</sup> Susan L. Stebbing (1914), *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. v.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

yet converted to analytic philosophy, and according to her account this conversion only took place when she met Moore in 1917, three years after the book was published.<sup>5</sup>

In criticising Bergson, Stebbing clarifies that she is in defence of what Bergsonians would call 'intellectualism'. Her approach to Bergson's thought involves an elaborate argument against its confused identification with currents within pragmatism.<sup>6</sup> Instead, Stebbing situates Bergson within what she understands to be the French Voluntarist tradition.<sup>7</sup> According to Stebbing both pragmatism and voluntarism emerge from a similar drive towards addressing 'the protest that philosophy has been made too hard for the plain man'.<sup>8</sup> While pragmatism was usually portrayed as an epistemological 'method compatible with any metaphysics',<sup>9</sup> Stebbing criticised some of its proponents for arguing that 'it points definitely to a metaphysic of voluntaristic type'.<sup>10</sup> Whereas pragmatism tends to emphasise intersubjectivity, voluntarism, in Stebbing's construal, is an extremely individualistic philosophical tradition. Stebbing's account further attempts to divorce the two by diagnosing a basic divergence in their views of the nature of truth. Whereas pragmatism (at least in the Jamesian variant which Stebbing focuses on) is committed to a view of the true as the useful, Bergson, as Stebbing points out, holds that the true is the real. Both, according to Stebbing, are in the wrong, primarily because they have to rely on 'non-intellectual methods of determining truth and solving metaphysical problems'.<sup>11</sup>

#### Joel Katzav (University of Queensland) – The Philosophy of Grace de Laguna (or, Grace Beyond Analytic and Continental Philosophy)

The work of Grace de Laguna (1878-1978) has been forgotten. I argue, in three steps, that she is a major twentieth-century thinker whose thought remains relevant today. First, I outline her speculative approach to philosophy. This approach endorses methodological naturalism while allowing philosophers a substantial degree of autonomy from science and common sense, and requiring that philosophy be systematic. Second, I show that her approach to philosophy is distinct by comparing it with the analytic approaches of David Lewis and David Armstrong, the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and the pragmatism of John Dewey. Third, I show that her approach is fruitful. It allowed her to articulate many of the positions and arguments that were, much later, taken to be key contributions by analytic philosophers to philosophy. Her philosophy of mind and language, developed in articles in the 1910s and in her 1927 book *Speech*, outlines and engages with type-physicalism, functionalism, anomalous monism, externalism about mental content, the idea (to use her terminology) that meaning is fixed by use and the social division of linguistic labour. Her epistemology and philosophy of science, presented in her 1910 book *Dogmatism and Evolution* and in later articles, develop ideas that became central to twentieth-century philosophy of science (e.g., confirmation holism, fallibilism about science and mathematics, and the centrality of research programs to science)

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<sup>5</sup> See Siobhan Chapman (2013), *Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 33-34; Michael Beaney (2016), *Susan Stebbing and the Early Reception of Logical Positivism in Britain*, in Christian Damböck (ed.), *Influences on the Aufbau*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 238-239.

<sup>6</sup> This, for example, is the view put forth in Russell's famous 1914 critique, for which he is criticised by Carr and Costelloe.

<sup>7</sup> See also e.g. Mark Sinclair (2018), 'Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 26, no. 1: pp. 131-153.

<sup>8</sup> Stebbing (1914), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Stebbing 1914, p. vi.

but also presents key twenty-first century ideas (e.g., the centrality modelling to science, the autonomy of the special sciences and perspectival realism). Her metaphysics, which culminates in her 1966 book *On Existence and the Human World*, drives her philosophical discoveries and, partly because of this and partly because of its explanatory strength, commends itself to us and raises questions about how we do philosophy.

## Croatian Women Philosophers: An Overview

### Luka Boršić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – First Two Croatian Women Philosophers

The two earliest Croatian women philosophers whose philosophical works have been preserved espoused a kind of radical feminism. The earliest woman philosopher known to us is Maruša Gundulić (Maria Gondola, born around 1557 in Dubrovnik). She is the author of a famous dedicatory letter from 1584 in which she argues that women are more virtuous, more intelligent and, generally, better human beings than men. Moreover, her husband Nicolò Gozze wrote two dialogues (*Dialogo della bellezza* and *Dialogo d'amore* from 1581), which represent philosophical thoughts and arguments of the interlocutors, that is Maruša Gundulić (Maria Gondola) and Cvijeta Zuzorić (Fiore Zuzzori), and in which the role of Maruša Gučetić can be understood as the one of a “female Socrates”. Almost exactly 300 years later Helena Maria Druschkovich (born in Vienna in 1856, known as Helene von Druskowitz) struggled to create a systematic doctrine that should replace religion: an anti-materialist monistic system in which there is an “Over-Sphere” as an ideal unattainable for everything related to matter. We can approach the Over-Sphere only by distancing ourselves from anything material. This presupposes a fundamental social reform: for Druskowitz, it is sexual reform. Women are much more intellectual and spiritual beings than men: by abandoning the patriarchy and giving absolute priority to women, society as a whole would come closer to the ideal Over-Sphere. In its radical form, this would require the complete separation of men from women, leading to the extinction of the race, with women as leaders in death.

### Ivana Skuhala Karasman (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – Two Modern Croatian Women Philosophers

Elza Kučera (1883–1972) is best known as the first female librarian in Croatia. It is less known that she was also passionate experimental psychologist. Furthermore, she had doctoral degree in philosophy from the University of Zürich, she translated from German and Hungarian language, she was involved in feminist movement, and had an extensive correspondence with prominent people of her time. Although she was a remarkable and educated woman, except for a few encyclopaedic entries she is almost completely forgotten. Another Croatian woman philosopher of the period was Ivana Rossi (1892–1963). She was the first Croatian woman to receive a PhD title from the University of Zagreb in 1916. The topic of her dissertation was *The Basic Thoughts of Henry Bergson's Philosophy* and it testifies about the contemporary reception of Henri Bergson, who was alive at the time when she wrote her dissertation. Rossi spent her entire professional career working as a high school teacher in Zagreb. She is also famous as translator of James Barrie's *Peter Pan in Kensington Park* which is the first Croatian translation of a book on Peter Pan.

## Matko Gjurašin (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) – Two Croatian Women Philosophers on Free-Will

In my presentation I will talk about Elly Ebenspanger (1904–1942) and Marija Brida (1912-1993), two Croatian woman philosophers who worked on the topic of free will. Ebenspanger wrote the first dissertation on the topic in the history of Croatian philosophy. There she has developed a noncausal axiological libertarian theory of free will: humans are free when they act for or against a moral value. Brida gave her understanding of free will in a series of three articles. An event-causal libertarian, she defines as free those actions that are in a broad sense creative: actions aimed towards producing art and scientific discoveries, humanizing interpersonal relations, and fighting against suppression of freedom.

## Ana Maskalan (Institute for Social Research, Zagreb) – Women Feminist Philosophers in (ex) Yugoslavia: Being at the Crossroads between East and West

In my presentation, I will touch on theoretical controversies and their social components related to the acceptance of feminist ideas in the former Yugoslavia, using the examples of selected Croatian feminist philosophers. The basis of these controversies was the political-economic nature of the ruling ideology, which in feminist demands saw either bourgeois innovation imported from the West or a tendency that in socialist terms deserved to be only secondary to class, i.e. labour struggle. The latter position, despite some socialist efforts on gender equality, proved to be wrong, which was analysed in the works of a Croatian feminist philosopher Blaženka Despot. As for the first position, it is true that Croatian feminist philosophers encountered difficulties in adapting numerous feminist ideas to a specific socio-cultural context, making their own contribution, the contribution of the European semi-periphery, to the feminist intellectual corpus all the more important.

## Session 2

### The Physics and Metaphysics of Émilie Du Châtelet

#### Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) – The Disharmony of Leibniz and Du Châtelet

It is widely assumed that Émilie Du Châtelet shares with G. W. Leibniz a thoroughgoing commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason ('PSR'). My primary goal is to argue that Leibniz and Du Châtelet diverge radically in the nature of their commitments to the PSR, and that this difference shapes their respective metaphysics. In particular, I show that Leibniz conceives of sufficient reasons as complete explanations, and that this conception underlies Leibniz's 'world-apart' doctrine: the claim that any created substance is metaphysically independent of all other substances (except God). By contrast, I show that Du Châtelet is committed to denying that substances are metaphysically independent of one another in Leibniz's sense, and that this commitment can be traced to Du Châtelet's conception

of sufficient reason. Insofar as Du Châtelet's metaphysics is widely assumed to be Leibnizian, my arguments highlight the extent to which some of her core commitments—namely, her conception of sufficient reason and her views concerning the independence of substances—are non-Leibnizian.

### Caspar Jacobs (University of Oxford) – Du Châtelet: Idealist About Extension, Bodies and Space

Émilie Du Châtelet's (1706-1749) magnum opus is her *Institutions de Physique* (1740; hereafter *Foundations of Physics*). This paper is concerned with the accounts of space and extension found in the *Foundations*.

Brading *et al.* (2018) completed the first full translation of the *Foundations* into English. Its fifth chapter, on space, is among those that were not available in English before their translation, and therefore has to date received little philosophical engagement in the English-speaking world. I intend to give a detailed philosophical analysis of the views on space and extension as found in the *Foundations*.

The purpose of the paper is two-fold. First, I provide an original reconstruction of the central argument of Chapter 5 of the *Foundations*, in which Du Châtelet explains how we come to perceive multiplicities of non-extended simples as extended bodies. The reconstruction is as follows:

- (1) We necessarily represent numerically distinct simples (i.e. multiplicities) as external to each other.
- (2) We represent simples that are external to each other *as a unity* by representing them as spatially extended.
- (3) *Sub-Conclusion*: When we represent a multiplicity as a unity, we necessarily represent it as spatially extended. (From (1) and (2))
- (4) When we represent a multiplicity, we necessarily represent it as a unity.
- (5) *Conclusion*: We necessarily represent a multiplicity as spatially extended. (From (3) and (4))

I will comment on the premises one-by-one.

Second, I show that this argument reveals an idealist strand in Du Châtelet's system: she is an idealist about extension in the sense that extension is a mental construct which confusedly represents multiplicities of fundamental substances. This is a form of *essence idealism*, as opposed to *existence idealism* (Stan, forthcoming). I will argue that this essence idealist strand extends to Du Châtelet's views of bodies and space, *contra* Stan (2018) and Brading (2018b). The picture that emerges is of Du Châtelet as both a *substance realist* and a *spatial idealist*.

If the interpretation I give is correct, then Du Châtelet's worldview is dualistic: there is a separation between the fundamental level of simples, and the phenomenal level of bodies. The connection between these two levels is complicated. On the one hand, the basic level grounds the higher regime: no bodies without elements. On the other hand, we cannot *reduce* the phenomenal level to the fundamental level, since the former is a mental construct with the latter as its partial input. Furthermore, the phenomenal is not a truthful representation of the fundamental level: it is a

*confusion*, which misrepresents the ground level in some of its basic aspects. Therefore, Du Châtelet's views come close to those of Kant.

### Joseph Anderson (Allen University Columbia, SC) – Du Châtelet Against Atomism but Not Atoms

The *Institutions de physique* of Émilie du Châtelet is a work that unites two of philosophy's most bitter enemies, setting side-by-side Leibnizian and Newtonian theses. The dissonance between these two influences has suggested to some that du Châtelet went through phases rather than being at the same time a Leibnizian and a Newtonian. Others have argued that we misunderstand du Châtelet's attitude towards the text, pulling from some of her correspondences in which she suggests that Leibnizian ideas deserve to be better known but not necessarily accepted. By examining passages on extension, atomism, and atoms, we will begin to see how du Châtelet grounds her mostly Newtonian physics in a Leibnizian metaphysics. Du Châtelet rather humorously claims that saying there is extension because there are atoms is like claiming that there are watches because there are watches (smaller watches, we might say). Unlike many other critics of atomism, du Châtelet interprets atomism as an attempt to explain what makes extended things extended. Most critics of atomism in early modernity would find the indivisibility of atoms inconsistent with their having dimension. Du Châtelet instead worries that atomism isn't able to account for the possibility of extension. Later in the text, she expresses openness to the existence of atoms. These views are consistent, of course, as long as atomism isn't taken as merely a theory involving atoms but a theory that holds that atoms are the most fundamental constituents of body. In this paper, I explore the way du Châtelet's passages on atoms and atomism contribute to her novel synthesis of Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian physics. Along with selections from her correspondence (especially regarding the criticism of Crousaz), I use the atomism/atoms dichotomy to argue for the much more interesting interpretation of du Châtelet which claims that she offers a genuine synthesis of Leibnizianism and Newtonianism rather than a merely descriptive text or a text that mirrors the stages of the author's development.

### Biography and Historiography

Rodolfo Garau (Università Ca' Foscari) – Historicizing the History of Women Philosophers. Three Early Modern Cases: Mainly on Marguerite Buffet's, but also on Pierre Gassendi's, and Giles Ménage's, "Histories" of Women Philosophers

This presentation focuses the emergence, in the 17th century, of the genre of the "histories" of women philosophers. It explores three case studies, offered, respectively, by the woman philosopher Marguerite Buffet and her *Nouvelles observations sur la langue française*, 1668, which will be the main subject of the talk; and, secondarily, by Pierre Gassendi (*Life of Epicurus*, 1647, and *Syntagma philosophicum*, 1658) and Gilles Ménage (*History of Women Philosophers*, 1690).

The presentation will start by drawing a sketch of the debates on the status and dignity of womanhood in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth century-France, which will set the scene for my account of the emergence of the "histories" of women philosophers. It will then focus on the treatment of the history of women philosophers of the antiquity by Pierre Gassendi in 1647 and 1658, which might well

be the first in modern times. Gassendi's coincide "history", it will be argued, had bearings on the aforementioned debate, for it explicitly aimed at proving that women possessed rational faculties as much as men, and that, as much as men, they are therefore able to philosophize and to be taught philosophy. I will then focus on Marguerite Buffet, which will be the main focus of the presentation. In her overlooked writing *Nouvelles observations*, Buffet took explicit position in favor of women's ability to philosophize, also providing a philosophical argument to prove this point – one rooted in Cartesian philosophy. Accordingly, the soul, being a different 'res' from the body, does not possess sexual connotations, neither female or male, thus ensuring that the ability to philosophize, being based on pure reason only, belongs to both sexes equally. notably, as an actor category, this view appears to contradict some feminist account of the notion of reason in modern philosophy, such as Bordo's (1987). I will then focus on the list of notable women put forward by Buffet, including not only ancient women philosophers, but also contemporary figures –such as Christina of Sweden – as a part of Buffet's argument in favor of women's philosophical stature. I will conclude with some remarks on Gilles Ménage's *History of Women Philosophers* – the first work carrying such title in modern Europe. While the work was believed that have single-handedly inaugurated the genre, I will argue that the context I provided shows that Ménage took part in a trend of scholarship that had already begun.

Through these case studies taken together, I aim at showing that the emergence of such genre is to be viewed in connection with the outburst that the "querelle des femmes" in 17th century-France; and that, as a consequence, such genre was at its onset characterized by strong political and social implications.

#### Tatiana Kolomeitceva (independent researcher) – Bringing Back Women Philosophers into Russian History of Philosophy: Natalia Vokach

There are no women in the history of Russian philosophy's textbooks. But if you look through the journal "Philosophy and psychology questions" of 1911, you can find a very long article of 29-year-old Natalia Vokach despite the philosophy professors of that time published their issues there. Does it say much about Russian academic culture before the Revolution? It says more about current times.

We remember Natalia Vokach only with her husband's name, Ivan Ilyin. Natalia Vokach's writings concern logic, phenomenology, aesthetics and history. They cannot become the base of Putin's ideology as her husband's works used to be. We do not remember much of her because she was a woman philosopher inside the traditional gender role of a philosopher's wife. It seems like being a good wife established the ground to being forgotten as a thinker for her. There is no a single biography dedicated to her as a researcher. Sometimes her surname is grammatically used in Russian like a male one in philosophical context. Moreover, Vokach's writings are being published inside Ivan Ilyin's books during the last 10 years.

In this study we briefly review the importance of Higher women courses and time in Heidelberg in Natalia Vokach's philosophical education. The objective was to examine Natalia Vokach's main philosophical writing on logic and aesthetics. The study will attempt to show Natalia Vokach as an independent thinker.

Finally, the study begins the exploration of pedagogical perspectives of using Natalia Vokach's writing in teaching logic in philosophy.

Maria Rosa Antognazza (King's College London), presented on behalf of Marco Paolinelli –  
Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908-1990): An Impenitent Metaphysician

This paper retraces the salient stages of Sofia Vanni Rovighi's intellectual biography and highlights the most important aspects of her thought.

Sofia Vanni Rovighi was one of the first women professors of philosophy in Italy. In addition to her work as a scholar, she became an extremely influential teacher, who trained several generations of students at the Catholic University in Milan through her exceptionally clear and insightful *Elementi di filosofia* (*Elements of Philosophy*).

An original philosopher and a leading historian of philosophy, her interest in philosophy was born during her high school years. In 1926 she enrolled in the Faculty of 'Lettere e Filosofia' at the recently founded Catholic University in Milan. She trained in the context of Neoscholastic philosophy, studying with Amato Masnovo, who taught her to read Thomas Aquinas' works directly, going further than handbooks. Thomas Aquinas and Masnovo remained her points of reference throughout her entire life.

After her graduation, intolerant of the Italian philosophical environment dominated by the actualistic philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, she continued her philosophical training abroad. She met Gilson, Heidegger, and in particular Husserl. She also tried to acquire knowledge in the scientific field.

At the time, Husserl and his *Logical Investigations* were almost unknown in Italy. In Husserl's works, Sofia Vanni Rovighi found the theses of the medieval scholastic thinkers on intentionality and universalizing abstraction, thus confirming herself in the idea that there is a 'perennial philosophy'. In her view, the task of every philosopher is to rediscover those truths that no one can deny, through unprejudiced research. In the same years she was also interested in the logical positivism of the Vienna circle, and then in English analytic philosophy, especially on moral issues. She also devoted herself to the in-depth study of the great early modern thinkers, such as Kant, Hegel, Spinoza and Galileo. Her research, based on the direct reading of a vast variety of texts in the history of philosophy, was always driven by theoretical purposes as opposed to being a purely historical reconstruction. In an era of widespread rejection of metaphysics, Sofia Vanni Rovighi remained an impenitent metaphysician. According to her, metaphysics is the heart of all philosophical research, and in particular is the foundation of objective supra-historical values.

## Political and Moral Philosophy in Twentieth Century Europe

### George Bocean (Durham University) – Marxism and Sexual Revolution in Early 20th Century Russia: The Theoretical Contribution and Role of Bolshevik Feminism on Marxist Theory and the Question of Women's Emancipation in Russia

When discussing the ideas of Marxism in regards to its theoretical analysis as well as its practical methods within the context of Russia, it brings out the focus to the question of the emancipation of women. The Sexual Revolution has always been at the forefront within the circles of Marxist thought; starting from the Revolution of 1905, continuing throughout the First World War, and going even further from the February Revolution (8<sup>th</sup> of March in the Gregorian Calendar) to the October

Revolution of 1917 and beyond. It indicates that the role of women has always been significant in the realm of social justice in Russia of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, as soon as the Bolsheviks came to power, many rights for women were put forward, such as the right to vote, the liberalisation of laws on divorce and abortion, decriminalisation of homosexuality, and an overall new higher status for women in society.

Alongside the aforementioned achievements, there has also been a prominent role in developing the ideas of Marxism and Sexual Revolution within Russia on behalf of female Bolsheviks during this period. The most prominent theoreticians were Aleksandra Kollontai (1872-1952), Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869-1939), Inessa Armand (1874-1920), and Aleksandra Artyukhina (1889-1969), just to name a few. Each of these thinkers have contributed both in theoretical ideas, as well as practical methods in approaching the question of sexual revolution thorough a Marxist framework within Russia.

Based on their theories, this paper will answer two questions. The first is related to the question of 'womanhood' in Russia under the Tsarist regime. It will analyse the image and expectations of women according to cultural and religious ideas in Russia at the time. The main source that will be focused upon here is Joanna Hubbs' *Mother Russia: The Feminine Myth in Russian Culture*. The second question, which is even more relevant to the topic itself, is the contribution of female Marxists in late Tsarist and early Soviet Russia, not only towards the ideas of Marxism itself, but also towards the question of Sexual Revolution as a whole.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the contribution that Kollontai, Krupskaya, Armand, Artyukhina, alongside other female Marxists in Russia, had in regards to their analysis of culture and religion in Tsarist Russia. This will be done in relation to their analysis and criticisms towards the socio-political and economic landscapes, as well as the cultural background of Tsarist Russia. Thus, this would emphasise the contribution of women in the field of intellectual history towards progressive revolutionary ideas not only through theoretical writings but also through their practical methods in regards to materialising such ideas in society as well.

### Charles des Portes (University of Leeds) – The *Eros* of Freedom: Hannah Arendt's Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Hannah Arendt is well known for her separation between the political and the social. This distinction is part of the several conceptual distinctions she put at the ground of her political theory. Moreover, they were the principal subject of critique made by other scholars on her thought. However, I think that these critiques are misled for two main reasons. First, they take Arendt's concepts as rigid categories, second, they assume that these distinctions form a binary. Against these statements, I intend to place Hannah Arendt's political theory within the field of phenomenology, where it belongs. She described herself as "a sort of phenomenologist" (Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. 405) which gives another view on her categories as well as her way of doing philosophy. Indeed, from her phenomenological perspective, concepts are not fixed sociological categories but phenomenal experiences. Their distinctiveness represents their structure as lived experience. However, it does not mean that two distinct categories cannot be somehow connected. For instance, according to Arendt, liberation and freedom are not the same, nevertheless, liberation is a condition of freedom. And it is precisely the question of freedom that interests us. More precisely, I make the hypothesis that Arendt's hermeneutic phenomenology is in itself a practice of freedom. To make my point, I will first give my

interpretation of Arendt's account of freedom that I define as an *an-archic praxis*. It means that freedom is an action that aims at the transformation of a social reality and at a new beginning (*praxis*), but this action does not rely on any rule or authority and is characterized by its spontaneous novelty (*an-archic*). Thereafter, I will analyse the structure of Arendt's hermeneutic phenomenology as twofold, first a phase of *deconstruction* followed by one of *experimentation* (Borren, 2010). I will argue that these phases are respectively a phase of *liberation* and of *freedom*. A liberation from the authority of the metaphysical tradition and a practice of freedom because of the openness entailed by critical thinking. Throughout the hermeneutic process of critical thinking, I will argue that an erotic of freedom is developed, or rather, practiced. To make my point, I will rely on Audre Lorde's account of *Eros* (2019), which, I will argue, is a manifestation of our hermeneutic mode-of-being. From an Arendtian perspective, Eros could lie in what she called the *abyss of freedom*, which means that the erotic, when liberated from tradition, opens up an abyss from which new beginnings can arise and where imagination is at free play allowing us to create new categories of understanding that are characterized by their openness. From this abyss we can *feel our freedom*, and this feeling is precisely *erotic*, "what we can feel in the doing" (Lorde, 2019, p. 44), in our very practice of critical thinking.

### Christopher Thomas (Manchester Metropolitan University) – Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention

For Simone Weil the invocation of 'rights' to address extreme human suffering—what she calls 'affliction'—is 'ludicrously inadequate'. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be *heard*. For Weil, then, it is the hearing of the 'cry' of the afflicted that is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil's concept of *attention*, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil's ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of *disinterestedness*. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.

## Session 3

### Mind, Metaphysics, and Epistemology in Early-Modern Britain

#### Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin) – Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Human Nature and the Lockean Distinction between Person and Man

Cockburn emphasizes that human nature is the ground or foundation of morality. Several scholars have rightly argued that this makes her moral philosophy original, but the underlying metaphysical implications of her account of human nature deserve more attention. The aim of this paper is to examine Cockburn's account of human nature and the metaphysical commitments that follow from it. I pay particular attention to the questions of whether her account of human nature is consistent with her metaphysical agnosticism about the materiality or immateriality of thinking substances,

defended in other parts of her works, whether her views on human nature presuppose specific views about kinds and essences, and whether her account of human nature is in tension with the Lockean distinction between the ideas of a person and a man. I show that she does not have to give up metaphysical agnosticism about the metaphysical constitution of thinking substances, but that her underlying account of kinds and essences is more metaphysically demanding than Locke's. Although Cockburn adopts the Lockean distinction between the ideas of person and man when she defends Locke against objections from an anonymous critic, she associates different meanings with 'person' and 'man' than Locke does. This leads to the perplexing result that Cockburn's account of human nature comes closer to Locke's account of a person than that of a man, while it comes closer to her understanding of a man than that of a person. I offer possible explanations for this result and conclude by highlighting how my examination of Cockburn's underlying metaphysical views offers additional support for her independent and original philosophical thinking.

### Benoit Gide (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) – From the “Natural Suggestion” to the “Super-Induced Sensation” of the External World Shepherd's Realism – Against Reid's?

Reid describes the process by which Berkeley and Hume drawn the full skeptical conclusions inlaid in the very principles of modern philosophy<sup>12</sup>, maintaining both conceptual and epistemological skepticisms<sup>13</sup> – that is, on the one hand, we can have no idea of an external world and that, on the other, we can have no reason to believe it exists. Against this, Reid explains the *conception* and *belief* we do have in external world by showing they are both *immediately suggested* by our very constitution in a way he characterizes as “*a natural kind of magic*”<sup>14</sup>.

Shepherd explicitly sides with him in charging modern philosophers for saying that “in the perception of objects their existence is contained”<sup>15</sup>, but also says that “What Reid calls *common sense* and considers erroneously to be a *sense* or *instinct*, is no more than an *observation of the simplest relation of our ideas*.”<sup>16</sup> She thus describes perception of external objects as “a mental vision”<sup>17</sup>, and maintains “that reason (or the observation of the relation of our simple sensations), does as a new sensation of the mind, give evidence of unperceived existences”<sup>18</sup>, or “that the relations of various sensations generate conclusions, which become new sensations or perceptions, and which [...] afford an evidence of the existence of the exterior objects to which they refer”<sup>19</sup>.

In doing so, she seems to return exactly to what Reid identifies as necessarily leading to skepticism – that is, the mediation of perception by ideas or sensations (that makes objects unperceivable or even unconceivable), and the description of reason and judgment as a comparison of ideas or a perception of relations between ideas or sensations (that makes the existence of external object unknowable). How cannot it be so?

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<sup>12</sup> IHM 1.7, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> Van Cleve, in J. Greco (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism*, OUP, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> IHM 5.3, p. 60.

<sup>15</sup> *Selected Writings*, p. 107.

<sup>16</sup> p. 141.

<sup>17</sup> p. 158.

<sup>18</sup> p. 103.

<sup>19</sup> p. 98.

Despite the blatant opposition of their doctrines of perception, there may share a broader methodological and substantial background. Indeed, in describing the process of perception, Shepherd intends to “dwell upon the method nature takes with all men”<sup>20</sup>, adding that the understanding of it “requires a philosophical examination to separate [the] natural junction of thought”<sup>21</sup> that is made in it. This seems not foreign to Reid’s general project of an analysis of the mind as “an enumeration of the simple and original principles of our constitution”<sup>22</sup> and his adding that, in analyzing perception, “we must become like children again, if we will be philosophers: we must overcome this habit of inattention which has been gathering strength ever since we began to think”<sup>23</sup>.

Thus, examining Shepherd’s argument for realism (through her theory of latent reasoning and coalescence of sensations) in connection with her criticisms of Reid (his theory of primary qualities and his omissions of objections from dreams, notably), we would argue that she’s better understood as pursuing the very project and commitments of a commonsense realist philosophy, rather than slipping back into the idealism – which Hamilton and Ferrier will soon do after.

## Vulnerability in the Thought of 20th-Century Women Philosophers. 2: Contingency and Freedom

### Introduction

The papers offered in this panel form part of the research project “Vulnerability in women’s philosophical thought. Contributions to the debate on present emergencies,” and are selected from the studies that the Seminar Philosophy and Gender -ADHUC at the University of Barcelona has been carrying out over more than 20 years around the work and thought of early 20th century women philosophers.

Through a dialogue with the current paradigm of vulnerability, the panel aims to analyse the issue of history and its relationship with the present in the work of María Zambrano, Hannah Arendt and Françoise Collin. These thinkers’ theories arise from their perception of the fragility of a present in which, in Arendt’s words, tradition has been broken and the future arrives with no guarantees. This is the source of her refusal to renounce the past although it may be *fragmented* and can no longer be evaluated with certainty. All these women thinkers were aware that, faced with the onslaughts of political power, historical facts and events are fragile and vulnerable. Far from demanding objectivity, which claims to eliminate the contingent nature of what has passed, in all of them we find instead a concern to seek in the past the presence of minimal, humble gestures which bear witness to a different logic; a capacity to resist destruction; gestures which would enable us to trace the fragile threads leading to the present and the signs illuminating the political imagination.

The works and passages by these philosophers will be analysed in the panel so that the three papers can outline clearly the presence of categories such as contingency, fragility, interpellation, hope, natality and ruins: categories which may form part of a conceptual map of vulnerability. The objective

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<sup>20</sup> p. 101.

<sup>21</sup> p. 103.

<sup>22</sup> IHM 1.2, p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> IHM 5.2, p. 57.

is to study the coherence of the paradigm of vulnerability in greater depth and investigate its function and utility for addressing the issues and emergencies of our own times.

In this line, the papers titled “Contingency, hope and freedom. María Zambrano on the Spanish Republic and Civil War” and “Contingency and storytelling in Hannah Arendt” address the place of contingency in relation to history, the past and memory in the *oeuvre* of two women philosophers who were writing after the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and who asked themselves how a new relationship with the past might be established in order to properly inhabit and *understand* the present.

The paper titled “Contingency, freedom and natality: Françoise Collin reads Hannah Arendt,” on the feminist philosopher Françoise Collin, enables us to elucidate a systematic comparison between the work of the early 20th century women philosophers and feminist philosophical production, and to trace thematic threads (and genealogies) uniting these thinkers with those of the second and third waves of feminism. The topic of contingency, in a non-traditional way of looking at the past and its nexus with freedom, represents one of the cornerstones of Collin’s rereading of Arendt.

#### **Elena Laurenzi (University of Salento) – Contingency, hope and freedom. María Zambrano on the Spanish Republic and Civil War**

My paper will consider the theme of vulnerability in the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano’s reflections on history. I will analyse some writings from the 1970s, in which, on the occasion of Francisco Franco’s death, this exiled republican thinker revisited the history of the Republic and the Civil War. I will elucidate the link to vulnerability in two different lines. On the side of content, Zambrano focuses on past experiences, presences and potentials which were fragile and ephemeral because they did not belong to the winners, and therefore went unrecognised in the hegemonic, official historiography. On the side of the reflection on the meaning and perspective of the historiographical work, Zambrano accounts for the loss of faith in the sense of history, and thus starts from the contingency of the present in rereading the past, finding a source of inspiration in its ruins and the fleeting dawn of its hopes.

#### **Fina Birulés (University of Barcelona) – Contingency and Storytelling in Hannah Arendt**

Hannah Arendt’s reflections on history, the past, memory and narrative are marked by various features deriving from her clear awareness of the fragility and contingency of human affairs. My paper will argue that, in Arendt’s work, accepting contingency does not mean the renunciation of thought or submission to the accidental, but a clear and determined will to be responsible towards the world. In particular, I will focus on the importance of Isak Dinesen’s work in Arendt’s “old-fashioned storytelling.”

Teresa Hoogeveen (University of Barcelona) – Contingency, Action and Natality: Françoise Collin Reads Hannah Arendt

Françoise Collin (1928-2012) is a crucial figure in understanding how Hannah Arendt's work and thought was introduced into feminist theory during the '80s and '90s. The fact is that, despite not being a feminist, Arendt's unwavering and original thinking, her commitment to understanding the present, was a key element in Collin's thinking and rethinking of her own feminist experience. In order to show how the Collin's experience as a feminist shaped her reading of Arendt, I would like to focus on her article "Agir et donné", in which she analyses Arendt's conception of "what is given" and its ties to a pejorative conception of nature, possibly a remnant of the dualistic conception of reality in traditional metaphysics. In the presentation, I will further explore what Collin calls the "majority Arendt" versus the "minority Arendt" and how the tension between these two positions can be viewed through Arendt's notions of contingency and action. To close, it will be shown how Collin demonstrates the way in which natality is a fundamental and at the same time subverting concept in Arendt's own work.

## Women on Logic and Language in the Twentieth Century

### Introduction

This symposium will report on a project to recover and revivify important but currently neglected contributions by female authors to twentieth-century thought about logic and language in the Western tradition. Perhaps even more than other branches of philosophy, logic and systematic thought about language have been culturally coded as masculine. The history of formal and philosophical logic, and the history of logic-driven fields like early analytic philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and the intersection of philosophy and linguistics are predominantly associated with male names such as those of Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, W.V. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Paul Grice, Roman Jakobson, and Richard Montague. The impression persists that this was an all-male project. But that impression is misguided. The papers in this symposium will showcase some of the ways in which women contributed to twentieth-century thinking on logic and language in the UK, US, and the European continent. They will uncover the influence which work by women had in their own time, and consider how their work can and should now shape contemporary debates

The individual papers in this symposium concentrate on the work of a range of philosophers and logicians, but share the common aim of restoring female thinkers' ideas to their rightful place in the history, as well as the current practice, of logic and language. Chapman's paper concentrates on Susan Stebbing's interest in the use of language in everyday communication, and discusses how it prefigures approaches to linguistic study developed much more recently in the disciplines of pragmatics and of critical discourse analysis. Janssen-Lauret's paper reviews the ideas of Ruth Barcan Marcus on the direct-reference theory of names and on the many and varied applications of quantified logics of modality, and argues for the superiority of these over those of Saul Kripke, who is largely credited with both developments. Reichenberger's paper looks to Rózsa Péter's 1944 book *Playing with Infinity* for insights into Péter's highly original and little known philosophy of mathematics, concentrating in particular on her reflection on the implications of Kurt Gödel's proof as well as her criticism of Alonzo

Church's identification of the intuitive notion of effective calculability with the mathematically precise notion of recursiveness.

The ideas of these and other female thinkers were often marginalized and subsequently overlooked for a combination of social and political reasons. This symposium aims to begin the process of redressing this injustice by reconsidering the intrinsic merit of their work. It will highlight some of the ways in which female thinkers made influential contributions to the study of logic and language in their day and also retain great potential to shape present-day debates.

### Siobhan Chapman (University of Liverpool) – Susan Stebbing: Philosophy, Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis

This paper will offer a reading of Susan Stebbing's philosophy informed by later developments in two branches of linguistics which are particularly significant in the present-day study of language: pragmatics and critical discourse analysis. Stebbing was a significant voice in formal analytic philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century. But she was unusual in her intellectual context for her concern with how language is ordinarily used in everyday communication, including the significance of context to meaning (e.g. Stebbing 1930, Stebbing 1943). Particularly in her later work, this concern developed into an interest in the practical analysis of language, showing how close attention to the linguistic choices made in texts such as newspaper reports, political speeches and advertisements could reveal their underlying ideological assumptions and the persuasive devices employed in them (e.g. Stebbing 1939, Stebbing 1941). This paper will explore the striking congruences between Stebbing's work and subsequent developments in pragmatics and in critical discourse analysis. Pragmatics is concerned with meaning as it functions in everyday communication, especially in relation to context (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995, Horn 2007). Critical discourse analysis is concerned with uncovering often implicit ideologies in instances of actual language use (e.g. Fairclough 2000, Toolan 2002). There is no apparent causal link between Stebbing's work and these developments in linguistics; the emergence of these ways of considering language in different historical and social contexts and in relation to different disciplinary backgrounds offers compelling support for the importance of the contextual consideration of meaning and the critical analysis of language use.

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## Frederique Janssen-Lauret (University of Manchester) – Ruth Barcan Marcus and Quantified Modal Logic

Analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century didn't turn out the way it was supposed to. Early analytic philosophy had largely spoken with one voice: adhering strongly to descriptivism, the canonical view deriving from Frege and Russell, and equally strongly to extensionalism and anti-modal attitudes. Quine and the Vienna Circle argued vociferously that extensional, non-modal, logical form was a crucial mark of scientific or mathematical objectivity (Janssen-Lauret 2018: xxxv-xxxvii). By the mid-analytic period, two of the most distinctive new movements in logic and the philosophy of language centred on the direct-reference theory of names, and the many and varied applications of quantified logics of modality. Both had come into the analytic mainstream through the works of one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit both to Kripke. In this paper, I argue that Barcan Marcus' versions of these ideas were not inferior, but in fact superior, to Kripke's.

Ruth Barcan (later Ruth Barcan Marcus) published the first quantified modal logic in her mid-twenties (Barcan 1946a, 1946b, 1947). Barcan approached quantified modal logic as a calculus, proof-theoretically. Her system therefore did not assume quantification over possible worlds, as in Kripke's now more common treatment, and her well-known Barcan Formula (really a schema) did not imply a possible-world model with constant domains as a result. I read Barcan's 1946-47 modal logic in the context of her wider philosophical views from the '60s, specifically the empiricist nominalism which also informed her arguments for taking ordinary proper names' meanings to be just their bearers, not descriptions of their bearers (Barcan Marcus 1961). I make the case that her approach is philosophically well-motivated, connected to her views on reference, and well-matched to her overall views on ontology. Barcan, whose strict nominalism led her to reject posits which could not be directly observed and named, thought possible worlds unpalatable. She conceived of modal calculi as allowing us to regiment counterfactual discourse about actual existents. I show that Barcan Marcus's ontologically parsimonious views have the advantage over Kripke's

with respect to ontological parsimony, epistemic access to possible worlds, and her position on naming, reference, and statements of identity. I conclude that her contributions ought to be recognised as the first of their kind, and that Barcan Marcus must be awarded her proper place in the canon of analytic philosophy.

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### Andrea Reichenberger (University of Paderborn) – Discovering Philosophy Behind Logic and Mathematics: Lessons from Rózsa Péter's "Playing with Infinity"

Rózsa Péter's book *Playing with Infinity*, first published in 1944, serves undoubtedly an educational aim: to explain mathematics for people who confess themselves unskilled in the subject. However, the book also offers insights into Péter's highly original and little known philosophy of mathematics. For Péter, the task of the foundations and philosophy of mathematics is a "self-critique of pure reason". The significance this task becomes clear if one takes a closer look at the last chapter of the book, devoted to Gödel's theorem, and her criticisms of Church's thesis. Péter argued that Gödel's proof did not refute Hilbert's program. Indicating the creative power of human reason, Gödel's results opened the door to the remarkably successful development of partial realizations of Hilbert's program, as we would say today. Thus, the fall of absolute certainty came hand in hand with the rise of partially secure and reliable foundations of mathematical knowledge. Péter interpreted the decision problem as a question about the reliability of logic and explained the significance of Gödel's demonstration by referring to Gentzen's consistency proof for arithmetics. In his famous paper, "An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory," Alonzo Church (1936) identified the intuitive notion of effective calculability with the mathematically precise notion of recursiveness. This proposal, known as Church's Thesis, has gained wide acceptance. Péter argued that the class of general recursive functions is too wide to identify them with constructive functions. In particular, she questioned whether all recursive functions are really effectively calculable. Both examples, Péter's reflection on the implications of Gödel's proof as well as her criticism of Church's thesis, can be seen through Kantian glasses, i.e., a critique in this philosophical context doesn't mean destruction, but it aims at the exposition and delimitation of possibilities: what can be reached by pure (or mathematical) reason and what can't be done.

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## Session 4

### The Mary Midgley Archive, Durham University Library

Join archivist Andrew Gray and philosopher-in-residence Liz McKinnell with a host of panellists for a whirlwind (virtual) tour of the Mary Midgley Archive at Palace Green Library. Artist Verity Birt (Northumbria University and Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art) will discuss her use of Midgley's work in her practice – how specialization and atomization is death to creativity. Doctoral researcher Amber Donovan (Durham) will consider Midgley's metaphilosophy and how that drives her unconventionally accessible style of philosophy. Ian James Kidd (Nottingham) reflects on Midgley's campaign against the closure of Newcastle Philosophy in the 1980s, with reference to letters in the archive from Strawson and Dummett. We learn how disputes about the nature of philosophy aren't necessarily a sort of narcissistic navel-gazing – they can be tied up with very real professional and political issues. Yiota Vassilopoulou (Liverpool) introduces to Midgley's early unpublished work on Plotinus and considers the scholarly value of studying work that Midgley herself did not return to. Along the way, Gray and McKinnell will provide an overview of the archive. In association with Women In Parenthesis @parenthesis\_in

### Speakers

Andrew Gray (Durham University)

Liz McKinnell (Durham University)

Verity Birt (Northumbria University and Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art)

Amber Donovan (Durham University)

Ian James Kidd (University of Nottingham)

Yiota Vassilopoulou (University of Liverpool)

### Women Philosophers in Late-Medieval and Renaissance Humanism

Ana Rieger Schmidt (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) – Christine de Pizan's  
Philosophical Sources

The present article intends to evaluate the philosophical contributions of medieval writer Christine de Pizan (1363-1430), as well as to identify and analyze the philosophical sources of her thought -

especially the influence of Augustine to her understanding of the relation between body and rationality.

The quest for the philosophical dimension of Pizan's work needs to take into account a fundamental sociocultural distinction for the medieval period: the distinction between cleric (*clericus*) and layman (*laicus*). One major challenge of including women in the philosophy canon is the fact that they appear to be rather isolated and do not seem to belong to an established tradition. As a result, we need to create a narrative seeking to connect their writings and views to a specific intellectual context. In order to address this problem we state that Pizan can be studied as a humanist (more precisely, a medieval French humanist), that is, as part of a layman intellectual milieu apart from the scholastic tradition.

Understanding Pizan's philosophical contribution also involves identifying her philosophical sources. Our hypothesis holds that Pizan leans in the direction of Augustine of Hippo (AD 354 - 430 AD) when she reflects on the relation between the rational soul and the sexed body. Augustine emphatically maintains that man and woman are equal considering the orientation of souls to God. Thus, to say that women were not created in the image of God is an error, for it compares the divine image to the female bodily condition. If God is not a body, then the element that brings men to God cannot have corporeal nature. Such an interpretation manifestly implies a particular understanding of the superiority of the soul in relation to the body (at least its rational part), so that bodies are not a determining impediment to intellectual activity. In effect, we must have a symmetrical distribution of the faculty of reason between both the sexes of the human species. This understanding is at the very core of Pizan's assertion that "*human superiority or inferiority is not determined by sexual difference but by the degree to which one has perfected one's nature and morals*" (*City of Ladies*, I, IX). It is also a central case for the spiritual rehabilitation of women, whereby "*it is beyond doubt that women count as God's creatures and are human beings just as men are. They are not a different race or a strange breed, which might justify their being excluded from receiving moral teachings*" (*City of Ladies*, II, LIV).

### Favola Visco (Università degli Studi dell'Aquila) – Cereta: Strength, Stubbornness, Struggle

In the 15th century Italian Humanism, the transformation of the notion of a cultivated person impacted on education and opened up schooling opportunities for the female gender – even if not equal opportunities. Young girls could obtain education in grammar and not in the other disciplines of the *trivium* – dialectic and rhetoric; history, poetry, and philosophy were discouraged as well; and it was expected they expressed themselves in vernacular – the language of the domestic sphere – not in Latin, the language of the public culture. Education was extended, but according to the gender and resulting in educated women gaining literacy without having the possibility of becoming scholars – they were trained to be part of an audience, not to speak to one.

Laura Cereta (Brescia, Italy, 1469-1499) acknowledged and fought such a confinement: at first educated by her father, she delved into essayistic writing and philosophy, wrote in Latin, and confronted the male culture of her time by advocating her role as a scholar. Her case is very interesting because it exhibits distinguishing features of an early feminist position. She aimed at literary fame and immortality and was a prolific author of philosophical letters and historical essays – which openly defied the male character of the two disciplines. As any man of letter, she sought ecclesiastical patronage and gave readings of her essays in urban academies and salons; in 1488 she also attempted to publish a collection of her writings (*Epistolae Familiaeres*), which had circulated as a manuscript during her life and was eventually published in 1640.

Her texts display her erudition and spare no talent from expression: literal and philosophical references, legal jargon, analysis of contemporary events, and above all sharp opinions on women, marriage, and education. She was an extraordinary woman and her originality defied the established order of the genders. Her strong will to be renowned as a scholar was rewarded: she was well known in the intellectual circles and corresponded with humanists and religious authorities. But she also suffered strong disapproval and the suspect that the real author of her writings was her father. She always rebutted and never showed submission, trying to reach a position of historical relevance that at the time was precluded to her.

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it intends to re-evaluate the role and the importance of Cereta in the cultural debate of her time – something generally overlooked by scholars and biographers. Secondly, it proposes to interpret Cereta's proud engagement against gender imbalances as a story with a moral: the thwarting she came across indicates that both she knew where to strike and the men around her were sensitive to the vehemence of her criticism.

### Marina Christodoulou (University of Klagenfurt/University of Toulouse) – Equality Used to be Superiority: The Paradigm of Lucrezia Marinella and Henricus Cornelius Agrippa

When we talk, in our postmodern everyday life and formal speeches, the word “equality” comes handy at all times: equality of races, sexes, genders, professions, citizens, humans, and even organic life. Equality is considered a given, or a datum, it encapsulates the *political correctness* of the post-modern times. After the historical trauma of the rise of Fascism and Nazism, superiority sounds at least scandalous.

It was, however, a time, or more specifically multiple centuries, or more specifically, there were, *more* centuries in the human history where superiority was an admissible datum, and politically correct, than there have been centuries where it is not. Equality is a recent phenomenon, of mainly the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, which started to rise in the later Renaissance and Enlightenment. Until about the 1500s superiority was the norm.

Until the 1500s man was the superior being on Earth and even the whole Universe. At that time some objections started to take place. There were also before that, from Antiquity, but not much survives. The objections from 1500s foreword, managed not only to survive but to weight upon making differences and changes in the order of things.

Objections to the superiority of man were feministic objections, mainly from women authors and some men, too. Examples are Moderata Fonte, who wrote the treatise *The Worth of Women (Il merito delle donne)* around 1592, and published at 1600; Lucrezia Marinella, who wrote *The Nobility and Excellence of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men (La nobilta et l'eccellenza delle donne, co' difetti et mancamenti de gli uomini)*, published in 1600/1601/1621; and Henricus Cornelius Agrippa, who wrote the *Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex* at 1509, and published at 1529.

It is a regular consequence that the *superiority* of woman would rise at that point as an issue, because the superiority of man was the norm. Therefore, the normal and expected trend would be a reversal of genders or sexes (a word which applies at that times, in contrast with “gender”). For the people at that time the scandal would be the superiority of woman instead of man, for the people today the scandal is more the superiority of one sex over the other instead of their equality.

For centuries, the first utterance-statement of the “woman question” was coined as the *Querelle des Femmes* (1400-1789). Based on this new trend and this new sociopolitical and philosophical question, is Lucrezia Marinella’s work.

I plan to go through Henricus Cornelius Agrippa’s *Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex* (1529) to get a taste of gender “superiority” writing, and then focus on Lucrezia Marinella’s *The Nobility and Excellence of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men* (1600/1601/1621), which was composed as a furious, polemical, and indignant answer to Giuseppe Passi’s *Dei donneschi difetti* (*The Defects of Women*), published in 1599. The uniqueness of Marinella’s treatise lies on the fact that it is a polemical counteraction to a misogynistic treatise against women, and authored by a woman.

## Nature and Perception in the Work of Margaret Cavendish

Jonathan Shaheen (Ghent University) – The Philosophical Fancy of Cavendish’s *Blazing World*:  
An Allegorical Interpretation

This paper presents an allegorical interpretation of *The Blazing World* (henceforth *TBW*), a novel Margaret Cavendish published together with her treatise *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy* (henceforth *OEP*). Though Cavendish claims that *TBW* has a philosophical part, and that it coheres with *OEP*, most scholarship on *TBW* ignores *OEP*, instead focusing on value-theoretic questions that turn on whether Cavendish intended the novel to be utopian or dystopian. Here Cavendish’s claims are vindicated by an interpretation of *TBW* on which it is primarily an allegory for the metaphysics of *OEP*. The paper develops this new reading of *TBW* not only in the context of a reading of *OEP*, but more generally in the framework of a unifying methodological approach to Cavendish’s works.

The present interpretation breaks new ground by framing *TBW*’s Empress’s power and epistemic projects as allegories for what *OEP*’s nature can do and know. To support this framing, the paper establishes, on a textual basis, that allegorical relationships hold not only between *TBW*’s Empress and *OEP*’s nature, but also between *TBW*’s Emperor and *OEP*’s God; the Empress’s subjects and *OEP*’s parts of nature; and scientific societies of those subjects and the Royal Society, a primary critical target of *OEP*. Though scholars have noted the parallel between *TBW*’s scientific societies and the Royal Society, the other correspondences have gone unremarked in the literature. The perspective offered here therefore allows for satisfying and hitherto unnoticed explanations of otherwise puzzling features of the novel, including the overall structure of the middle third of the novel, in which the Empress sets out to learn everything nature itself could know, and more besides; the inclusion of immaterial spirits as oracles for otherwise unanswerable questions; the introduction into *TBW* of Cavendish herself as a close confidant of the Empress; and the materialistic treatment of the Empress’s religion.

The interpretation is motivated by a general methodological approach to Cavendish that treats her as committed across works to the development of an overarching metaphysical vision about how nature is ordered. A peculiar feature of her panpsychist metaphysics is that she conceives of nature’s order as resulting from the effective governance of nature’s parts. Her metaphysical thinking is thus deeply rooted in social metaphors. Reading *TBW* as an allegorical expression of Cavendish’s abiding metaphysical project provides a way of gaining perspective on how those social metaphors result in Cavendish’s metaphysical commitments about order. To the extent that she ultimately takes on political or value-theoretic commitments in *TBW*, for instance, they are precisely those commitments

that influence her theory about nature's order in *OEP*. It is *OEP*'s nature, after all, that Cavendish meant the elaborate allegory of *TBW* to represent, and to illuminate.

### Laura Georgescu (University of Groningen) – No True Disorder, No True Order: Regularity and Irregularity in Cavendish's Philosophy of Nature

This talk contributes to the ongoing debate about normativity and regularity in Cavendish's philosophy by challenging what I take to be a presupposition held by many involved in the debate: that Nature as a whole is the kind of thing that can be ordered (or disordered). I argue that, in Cavendish's philosophical system, especially as developed in the *Observations upon experimental philosophy* (1666) and the *Grounds of natural philosophy* (1668), it is a category mistake to treat the whole of Nature as regular or irregular. I defend this claim with two arguments.

One argument builds on Cavendish's claims about parts and wholes: specifically, I take Cavendish to deny both whole-to-whole interactions and whole-to-part interactions – i.e., wholes qua wholes are by definition non-relational. Regularity and irregularity, though, are relations, and hence can only exist between parts, and cannot be extended to the whole of Nature, given its non-relationality. This is why, strictly speaking, the whole of Nature is not the kind of thing that can be ordered or disordered.

The second argument builds on Cavendish's claims about the effects of nature. Everything that could ever possibly be experienced is an effect of natural motions, but Nature as a whole is not *strictu sensu* composed of these effects. Consequently, while they are, in some sense, effects "of" nature, and while we can talk about aggregates of such effects, in doing so, we say nothing about Nature as a whole. In which case, even if we could talk about the order and disorder of the effects of nature, we would still not be saying anything about Nature as a whole. However, all of this does not entail that regularity and irregularity are entirely illusory. From the perspective of the parts of nature, I show that nature's motions have to be both regular and irregular. My claim here takes the form of a conditional: if there is to be the kind of a world in which we encounter particular creatures (finite associations of finite parts enjoying diachronic unity) with ordered behaviour – that is, given the kind of world in which we, and Cavendish, do seem to live – then regular and irregular motions (of parts in relation to other parts) are necessary. Maximum regularity and maximum irregularity simply cannot bring about the kind of world we are familiar with.

### Peter West (Durham University) – Thinking in Colour: Margaret Cavendish on Conception, Perception, and Existence in Nature

One of the most striking features of Margaret Cavendish's philosophical system is her commitment to the materiality of colours. As Colin Chamberlain notes, this means that unlike most of her contemporaries – whose metaphysics commit them to a Kansas-like external world devoid of colour – Cavendish's view entails that the world around us is like Oz: it exists in technicolour (2019). Chamberlain presents this a positive feature of Cavendish's materialism. However, Cavendish's view leads to some *prima facie* problematic consequences. As Cavendish herself acknowledges, her materialism about colours entails that there are some colours of objects that are, in principle, unperceivable *and* that some colours could, in principle, be *felt by touch*. We might, then, ask why,

despite these seemingly undesirable entailments, Cavendish remains committed to the view that colours are *material* qualities of objects?

My contention is that Cavendish's attempt to collapse the distinction between the material qualities of objects in the world and those qualities that exist only in the mind, which later thinkers would refer to as the primary-secondary quality distinction, is a pivotal step in her rejection of dualism and her argument for materialist monism. I will also demonstrate that, in this regard, Cavendish's argument for monism is similar to that of Berkeley – although Berkeley, unlike Cavendish, argues for *immaterialist* monism. Both Cavendish and Berkeley are 'type', rather than 'existence', monists: both maintain that there is one kind of substance (I adopt this terminology from Gordon-Ruth 2018). What's more, both are committed to an argument along the following lines:

1. Primary qualities and secondary qualities are, in fact, inseparable.
2. If any two things are inseparable, they exist in the same place.
3. Therefore, *both* primary and secondary qualities exist in the same place: *either* in the mind or 'out there' in the external world.

The crucial *difference* is that while Cavendish takes both to exist 'out there' in the world, Berkeley maintains that they exist only in the mind. For my purposes, however, the important thing is that both accept the above argument. Both Cavendish and Berkeley use the unsustainability of the primary-secondary quality distinction as a 'hook' with which to draw their readers to one side or the other of the dualist's material-immaterial divide.

Very little scholarly attention has been paid to the similarities between Cavendish and Berkeley. Literature that does focus on both thinkers tends to pick up on the fact that both are sceptical of the practical output of microscopy and telescoping. As Catherine Wilson (2007) puts it, both can be characterised as 'naked-eye empiricists'. No doubt, this is an important area of common ground. But in this paper, I argue that the common ground between them is larger than current scholarship suggests. A wider upshot is that their shared view that the primary-secondary quality distinction is unsustainable reveals that at least two committed Early Modern monists saw it to be the Achilles' heel in their dualist opponents' worldview.

## Session 5

### Women in the History and Philosophy of Science

Trevor Pearce (UNC Charlotte) – Feminist Philosophers of Evolution: Antoinette Brown Blackwell and Frances Emily White

Antoinette Brown Blackwell was one of the first women to be ordained as a minister in the USA; she was also one of its first feminist philosophers of science. In this chapter I will show that Blackwell's early writings, despite being committed to the reconciliation of biology and philosophy, rejected the agnostic and quasi-materialist evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer and others. Her position contrasted with that of the physician and philosopher Frances Emily White. Although both White and Blackwell wrote feminist critiques of Darwin and Spencer in the 1870s, White did so from the

perspective of a strict materialism, whereas Blackwell argued that evolution was compatible with dualism and personal immortality.

### Francesco Nappo (UNC Chapel Hill) – Mary Hesse on Materiality and Analogy

Beginning with her 1952 paper “Operational Definition and Analogy in Physical Theories”, Mary Hesse has championed an approach to the role of analogy in scientific inquiry that, while inspired to the work of N. R. Campbell (1920), goes considerably beyond the latter both in terms of detail and philosophical motivation. Unfortunately, Hesse’s early work on the role of analogy in science, which culminated in her *Models and Analogies in Science* a decade after (1963), is not widely read in philosophy circles and even less understood. In this presentation, I will discuss what I take to be one of the most widespread misunderstandings of Hesse’s early work, which concerns the distinction between “formal” and “material” analogies in science. This distinction was first introduced in her 1953 article “Models in Physics”, where Hesse claimed that the term “analogy” is used in physics in at least two different ways: first, to describe cases of accidental similarity between the formalism employed in two otherwise distinct physical theories, as in Lord Kelvin’s famous “analogy” between the laws of fluids and those concerning the transmission of heat; second, to describe cases in which one domain of scientific interest (e.g. electromagnetism) is employed as a model for phenomena in another scientific domain (e.g. gravity), in the sense of licensing inductive inferences of various degrees of strength from one domain to the other. Accordingly, when in her 1963 book Hesse sat down to write the minimal conditions for an analogy from one scientific domain to another to justify (to some extent) inductive arguments from properties of the former to properties of the latter, she claimed that only “material” analogies are inductively significant. She clarified this claim by adding that an analogy is “material” just in case it involves “pre-theoretic” similarities, i.e. resemblance with respect to predicates that can be accepted as part of the vocabulary of a scientific community *before* the analogy is proposed; and it is “formal” otherwise. She also gave an argument why formal analogies are too thin to play the inductive function that material analogies play in science: “any sufficiently rich theory could be made isomorphic to any given accepted statement” (49), meaning that cases of “formal” analogy can be cooked up more or less at will by introducing gruesome vocabulary. Unfortunately, the version of Hesse’s view that has become popular among commentators takes her to draw a distinction between analogies that have a “physical ground” and those that don’t. Paul Bartha (2009), Dardashti, Winsberg, et al. (2018), and John Norton (forthcoming), to mention only a few of recent commentators, offer more or less the same counterexample to this cartoonish version of Hesse’s view: “It disparages” to quote Norton, “the fertile analogy between Newtonian gravity and Coulomb electrostatics, for example.” This assumes that, for Hesse, *being an inverse-square force* does not constitute a material respect of similarity. I will argue that Hesse never meant to rule out this possibility, and that the purported counterexamples to her view are counterexamples to a view she never held. To demonstrate the usefulness of Hesse’s material condition on inductively significant analogies in science, towards the end of the paper I will argue that something close to this condition may be correct for inductively significant analogies in the domain of pure mathematics.

### Joshua Fischel (Millersville University of Pennsylvania) – Monsters, Meteors, and Metaphysics: Lorraine Daston’s Recasting of Modernity

Lorraine Daston's research in the history and philosophy and science has ranged widely, from her early work on the rise of statistical and probability thinking during the Enlightenment, to a detailed conceptual history that tracked the relationship between various iterations of "nature" and their relevance to the epistemic and metaphysical foundations of modern scientific practice. She has also written prolifically on the status of the monstrous and the marvelous as objects of scientific inquiry, the preternatural philosophy of early modern Europe, as well as raising the question why human beings from one historical moment to the next have looked to nature as a source for ethical and political normativity. Given this seemingly diverse array of research interests, this paper asks what if any unifying skein runs through her work.

Peter Galison begins to provide the germ of an answer when he remarks that, "In all her work...Ms. Daston is interested in a formal conceptual history that has been nourished and animated by philosophy and, as a result, has flowered into a fundamentally new kind of cultural history...". Galison has rightly been impacted by Daston's approach and development of conceptual history. However, this paper will look more closely at the substance of Daston's underlying philosophical commitments, by drawing out into the foreground her distinctive philosophical anthropology that underwrites and is in part a product of her various projects of historical inquiry into the emergence of the Modern world. Which is to say that Daston's historical reconstructions of Modernity is not approached exclusively as a project of description and explanation but, it will be contended, is read by Daston also as source material for the development of her own philosophical anthropology, something only made explicit in her most recent work entitled *Against Nature* (2019).

This paper begins by sketching Daston's challenge to traditional accounts of Modernity's origins. Doing so will open up the space to situate Daston's account with other counter-narratives of Modernity including, most importantly, those of Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault. One of the key elements that distinguishes Daston's counter narrative from Foucault and Kuhn's is her claim that the "disenchantment of the world" (Weber) was never a foregone conclusion, but was the outcome of a struggle between a monistic and pluralistic metaphysics, the latter of which she identifies with the preternatural philosophy of the 17th century: and a metaphysics pregnant with possibilities which Daston appropriates for her own purposes in her philosophical anthropology. In this sense, Daston's work is comparable to Stephen Toulmin's in his *Cosmopolis*, where he argues that Modernity would have taken a different path had Montaigne rather than Descartes' 'quest for certainty' set the research programme for Modernity. This paper ends by suggesting that Daston's philosophical anthropology is best seen as one of a number of contributions to the reemergence of Jamesian pragmatism in the late 20th century. Both James and Daston, in this sense, can be thought of as revivifying the preternatural philosophy of the 17th century, and modeling an alternative ontology for an alternative Modernity.

### Cristina Chimisso (Open University) – Hélène Metzger on the Role of Emotions and Habits in Scientific Knowledge

Recently there has been considerable attention to the role of emotions and habits in scientific knowledge. Historians and philosophers of science have referred to French philosophers, including Gaston Bachelard, but they have neglected a scholar in the same milieu, namely Hélène Metzger (1889-1944), even though she assigned a more positive role to emotions and habits than any of her contemporaries. She neither condemned emotions and habits in the study of nature, nor defended their role over reason, but rather proposed a complex and measured position. On the one hand, she

showed that emotions and habits could keep alchemists pursuing blind alleys. On the other, she analysed the ways in which emotions, passions and habits shape research into nature, including its most successful programmes. In this talk, I shall evaluate her complex position, and suggest that it still has great relevance for current scholarship.

## Ayn Rand and the History of Philosophy

### James Lennox (University of Pittsburgh) – Introduction

We propose a symposium, consisting of four papers, centered on the (academically) underappreciated Twentieth Century Russian-American novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand. Rand is an unprecedented cultural phenomenon—her novels and non-fiction books have sold over 30 million copies and have been translated into 26 languages. Nevertheless, her moral defense of egoism and capitalism, combined with her atheism, mean that her views do not fit comfortably into any of the standard cultural or political categories available today. And yet those views are all aspects of a philosophy that is broadly in the Aristotelian tradition and is centered on a distinctive understanding of reason and of its role in all aspects of human life. In the four talks proposed for this symposium, our speakers will examine her views about reason and virtue in comparison with Aristotle's; her egoism and atheism in comparison with the thought of Michel Foucault; her understand of spiritual values in light of her atheism; and the unique defense of abortion rights that follows from her distinctive philosophical defense of individual rights.

### Gregory Salmieri (University of Texas, Austin) – Ayn Rand and Aristotle on the Standard of Value

“There is a morality of reason,” wrote Ayn Rand, “and Man’s Life is its standard of value.” This statement sounds a number of Aristotelian themes, for Aristotle both stressed the need to identify a standard for living well and identified that standard as the distinctly human form of life—a life of developing and exercising the rational faculty. But Rand has a distinctive (and distinctively modern) view of the human form of life and of how reason relates to the faculties and needs that human beings share with other living things. This talk explores this difference and its causes and consequences, including Rand’s and Aristotle’s differing conceptions of virtue, differing assessments of material production, and differing approaches to establishing principles in ethics.

### Lisa Downing (University of Birmingham) – An Unimagined Encounter: Rand with Foucault

In this paper I will examine how some of Ayn Rand’s central concerns and concepts, including ethical selfishness, the cultivation of the self as a moral project, and religion as an evil, find striking parallels in the work of continental philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984). No extant criticism picks up on these similarities; indeed there is a complete absence of engagement with Randian theory in the fields of continental thought and critical theory, and much questioning of her legitimacy as a philosopher in the field of analytical philosophy. The prominence of Foucault in the history of thought, in comparison

to Rand, suggests a bias that is both sexist and based on assumptions about political legitimacy. One benefit of tracing the contiguity between Rand and Foucault is to show the relevance of Rand's thought for a body of work that has excluded it and, conversely, to show how the closeness of Foucault's work to Rand's casts retrospective light on a thinker whose relationship with neoliberalism and individualism was ambivalent and ambiguous, despite the best attempts of scholars to fit him into a left-wing continental canon. Having begun to trace some similarities between the thought of Rand and Foucault in my book *Selfish Women* (2019), in this paper I will examine these in more detail, and will show the workings of a Randian "reverse discourse" *avant la lettre*.

### Robert Mayhew (Seton Hall University) – Ayn Rand on Atheism, Religion, and Values

Camille Paglia, after praising Ayn Rand and insisting that she "was the kind of bold female thinker who should immediately have been a centerpiece of women's studies programs," indicates some of their differences—for instance: "Rand disdains religious belief as childish, while I respect all religions on metaphysical grounds, even though I am an atheist." This is indeed one of many significant differences between them, though 'childish' does not begin to convey what Rand finds objectionable in religion. In this paper, after sketching Rand's "metaphysical grounds" for rejecting theism and her epistemological grounds for rejecting faith, I focus on her conviction that religion is an obstacle to maintaining and pursuing genuine sacred values.

### Ben Bayer (Ayn Rand Institute) – Ayn Rand's Defense of Abortion Rights Vs. Contemporary Kantian Defenses

Ayn Rand offered a vigorous defense of abortion rights which applied her own unique theory of rights. This theory was not formulated with the abortion controversy in mind but has direct consequences for evaluating it. The theory can be contrasted usefully with Kantian/deontological theories of rights that treat persons as the basic bearers of rights. On this view, any being that possesses some combination of consciousness, rationality, and agency qualifies as a person, independent of biological classification or embodiment. The problem for defenses of abortion rights that merely challenge the personhood of the fetus is that rights are then seen as contingent on mental development. This means that many human beings already born may not be persons and may not possess rights (thus, abortion rights defenders like Mary Anne Warren face a daunting infanticide objection). In contrast, Rand identified individual human beings as the paradigmatic rights bearers. Rand saw the case for rights generally as depending on specific facts about human nature, including rationality conceived of as a biological faculty, and also facts about how human beings are individuated from each other in a social context. This delimits the class of rights bearers in a way that the Kantian personhood view does not, which helps Rand's theory avoid the usual objections. This paper argues that Rand's theory offers a principled defense of abortion rights that is superior to the Kantian view.

# Recovering and Teaching the Thought of Ancient Women

## Introduction

Despite a common perception that Greco-Roman philosophy was fundamentally a male enterprise, some doxographic evidence of ancient Greek women involved in philosophical activity has survived. The overarching question behind this panel is how to reclaim the contributions of ancient Greek and Roman women to the history of philosophy and add these figures to the philosophical canon. We start from our experiences as students, researchers and teachers of ancient philosophy and ask ourselves what are the difficulties, challenges and, most importantly, benefits of studying the thought of ancient women and including women in the ancient philosophy curriculum.

The first paper introduces several methodological questions about how to study the life and, where extant, the works of women who engaged in philosophical practice, as well as teach what ancient (male) philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle had to say about women. The focus of this paper, and of the panel as a whole, will be the following issues: what makes women philosophers in antiquity? Are we to call philosophers only the women who wrote philosophical treatises or also women who more generally took part in the intellectual life of their community? Most importantly, should questions about home economics, female morality and women's virtues be considered 'strictly philosophical'? These general methodological questions will be discussed by looking at three specific case studies.

The second paper focuses on the Pythagorean women. Women first entered the Greek philosophical scene in the early fifth century BCE in Southern Italy as followers of Pythagoras'. In the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic period, the Pythagorean women were believed to be the authors of fifteen letters and philosophical treatises. This is one of the earliest attempts to demonstrate women's intellectual potential and justify their ability to practice philosophy. The paper assesses the arguments from these Pythagorean writings, discusses whether women could have authored them and determines what makes them philosophical.

The third paper focuses on the role of women in Cynic philosophy and, more specifically, on the way of life, work and thought of Hipparchia, a personality liberated from the social patterns of her era, which obliged women to be a silent housekeeper. The purpose is to show how this figure epitomises the principles of Cynic philosophy, enables us to comprehend Hellenistic thought and philosophical practice, and carves a new path in the history of ancient Greek women philosophers.

Finally, the fourth paper discusses the role and contributions of Neoplatonic women philosophers, especially of Sosipatra of Ephesus and Hypatia of Alexandria, suggesting how to tackle difficulties such as the lack of direct evidence and how to draw conclusions about the thought of ancient women from the available information about their life. The aim is to show how texts about these women, like biographical notes on their lives and letters dedicated to them, might be included into the teaching of Neoplatonism in antiquity.

Overall, we aim to promote discussions of how to study these female figures and offer reflections on different ways this material can be taught. We suggest that there is enough of historic and, more importantly, *philosophical* interest in the available evidence to justify dedicating substantial class time to archaic, classical and Hellenistic women thinkers, and we identify effective research and teaching strategies for future students, researchers and lecturers of ancient philosophy.

Caterina Pellò (University of St Andrews) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: A Case-Study from the Pythagorean Tradition

This paper shows how to teach ancient Greek and Roman female philosophers by focusing on the specific case of the Pythagorean women. That of the Pythagoreans is the first (documented) case of female engagement with ancient Greek thought. The available evidence for early Pythagoreanism suggests that in the 5th century BCE women attended Pythagoras' public lectures and were included in his restricted intellectual circles. However, no direct evidence from this group of women has survived: we do not know whether they left any written works and, if so, what their philosophical contributions were. By contrast, the Hellenistic period sees a flourishing of Pythagorean writings, including 10 letters and 5 treatises written under the names of Pythagorean women. This would be the first example of philosophical prose ascribed to female authors. Yet whether these texts were in fact authored by women or rather by men using female pseudonyms is a point of heated academic controversy.

I plan to do a close reading of select passages from Phintys' *On Moderation*, Perictione's *On the Harmonious Woman*, and Perictione's *On Wisdom*. I shall discuss their philosophical arguments and analyse how they respond to their (male) philosophical ancestors and contemporaries, take part in the philosophical debates of their time, and bring new philosophical perspectives to the table. What I hope to show is that the treatises attributed to the Pythagorean women are philosophically valuable and should thus be included in our ancient philosophy syllabi.

Maria Protopapas-Marneli (Research Centre for Greek Philosophy, Academy of Athens) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: The Case of Hipparchia

In this paper, I wish to discuss how Cynic philosophy, a School of the Hellenistic era, can be adapted as a choice to renounce the traditional way of living through the purely innovative actions of Hipparchia, the Cynic philosopher. Having been influenced by Crates and his teachings, she decides to follow him and adopt the Cynic way of life. She wears the cynic garb as no woman before her had ever done. Hence, she constitutes a unique case, different from her contemporaries, by refusing all conventions and her elite background to become an athlete of continuous corporeal and rational exercise. She achieves that by breaking off totally the bonds with the privacy of the ancient society in order to promote the privileges of the primitive life in public, as a way of reassessment of the life in nature. Including Hipparchia in a philosophy course has to deal with multiple domains: politics, practical philosophy and the consequences of one's own choice to live freely, in the city center as a habitat, out of the limits of the house. The Cynic rejects the notion of *oikos* and its financial privileges in the Classical times. Moreover, Hipparchia's writings (short treatises, lost but known from the *testimonia*) could serve as proof of her systematic rhetorical debate with her philosophical contemporaries.

Jana Schultz (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) – Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy: The Case of the Neoplatonic Philosophers

Many sources testify that women played an important role in the Neoplatonic schools of late antiquity. Sosipatra of Ephesus and Hypatia of Alexandria were well-known and respected teachers and for several male Neoplatonists we have evidence that they had male and female students. Especially prominent is Marcella as the wife and student of Porphyry. From Iamblichus we have a letter written to a student named Arete, and Damascius dedicated his *Life of Isidorus* to his student Theodora. However, when it comes to recovering and teaching the thoughts of the female Neoplatonists, we are confronted with the problem that none of their philosophical texts was passed down to us. In approaching their thoughts, we depend on indirect sources of two kinds, namely hagiographical and historical texts that speak *about them* and letters that speak *to them*.

Both kinds of sources lead to methodological problems regarding the question of the thoughts of female philosophers. The ancient texts about the female Neoplatonists focus on their way of life and the circumstances of their death and not on their philosophical work. The letters to female Neoplatonists are more focused on philosophical topics, but they reveal more about the philosophical thoughts of the writer than about the thoughts of the person to whom they are dedicated.

Focusing on the cases of Sosipatra of Ephesus and Hypatia of Alexandria, my paper will discuss first how far indirect sources allow us to form hypothesis about the philosophical thoughts of these prominent Neoplatonic teachers. I will then conclude with some reflections about how the texts concerning Sosipatra and Hypatia might be included into classes teaching the ancient Neoplatonists.

### **Katharine O'Reilly (King's College London) and Branislav Kotoc (King's College London) – "Old Wives Tales"? Challenges and Opportunities in Teaching Women in Ancient Philosophy**

The history of philosophy is characteristically conducted without reference to the work and thought of women in antiquity. However, it is undeniable that women have been ever-present in philosophy. In this paper, we aim to disrupt assumptions made about women in classical philosophy and uncover the sources of some of those assumptions. To do so, we reflect on our experiences of teaching women in ancient thought: the challenges we face, the opportunities it presents, and why we feel it is crucial to discuss both aspects of the experience and encourage others to integrate ancient women into their teaching. While our discussion is mostly meta-philosophical, we draw examples from ancient texts to ground the main points (including, especially, the reported speeches of Diotima and Aspasia in Plato, and the *Pythagorean Letters*).

We defend the view that the philosophy of ancient women can be successfully taught not just in separate, dedicated courses, but integrated into general philosophy syllabi, alongside key figures such as the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle and the Cynics. Yet there are challenges to doing so. We address three main challenges, presented as objections we have faced. In addressing these three types of barrier, we suggest that these texts present philosophically interesting challenges, and opportunities for deep philosophical engagement with these materials, as reflected, also, in the three case studies that form part of the panel.

## Session 6

### Phenomenology and the Emotions in the Twentieth Century

#### Pia Valenzuela (Catholic Institute) – Magda B. Arnold's Work on the Integration of Philosophy and Psychology Perspectives on Human Emotion

Magda B. Arnold (1903–2002) was one of the prominent female contributors of the mid-20th century on emotion research. She coined the term 'appraisal' as the initial assessment that starts the emotional sequence and arouses both the appropriate actions and the emotional experience itself, so that the physiological changes, recognized as important, accompany, but do not initiate, the actions and experiences.<sup>24</sup> With this, she put the basis of the appraisal theory of emotions –which Richard S. Lazarus built on her theory-<sup>25</sup> moving toward the cognitive approaches predominant nowadays. However, her voice has been silenced and her work has not been fully recognized, getting few quotations in contemporary research.<sup>26</sup>

In a period of increasing physiological research, she criticized reductive explanations of emotions of psychological phenomena, including emotions, from behaviourism and psychoanalysis as well. She oriented her work using phenomenological insights, thus integrating the psychological, behavioural and neurophysiological aspects on the experience of emotions. Not being a Philosopher by formation, she was influenced by phenomenologists views –i.e. Scheler, Sartre- and the philosophical thought of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, which offered her some concrete philosophical basis and critical check on her own theory. This determined the way of her contribution to interdisciplinary work and integrative view on issues like mind-brain relation, cognitive and moral aspects of emotions research.

My aim is to offer first a brief view of Arnold's theory of emotion in historical perspective, placing her work and life in the context of her times. Secondly, I want to highlight her broader theory of human emotion integrated in the overall development of a person's life and actions, trying to uncover her intellectual work on the integration of Philosophy and Psychology perspectives. I hope also to shed some light into the current dialogue many scholars from both disciplines are looking for, despite the epistemological and methodological differences.

#### Ronny Miron (Bar-Ilan University) – The Circle of Nothingness: The Problem of the Phenomenological Beginning and the Possibility for Metaphysics

The question where phenomenology begins is often recognized as a practical matter that concerns its descriptive method and peculiar eidetic analysis. However, once the very questioning of the beginning is acknowledged as communicating the philosophical spirit of phenomenology itself, phenomenology is thrown into an essential circularity that exceeds the realm of methodological considerations. The

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<sup>24</sup> M. B. Arnold, *Emotion and personality*, vol. 1, Psychological aspects, Columbia University Press, New York, 1960a.

<sup>25</sup> See Richard Lazarus, *Emotion and adaptation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991.

<sup>26</sup> There are a couple of exceptions like for example the special volume devoted to her in Stephanie A. Shields & Arvid Kappas (Editors), *Magda B. Arnold's contributions to emotions research*, «Cognition and Emotion», 20:7, (2006), pp. 898-901, DOI: 10.1080/02699930600615736.

suggested paper focuses on the thinking of the woman phenomenologist, Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966). Far from merely providing a different view of the related question, she seems to transform the very understanding of circularity from a philosophical problem to a guiding clue for achieving a metaphysical understanding of reality.

Quintessential to her realistic orientation, Conrad-Martius pinpoints the issue of the phenomenological beginning in the close relation between Being or Reality and nothingness. The foundational argument in this regard is formulated in her early establishing treatise *Realontologie* (1923), concerning what she regards as the only philosophically relevant difference, i.e.: the difference between existence and nothingness. No less than this determination depicts the framework in which Conrad-Martius wishes to convey her realistic view of phenomenology, it articulates her explicit desire to distance herself from the idealistic thinking that she associates with the argument that there exists an unfathomable contradiction between the ideal and the real. However, she regards this idealistic view as a “blinding insight” that blocked any access to the philosophical question of reality. Therefore, as opposed to her view of idealism, Conrad-Martius argues that reality is something “totally different” that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition to the nonexistent or nothingness”.

The suggested paper will address Conrad-Martius's realistic reply to Husserl's transcendental view of the phenomenological beginning. Inspired by her thinking, it will suggest substituting the view that regards the question of where phenomenology begins as a problem with seeing it as positive guidance clue for consolidating metaphysics. Thus, unlike the adherence of the transcendental phenomenology to a-priori everlasting forms, the proposed realistic metaphysics communicates the mortality of finite beings or their essential accessibility to nothingness. For this end, the discussion will delineate the milestones in Conrad-Martius's metaphysics whose origin in nothingness is followed by a careful approximation to the 'gate of reality' until standing before the threshold of metaphysics and finally coming to full circle back to nothingness. Each of the two occurrences of nothingness within this circle will be illuminated in terms of both beginning and end, namely in the view of their function within the entire road. At the same time, the in-between stages of the 'gate of reality' and the 'threshold of metaphysics' will be securitized as bearing the most essential contents explored in Conrad-Martius's thinking. Finally, coming to terms with the complex relations between the comprising elements that are woven together in Conrad-Martius's philosophical path will enable evaluating the response suggested by her phenomenological realism to the transcendental view of the question regarding the genuine beginning of phenomenology.

## Iris Murdoch and Analytic Philosophy

### Introduction

In this symposium we explore both the recent reception of Iris Murdoch's philosophical work, and some of the continuities and discontinuities between her philosophical writings and the analytic canons she sought to challenge.

Murdoch occupies an uneasy place within the history of analytic philosophy. She was trained in analytic philosophy, she lamented the poverty of its resources to engage with other traditions, yet she used those resources to criticise them all. But her use of analytic resources was not exclusive. Her philosophical career is characterized by a free engagement with French phenomenology and existentialism; a liberal use of aesthetic, Freudian, and theological concepts (and alternative

interpretations of more commonly used concepts such as ‘freedom’); and her willingness to draw idiosyncratic connections among seemingly disparate philosophical perspectives. While she recognized the strengths of ordinary language approaches to philosophical inquiry and describes herself as a ‘naïve empiricist’, she lacked her contemporaries’ aversion to metaphysical or substantively ethical modes of argument. Perhaps it is in part because of this medley of approaches that analytic philosophers have struggled to position Murdoch within the history of analytic philosophy and her work was largely neglected until recently.

By examining these aspects of Murdoch’s work, we can begin to understand the ambiguity of her place in the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy, and in doing so, we hope to shed a light on the larger problem of the lack of women philosophers in the canon.

This symposium features three papers. The participants have agreed to send the papers to each other ahead of the conference, so that the presentations can be shorter and there is ample time for discussion in the symposium.

Paper 1 argues that, despite her complaints against Kantian accounts of freedom, Murdoch’s own purported alternative account needs a Kantian twist to save it from a malign contradiction.

Paper 2 looks at the role of wonder in Murdoch’s ethics. Examples of awe and wonder recur frequently in Murdoch’s philosophy; but this experience has received comparatively little attention from most of Murdoch’s contemporaries. This paper argues that Murdoch’s interest in the phenomenology of wonder stems from the experience of wonder being a response to *attention*. It proposes that, for Murdoch, the experience of wonder is then not merely an emotional response to the world, but also plays an active role in driving ethical inquiry.

Paper 3 focuses on aspects of Murdoch’s philosophical methodology, attempting to account for the difficulty that some readers have in recognizing her writing as legitimately argumentative. Using ‘The Idea of Perfection’ as a case study, this paper will display how Murdoch approaches philosophical problems, noting both her affinities with ordinary language philosophy, but also her distinctive use of metaphysical and evaluative modes of argument.

### Ana Barandalla (independent researcher) – Murdoch on Freedom

Murdoch sought to provide an alternative notion of freedom to the Kantians’. However, I argue that her account needs a Kantian treatment to save it from a malign contradiction.

Murdoch charges Kantian conceptions of freedom with bequeathing us a denuded conception of the self: identified solely with a choosing will, and detached from the individual’s inner life. She produced a richer conception of the self, one that was historically shaped, and that incorporated the individual’s inner life. She also maintained that exercising one’s freedom was a matter of silencing those additional elements constitutive of the self. Given the nature of the concept of freedom, Murdoch’s position is tantamount to holding that those additional elements both are, and are not, constitutive of the self. Her position, then, harbours a contradiction.

However, I further argue that if give Murdoch’s account a Kantian constructivist interpretation, that contradiction is rendered apt, for it captures a contradiction in the individual’s experience of freedom.

According to constructivism the self is something one makes oneself into through an ongoing interaction between the different elements of the self vying for influence. This involves the rejection

of the commands of some of those elements. These are the elements that Murdoch holds we are to silence. On this view then, Murdoch is right to hold that we are to silence those elements of the self. But because our self-constitution is effected by the exercise of silencing those elements, rather than by their having been silenced, those elements must be part of the self. Murdoch then is also right in holding that those elements are part of the self.

Murdoch's contradiction of what is, and is not, part of the self matches the individual's experience of having to silence elements of herself in order to constitute herself.

### Amber Donovan (Durham University) and Sasha Lawson-Frost (independent researcher) – Murdoch on Wonder

This essay will explore the role of wonder in the ethical vision of Iris Murdoch.

Murdoch's philosophical writings, as well as her fiction, frequently draw on examples of the experience of wonder. For instance, she describes the awe-striking experience of watching a hovering kestrel in *The Sovereignty of Good* as a example of someone 'giv[ing] attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care' (p.82). Her novels are also strewn with examples of characters who are held captive by a sense of wonder because of artworks or by falling in love.

The reason for Murdoch's interest in wonder, we suggest, stems from the emphasis she places on contemplative attention to particulars. For Murdoch, attention is fundamental to recognising the reality and 'otherness' of things and people in the world around us. Many of the examples of wonder she uses show exactly this kind of shocking realisation of a world that exists beyond our own imagination and fantasies. The wonder that such attention invokes is then not merely an emotional response to the world, but also plays an active role in *driving ethical inquiry*.

The phenomenology of wonder is something which has received comparatively little attention from many of Murdoch's contemporaries. Part of the reason for Murdoch's own interest in wonder, we suggest, stems from her holistic conception of ethics and morality as something which pertains to one's 'total vision of life' ('Vision and Choice in Morality' p. 80). This approach differs from that of many of Murdoch's contemporaries in that it takes all aspects of human experience, (including the experience of wonder), to be in the domain of ethics, rather than focusing on narrower questions of moral choice and/or deliberation.

### Lesley Jamieson (Queen's University) – How Iris Murdoch Does Moral Philosophy

In this paper, I will use an analysis of Murdoch's approach to philosophy to connect two distinct aspects or 'movements' present in her 1964 paper, 'The Idea of Perfection': firstly, her 'ordinary language' description of the Case of M and D, and secondly, her striking introduction of the more metaphysical claim that we should think of moral concepts as 'concrete universals'. My hope is to highlight that Murdoch's work was in some respects continuous with the ordinary language philosophy she was criticizing (for its behaviourist and non-cognitivist neglect of the perfectionist dimensions of the moral life); one significant difference lies in her willingness to experiment with more imaginative and metaphysically-loaded philosophical language in service of respecting what we ordinarily say. Additionally, I will claim that the importance of respecting this particular aspect of our

ordinary linguistic practices is supported by a substantive claim about what elements of our extant human practices should be preserved through metaphysical description. As Murdoch writes of the picture of human moral agency that she is challenging, 'I do not think people *ought* to picture themselves in this way'.

## **Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Economics**

**Janelle Pötzsch (Paderborn University) – The Economic Thought of Harriet Taylor Mill (1807-1858)**

In her essay *Enfranchisement of Women* (1851), Harriet Taylor argues that gender equality is a necessary prerequisite both for social progress and for economic growth. Yet even though her thesis that equal employment opportunities for women implies a better allocation and development of human talent clearly has a Utilitarian ring, I aim to show that Taylor's economic ideas are much more complex, and also involve a Socialist bend. This becomes particularly evident in her analysis of the popular argument that the inclusion of women in the labour market would lead to excessive competition. Although Taylor thinks such development unlikely, she points out that the worst outcomes of such fierce competition can (and should) be addressed by legislative measures. That point being made, Taylor underlines that she doubts competition will persist to rule people's lives: In her view, the division between capitalists and labourers as well as the laws of supply and demand will one day come to an end. Such thesis is remarkable insofar as she has stressed the beneficial effects of competition throughout her essay, maintaining that as soon as people are valued according to their skills rather than their sex, market forces will settle who will get employed in which occupation.

In my paper, I will focus on Taylor's arguments for and against competition, and why she entertains the possibility that competition will some day cease to be "the general law of human life". My aim is to provide a more nuanced account of her economic ideas. I shall argue that Taylor's understanding of competition suggests that she does not consider market forces to be neutral. Her arguments draw attention to the ambivalent nature of competition: It has beneficial effects insofar as it breaks open entrenched structures, but at the same time always runs the risks of establishing other structures instead which are no less problematic, depending on who controls it. This balanced view makes Taylor one of the most interesting figures of economic thinkers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, whose reflections seem to have been influenced by arguments from, among others, Carlyle and Ruskin. I will close my paper by dwelling on how Taylor's theses can be made fecund for current issues in business ethics and the philosophy of economics.

**Alan Coffee (King's College London) – Catharine Macaulay and Anna Laetitia Barbauld:  
Reassessing the Impact of the "Republican Viragos"**

The early modern period has bequeathed us a canon of familiar names who fill almost all introductory texts to the history of political philosophy – names such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Burke. As so often in the history of philosophy, no women are included in this list. And as just as equally often, this is both misleading and a detriment to the discipline. Catharine Macaulay engaged extensively and effectively with each of the theorists listed. Yet, while she was one of the most

significant and influential political philosophers of her period – described by Burke as “the greatest champion among” the radical group that he opposed – Macaulay was almost entirely forgotten by philosophers until this century. Though there is something of a renaissance in her study today, considerable work remains to correct centuries of neglect. Though even today, Macaulay is best known for her influence on Wollstonecraft, it is her connection with a lesser-known figure that I shall explore.

Like Macaulay, Barbauld was a prominent public intellectual and political activist notable for her presence as a forthright woman intervening in issues usually reserved for men, such as in opposing the Test and Corporations Act in the 1790s. While Barbauld was better known in her day – as now – as a poet, she was a perceptive and innovative political theorist. Unlike Macaulay, however, she remains unstudied by specialists in political philosophy. On her own, she is eminently worthy of analysis. But together with Macaulay, Barbauld’s work can be seen as part of a much larger, and highly significant, women’s presence in the tradition of republican theory that is only just coming to light.

On separate occasions, Macaulay and Barbauld were each described as “republican viragos”. This is interesting for several reasons. Amongst republican scholars, women are almost never mentioned as theorists before Hannah Arendt. And amongst feminists, there has been a longstanding and deep suspicion of republicanism which is often considered irrevocably masculine in its structure. Nevertheless, we can now see a considerable number of women in this period – not just in Britain but equally in France (Gouges, Grouchy, Roland) and the USA (Wright, Fuller, Moore) – writing within the republican tradition. While they do not all directly advocate for women’s rights, Macaulay and Barbauld included, collectively their work serves as a powerful internal critic of republican logic – using its structures to negate sexist assumptions, its principles to challenge its patriarchal norms, and their presence to redefine implicit conceptions of gender.

Reading Macaulay and Barbauld together is instructive. While they moved in the same radical circles, Macaulay is a purist, looking back to the idealist principles of the seventeenth century, and the Civil War. She does this to great effect, articulating easily the most comprehensive and fully worked-out republican statement of the eighteenth century of any writer, across eight volumes of English history. However, where Macaulay develops a tight system structured around the core values of liberty, equality and virtue, Barbauld offers a more nuanced re-articulation of each of these themes in more conflicted terms to suit the nineteenth century. The combined effect is a viable, radical and inclusive republicanism relevant to our own times.

### **Nicolai von Eggers Mariegaard (Kingston University) – The Politics of Virtue: Feminist Theorists in the French Revolution**

Virtue, defined as acting with an eye to the common good, was the central concept of republican and much other political theory throughout the early modern period. For writers such as Montesquieu, however, the concept referred merely to (male) citizens’ public conduct, while writers such as Rousseau defined female virtue and proper behaviour as confined to the private sphere proper. In this, they followed an understanding of politics proposed by Aristotle, who distinguished sharply between the logics and powers of politics *vis-à-vis* that of the household, while also seeing virtue as largely depending on a person’s role within society.

With the advent of the French Revolution, a series of politically active female political theorists challenged, in various ways, these two chauvinist aspects of dominant political philosophy. Some

argued for the inclusion of women on the basis of equality, while others argued the same but on the basis of a fundamental sexual difference; some drew republican conclusions from this, while others drew royalist ones; but what they all had in common was a focus upon and attempt to redefine the concept of virtue. This they did both by problematising the definition of female virtue *vis-à-vis* male virtue *and* by dissolving a sharp divide between public and private power.

In this paper, I give a systematic presentation of how five female French revolutionaries argued for and attempted to redefine the concept of virtue with the aim of claiming a political role for women in society in relation to 18<sup>th</sup> century definitions of virtue and their Aristotelian legacy. The authors in question are Olympe de Gouges, Louise de Keralio (later Robert), Theroigne de Méricourt, Marie-Madeleine Jodin, and Etta Palm d'Aelders.

This paper makes two contributions to the history of philosophy.

First, none of these theorists wrote philosophical treatises in any traditional sense of the word, but – as scholars have long argued – carving out space for women writers in the history of philosophy also means drawing on a different set of texts and including other genres. Thus, as I will show in this presentation, even if none of these writers were philosophers in the sense of drawing up large philosophical treatises, they were all contributing to central debates within political philosophy at the times. Some did so more explicitly and self-aware than others with explicit discussions and critiques of Rousseau or references to the longer history of female political writers such as Christine de Pizan.

Second, as I will argue in this paper, these theorists do not merely draw attention to the position of women (or lack thereof) within existing theory. By focusing on private power relations and in many ways bridging the gap between public and private implications of 'virtue', these philosophers prefigure later feminist focuses on the public-private divide and its problematic role in excluding women from view. In doing so, these writers problematise republican theory in ways that remain relevant till this day.

## Session 7

### Ethics and Emotions in the British Analytic Tradition

#### Miranda Boldrini (Sapienza University of Rome) – Iris Murdoch in the Analytic Tradition: A Different Epistemology for Moral Philosophy

Iris Murdoch's place within the history of analytic philosophy is ambivalent: she accounts herself as part of this tradition, while strongly criticizing some of the conceptual pillars of (early) analytic philosophy such as the distinction between facts and values. This ambivalence resonates in the fact that Murdoch is rarely acknowledged as a key figure of the history of analytic philosophy, even if philosophers such as Hilary Putnam and John McDowell recognize their debt for her.

In this talk, I address the question of Iris Murdoch's position and contribution to the history of analytic moral philosophy: I argue that one of the most important disagreement between Murdoch and analytic approaches to ethics is to be found in her different conception of moral philosophy, and that

Murdoch's alternative conception of moral philosophy represents one of her main contributions for contemporary moral philosophy.

In the first part of my talk, I focus on Murdoch's critic to the metaethical search for «neutrality» in moral philosophy. I expose her alternative conception of moral philosophy as a moral practice, i.e. as a practice internal to the domain of the moral which engages us as moral beings. In particular, this point is made clear by Murdoch's problematization of the way ethics is circumscribed as a «domain» by philosophers. One of Murdoch's greatest legacy for contemporary ethics, I argue, is to show that ignoring these normative issues makes moral philosophy blind to itself as well as to ordinary moral life.

In the second part, I show that Murdoch's perspective on moral philosophy can be read as expressing an «alternative moral epistemology» (Walker, 1989) which shows Murdoch's originality against the background of moral theories in the analytic tradition. To fully elucidate the significance of her different approach in moral epistemology, I will consider Murdoch's critic of the analytic philosopher's tendency towards «universal formulae» and logical analysis. I will stress that what Murdoch provides, by contrast, is a philosophical approach centered on the attention for the individual and on the exploration of forms of life. In particular, I propose to read Murdoch's alternative moral epistemology through two notions that I take from feminist ethics: the notions of «epistemic responsibility» and that of «self-awareness».

In the third and last part, I argue that Murdoch's alternative moral epistemology makes sense of what Annette Baier claimed about women in the history of moral philosophy as – not essentially, but only at an epidemiological level – expressing «a different moral voice made reflective and philosophical».

### Elizabeth Drummond Young (University of Edinburgh) – Shirley Letwin on Individuality and Moral Practice

Shirley Robin Letwin [1924-1993] has made significant but overlooked contributions to the philosophical concept of individuality and its role in moral practice. Her work has been considered by literary critics, but not taken up by philosophers. In this paper, I first set out Letwin's concept of individuality in the context of romantic love and consider her influence in the current discussions of the philosophy of love. I then develop her view in the context of moral conduct more generally. I conclude by placing her work in the tradition stimulated by Elizabeth Anscombe's call to develop more finely tuned descriptions of moral behaviour. (Anscombe, 1958).

Letwin proposes that the individual can be defined as a unique rational consciousness, who is constantly changing and recreating the self (Letwin, 1977). Thus she poses a direct challenge to writers, such as Stendhal, whose cynical view of romantic love is that it is a description of the stimulation of the lover by the beloved for as long as the novelty lasts. Then the option is either to engage with a fantasy figure based on the beloved and thus to lose touch with reality or to lose interest, move on to the next beloved and be unfaithful. Letwin's view of romantic love where both the lover and beloved are constantly changing, is one of both parties respecting the individuality of the other and a perception of the particularity of the individual which encourages fidelity rather than the opposite, born out of boredom.

Extending the theme of particularity, Letwin develops the idea of the gentleman as an ideal of moral practice (Letwin, 1982); but this is no plea for conventional superficial British manners embodied in

male form. Letwin chooses female as well as male characters from Trollope's novels as examples. In so doing, she creates a compelling picture of refined moral practice, but not an ideal exemplar in the form of a moral saint. Letwin rejects talk of rigidity, ideal, model or pattern; what defines a gentleman is a 'way of being in any circumstances'. The important qualities are integrity, serenity in the world, self-knowledge and a respect for others' individuality. With these qualities to hand, the actions, intentions and thoughts of 'a gentleman' bring harmony yet variety to moral practice.

The use of fictional examples (which in Trollope's case are very extended character studies over time) allows Letwin to delve deeply into this variety of moral practice and make fine distinctions of the type advocated by Elizabeth Anscombe in her call to moral philosophers to take a more rounded view of morality.

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#### Eleanor Robson (Birkbeck, University of London) – Delimiting the Ethical Domain: Midgley as a Supplement to Foot

There is a burgeoning interest in whether the work of Iris Murdoch, Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot and Elisabeth Anscombe form a school of thought. In this paper I contribute to that effort by exploring the relationship between Midgley and Foot's respective thought on the topic of non-human animals. This is a topic that has hitherto been overlooked, yet it offers fruitful insights into the extent to which the thought of these women might be put to work alongside each other. By situating these two philosophers in direct dialogue with one another, I expose certain austere oversights in Foot's treatment of nonhuman animals which, I will argue, can be supplemented by the rich resources provided by Midgley's delimiting approach to nonhuman life.

I first examine the similarities between the thought of Midgley and Foot. Both thinkers develop a naturalistic framework according to their rejection of the fact-value purported divorce. From this basis, I deploy a critical analysis into Foot's position on nonhuman animals via Midgley's concept of the 'mixed community' (1984). Upon deeper analysis, Foot's position in *Natural Goodness* (2001) seems to overlook the presence and moral importance of the interrelated lives, capacities and dependencies between human and nonhuman animal life. Foot's work suggests that human morality operates within exclusively human communities, excluding any inter-species interaction or animal activity. This is problematic for Foot insofar as she is unable to account for various instances of human-animal and animal-animal interaction, notably, the rich intra and inter-species bonds accounted for by Midgley's concept of the 'mixed community'.

However, given the commonalities within Foot and Midgley's thought explored in my initial exposition, I go on to argue that Midgley's notion of 'mixed community' can be supplementary to Foot's framework – as such, their thought is compatible. By applying Midgley's concept of the 'mixed community' to the Footian notion of 'natural historical judgements', I will argue nonhuman animals can feature in the descriptive content of a human natural history. Furthermore, the Footian

framework in *Natural Goodness* can be expanded to accommodate the reality of interspecies interactions – even if such a move does not feature in Foot’s thinking. A combination of the Midgleyan and Footian project will serve to delimit the ethical domain by including within a liberally naturalistic understanding of ethics the real relationships and dependencies both within and between species. It also shows the historical importance and contemporary relevance of Midgley’s writing on the topic of animal ethics through a critical analysis on Foot.

## Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Women Logicians

Sara Uckelman (Durham University) – What Problem Did Ladd-Franklin (Think She) Solve(d)?

Christine Ladd-Franklin is often hailed as a guiding star in the history of women in logic---not only did she study under C.S. Peirce and was one of the first women to receive a PhD from Johns Hopkins, she also, according to many modern commentators, solved a logical problem which had plagued the field of syllogisms since Aristotle. In this paper, we revisit this claim, posing and answering two distinct questions: Which logical problem did Ladd-Franklin solve in her thesis, and which problem did she *think* she solved? We show that in neither case is the answer "a long-standing problem due to Aristotle". Instead, what Ladd-Franklin solved was a problem due to Jevons that was first articulated in the 19th century.

Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton) – Dorothy Wrinch on Judgment as “a very complicated phenomenon”

According to the multiple relation theory of judgment, famously put forward by Russell and defended again recently by a few authors, judging that Cassio loves Desmonda is not a relation of judgment between a subject and the proposition *that Cassio loves Desmonda*, but is rather a relation among a subject of the judgment and Cassio, Desmonda, and loving, i.e. a relation among objects, properties and relations. While the multiple relation theory has some obvious ontological merits, it has historically been subject to some fierce criticisms. In particular, in my paper I will focus on two problems that are generally considered to doom it:

(Order) The theory seems unable to distinguish between judging that Cassio loves Desmonda and judging that Desmonda loves Cassio;

(Nonsense) In obliterating order, the theory seems to allow for the possibility of judging nonsense, for example that love Cassio understand.

In 1919, in her paper “On the nature of Judgment”, Russell’s close friend Dorothy Wrinch (Senechal 2013) suggested how to solve both of these apparently severe problems by relying on famous Russellian tools. Wrinch urges that the relation of judgment is non-symmetrical, and thus it is the relation itself that provides judgments with the required order, so as to solve (Order). The relation of judgment is for Wrinch also the key to solve (Nonsense): Wrinch offers here a solution based on Russell’s type restrictions, maintaining, roughly, that it is not the case that anything can fill the various argument places in the relation.

Although Wrinch's paper appeared in *Mind*, it received very little attention, being not even mentioned by Russell and referred to, since its publication 100 years ago, by only a handful of authors (Griffin 1985; Hanks 2007; Korhonen forthcoming; Lebens 2017; Ostertag forthcoming), often only briefly and merely in footnotes.

Like Wrinch, I will not attempt in this paper to "give any answer to the question as to the truth of the multiple relation theory". I will rather try to show that Wrinch's solutions to some of the most severe problems for the theory might be the way the theory might be made to work. I will discuss her solutions in detail, compare them to alternatives, and show that Wrinch has the resources to reply to the objections advanced by the few who discussed her work. In particular, I will address Griffin's remarks that allowing nonsense is a better solution to (Nonsense) than Wrinch's.

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### David Loner (University of Cambridge) – Alice Ambrose and Failure in the Life of the Mind of the Woman of Talent in Analytic Philosophy, 1935-75

My paper focuses on the life and work of Alice Ambrose (1906-2001). An American logician, Ambrose was the first and only official Cambridge Ph.D. student of Ludwig Wittgenstein's. Throughout her intellectual life, she worked to unpack Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As a Cambridge graduate and junior scholar, Ambrose sought to marry Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations of meaning with the efforts of mathematicians and logicians concerned for the study of "finitism" in mathematics. In her mature works, she cultivated a serious methodological assessment of Wittgenstein's notion of philosophy as "therapy." Distinct from the more literary interpretation of therapeutic analysis offered by the American philosopher Stanley Cavell, Ambrose took as her point of departure the "dissolution" of philosophical problems in mathematical expressions. In specific, she was cautious to distinguish her commentary on the "notation" of mathematical propositions from that of "ordinary language philosophy."

In this paper, I want to consider 1. Ambrose's contributions to the study of Wittgensteinian philosophy and 2. Ambrose's relative absence in the canon of twentieth-century philosophical history. Building on the work of intellectual historians Joel Isaac, Kenzie Bok and Jonathan Strassfeld, my paper situates Ambrose's life of the mind in a transatlantic subculture of elite education and philosophy, unique to the interwar and postwar era. Besides Cambridge, Oxford and Harvard, there existed at mid-century several tertiary levels of scholarship and learning in Wittgensteinian philosophy. One such institution

was Smith College. In 1937, Ambrose took up work at Smith as associate professor of philosophy. In 1962, she and her husband Morris Lazerowitz jointly became the Sophia & Austin Smith Professor of Philosophy at Smith. Ambrose would retire from Smith in 1972, going on to write several key essays in the exegetical study of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. These include her 1972 autobiographical sketch, "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Portrait," her 1975 APA presidential address, "Commanding A Clear View of Philosophy" and her 1979 essay article, "Is Philosophy An 'Idleness in Mathematics'?"

Throughout my piece, I explore the asymmetrical institutional dynamic shared between twentieth-century women of talent, their philosophies and elite universities and colleges. Locating Ambrose's life's work at the intersection of merit and misogyny in Anglo-American philosophy, I ask to what extent exclusion based on gender shaped Ambrose's general obscurity as a logician and her greater notoriety as a Wittgensteinian. In doing so, I seek to upend numerous assumptions historians of philosophy make when speaking about women in philosophy as disciplinary forerunners. I am here thinking of Michael Beaney and Siobhan Chapman's recent assessment of Susan Stebbing as a framer of the analytic tradition alongside Wittgenstein, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Acknowledging the structural inequalities that led to the historical exclusion of women like Stebbing and Ambrose, as Chris Meyns recently pointed out in their study of the philosopher Rose Rand, is the only way forward in terms of canonizing twentieth-century women philosophers. Their originality as thinkers must be weighed next to their lived experience as protégées of misogynistic figures like Wittgenstein and the institutions which licensed such bias.

## Session 8

### Anne Conway on Time, Process, and Generation

Jonathan Head (Keele University) – Considering Anne Conway as a Process Philosopher

It has been suggested (most notably by Carol Wayne White and Emily Thomas) that Anne Conway offers a philosophy that has a significant overlap with process thought, in the sense that her ontology subordinates substantial things to processes. However, this conflicts with the emphasis placed on the ontological primacy of substance in Conway's *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (1690). In this paper, I will argue that though Conway is not a process philosopher in a straightforward sense, processes nevertheless play a substantial role in her metaphysical system. Thus, I seek to explore how process is substantially important in Conway's world-view, whilst retaining her fundamental commitment to a substance metaphysics.

The discussion will fall into two parts. In the first section, I will consider Conway's definition of time as 'the successive motion or operation of creatures'. I will argue that Conway views time as constituted by a moral and ontological process of all things back towards the perfect spirit, God. Conway's definition is in fact stricter than it may appear at first glance, being tied to the idea of creaturely motion towards perfection. In the second section, I will review Conway's account of the constitution of creatures. Conway argues that creatures who appear to us as individuals are in fact constituted of dynamic systems of spirits under the control of a single ruling spirit. Given the transfer of mediating spirits from one creature to another, it is possible that creatures can lose and gain spirits without losing their identity. Given the definition of time discussed earlier, and the moral identity of creatures

being grounded in dynamic systems of spirits, we can see Conway as placing process at the heart of the moral scheme of the world.

So, we can think about created beings at two levels in Conway's philosophy: the basic ontological level of spirits and the second-order level of dynamic systems of spirits, through which we can track the moral development of individual creatures. As such, I will conclude that we can consider Conway as a 'moral process' philosopher, insofar as it is processes that are the subject of moral agency and the object of moral judgement, but this is balanced with a substance-based philosophy that posits individual spirits as the ontological ground of all things. I will conclude with some reflections concerning possible avenues of research with regard to the relation between Conway's philosophy and later process philosophers.

### Jessica Tizzard (University of Connecticut) – Anne Conway on Finite Creatures and Infinite Progress

This paper explores Anne Conway's metaphysics of time and its relation to her distinction between God and creatures. I argue two main points: i), that her conception of time cannot be understood independently of her moral theory; and ii), that she should be recognized as a significant precursor to Kant and his claim that we must postulate our immortality on moral grounds. Making this argument enriches our understanding of her position and the way it anticipates 18<sup>th</sup> century developments in metaphysics.

Conway's views on time are grounded in her conception of the distinction between divine immutability and creaturely mutability. She holds that "time is nothing but the successive motion or operation of creatures" (CC 14; II:6), arguing both that time would cease without this motion, and that such motion is completely necessary to the nature of creatures themselves. On Conway's view of the universe, mutability is the defining characteristic of non-divine substance (CC 29; VI:1). That we change through our own activity is fundamental to the nature of creatures as such, and time is nothing over and above this activity. The universe can thus only be said to exist 'in time' because time is identical to creaturely change. If there were no creatures, there would be no time.

Asking the further question, "why is mutability fundamental to creatures?" leads us straight to Conway's moral theory as the basis for her metaphysics of time. First, Conway claims that "indifference of will is the basis for all mutability and corruptibility in creatures" (CC 15; III:1). Our moral fallibility is the fundamental source of our capacity for change, and thus the basis of our existence in time. Second, this fallibility is also the basis of time's infinite nature. It is through our motions or activities that we become more perfect, and these must never cease, since it is in our nature as imperfect creatures to strive for perfection without reaching it (CC 33; VI:6). Creatures thus exist in "an infinity of times" (CC 13; II:5), or an infinity of successive motions progressing from worse to better.

Conway's thoroughly moralized metaphysics of time anticipates Kant's view in remarkable ways. As I argue, both agree that time is neither an absolute entity nor constituted by relations, and both make morally based claims about the infinite duration of finite creatures in time. Though Kant's claim is weaker insofar as he thinks we can at most "postulate" our immortality on merely practical grounds, his reasoning for this postulation is the same as Conway's: our fundamental moral nature is finite and fallible, thus we must exist for an infinite duration of time to be able to progress towards perfection. Both thinkers emerge from a deep exploration of the distinction between divine and creaturely moral

natures with substantive claims about the nature of time and our existence in it. In this respect, Conway's view should be recognized as an important precursor to Kant's claim that substantive metaphysical conclusions must be based in moral rather than speculative reasoning.

## Women in Ancient Philosophy and Women Philosophers on the Ancients

### M. Alexandra Valadas (Michigan State University) – Tracing Back Gender in the *Kepos* through Leontion, the Epicurist *Hetaira*

The disappearance of women from philosophy's history is a multidimensional phenomenon that emerged with philosophy itself. Most of women's discourses were extricated and erased from the history of philosophy or just considered minor. Free thinkers, poets, and philosophers were deemed negligible in their epochs: this silence, imposed by patriarchy and misogyny, led to a moral woundedness translated on the deletion of women philosophers from history. Such has produced a highly gendered historiographical landscape that denied women's knowledge, ways of knowing, and actual women in general. For example, most Greek Women are just mentioned in fragmentary ways, as side notes, and one, most often, must infer their role and position in society. Apart from the fictional accounts of women and their lives in Athens, we have little knowledge of women as individuals (and most of the history about them does not even acknowledge them a name).

It is then, my purpose to propose an examination of how Leontion, a *hetaira* and an Epicurist, as a woman, participated and was part of the intellectual, philosophical history of classical thought, and what were the reasons for such.

Epicurist *ethos* was never free of controversy. In the *Kepos*, where egalitarianism was practiced and Democritus' teachings amply discussed, it is not surprising that a new form of humanism was inaugurated. All members of the 'Garden,' free citizens, metics, slaves, women, and men were entitled to the privileges and responsibilities of being an Epicurist, and it is not surprising then, to find a *hetaira* (or even several *hetairai*) within the *Kepos*. Leontion is, probably, the most famous as well as the most vilified woman to belong to the ranks of Epicurus' followers. Even if her role as an Epicurist has been belittled and almost erased from history, 'echoes' of Leontion remain throughout history. Such is the fate of many women thinkers and philosophers that have been systematically erased and silenced during the course of time. To return to Leontion is to return to the way of life of the *sophós* of the *Kepos*. As a presumed *hetaira*, Leontion was neither circumscribed to the *idios* or the *oikos* and could practice a degree of autonomy inaccessible to other women. Leontion, the Epicurist, could then not only exercise her *autárkeia* but to live the life of the sage. For Epicurus - the ultimate sage, every living being naturally seeks pleasure and naturally avoids pain (DL, X, 129), and therefore searches for a wise life in equilibrium with a telos based on *ataraxia* (tranquility of the mind) e *aponia* (absence of pain). Epicurist ethics, in which there is a liberation from dogma and teleological systems, focusing on a degree of individual asceticism and moderation, allowed women to participate and flourish in such an intellectual milieu.

Leontion's figure, apocryphal or not, allows us to draw the critical relationship between the ethical landscapes of Epicureanism and the role of women in the Garden.

## Dorota Dutsch (UCSB) – “And the Famous Theano...” Rethinking the Canon with Panthea of Smyrna

In the *Portraits*, an elaborate compliment addressed to Panthea of Smyrna, Lucian compares her to four iconic female intellectuals: “Aspasia, as portrayed by Aeschines,” “the famous Theano, the musician of Lesbos, and Diotima” (17-18). “The famous Theano,” the wife or disciple of Pythagoras, may not be a household name today. In post-classical antiquity, however, she enjoyed a towering reputation. Clemens of Alexandria implied that her thought influenced Plato (*Strom.* 4.7.44.2). Stobaeus included her sayings in his *Anthology*. She was also the only female sage behind *chreiai*, the pithy sayings that served as the basis for elementary education, for boys—and girls (Plut. *CP* 145e). To Panthea, Theano the Philosopher was a cultural icon comparable to Sappho the Poet.

For us, however, Lucian’s canon of four wise women, including as it does *Aeschines’* Aspasia and *Plato’s* Diotima, raises fascinating questions about Theano’s agency and her status as historical figure. We cannot link her, like Sappho, to a well attested textual tradition. But neither can we trace her pedigree, like that of Diotima, to a famous literary text. What kind of figure, then, is Theano and what can we gain by restoring her in our own canon? In order to propose answers to these questions, this paper examines Theano’s extant sayings. In addition to the eight Greek *chreiai*, I consider the Syriac corpus, bringing to light fresh evidence from *Synai Syr.* 16 fol. 106-108-v.

Even the small body of eight Greek *chreiai* reveals Theano to be a complex figure; five of her Greek sayings define (sometimes playfully) the wife’s bedroom duties; three had been in circulation earlier than the other two. The remaining ones are made from identifiable building blocks and overlap with words of Plato and Theophrastus (Dutsch, forthcoming). Unpublished Syriac manuscripts of wisdom literature (translated from Greek in the third century CE) further enrich Theano’s repertory, attributing to her words on virtue, wealth (some drawn from the Doric pseudo-Pythagorica), and friendship (with Stoic overtones). Ute Possekkel has translated sixty-five of these sayings from BL *Add.* 14658 into German (1998). I draw on an unpublished manuscript from Mount Sinai (*Synai Syr.* 16 fol. 106-108-v) which reveals eleven new apophthegms (Jurasz, forthcoming), including versions of three of Theano’s Greek *chreiai* on sexual conduct, to reveal an even more intricate figure of Theano.

Together, the interconnected Greek and Syriac material forms an open text-network (Selden 2010). Theano, as constituted by them, is a work in progress, a text connected to other texts. Multiple agents (including girls learning to write) have interacted with this text and shaped it into a “tangled entity” (Latour, 2010) so vibrant, that we may attribute agency to it. Influential, yet impossible to pin down, Theano escapes the traps of narrowly understood historicity. This dialogic figure, whose strength lies in its rich reception, invites us to seek female agency not only in attested authorship, but also in the more subtle traces that users of culture leave on artifacts. We may wish, then, with Panthea of Smyrna, to reclaim as women intellectuals not only Sappho and Aspasia, but also Diotima.

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### Sara Diaco (University of Tübingen) – Simone Weil and the Classics: The Value of her Interpretation of Ancient Texts for Classical Studies and Modern Philosophical Reflections

Simone Weil's reflection on ancient texts has been mostly investigated from the point of view of its references to Christian thought thus leaving unexplored or indeed unrecognized the significance her interpretation may have for, on the one hand, the field of Classics and, on the other hand, current philosophical discussions on broader issues.

The first part of the presentation will show the potential of Simone Weil's reading of ancient texts for classical studies. The paper will in particular focus on the work *The Iliad or the Poem of Force*; the aim is to verify how Weil's claims in this work may be helpful to understand other texts that have not so far been considered in this light, especially the tragedies and Plato (the paper will devote particular attention to Euripides' *Medea*).

This analysis will provide an outline of Weil's thoughts on the *Iliad*, which will allow the paper to show, in the second part, that her interpretation of force in the *Iliad* anticipates some of the current discussions on violence inspired by the Classics (the paper will provide a brief comparison with Adriana Cavarero's analysis of horror).

The paper will thus suggest that Simone Weil's reflection, on the one hand, is textually accurate and scholarly valuable, and, on the other hand, represents a forerunner of considerations and arguments about current problems. For Weil's analysis of ancient texts, in particular of the *Iliad*, is capable, at one time, to distill some of the questions and views that permeate ancient Greek culture and are common to other Greek authors, and to provide a discussion about force that is relevant at all times, thanks to its insight into the effects of violence on human beings.

### Feminism, Morality, and the Passions in Early-Modern Europe

#### Ariane Schneck (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) – Elisabeth's Influence on Descartes in the Correspondence and the Passions of the Soul

In May 1643, Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes began a correspondence that lasted for more than six years. This correspondence is best known today for Elisabeth's penetrating criticisms regarding the possibility of mind-body interaction and other Cartesian claims. However, a growing

number of scholars have begun to conceive of Elisabeth as more than a mere critic of Descartes and have accordingly sought to shed light on her own positive philosophical thought.<sup>27</sup>

While these efforts to establish Elisabeth as a thinker in her own right have shed much light on the nature of Elisabeth's philosophy, they have yet to establish much about Elisabeth's *influence*. The objective of my talk will be to demonstrate this influence on Descartes' thought. In particular, my talk will highlight some interesting discrepancies between the correspondence and the *Passions of the Soul*, i.e. passages in which Descartes admitted to Elisabeth that he agrees with her but nevertheless did not alter the respective parts in the published version of the *Passions*. Since Elisabeth read and commented on an earlier version of the *Passions*, it is possible to identify points that were altered and claims that were left as they were despite Elisabeth's criticism and Descartes's concessions. Examples of the first are Descartes's admission that he made an error in his treatment of the passion of "languor" that Elisabeth had detected (AT IV 414, Shapiro 138), as well as his conception of beloved family members and friends as parts of a whole of which one is oneself also a part (CSM I 357, AT XI 389). It seems as if this treatment of love goes back to Elisabeth's critique of Descartes's ethics being too much focused on individual happiness and neglecting emotional ties to other people. An example of a concession that was not integrated in the *Passions of the Soul* is Descartes's admission that there are diseases that take away the power to reason and thus the power to make oneself happy (AT IV 282, Shapiro 106-107). Despite what he conceded to Elisabeth, he states in article 41 of the *Passions* that the soul's will is so free that it can never be constrained, not even by the body it is united with. My talk not only examines Elisabeth's influences on Descartes's thought, but will also provide an explanation why Descartes sometimes responded to her criticisms and sometimes not.

### Kathleen Cook (University of Pittsburgh) – Anna Maria Van Schurman as Philosopher and Feminist

A distinguished historian of Early Modern Philosophy once claimed in a semi-public setting that Anna Maria Van Schurman was not a philosopher. Some of us then disagreed, as would many more of us now. However, her claims to being a philosopher have produced hesitation. Additionally, while some would happily include her on a list of early feminists, others would deny her that description or grant it only with qualification.

I will argue that Van Schurman was a philosopher and a feminist. I will first examine a number of considerations which might seem to weigh against these categorizations in her case. In some instances, I believe the standards employed are mistaken, in others, that Van Schurman may have been misunderstood. I also offer a number of positive reasons we should think of her as a philosopher and a feminist. In particular, I will argue that in her invocation of Aristotle in a number of places in the *Dissertatio* and in her correspondence with Rivet we can find evidence of her philosophy and her feminism. Furthermore, I will suggest that we should see her use of Aristotle as an instance of a strategy which has characterized a group of more recent feminist historians of philosophy.

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<sup>27</sup> For the most extensive treatment, see Shapiro, 'The Union of Soul and Body', and her introduction to *The Correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth*. See also Broad, *Women Philosophers*; Ebbersmeyer, 'Argumentations Épicuriennes'; Nye, 'Polity and Prudence' and *The Princess and the Philosopher*; Tollefsen, 'Mind-Body Interaction', and Johnstone, 'The Bodily Nature of the Self.'

# Who Counts as a Philosopher and Why? On the Text Tradition Catalogues of Learned Women (Denmark and Germany, 1650-1800)

## Introduction

Since Eileen O'Neill's classical study 'Disappearing Ink' (1998), the shortcomings of our standard accounts of the history of philosophy, in which we find hardly any women represented as philosophers in their own right, became apparent. A constructive way to address this problem is to look at different text traditions that developed independently of general accounts of the history of philosophy and which convey information on women philosophers. One example of such a text tradition is that of *catalogues and lexica of learned women*. Flourishing especially during the early modern period, this text tradition contains rich material on women philosophers from antiquity up to the early modern period. Starting with Boccaccio's *De Claris mulieribus* (1362), books appeared all over Europe featuring women famous for their learning. This text genre became especially popular in Germany and in Denmark. During the 18th century, six of such catalogues were published in Denmark and more than twenty in Germany during the 17th and 18th centuries. Most of the women philosophers portrayed in these texts did not find their way in standard account of the history of philosophy. Despite its relevance for our understanding of the history philosophy, this text tradition has been almost entirely overlooked by modern scholarship. Concerning the German context some pioneering work has been done, especially during the 80s and 90s, by Elisabeth Gössmann (see also the PhD dissertation by Schmidt-Kohberg, *Manche Weibspersonen* (2014)). Concerning the Danish context, Marianne Alenius's works provide some starting points for further research. However, it still holds true that this text tradition has not yet been investigated by historians of philosophy in any systematic and comprehensive manner.

We propose to take this text tradition into account when reconstructing philosophy's past. We intend to uncover patterns of thought that had an impact on the inclusion (and exclusion) of women philosophers from the history of philosophy by investigating this text corpus with the following questions in mind: Who counts as a philosopher and on what grounds? What are the underlying assumptions concerning the discipline of philosophy and of being a philosopher? What role does education, life form, profession, public appearance and written works (published and unpublished) play for the definition of a woman philosopher? We assume that considering this text tradition will broaden our understanding of the history of philosophy and lead to a more accurate understanding of the role women played in philosophy's past.

Anne-Sophie Sørup Nielsen (University of Copenhagen) – Female Philosophers as “Learned Women”: A Critical Examination of the Genre *Gelehrte Frauenzimmer*

Women are severely underrepresented in standard accounts of the history of philosophy. This is often explained by reference to the notion that there simply were no women philosophers worth mentioning. This claim can, however, be questioned by turning to alternative literary sources in order to find examples of women who participated in contemporary intellectual debates and who could appropriately be categorized as philosophers. One of these sources is the *catalogues and lexica of learned women*; a genre that was thriving in early modern Europe. These catalogues contain entries about thousands of women who were active in studies of theology, law, art and philosophy. Until now,

no in-depth research has been done on Germany's extensive contribution to this tradition, apart from the ground-breaking work by Elisabeth Gössmann (and a PhD-dissertation by Karin Schmidt-Kohberg).

I will argue that a lack of attention to this text genre is one of the reasons for the exclusion of early modern women from most histories of philosophy, which has, consequently, led to the false but widespread assumption that women were not involved in philosophical debate in the 17th and 18th Century. Diving into this massive text corpus, the picture of the early modern period radically changes and the continuous presence of women in philosophy becomes strikingly apparent.

In my paper, I will start with a brief examination of the text tradition *Catalogues of Learned Women*, focusing on the German context. Then I will go on to analyze which criteria the authors have applied in order to characterize a woman as 'learned' as well as the judgements made on women's ability to be philosophers. Finally, I will be offering some reflections on the role of literary style in the characterization of women as philosophers.

**Sabrina Ebbersmeyer (University of Copenhagen) – What Makes a Princess a Philosopher?  
Or: Elisabeth of Bohemia sans Descartes**

Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) is today best known for her extensive letter exchange with the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). In standard accounts of the history of philosophy, Elisabeth (if mentioned at all) is usually referred to as a 'student', 'friend' or 'follower' of Descartes. It is only in recent years that Elisabeth's own philosophical position received some scholarly attention and that she became considered a philosopher in her own right (see e.g. Shapiro, *The Correspondence* 2007, Kolesnik-Antoine/Pellegrin *Élisabeth de Bohême face à Descartes* 2014). However, it is usually overlooked that during her lifetime and the century following her death, Elisabeth had a philosophical reputation prior to and independent of her letter exchange with Descartes.

This contribution investigates and critically assesses these earlier testimonies of Elisabeth's philosophical reputation as found in German lexica and catalogues of learned women. I will argue for the thesis that whether or not Elisabeth is considered a philosopher and what role Descartes played for this assessment, is dependent on the text genre and the underlying assumptions about the nature of philosophy.

The contribution consists of three parts: Firstly, I will present how Elisabeth is portrayed in several catalogues of learned women that appeared in Germany between 1671 and 1772. Secondly, this evidence will be contrasted with the representation of Elisabeth as found in the writings of two eminent historians of philosophy of the same period, namely Christoph August Heumann (1681-1764) and Johann Jakob Brucker (1696-1770). Finally, these findings will be compared and their impact on our understanding of Elisabeth as a philosopher evaluated. The results raise several questions concerning the impact of text traditions on the representation of women philosophers in the historiography of philosophy.