CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

DAY 1 – THURSDAY 23 APRIL

TIME	MAC 604 (4.2)	MAC 302 (1.1)	MAC 304 (1.2)	MAC 305 (1.3)	MAC 405 (2.1)	
9 9.30 10 10.30 11 11.30						MCM (Pyramid Room, King's Building KIN-450)
12						REGISTRATION
12.30	WELCOME					
1 1.30 2	KEYNOTE: RAPHAEL WOOLF					
2.30	COFFEE					
3 3.30 4 4.30		PANEL 1 Plato	PANEL 2 Non-Western Morality and Politics	PANEL 3 Early Modern Epistemology	PANEL 4 Symposium: Gradualism in Emancipation	
5 5.30						Reception (Terrace Café)
7						(MC dinner)

DAY 2 – FRIDAY 24 APRIL

TIME	MAC 604 (4.2)	MAC 302 (1.1)	MAC 304 (1.2)	MAC 305 (1.3)	MAC 405 (2.1)	
9 9.30 10 10.30		PANEL 5 Aristotle and the Good Life	PANEL 6 (SMRP) Love and the Good in Medieval Philosophy	PANEL 7 Early Modern Philosophy of Religion	PANEL 8 Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Andreas-Salomé	
11	COFFEE					
11.30 12 12.30		PANEL 9 Aristotle on Science	PANEL 10 Symposium: Medieval Theories of Introspection	PANEL 11 Symposium: Judgment in British Idealism and Realism	PANEL 12 Love, gender, sexism	
1 1.30	LUNCH					
2 2.30 3	KEYNOTE: MONIMA CHADHA					
3.30 4 4.30 5		PANEL 13 Symposium: Epistemological Ethics in Indian and Greco-Roman philosophy	PANEL 14 Symposium: At the Center of the World: Place, Stability, and Order from Plato to Oresme	PANEL 15 Symposium: Early Modern German Ethics	PANEL 16 Spinoza	
5.30						**AGM** Anatomy Theatre
7						Conference Dinner

DAY 3 – SATURDAY 25 APRIL

TIME	MAC 604 (4.2)	MAC 302 (1.1)	MAC 304 (1.2)	MAC 305 (1.3)	MAC 405 (2.2)	
9		PANEL 17	PANEL 18 (SMRP)	PANEL 19	PANEL 20	
9.30		Stoicism	Medieval Philosophy of Mind	Methods of Inquiry in the 18th Century	Kantian Themes in the 20th Century	
10						
10.30						
11	COFFEE					
11.30	KEYNOTE: SARA UCKELMAN					
12						
12.30						
1	LUNCH					
1.30						
2		PANEL 21	PANEL 22	PANEL 23	PANEL 24	
2.30		Philosophical Canon	Medieval Philosophy and Religion	Kant	19th-20th c. Philosophy of Mind	
3						
3.30						

KEYNOTES

Raphael Woolf (KCL): Why the Dialogue Form Doesn't Matter: Plato, His Characters, and the Writing of Philosophy (*chair: John Callanan*)
Monima Chadha (Oxford): Reimagining Responsible Agency (*chair: Clare Carlisle*)
Sara Uckelman (Durham): What the History of Logic Can Teach Us About the Future of Logic (*chair: Zita Toth*)

PANELS

1. Plato

Chair: Christiana Sessini

Athanasia Giasoumi (Athens): Misology and Defective Paideia: Plato on the Educational Roots of Hatred of *Logoi*
Simonas Baliukonis (Vilnius): Care as a Strategy of *homoiōsis theōi*: Assimilation to the Unidentified Gods of the *Phaedo*
Samuel Stevens (Southampton): Plato's Divided Line and the Practice of Greek Mathematics
Antonio Kerstenetzky (Princeton): *Hubris* in Plato's *Phaedrus*: Rethinking the Psychology of Vice

2. Non-Western Morality and Politics

Chair: Lea Cantor

Lilith Lee (Amsterdam): A Slavery that Liberty Creates and Conceals: Recovering TAN Teck Soon's Anglo-Chinese Critique of Colonialism and Confucianism
I Xuan Chong (KCL): Moral Education in the Zhuangzi
Jinesh Sheth (Birmingham): On the Method of *Anekāntavāda* and its Therapeutic Paradigm

3. Early Modern Epistemology

Chair: Kenneth Novis

Jan Forsman (Tampere): Metaphysics Under a Watchful Eye: Émilie Du Châtelet's "On Freedom" and Voltaire's *Traité de Metaphysique*
Tobias Sandoval (UT Austin): 'What Is Natural Is a Constant Habit or Custome': Cavendish on Habits and Procedural Memory
Anna Ortín Nadal (Barcelona): Cordemoy on Secondary Causation as Prejudice
Sadik Ameer (Edinburgh): Knowledge-First Epistemology and Mullā Ṣadrā's Account of Conception and Assent

4. Symposium: Gradualism in Emancipation (organizer: Sandrine Bergès)

Chair: Fridolin Neumann

Sandrine Bergès (York/Bilkent): Abolishing the Slave Trade: A Moral Problem
Laura Brace (Leicester): Elizabeth Heyrick and the 'Wily Artifice' of Gradual Emancipation
Alan Coffee (KCL): "Perhaps it would be dangerous to trust women all at once, with liberty in that extent which it is due": Is Mary Hays's Gradualism about Women's Rights Consistent with her Philosophical Principles?

5. Aristotle and the Good Life

Chair: Chiara Lalli

Chris Izgin (Oxford): Aristotle's Account of Philosophy in the *Protrepticus*
Filip Grgic (Zagreb): Doing Well and Making Truth: Anscombe's Aristotle
Rossana Zanetti (Pisa/Florence): Serving the God in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*: An Echo of Plato's *Timaeus* 87c–90d?
Jelena Milosavljevic (UCL): Aristotle on the Satisfaction of Human Appetites

6. Love and the Good in Medieval Philosophy (SMRP)

Chair: Amber Carpenter

Marco Vorcelli (Padua): Does Being *supra passiones* Equal Being *sine passiones*? Albert the Great on the Passions of "Heroes"

Tatiana Barkovskiy (Cambridge): The Interplay Between Reason, Love, and Emotion in Hadewijch of Brabant

Andrea Sola (Salerno): The Vindication of Self-Love in Renaissance Erotology

Steven Waldorf (CUA): Francisco de Vitoria on the Political Good and the Supernatural End

7. Early Modern Philosophy of Religion

Chair: Dino Jakusic

Ioannis Spiliopolous (Athens): Hume on Miracles

Boxiang Yu (Edinburgh): Descartes on Imago Dei and Knowledge of God

Foivos Syrigos (Athens): Natural Law and Miracles in Leibniz

Mario Schärli (HU Berlin): Baumgarten's Actualist Modal Epistemology

8. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Andreas-Salomé

Chair: Tobias Keiling

Dominic J. Kearney (Southampton): Monism and Motivation: Schopenhauer's Theory of Intention

Joseph Chapman (Cardiff): Nietzsche's Critical Reception of Schopenhauer's Account of Humanity's Metaphysical Need

9. Aristotle on Science

Chair: Chris Izgin

Giuseppe Colonna (Oxford): Simplicius on Redefining Change in Aristotle's *Physics* III

Sebastiano Belleggia (Columbia U): Endoxic Method and Ancient Medicine

10. Symposium: Medieval Theories of Introspection (SMRP) (organizer: Susan Brower-Toland)

Chair: Preedanant Jareonsettasin

Peter Hartman (Loyola Chicago): Introspection and Retrospection: Hervaeus and Durand on State Consciousness

Yanfu Chen (KU Leuven): Peter John Olivi on Human Introspection

11. Symposium: Judgment in British Idealism and Realism (organizer: Simon Wimmer)

Chair: Mahdi Ranaee

Mark Textor (KCL): Herbart Helps Bradley

Simon Wimmer (Düsseldorf): Judgement and Knowledge in Bradley, Cook Wilson, and Stout

Giulia Martina (Nottingham): Dawes Hicks on the Genesis of Judgement

12. Love, Gender, Sexism

Chair: Ying Xue

Ian MacLean-Evans (York, Canada): Neither Male nor Female: Anti-Essentialism in Poulain de la Barre

Emily Thomas (Durham): Letters of Women Philosophers 1902–1951: Sexism and Shadow Networks

Colette Olive (Leeds): How Disinterested Is Murdochian Love?

13. Symposium: Epistemological Ethics in Indian and Greco-Roman philosophy (organizer: Joachim Aufderheide)

Chair: Monima Chadha

Joachim Aufderheide (KCL): What Did Aristotle Make of Plato's Cave?
Amber Carpenter (Einstein Forum): Can Conceptual Cognition Conduce to Transformation through Knowing a Non-conceptual Reality?
Michael Griffin (British Columbia): Liberating Knowledge: Valentinian Gnōsis and Narrative Transformation
Marie-Hélène Gorisse (Birmingham): Knowledge and liberating self-transformation in Jainism

14. Symposium: At the Center of the World: Place, Stability, and Order from Plato to Oresme (organizer: Yael Kedar)

Chair: J.P. Osmond

Giora Hon (Haifa): What Keeps the Earth in its Place? Misinterpreting Classical Arguments Bearing on Stability
Noa Naftalovich (Tel Hai College): Christopher Alexander's Luminous Ground: Centers and Wholeness in the Theatre of Dionysius at Athens
Suf Amichay (Cambridge): As the Very Center of the Earth, Drawing All Things to It
Yael Kedar (Tel Hai College): Natural and Mathematical Centers: Grosseteste, the *Summa philosophiae*, and Roger Bacon

15. Symposium: Early Modern German Ethics (organizers: Stefano Bacin and Michael Walschots)

Chair: Cheng-Hao Lin

Stefano Bacin (Milan): Pre-Kantian Moral Dilemmas?
Courtney Fugate (Florida State): The Universality of Laws of Nature and Laws of Freedom
Sonja Schierbaum (Würzburg): Wolff on Conscience
Michael Walschots (Milan): Duties to Self, Others, and God in Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius

16. Spinoza

Chair: Amedeo Robiolio

Oliver Toth (Heidelberg): Spinoza on Love of Finite Beings
Kenneth Novis (Oxford): Democracy and Human Nature: A Puzzle for Spinoza
Stephen Harrop (KCL): Personal identity and the eternity of the mind in *Ethics* V
Francesco Gandellini (Hebrew University): Identity or inseparability? Spinoza meets Wittgenstein

17. Stoicism

Chair: Marco Vorcelli

Peter Osorio (Harvard) and Máté Veres (Geneva): The Stoic Theory of Trust
Máté Veres (Geneva): Sagehood and Expertise in Early Stoicism
Chiara Lalli (Louvain la Neuve): Rethinking Cicero's *Voluptas*: Philosophical Depth Behind a Roman Polemic
Stefano Parrinello (St Andrews): Panaetius of Rhodes and Biological Cosmology in Later Stoicism

18. Medieval Philosophy of Mind (SMRP)

Chair: Boxiang Yu

Ana Lomadze (Ilia State): What is the Act of the Intellect: Knowing or Co-existing with an Object? Duns Scotus on the Human Intellect
Tilke Nelis (KU Leuven): *Quot Translationes, Tot Variae Lectiones*: Textual Fluidity in Latin Versions of Aristotle's *De Anima*
Francesco Binotto (Hamburg): Hervaeus Natalis on the Ontological Status of Mental Acts

Helen Hattab (Houston, TX): Sixteenth-Century Views of Abstraction in Relation to Descartes' *Rules*

19. Methods of Inquiry in the 18th Century

Chair: Francesco Ciocconi

Lorenzo Sala (Milan): The Experiential Turn of Eighteenth-Century Germany and Wolff's Puzzle of Certainty

Tzuchien Tho (Bristol/Leipzig): Euler and the Architectonic Refoundation of Newtonianism

Andrew German (Ben Gurion University): Aristotelian Shadows in Rousseau's Concept of Reason

Lewis Ashman (Edinburgh): When Is a Natural Philosopher Doing Philosophy? Laws, Causes, and Disciplines in Late Enlightenment Edinburgh

20. Kantian Themes in the 20th Century

Chair: Xingding Liu

Fridolin Neumann (Warwick): Heidegger's Realism and his Appropriation of Kant

Tobias Keiling (Warwick): Transcendental Arguments in Heidegger's Being and Time

Mahdi Ranaee (Siegen): Wilfrid Sellars' Inverted Antinomy: How his Kantianism Overcomes the Clash of the Images

21. Philosophical Canon

Chair: Kate Kehoe

Dino Jakusic (Warwick): (Not) Teaching Medieval Philosophy in the UK: an Empirical Perspective

H. Melisa Acar (Glasgow): The Invisible Concept: The structuring power of success in the history of philosophy

Xingding Liu (UNSW, Sydney): How to name the nameless: A typological analysis of signifiers in WANG Bi's philosophy of language

22. Medieval Philosophy and Religion

Chair: Fedor Benevich

Karim Shoaib (Edinburgh): God's Huwiyya in al-Kirmānī's Rāḥat al-ʿAql

Nathaniel Taylor (CUA): Avicenna and the Many Ways by which the Many Senses of Being are Said

Luigi Valletta (Independent): Roland of Cremona: Dominican Cosmology between Anti-Cathar Polemic and Opposition to Heterodoxy

Preedanant Jareonsettasin (KCL): Bradwardinian Modal Contextualism to the Rescue: Reconciling Divine Determinism with Creaturely Freedom by Distinguishing Sorts of Contingency

23. Kant

Chair: Ma Jian

Daniel Dearlove (KCL): Kant on Absolute Positing as Subjective Synthesis

Lia Nordmann (Cambridge): Kant on Animals as Analogues of Humanity

Carlina Schreiber (Cologne): Kant on Inner Morality and Political Obligation

Lorenzo Spagnesi (Trier): Maxims of Inquiry: A Zetetic Solution to Kant's Antinomy of Mechanism and Teleology

24. 19th–20th-Century Philosophy of Mind

Chair: Emily Thomas

Matyáš Moravec (Queen's Belfast): James, Bergson, Mrs Piper, and the Ghost of Richard Hodgson

Jeremy Dunham (Durham): James and Stumpf on Space: The Changing Face of Empiricism and Nativism in the Nineteenth Century

Ethan Harley Field (Liège): The Reactions to Samuel Alexander's Compresence Revolution

KEYNOTES

Raphael Woolf: Why the Dialogue Form Doesn't Matter: Plato, His Characters, and the Writing of Philosophy

Broadly, there continue to be two approaches to the question of how to determine Plato's views from his dialogues. One approach regards it as legitimate to more or less directly read off what Plato thinks on a given occasion from what the leading character in a given work says. The other does not consider this legitimate. Both approaches appeal, in different ways, to Plato's use of the dialogue form. The first points out that each dialogue usually has an identifiable leading character, the second that each contains multiple voices that cannot be reduced to a single authorial representative. This focus on the dialogue form, I argue, leads to impasse. A more fruitful way to advance the debate, while providing a strengthened defence of the second approach, is to take seriously the fact that Plato's speaking characters are without exception distinct from Plato. After drawing out some implications of this for our understanding of Plato's own attitude towards writing, I offer a brief diagnosis of the persistence of the first approach in relation to the practice of writing philosophy more generally.

Monima Chadha: Reimagining Responsible Agency

The impersonal event-causal view of action is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind and action. The Ancient Indian Buddhists philosophers were perhaps the first to argue for this view; indeed, they believed that this account of action enhances agentic control and freedom. Some philosophers, however, worry this view threatens agency, freedom and responsibility. In this paper, I argue that the impersonal event-causal view is no cause for such worry; indeed, if any, it is an opportunity to rethink our notion of responsible agency.

Sara Uckelman: What the History of Logic Can Teach Us about the Future of Logic

The starting point of this talk is the present-day state of logic, a field which is ever expanding and becoming more inclusive and yet which still presents systemic barriers of access to certain groups of people. As logicians and philosophers, we think there is value in the study and practice of logic (and philosophy!), so patterns of exclusion should concern us, in two ways:

- Where did these exclusionary structures come from?
- What can we do to get rid of them?

A lot of work has been done in philosophy on the latter question, as witnessed by important work done in canon-revision. But the former question is much less often discussed. These exclusionary structures do not exist in a vacuum, but are rooted in historical events and developments, which means that if we wish to understand where these exclusionary structures come form and how we can get rid of them, we must understand the history of our field, so that the history of logic can teach us about the future of logic. Only by looking at historical answers to "who gets to have access to logic and why" can we fully understand where we are at today, and identify ways to change where we are going tomorrow.

SYMPOSIA

(4) GRADUALISM IN EMANCIPATION

organizer: Sandrine Bergès
participants: Sandrine Bergès, Laura Brace, Alan Coffee

Late 18th- and early 19th-century abolitionists are hailed as ambivalent heroes of their times: they realized, rather late, that slavery was wrong and had to be stopped. Yet, instead immediate abolition, most of them argued for gradual abolition. In parallel to this debate, the question of women's emancipation was discussed in much the same way, with calculations of how long we should wait before all women could be granted civic and political rights. Our panel examines some of the issues that rise from those gradualist arguments.

One concern that gradualists had was the possibility that new right-holders would not know how to profit from their rights, that they would end up harming themselves and others with their new freedom, or that they would put themselves at risk of harm by those who previously held authority over them – plantation owners for the enslaved, and husbands or fathers for women. This is a problematic attitude, which has been criticized as cruel and incoherent (Heyrick). Cruel because it placed very little weight on the condition of those waiting to be emancipated, and incoherent because it was at odds with the rhetoric that abolitionists applied to their own case about equality, liberty, natural rights and justice – all principles that we inherited from them, and that have most influenced our current political philosophy.

In this panel we hope that by exploring some of the philosophical arguments put forward at the time we begin to understand why philosophy failed to bring about the emancipation of the enslaved and women as soon as it turned to it.

(10) Medieval Theories of Introspection (SMRP)

organizer: Susan Brower-Toland
participants: Yanfu Chen, Peter Hartman

Later medieval philosophers develop sophisticated accounts of the mind's awareness of its own acts. This panel examines several influential theories of introspection from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, focusing on how medieval thinkers analyze the structure of self-awareness and the relation between consciousness and more introspective modes of reflexive awareness. A central issue concerns the structure of introspective awareness: is such awareness implicit in the first-order acts themselves or does it instead require a distinct, higher-order act of reflection? Related questions arise about the relation between the introspecting act and the act introspected – are they are simultaneous or sequential, identical in kind or distinct? Together, these papers explore a wide range of later medieval approaches to introspection and call attention to various debates about the nature and structure of reflective awareness.

(11) JUDGMENT IN BRITISH IDEALISM AND REALISM

organizer: Simon Wimmer
participants: Giulia Martina, Mark Textor, Simon Wimmer

What is judgement? Does it connect us with reality? And how is it related to knowledge and perception? This symposium will tackle these questions by reconstructing and assessing the contributions of the British Idealist F. H. Bradley, his realist contemporary John Cook Wilson, and the slightly younger realists G. F. Stout and George Dawes Hicks. We hope to make progress in dialogical fashion: our protagonists

criticised and responded to each other and we will recreate some of this engagement. We focus on figures who have not received as much attention as some of the more famous early 20th-century realists, in order to bring to the fore how varied and sophisticated critical reactions to British Idealist views of judgement were at the time, both in the views taken and in the methodologies employed.

The three contributions to this symposium start from Bradley's view that judgement is "the act which refers an ideal content … to a reality beyond the act." Bradley motivates his view in part by criticising the claim that judgement is a synthesis of different contents. But whilst the three realist authors the symposium focuses on agree with Bradley that judgement is not a synthesis, each develops distinctive criticisms of Bradley's positive view.

Contribution 1 engages with Cook Wilson's argument that Bradley's definition is circular. We can only understand reference to reality, Cook Wilson claims, if we already understand judgement. Contribution 1 will make a case that Bradley's theory of judgement was influenced by Herbart, who advocated that the basic form of judgement is absolute positing. This account of positing gives Bradley the resources to respond to Cook Wilson.

Contribution 2 targets another line of criticism that both Cook Wilson and Stout level at Bradley. A reference to reality, Cook Wilson and Stout argue, presupposes that knowledge is an immediate relation to reality. So insofar as knowledge is a case of judgement, judgement cannot be what Bradley says it is. But even though Cook Wilson and Stout agree in this criticism of Bradley, they disagree over the cases of judgement where we get things wrong: are these judgements relations too, even if they cannot be relations to reality? Cook Wilson says 'no', Stout 'yes'. This disagreement is traced to the different metaphysics of modality Cook Wilson and Stout are operating with. Unlike Cook Wilson and Stout, Dawes Hicks bases his criticism of Bradley on methodological grounds.

Contribution 3 discusses Dawes Hicks' 'genetic' approach, inspired by cutting-edge psychological research of the time, on which we must explain how judgement could develop in creatures like us. Dawes Hicks faults Bradley for making this development impossible: Bradley's subjective conception of perception does not allow for a gradual development of the objectivity of judgement. In response, Dawes Hicks provides an objective conception of perception, on which judgement turns out to differ from perception merely in 'degree of complexity'.

(13) Epistemological Ethics in Indian and Greco-Roman philosophy

organizer: Joachim Aufderheide
participants: Joachim Aufderheide, Amber Carpenter, Marie-Hélène Gorisse, Michael Griffin,

Self-transformation is considered the central ethical task in most ancient philosophical schools. This symposium explores a common thread among several of these schools in India and the Graeco-Roman Mediterranean world, namely the supposition that this necessary transformation is effected through knowing reality. It is transformative because the knowledge at issue is something rare and hard-won, deserving of the accolade 'wisdom'. This claim, that true knowledge transforms us, underwrites a distinctive and compelling ethical view, and one which integrates ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and moral psychology, often leading to a comprehensive system.

In the Anglo-European sphere, approaching knowledge as an ethical goal has not been popular since the modern era, barring select religious contexts. Mainstream moral philosophy typically defines its domain as the sphere of action, making room for knowledge only insofar as it contributes to acting well. Classical philosophical views, however, offer a different perspective: many Greek and Hellenistic philosophers identified proper knowledge of reality (not a narrow 'practical knowledge') as that which transforms knowers into good people, and thus makes life good; several diverse classical Indian philosophical traditions identify knowing reality as the primary and good-making ethical task. For these philosophers, ideal cognition of how things really are is not just a practical pre-requisite for being able to engage in good practical action, but is that in which doing well and being good consist. Reconfiguring ethics and its relations to knowledge and reality promises not only to bring out the often missed unity and coherence

in the thought of these classical philosophers, but also offers a way to integrate, as they did, the diverse moral aspects of our own lives.

In this symposium, we propose to examine the connection between self-transformation and knowing reality, through the lens of Buddhist, Greek, Jain and Roman perspectives. This will provide a first step towards reconfiguring our understanding of what ethics is, what its central questions are, how it relates to metaphysics, mind, and epistemology. More specifically, the papers contribute to showing how the familiar epistemological 'what is knowledge?' becomes an ethical one by raising and addressing key questions: Is the knowledge that transforms us a knowledge of a distinct 'moral' reality or of the plain reality that physicists might study? Is that reality much like what common sense recognises as real or is it radically unfamiliar? Questions of philosophical psychology are bound to these epistemological and metaphysical concerns: What exactly are the promised transformations that knowing reality effects? And finally, how do we cultivate these transformations? If knowledge of reality should transform us, then what – according to each of these differing accounts of knowledge and reality – do we need to do or practice to attain it? How must we develop ourselves to grasp this reality accurately, and thus make ourselves, our lives and our actions good?

(14) At the Center of the World: Place, Stability, and Order from Plato to Oresme

organizer: Yael Kedar
participants: Suf Amichay, Giora Hon, Yael Kedar, Noa Naftalovich

The notion of the *center* – of the earth, the cosmos, or a structure of order – emerges as a crucial theme in pre-modern philosophy. The center not only grounds physical explanations but also provides meaning and orientation within a finite cosmos. Without it, there are no directions, no structure, and ultimately no coherent theory of the behaviour of elements, planets, or natural processes. From antiquity through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, metaphysical reflections on the stability, meaning, and function of the center were thus bound up with deeper issues of place, necessity, and cosmic order.

We propose this panel within the framework of a larger project that seeks to reconstruct the medieval concept of heaviness, both as a property in itself and as a principle structuring the dispersion of matter and the motion of bodies toward their natural place. Within this context, the notion of the *center* emerges as crucial. The panel brings together four papers that approach the problem of cosmological centrality across different traditions, highlighting its philosophical, scientific, and symbolic significance.

The first paper examines the link between center, stability, and balance by revisiting classical arguments for the earth's immobility at the center of the universe. It challenges the view that Plato and Aristotle relied on symmetry or the principle of sufficient reason, showing instead that Plato appealed to equal balance, whereas Aristotle grounded stability in the doctrine of natural place. The second paper turns to Christopher Alexander's morphogenetic theory, exploring how order emerges through centers. By examining Vitruvius' architectural vision of the Theatre of Dionysus, it analyzes how Alexander's notion of the "luminous ground" – a metaphysical field of unity generated by the coherence of centers – reveals the power of concentric physical and metaphysical centers to embody and radiate cosmic order. The third paper addresses the necessity of celestial motion around the earth in Aristotelian natural philosophy and its later reinterpretations. Beginning with Avicenna and Averroes and moving through Buridan and Oresme, it shows how the condemnations of 1277 prompted a decisive recasting of cosmological centrality, shifting the understanding of necessity itself. The final paper investigates the relation between center and place, distinguishing the mathematical from the natural center. Focusing on Grosseteste, the *Summa philosophiae*, and Roger Bacon, it demonstrates how medieval thinkers grappled with the difficulties generated by Aristotle's definition of place as a container, thereby exposing the tensions inherent in the very notion of "natural place."

Taken together, these papers trace the multifaceted history of the world's center from antiquity to the later Middle Ages and beyond. They reveal how seemingly simple questions – *how to define the center? what lies at the center, and why does it remain there?* – provoked wide-ranging debates in philosophy, natural science, and even architecture, debates that shaped medieval cosmology and continue to resonate in later conceptions of space and order.

(15) Early Modern German Ethics

organizers: Stefano Bacin and Michael Walschots
participants: Stefano Bacin, Courtney Fugate, Sonja Schierbaum, Michael Walschots

Early Modern European Philosophy is a constantly advancing area of study. In recent decades, considerable progress has been made on expanding the Early Modern canon to include figures and works that have been traditionally marginalized, with a particular focus on Early Modern women philosophers. Advances have also been made along thematic lines: while at one point in time the scholarship focused predominantly on issues in metaphysics and epistemology, recently there has been increased interest in the social and political philosophy of the period, such as how slavery and race were theorized. There is much work left to be done, however, and not only on thematic lines: the canon of Early Modern European philosophy also needs to be expanded along *national* and *linguistic* lines as well. An example is Early Modern German philosophy, which (aside from Leibniz and Kant, who in a way serve as the bookends of Early Modern German philosophy) receives comparatively little scholarly attention, especially in the Anglophone world, in part because most works have not yet been translated into English. Thanks to the work of a handful of scholars, the situation is gradually improving, especially with respect to how Early Modern German philosophers approached issues in *theoretical philosophy*. Early Modern German *ethics*, however, has been a particularly neglected area of study. This panel brings together both emerging and established scholars to encourage the advancement of scholarship on Early Modern German Ethics. Additional aims of the panel are to present a window into the current state of research into this area, as well as foster a collaborative exchange of ideas among panel members and conference attendees.

The four papers in this panel address a variety of central topics and figures. In addition to the function of conscience and moral judgment in agency (Paper 1), papers explore topics such as the priorities given to duties to self (Paper 2), conflicts of duties (Paper 3), and the notion of universality implied by laws of both nature and morality (Paper 4). The figures discussed range from Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten to C. A. Crusius and J. G. Darjes. Collectively, the papers therefore promise to introduce Early Modern German figures into debates on topics with which contemporary moral philosophers continue to grapple.

ABSTRACTS of regular submissions
(in alphabetical order of the contributors)

H. Melisa Acar: The Invisible Concept: The structuring power of success in the history of philosophy

Despite its cultural ubiquity, the concept of "success" has received remarkably little direct attention in the history of philosophy. While central to how individuals and societies assess value, aspiration, and legitimacy, success remains philosophically underdefined – an object of practice, but rarely of theory. This paper argues that success has long operated as an invisible concept: structurally present across ethical, political, and existential thought, yet conceptually absent or unnamed. As such, it demands a critical genealogy.

The project reconstructs this hidden history by analyzing how key philosophical traditions have encoded "success" through adjacent categories – *eudaimonia*, *virtue*, *salvation*, *dignity*, *self-realization* – without isolating success as a problem in its own right. In Aristotelian ethics, success is implicitly equated with eudaimonia, the full actualization of human potential in accordance with reason and virtue. The Stoics, by contrast, internalize the metric of success, defining it as freedom from external conditions through alignment with nature and rational self-discipline.

In the Christian tradition, Augustine reconfigures success as the soul's journey toward divine truth; earthly triumphs become illusory, even spiritually dangerous. By the early modern period, thinkers like Montaigne relocate success to the realm of self-authenticity, irony, and self-examination – rejecting glory in favour of interior coherence. Later, Nietzsche subverts the very idea of socially sanctioned success by introducing self-creation and value transgression as success's only authentic form. Rawls reintroduces the question within institutional justice, and Foucault exposes success as a disciplinary mechanism – producing subjects who conform to normative ideals under the guise of freedom and merit.

This paper makes two core claims. First, it proposes that the invisibility of "success" as a named concept has served a normative function, makes hierarchies of value and legitimacy to appear neutral or natural. Second, it suggests that recovering success as a philosophical category offers a new perspective on familiar questions: What is a good life? What counts as achievement? Who decides which lives are exemplary, and on what grounds?

By examining how success has been distributed, denied, moralized, or deconstructed across historical contexts, the paper reveals its status as a metaphilosophical problem – one that intersects ethics, social philosophy, and political theory. This project does not attempt to define success once and for all, but to make its conceptual absence visible and philosophically productive. In doing so, it invites a broader conversation on how philosophy might critically engage the evaluative frameworks that shape modern life. In this way, this paper aims to open a new line of inquiry: the philosophy of success as a domain in its own right. Its historical reconstruction is not only diagnostic but constructive – laying the groundwork for future analysis of success as a moral, institutional, and existential structure.

Sadik Ameer: Knowledge-First Epistemology and Mullā Ṣadrā's Account of Conception and Assent

'Knowledge-First' is regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the last 25 years. Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1641) is arguably the most important Islamic philosopher of the last 400 years. This paper argues that his account of the distinction between conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) is compatible with a knowledge-first reading of his epistemology, and that in fact Ṣadrā is a knowledge-firster.

Ṣadrā's starting point is that knowledge is a simple state of consciousness (ḥālah wijdāniyyah nafsāniyyah) which cannot be defined by genus and differentia. No epistemic state is clearer than knowledge, and other epistemic notions are made clear by it. On this picture, knowledge is primitive, most evident and explanatorily prior to other cognitive states. In the tradition, assent was historically defined as conception

accompanied by judgement; I show that by formulating conception and assent as two simple ways of being in a state of knowledge and by critiquing the view that they are composites built from smaller parts, Ṣadrā's account demonstrates how one can reconcile existential dependence and explanatory priority between epistemic states without sacrificing simplicity or reversing the explanatory priority.

I show that as a consequence of their simplicity, they do not admit real essential definitions and at most can be defined nominally. A central contribution of the paper is to analyse Ṣadrā's treatment of conception and assent in terms of both existential and essential dependence for simple entities. Showing that the genus and differentia for simples are inseparable existentially and is the reason why judgement is referred to as a 'token differentia', which assent entails. Existentially, assent depends on an instance of conception (there is no assenting without something conceived). Essentially, however, assent is not constituted by conception (assent ≠ conception + judgement) because it is simple. Assent is already a mode of knowing, distinguished from the state of merely conceiving by the entailment of judgement. This simplicity claim and the difference between the essential and existential picture resulting from it, does the main work: the correct account in light of the former blocks the familiar move that treats assent as having conception as a constituent part or that tries to build a truth-involving state out of non- truth-involving pieces, while the correct account in light of the latter supports a knowledge-first reading by accounting for the fact that you need to know P to assent to P. Assent is not a neutral conception with judgement tacked on; it is a simple state which entails judgement. The paper develops this reading through a close analysis of Ṣadrā's metaphysics of simple things, his remarks on the exceptional obviousness of knowledge, and his handling of the relation between conception, assent, judgement, truth, passive knowledge states and actions of the soul. It is significant both in terms understanding Ṣadrā's take on a debate that started as early as the 10th century in Islamic philosophy, and in terms of paving a new interpretation of him as a knowledge-first thinker.

Suf Amichay: As the Very Center of the Earth, Drawing All Things to It

The centrality of the sublunar world in the universe, and in particular the centrality of the element of earth, is a foundational principle of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In this talk I trace the shifting accounts of the type of necessity attributed to that centrality. I begin with Avicenna and Averroes, for whom the question was whether the necessity of celestial motion around the world's center is a priori or a posteriori, each position turning on a different definition of the necessary. I then turn to the Latin Middle Ages: the condemnation of 1277 forced a reconsideration of many basic principles in natural philosophy. In the discussions of Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme, the centrality of the world was recast: what had been regarded as absolute necessity before – or what we would regard today as necessary a priori – was increasingly treated as a derived necessity – which we would call a posteriori. These transformations mark a broader reconfiguration of natural philosophy, marking a period of shifting science and scientific methods.

Lewis Ashman: When Is a Natural Philosopher Doing Philosophy? Laws, Causes, and Disciplines in Late Enlightenment Edinburgh

The English term 'scientist' was coined in the 1830s by naturalists eager to distinguish themselves linguistically from philosophers. The modern notion of 'science' as a field distinct from 'philosophy' had evidently appeared, but what had actually changed in how natural inquiry was conceived? This talk argues that late Enlightenment Edinburgh offers an answer. It looks at several influential professors who characterised philosophy (and therefore natural philosophy) as by definition concerned with a deeper level of causation than the establishment of natural laws. These professors believed that it was possible to reason from the 'laws of nature' to God, the 'first cause', yet their commitment to placing scientific explanation upon empirical foundations made the distinction between laws and causes so fine as to encourage its collapse.

Echoing the work of James Gregory, professor of medicine (1776–1821), who sought to develop a pious empirical psychology, John Robison, professor of natural philosophy (1773–1805), reformulated the justification for reasoning in science through the notion that the human mind was so constituted by its

maker naturally to discern cause and effect. Dugald Stewart, joint-professor of mathematics (1775–85) and professor of moral philosophy (1785–1820), distinguished between the 'generalization of a fact' (that is, the establishment of a law) and the 'discovery of an efficient cause'. John Playfair, professor of mathematics (1785–1805) and natural philosophy (1805–19), was, like Robison, less concerned than Stewart in the distinction between laws and causes, characterising laws of nature not as mere physical regularities but direct evidence of divine agency. Yet John Leslie, professor of mathematics (1805–19) and natural philosophy (1819–32), claimed that a 'truly philosophical' approach to natural inquiry, following David Hume, takes cause and effect to be mere 'constant and invariable sequence'.

For Stewart, physical 'principles' are akin to Euclidean 'definitions', from which one may reason through 'axioms' toward proper explanations. Laws of nature are principles, and we require axioms, the 'elements of reasoning', to move from principles to the agency that gives rise to them. For Robison and Playfair, however, it was precisely the focus on establishing laws of nature that raised natural philosophy to its modern pinnacle, as philosophers rejected speculative inquiry into the origins of the powers that animate nature. All agreed that natural philosophy was essentially concerned with physical explanation, though Robison and Playfair thought the mind could identify the origin of phenomena in God more readily than did Stewart.

This paper proposes that these positions made natural philosophy at late Enlightenment Edinburgh almost equivalent to the 'modern' notion of natural science articulated in the 1830s by David Brewster (Edinburgh alumnus) and Mary Somerville (Edinburgh resident prohibited from studying at the university). That is, an empirical enterprise concerned with the acquisition of physical facts toward the explanation of natural processes through laws of nature. As the nineteenth century progressed, secularisation discouraged appeals to divine causation and arguments over the precise meaning of natural *philosophy* became moot as natural inquiry came to be known as 'science'.

Joachim Aufderheide: What Did Aristotle Make of Plato's Cave?

Most major schools of ancient Greek philosophy assert that ordinary life is fraught with suffering or existential unease and that practising philosophy turn life around from misery to happiness. This is especially clear in the medical analogies employed by the Hellenistic schools, from diagnosing pervasive existential un-ease that they promise to cure with knowledge of nature (Epicureans and Stoics) or a better understanding of what to aspire to (Sceptics). Plato's Cave, likewise, paints the misery of ordinary life in stark colours. The proposed solution – turning the soul around – culminates in a radically different life, complete with a new kind of agency. Knowing what is real and what is not in spite of misleading appearances helps focus on what matters: striving to do what is *really* good and virtuous, not merely what seems so.

Aristotle is an outlier, since he does not regard ordinary life as miserable, nor does he offer a *therapeia*. This stems partly from a denial of the Platonic position that reality is radically different from what we take it to be: we are not systematically mistaken. To live well, we seemingly need "only" develop the virtues of character and practical wisdom, supported by external goods and suitable political arrangements. I argue, however, that Aristotle's best life does require a transformation. He endorses a version of the ideal of godlikeness (Sedley 1999; 2017) that sets the contemplative life above the life of mere practical virtue. Attaining this ideal requires knowledge of who (and what) we are, as well as an understanding of fundamental metaphysics. Drawing on EN VI.13, EN X.7–8, EE VIII.3, and Pol. VII.1–3, I argue that the insight that we are divine and capable of theoretical philosophy reshapes life's aspirations, transforming moral psychology, action, and especially politics.

Stefano Bacin: Pre-Kantian Moral Dilemmas?

Much of German moral philosophy in the time between Leibniz and Kant aims at providing a comprehensive treatment of the entire scope of moral demands, most often along the general lines of a doctrine of duties, following the model of Pufendorf's *De officio hominis et civis*. A central issue, in this regard, is how to construe and treat cases where different duties appear to come into conflict. Most German moral philosophers in the eighteenth century deny that a genuine clash of duties is possible.

Their arguments to that effect vary, though. Furthermore, even if the possibility of a real dilemma is denied, it remains to be explained not only how different valid duties may appear to clash, but most importantly how an agent should deal with such cases. While Kant's view on the matter has been given some attention by scholars, those of previous writers have been entirely neglected so far. The present paper shall survey the main relevant arguments by Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Darjes as to whether there are genuine conflicts of duties, and how to handle apparent perplexing cases.

Simonas Baliukonis: Care as a Strategy of *homoiōsis theōi*: Assimilation to the Unidentified Gods of the *Phaedo*

The whole scheme of ethical development in the *Phaedo* is based on the soul's efforts to gain the qualities of the gods, i.e. to assimilate to them. The divine Forms are often interpreted as the only object of assimilation in the *Phaedo* (e.g. Gallop 1975, Betegh 2003). Accordingly, the strategy for assimilation to these Form-gods is based on the soul's intellectual activity (79d) and rule over the body (79e–80b). This perfect match between the object and the strategy of assimilation seems to fully represent the *Phaedo*'s ethical ideal. However, this paper argues that in the *Phaedo*, there is another, previously undetected object of assimilation – care-taking gods, which cannot be identified as the Forms. These gods as ethical examples fit the *Phaedo*'s ethical scheme since their presentation is accompanied by the specific strategy of assimilation, which Socrates himself represents. Moreover, these other gods are presented as an essential part of Socrates' theory about the soul's fate after death (63b–c).

Recently, some scholars have argued that the Forms are not the sole object of assimilation (Nightingale 2021, Ebrey 2023). However, the distinction between the Forms and other gods was made for the wrong reasons, since no proper *differentia* was identified. This paper suggests that care-taking seems to be just such a quality which makes us distinguish at least two kinds of gods (62b–63c; the Form of the Good would have this quality, but it does not fit the description for other reasons; moreover, it may be that anonymity of these gods is intentional, since Socrates reckons himself unable to identify them (cf. Betegh 2009)). This paper presents how Socrates strives to assimilate to these gods by doing what they are doing – taking care of others. He does that by encouraging his friends to properly prepare for death by following the trail set by their conversation (115b–c). Since the success of Socrates' friends will mean that he was a good caretaker and has developed the divine quality, their further philosophical effort is presented as a help for Socrates himself (cf. Bossi 2018, who emphasises the importance of Socratic care in Socrates' last words, but does not connect it with his pursuit of divinity).

In the coda of this paper, it is argued that care-taking as a strategy of *homoiōsis theōi* and the essential quality of the philosopher make us see more similarities between the ethics of the *Phaedo* and the middle and later dialogues than before. In such dialogues as the *Republic* or the *Phaedrus*, care-taking, albeit in different guises, is an integral part of the philosopher's assimilation to the gods (cf. Annas 1999, 62; Irani 2017). In later dialogues, it is a bit more difficult to assess the importance of this aspect. However, if we leave aside the assimilation to gods as such and think about the essence of the philosopher, we will see that care-taking may be the crucial quality, differentiating the philosopher from her/his best imitators (Gill 2012, 240–44).

Tatiana Barkovskiy (Cambridge): The Interplay Between Reason, Love, and Emotion in Hadewijch of Brabant

Similarly to the 'mainstream' philosophers of her time, Hadewijch of Brabant is both optimistic about the epistemic capacities of reason (*reden*) – perhaps surprisingly so for a thinker usually grouped with other 'medieval female mystics' – and nonetheless cautious to emphasise the limits of this intellectual faculty. On the other hand, however, her epistemology is firmly grounded in a framework typical for the latter group, as she perceives Love (*minne*) not as an emotion, but as an epistemic power; together with reason, they constitute the two 'eyes' – or aspects – of the soul's 'power of sight' (Letter 18). The aim of my paper is to explore how affect (*affectie*) and emotional experience intersect with both these aspects and the activities that are proper to them.

As Hadewijch argues in Letter 4, there are many things in which reason 'errs' and 'fails'. Importantly, several elements in her list pertain to affects – such as fear, hope, charity, and sadness. By distinguishing specific kinds of emotional behaviour as the *loci* of reason's erroneous activity, she posits (much like many of her scholastic contemporaries) that sensuality must be subject to reason, thus emphasising a hierarchical relation between them. In Letter 12, she draws a fundamental distinction between worldly love limited by emotionality and divine Love congruent with 'higher' reason by deploring how 'the emotional attraction of frivolous love' makes one 'lose enlightened reason, which is our rule and teaches us how to observe Love's right'. Finally, in Stanzaic poem 25, she describes how the agent first experiences Love, which inspires feelings of pleasure and desire, which in turn awakens their reason that moderates these.

Sebastiano Belleggia: Endoxic Method and Ancient Medicine

The scientific method that Aristotle describes in the *Posterior Analytics* starts from the grasp of first principles, which are immediate, self-evident, necessarily true, and known by induction. From these, scientific propositions are deduced by means of syllogisms. By contrast, the method he applies in the *Physics* and in the *Ethics* is apparently based on what Aristotle calls ἔνδοξα, i.e., reputable views, defined in the *Topics* as views held by all or most people in general or by all or most people among the wise. This discrepancy has stirred a lot of debate. Some scholars argue that Aristotle theorises and employs a so-called Endoxic Method, which, roughly, consists of surveying and harmonizing existing reputable views. Others take it that the Endoxic Method has been overly emphasized by its supporters, and may even be an outright scholarly fiction.

In this paper, I attempt to throw fresh light on this matter. While not taking a stance on whether the Endoxic Method can be regarded as a fully fleshed out method or not, I contextualise Aristotle's 'conservative' approach to reputable views with similar approaches in the Hippocratic Corpus. The most striking similarity is with the treatise *On Ancient Medicine*. Both the Author of this Hippocratic work and Aristotle are interested in the ability of a collective to build knowledge over time as a communitarian process, sometimes in contrast with the outlandish theories of individual philosophers. Aristotle's definition of reputable views parallels the picture drawn by the Author of the book *On Ancient Medicine*: reputable views are views that are held by (1) either all or most of the many, which correspond to the Author's account of folk-medicine, or by (2) all or most of the wise (or the most reputable among them), which correspond to professional medicine. The similarities are striking and some dependence between the two authors is likely.

With regard to the perceived clash that gave rise to the debate about the Endoxic Method, my analysis suggests that, just like for the Author of the book *On Ancient Medicine*, there is no tension between reliance on induction and trust in more traditional bodies of knowledge. Once the process of acquisition of knowledge is seen as the enterprise of a collective rather than an individual, relying on reputable views ensures that the conclusions the philosopher draws are not just his conclusions, but rather the final outcome of a collective process of assessing truth, either by a guild of experts or by a political community. Thus, Aristotle's reliance on reputable views is not in contrast with the theory of knowledge of the *Analytics*, but rather complements it. Even with reputable views into the picture, it is still true that the intellect grasps first principles that are obtained from perception via induction. When looking at reputable views, Aristotle is not leaving his epistemology aside, but rather moving from the perspective of an individual cognizer to a more social perspective: he is moving from the level of individual epistemology to the level of social epistemology.

Sandrine Bergès: Abolishing the Slave Trade: A Moral Problem

For the first years of the abolitionist efforts in Britain, what was sought was the abolition of the slave trade, not of slavery itself. Indeed, the First society for abolition was called Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade (SEAST). Much of the writings produced and publicized by the Society were specifically about the horrors of the transatlantic trade, the 'middle passage' whereby people were kidnapped in their native Africa, enslaved first by their countrymen, then transported to the coast and

sold to slavers, who transported them as if they were cargo in horrendous conditions to the West Indies or to America, where they were then sold to white people as servants and laborers. Amongst the members of SEAST many later fought for the abolition of slavery itself. They saw abolishing the trade as the first stage of a gradual emancipation. But for some, the efforts stopped there or aimed perhaps at the amelioration of the conditions of slavery, but they fell short of emancipation. Reasons for abolishing the trade were not always moral reasons: they were at best religious reasons and at worst economic or political reasons. But here I ask whether they were not in fact morally wrong. I don't want to suggest that the trade being stopped would not have been a good thing. But I argue that campaigning for the abolition of the trade, rather than the abolition of slavery was morally wrong: emancipation was only a possible consequence of abolishing the trade, whereas had slavery itself been abolished, the trade would no longer have been needed. In developing this argument, I look at texts by SEAST members, Clarkson and Sharp, their close associate, Equiano, their correspondent Lafayette, and contemporary works on how to respond to the flawed morality of past activists.

Francesco Binotto: Hervaeus Natalis on the Ontological Status of Mental Acts

Recent scholarship has devoted considerable attention to the question of the ontological status of mental acts in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century thought (Cross 2014; Pini 2015; Hartman 2019). Yet Hervaeus Natalis's position has not received systematic treatment, despite the fact that this issue lies at the heart of a sharp debate with Durand of Saint-Pourçain. This paper seeks to fill that gap by examining Hervaeus's account of the ontological status of acts of intellection, focusing in particular on *De Intellectu et Specie*, *Quodlibet* II, q. 8, and *Quodlibet* III, q. 8. Broadly speaking, Hervaeus aligns with John Duns Scotus in maintaining that acts of thought are not relations but absolute qualities inhering in the intellect. Nevertheless, he articulates distinctive qualifications that differentiate his view and deserve careful consideration. Two aspects of Hervaeus's contribution are especially noteworthy. First, he rejects the models of immanent action proposed by Thomas Aquinas and Durand, on the grounds that both interpret such actions within the framework of efficient causality. Hervaeus, by contrast, grounds immanent action in formal causality. For him, to say that thinking is an immanent action means that it is nothing other than the formal effect – or manifestation – of a qualitative form (namely, an act of intellection) inhering in the intellect. Just as a thing is white by virtue of the form of whiteness inhering in it, so too the intellect is thinking by virtue of the act of intellection inhering in it. Second, Hervaeus introduces an important distinction within mental acts themselves. Not every mental act counts as an immanent action: some, such as acts of concept formation, are transitive actions that culminate in a product – namely, a concept or 'mental word' – which itself is a quality inhering in the intellect.

Laura Brace: Elizabeth Heyrick and the 'Wily Artifice' of Gradual Emancipation

This paper explores some of the themes in Elizabeth Heyrick's 1824 pamphlet, '*Immediate Not Gradual Abolition*'. I focus in particular on her arguments against gradualism in emancipation, and her insistence that everyone is implicated in the perpetuation of slavery. I explore her arguments that a gradual approach to the abolition of slavery is incompatible with the rights of the slave, and is bound to be aligned to the interests of the slaveholders. She argues that gradual emancipation will inevitably lead to 'gradual indifference', and turn the grand, moral cause of abolishing slavery into a political calculation by deferring it into the future and by being too polite and accommodating towards the planters.

Heyrick exposes the power relations inherent in some of the metaphors behind the politics of gradual emancipation, such as the dangers of providing a banquet for a famished wretch, or bringing a prisoner out of the darkness into the sudden, dazzling light. If emancipation must be gradual in order to be salutary, she asks, does it follow that the 'wretched victim of slavery must always remain in slavery?' In this paper, I ask whether Heyrick's own use of the language of usurpation, fraud, rights and oppression offer a better chance of achieving the emancipation that she sought. Should we agree with her that gradualist emancipation must be rejected 'among those who have any claim to humanity'?

Amber Carpenter: Can Conceptual Cognition Conduce to Transformation through Knowing a Non-conceptual Reality?

Dignāga (5th C. CE) is pivotal for the development of Indian epistemology and logic. His *Compendium of Means of Knowing* offers novel theories of perception, language, and reasoning, and incisive criticisms of contemporary alternatives. This paper addresses Dignāga's theory of 'inference' (*anumāṇa*, in context 'reasoning') from an ethical angle.

In the context of the Buddhist tradition within which Dignāga works, the epistemological *is* the ethical: the definitive task, defining and constituting the domain of the ethical, is a comprehensive transformation through knowing impersonal reality. An 'impersonal' reality is selfless, transient, dependent – or, in another idiom, comprehensively devoid of organisation, agency, purpose, unity and wholes. Such a reality is to be known 'as it is' through a kind of experiential, quasi-perceptual, non-conceptual cognition, which the Buddhist tradition in fact consistently prefers.

Dignāga's logic address the second and decidedly lesser form of cognition the Buddhists acknowledge. If read against the broader background of Buddhist epistemological ethics, however, we see that what is distinctive in his account of conceptual reasoning allows it, unexpectedly, to play a role in the central Buddhist ethical project of transformation through knowing. His nominalist account of concept-meaning is underwritten by an understanding of reasoning or inference which is, unexpectedly, itself a practice in *refraining*: refraining from hypostasising, refraining from identifying grounds and agents, refraining from doing all the explanatory consolidation suited to knowing a teleologically ordered reality such as Aristotle and Plato inhabited. Because inference – concept-formation and the use of concepts – is, on Dignāga's account of it, an exercise in eschewing explanatory relations and grounding in essences, even conceptual reasoning can be conducive to the sort of transformation fully effected and even constituted only by non-conceptual, experiential cognition.

Joseph Chapman: Nietzsche's Critical Reception of Schopenhauer's Account of Humanity's Metaphysical Need

This paper identifies and begins to reconstruct Nietzsche's critical reception of Schopenhauer's account of the origin of transcendent metaphysics in a pervasive psychological need. In *The World as Will and Representation vol.2*, Schopenhauer suggests that humans as such possess a 'metaphysical need' (i.e. a psychological need for transcendent metaphysics) which is rooted in their rational self-reflection and confrontation with pervasive suffering. This need, he speculates, arose when humans first reflected upon the nature of their existence. As they developed powers of rational self-reflection capable of conceiving of the ubiquity of suffering and the inevitability of death, they also recognised the futility of "all striving" (WWRII §17: 169). This generated a "need for metaphysics" (WWRII, §17: 171), for something that can transcend those aspects of life, such as death, that make us feel as though all human endeavour is futile. From this need sprung, allegedly, both folk metaphysics (e.g. religion) and philosophical metaphysics. Nietzsche takes up Schopenhauer's inquiry into the origins of metaphysical thinking but rejects his claim that a universal and fundamental psychological need is the origin of transcendent metaphysics. Instead, he reverses and historicises Schopenhauer's claim: the metaphysical need is a *byproduct* of the longstanding popularity of transcendent metaphysics. Accordingly, Nietzsche develops a genealogical alternative to Schopenhauer's account.

I will begin my talk by outlining Schopenhauer's account, including the part-speculative, part-empirical methodology that informs his claims. I will then consider Nietzsche's appraisal of the essentialist and therefore *relatively* ahistorical nature of Schopenhauer's account, particularly focusing on Nietzsche's central criticism that Schopenhauer's account depends upon an anachronistic projection of the 19th-century human psyche onto earlier humankind. Finally, I will briefly discuss the key components of Nietzsche's genealogical rethinking of the origin of transcendent metaphysics – (1) the nature of our relationship with language and mathematics and (2) a psychological dynamic called *ressentiment* – although I will not attempt a substantial reconstruction of these points.

Yanfu Chen: Peter John Olivi on Human Introspection

This paper examines Peter John Olivi's account of human introspection, arguing that he develops a Reflection Model (RM) in which the mind cognizes its own acts and itself through a distinct act of reflection. Through the sequential dynamics of *conversio* (turning toward oneself), *aspectus* (reflective attention), and the generation of reflective judgments, he offers a systematic – though often overlooked – account of introspection, supplementing his better-known theory of consciousness. His analogy of tactile power and introspection further clarifies both the structure and the inherent limitations of introspective acts in human self-knowledge.

I Xuan Chong: Moral Education in the Zhuangzi

Focusing mainly on the *Zhuangzi*, this paper explores the cultivation of Daoist virtues from a comparative perspective.

The Zhuangzian sage wanders (*you*) without *telos* (ch.1) between conceptual frameworks (ch.2, 74/26/33–37) (Hansen 1992; Sikri 2023). While Zhuangzi's critique of *bian* reminds us of Plato's critique of sophistry (e.g. *Republic* 537c9–540c2; Sikri 2022), the Zhuangzian sage practises equanimity in navigating the proceedings of fate rather than finding refuge in the transcendent Forms (e.g. *Republic* 485a–487a).

However, the Zhuangzian account is not without difficulties, especially when it comes to pedagogy. First, given the ineffability of *Dao* (e.g. 5/2/55–61), true understanding is so elusive that even being ignorant can be seen as a sign of attaining *Dao* (27/11/44–50). Second, given the nature of non-purposive action (*wuwei*), it seems any effort to deliberately cultivate virtues is counter-productive by Zhuangzi's light. And finally, given the preference of "original nature" (*xing*) over "moral rules" (41/16/5–11; see also 18/6/72–73), one might reasonably ask whether (and/or in what sense) the Zhuangzian ideal is meant to be "normative". Yet it is clear that Daoism does advocate a moral-political ideal, which consists in letting the myriad things grow rather than forcing moral rules and knowledge (e.g. 19/7/4–20/7/7, 20/7/14–15, 28/11/61–66; *Daodejing* ch. 37, 57, 64; *pace Analects* 1.2, 3.1, 12.11). The question of how such socio-political transformation is supposed to take place, then, becomes even more pressing.

I shall argue that, in the *Zhuangzi*, the disciple of virtues gains something from the master by taking a peek at the master's immersion into the order of *Dao* (e.g. 20/7/28–21/7/33; Defoort 2012; *pace* Moeller 2016). This allows us to bypass Zhuangzi's apparent language scepticism (4/2/21–31). Further, such a quasi-mystical pedagogy is particularly fitting for conveying an understanding of the undividedness of *Dao* (cf. 16/6/36–17/6/45), and it is such an understanding that promotes equanimity and preserves/restores original nature. Finally, while the importance of the presence of the master echoes parallel themes in other religious traditions (see e.g. *Therīgāthā* vv.133–138 for the Buddhist counterpart), the Zhuangzian sage is unique in the sense that he employs both the Heavenly perspective and the Human perspective simultaneously (16/6/19–20; Tao 2011; see also Lai 2023).

Alan Coffee: "Perhaps it would be dangerous to trust women all at once, with liberty in that extent which it is due": Is Mary Hays's Gradualism about Women's Rights Consistent with her Philosophical Principles?

In her *Appeal to the men of Great Britain in behalf of women* (1798), Mary Hays offers a bold and unequivocal case for women's social and political equality based on their natural capacity for reason and standing before God. Less strident in tone than Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), Hays is similarly critical of the abuse of male power, and its resulting cultural prejudices, that keep women in a subordinate condition. Unlike Wollstonecraft, however, Hays several times makes the concession that, while women are entitled to equal rights, these might be extended to them gradually rather than all at once. In so doing, Hays appears to echo the language of the dominant gradualist, rather than immediatist, approach to the abolition of slavery.

This gradualism, however, sits awkwardly both with Hays's own arguments and with the underlying republican structure she employs, in which independence is prioritised as an individual good and social imperative. Indeed, Hays is something of an outlier amongst other republican writers, of whom few, if

any, make a concession to gradualism. Although it might be argued that Hays's gradualism is simply a tactical move in a politically hostile environment, in this paper I take her at her word. My aim is to determine whether Hays can consistently advocate the gradual extension of equal rights to women within her republican framework. Although the issues of women's equality and the emancipation of slaves are, I argue, not directly parallel, I also consider whether gradualism in abolition is compatible with Hays's principles. I conclude that gradualism is inconsistent in both cases.

Giuseppe Colonna: Simplicius on Redefining Change in Aristotle's *Physics* III

In *Phys*. III.1 Aristotle defines change as 'the actuality of that which is potential, *qua* such' (201a10–11) and later calls it an 'incomplete' activity (201b31–32). Modern readings of *Physics* III fall into three views. First (Kostman 1987), change is the actualisation of a potential for a determinate end; e.g., the change of the bronze into a statue is, for the bronze, the process of the statue's becoming actual. This captures end-directed cases but leaves the *qua such* clause idle, since on this reading it excludes nothing further. Second (Heinaman 1994), change is the actuality of a potential for changing; e.g., the change of the bronze into a statue is the actuality of its potential for becoming a statue, not of its potential for being a statue. This secures a determinate role for the *qua* clause by distinguishing the actuality of the thing *qua* potentially changing from the actuality of the thing *qua* what it already is, but it struggles with Aristotle's insistence that change is an incomplete activity: if the terminus is to be changing, there is no contrasting complete actuality. Third (Kosman 1969; Waterlow 1982; Coope 2009), change is an incomplete actuality of a potential for a determinate end; the actuality that is change is the actuality of the bronze *qua* potentially a statue, whereas the actuality that is not change is the complete actuality of the bronze *qua* bronze. This preserves incompleteness but faces difficulties with the unending movement of the heavens, with actions such as walking, with opposed forces operating on the same body, and with accidental change.

In response, Simplicius (*In Phys*. III 1–3) reframes Aristotle's definition in two steps. First, he separates *energeia* from *entelecheia*: by *energeia* he means activity; by *entelecheia* completion, i.e., actuality. Change is not *entelecheia*. Change is *energeia*, and it is an incomplete *energeia*. Second, he gives the *qua* restriction real work: it fixes the aspect under which the subject is taken, blocking reference to the substrate as already actual and selecting the subject as still in potency. In this sense, change is the activity of the potential as potential, not the activity of the substrate as actual; the *qua* restriction picks out that potency and makes it, not the substrate as such, the bearer of the *energeia* that constitutes change. On this basis, Simplicius addresses the problematic cases: the unending movement of the heavens is change since it is the *energeia* of a body *qua* capable of being otherwise in place according to time's order; walking is change since it is an incomplete *energeia* of a locomotive capacity *qua* still in potency to further positions, with no product-state; in cases of opposed forces, there is no change, since no single potency is actualised *qua* changeable towards a determinate direction; accidental change is change since it is the *energeia* of a passive capacity *qua* susceptible to external impact. By combining the *energeia* / *entelecheia* distinction with the *qua* restriction, Simplicius articulates a text-sensitive repair within *Phys*. III 1–3: on his account, change is the *energeia* of the potential *qua* such, a formulation that brings together Aristotle's disparate uses under a single notion.

Daniel Dearlove: Kant on Absolute Positing as Subjective Synthesis

This paper offers a new solution to a problem facing Kant's theory of judgement: namely, that of accommodating singular existential judgements, such as 'Socrates exists' (Martin, 2005; 2010) (Rosenkoetter, 2009). The problem arises because Kant's general theory of judgement is *synthetic*, meaning that all judgements involve the combination of at least *two* representations, which in the context of General Logic are *concepts*. Yet, he treats singular existential judgements as a kind of "positing" – a simple assertion of existence using *one* concept. The question is this: how can singular existential judgements, which seem to involve only one concept, fit into Kant's synthetic model of judgement, which seems to require that all judgements involve at least two concepts?

The literature offers two responses. Wayne Martin (2005) argues that Kant cannot resolve the "instability" in his theory of judgement, claiming that this instability led later figures (Herbart, Drobisch, and

Brentano) to develop the idea of a non-synthetic, "thetic" judgement. Rosenkoetter (2009) claims that Kant resolves the problem by having two distinct conceptions of judgement. But this solution forces us to gives up on Kant having a unified synthetic theory of judgement.

This paper proposes an interpretation of Kant that resolves this instability in a way that preserves Kant's synthetic theory of judgement. Both Martin and Rosenkoetter focus on General Logic. I suggest that Kant's solution requires turning to Transcendental Logic, which goes beyond concepts to the relation of concepts to objects by means of intuition. I argue that singular existential judgements are indeed synthetic, but they are not the objective synthesis of two concepts. Instead, they involve a subjective synthesis between a concept and an intuition. On this model, the object is posited *absolutely* through an intuition; the concept is then posited *relative* to this intuition and thereby determines the object.

This interpretation finds direct textual support in Kant's texts, particularly his discussions of the ontological argument and the modal categories in the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought'. In the former, Kant explicitly states that the judgement that "This or that thing […] exists" must be "synthetic", as it is the positing of the object in relation to the concept. In the 'Postulates', he clarifies that the categories of modality – possibility, actuality, and necessity – are not "objective-synthetic", since they "do not augment the concept of which they are asserted". Instead, such concepts "posit" a thing in relation to our "faculty of cognition" and so are "synthetic" but "are so only subjectively". Singular existential judgements don't require an alternative form of judgement (i.e. a thetic judgement); they instead involve a distinct type of synthesis proper *only* to Transcendental Logic, namely, an absolute positing by means of the modal categories. Absolute positing has no place in General Logic – a conclusion which has illuminating consequences for understanding Kant's idealism more broadly. Contra Martin, I claim that Kant can accommodate singular existential judgements within his theory of judgement. Contra Rosenkoetter, I claim that Kant can do so whilst upholding a unified synthetic theory of judgement.

Jeremy Dunham: James and Stumpf on Space: The Changing Face of Empiricism and Nativism in the Nineteenth Century

What is the origin of our concept of space? Does it emerge from our experience with the world, or is it an innate capacity? Traditionally, empiricists have argued for the former while the latter is associated with rationalist or Kantian perspectives. In this paper, I examine Carl Stumpf's and William James's attempts to develop an alternative position. I argue that Stumpf's 1873 space essay was a significant influence on the development of James's thought because it offered a way of reconciling nativism with empiricism.

Because Stumpf and James both occupy an important place in the history of phenomenology, it is tempting to trace Stumpf's influence through their phenomenological descriptions. However, I shall argue that such a comparison shows Stumpf less as an influence than an ally. James had other sources for the shared views that such a comparison reveals. The deeper influence of Stumpf on James can be revealed through an examination of Stumpf's discussions of physiology. Stumpf provided James with a model for conceiving a nativism in physiological terms, and thus for reconciling it with the principles of empirical science. In this way, Stumpf's extended well beyond the issue of space-perception. It had a global effect on James's psychology because it showed how certain necessary categories of experience could be defended without having to postulate the existence of additional mental faculties.

Ethan Harley Field: The Reactions to Samuel Alexander's Compresence Revolution

At the birth of analytic philosophy, the New Realist movement overthrew the status quo of British Idealism. Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) represented one of the foremost figures in this movement (Fisher, 2021a, pp. 1–2). Alexander was once said to have been the leading figure in British philosophy for more than a decade (Muirhead, 1939, p. 3), but his contributions have become sorely under-represented in the literature. Alexander played a central role in a movement which sowed the seeds for philosophical and methodological positions that remain dominant to this day.

Alexander argued for a "revolution" against British Idealism on the basis of a foundational intuition about experience – in any experience, two things can be apprehended: something mental and something non-mental (Alexander, 1909, 1914). In Alexander's terminology, what is mental is a presence which is

"lived" or "*enjoyed*", whereas intentional objects are presences which are not lived, only "*contemplated*". These presences are in relation to one another, but are nonetheless independent – they are "*compresent*" (Alexander, 1914). For example, when you have the experience of seeing a tree, you apprehend the presence of "your seeing" which you enjoy, which is compresent with "the tree" which you contemplate. Enjoyment and contemplation are distinct ways of being conscious – it is a mistake to think you are aware of your seeing in the same way as you are aware of the tree (Alexander, 1909, p. 56). This compresence intuition has great implications for metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It suggests we should endorse a type of realism wherein experience gives direct access to mind independent objects, and lays the foundations for a unique view of consciousness, similar to the non-positional "intrinsic glow" theories of the phenomenological tradition (Kriegel, 2009, p. 101)

This theory of compresence has been surprisingly neglected in contemporary literature on Alexander, and those that do address it, only do so in passing (cf. Fisher, 2021b; Thomas, 2022). It was nevertheless highly influential among his contemporaries and was subject to much discussion and critique. A key point of contention was Alexander's strict division between enjoyment and contemplation. This is threatened in introspection and self-knowledge for example, where mental states appear to be both enjoyed and contemplated (Wodehouse, 1910; Laird, 1919). Some challenged the intelligibility of the enjoyment/contemplation distinction in the first place, arguing that a positive non-positional form of awareness is incoherent (Reyburn, 1919; Blanshard, 1921; Ducasse, 1936; Stout, 1940). Others contended that it could not deliver the metaphysical foundations it promised (Turner, 1915; Jones, 1949). There is also extensive private debate surrounding compresence found in unpublished correspondence between Alexander and his contemporaries (*Samuel Alexander Papers, General Correspondence*, 1877–1938).

This paper will provide a brief introduction to Alexander's theory of compresence and reconstruct some of the main historical objections, with the aim to revive interest in the theory both from a historical perspective, and from its potential to advance contemporary debates about self-awareness and the structure of consciousness.

Jan Forsman: Metaphysics Under a Watchful Eye: Émilie Du Châtelet's "On Freedom" and Voltaire's *Traité de Metaphysique*

"On Freedom" is an unpublished manuscript that Voltaire (1684–1778) sent to Frederick, the Crown Prince of Prussia (later Frederick the Great, 1712–1786) in late Autumn 1737. While Voltaire sent the manuscript in his own name, later scholars have identified it to have been written (at least in part) by Émilie Du Châtelet. Whereas additions and corrections to the manuscript are written solely in Du Châtelet's handwriting, large portions of the text are also reminiscent of Chapter 7 of Voltaire's *Traité de Metaphysique* (1734), raising questions of Du Châtelet's precise contribution to the text. In this paper, I analyze Chapter 7 of Voltaire's *Traité* in comparison to "On Freedom" in an effort to more precisely distinguish Du Châtelet's role in the latter's composition, while contextualizing both texts with René Descartes's (1596–1650) *Meditation's on First Philosophy* (1641) and *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), as well as with Christian Wolff's (1679–1754) *German Metaphysics* (1719).

In the first part of the paper, I discuss the history of and the connection between the *Traité* and "On Freedom" and how the latter specifically was sent to Fredrick instead of the former. In the second part, I analyze the similarities and differences between Chapter 7 of the *Traité* and different versions of the "On Freedom", particularly the so called Kehl-edition (included in the *Oeuvres de Voltaire* vol. 14) and St. Petersburg manuscript (a scribal copy with additions and corrections preserved in the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg). I also contextualize two Cartesian arguments in the texts (an argument against the deceitful nature of God and an argument for theological mysticism) with Descartes's *Meditations* and *Principles*. Finally, in the third part, I utilize the differences between Chapter 7 of the *Traité* and the two versions of "On Freedom" to distinguish Du Châtelet's most likely contributions to the latter text. I argue that Du Châtelet contributed especially in two places: a larger emphasis on the Cartesian argument for theological mysticism at the end of "On Freedom" and a more serious handling of the conservation of physical motor force related to the problem of freedom. I contextualize this latter contribution with Du Châtelet's reading of Wolff's *German Metaphysics* in the spring of 1737, arguing for a large influence of wolffian philosophy on the two versions of "Of Freedom" which appears to be missing from the

Traité. I further argue for this wolffian influence to have contributed in "On Freedom" being sent to Frederick instead of the *Traité*.

Courtney Fugate: The Universality of Laws of Nature and Laws of Freedom

What does it mean for a moral law to be universal? Today, we speak of "universal laws of nature" and "universal moral laws" as if the meaning of these phrases were straight-forward and self-evident. However, if we look back at the history of Western philosophy a very different picture emerges. We discover, for instance, that "universality" was once exclusively a feature of genus-species concepts, while the notion of "natural law" (let alone "universal natural law") was practically non-existent. We also discover that philosophy's subsequent development, which eventually allowed someone like Kant to see a strict analogy between the Newtonian law of universal gravitation and the categorical imperative, required a series of revolutions and conceptual innovations in the way "universality," "law," and even "nature" were understood and articulated.

In this paper, I will closely examine and compare discussions of "universality" and "law" in a series of early modern German philosophers (esp. Wolff, Crusius, Baumgarten, and Kant) with the aim of demonstrating two points: (1) Their understanding of the universality of the moral law is directly impacted by their own differing understandings of the universality of physical laws. (2) This period thus witnessed a dramatic shift in the very meaning of universality, such that the phrase ends up being used almost equivocally. What would qualify as universal for Chrisitan Wolff, for example, would be the very antithesis of universal for thinkers like Christian August Crusius and Kant. One lesson I will draw from this is that, when studying the tradition of modern German philosophy, historians would best be advised to carefully investigate the oft-hidden nuances in these philosophers' understanding of universality before attempting to evaluate their concrete derivations of moral duties.

Francesco Gandellini: Identity or inseparability? Spinoza meets Wittgenstein

In the *Ethics*, Spinoza famously claims that '[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things' (2p7). Interpreters agree that this proposition asserts the existence of a *parallelism* between thought and being, a parallelism that Spinoza sets out to demonstrate – as with any other propositions in the *Ethics* – through the axioms, definitions and previous propositions that appear in the work. But how exactly should we understand this parallelism? Spinoza makes it explicit in the *scholium* of 2p7's demonstration. There he says that 'a mode of extension [*i.e., a being in the world*] and the idea [*i.e. thought*] of that mode are *one and the same* thing, but expressed in two ways' (2p7s, italics mine). Given this understanding, Spinoza has been taken to hold the thesis that thought is *identical* with being and thus to anticipate a view traditionally associated with Hegel. Scholars debate how Spinoza motivates this claim of identity. Michael Della Rocca has forcefully shown that the argument for 2p7 is driven by Spinoza's rationalism and, ultimately, by his unrelenting commitment to the *Principle of Sufficient Reason* ('PSR'). According to the PSR, each fact must have an explanation. The PSR thus rules out brute facts and, for Della Rocca, one is precisely the non-identity of thought and being. The argument Della Rocca builds on behalf of Spinoza deserves serious consideration. In this paper, I argue that the employment of the PSR does not yet force us to that claim of identity, but rather to the *inseparability* of thought and being, according to which the former cannot be thought or conceived of without the latter, in a sense to be further explicated. If so, Spinoza can be read to anticipate instead another philosopher, namely *Wittgenstein*. One might then ask how far Spinozism extends in the latter. Quite surprisingly, I suggest that it extends to the commitment to (a version of) the PSR, yet purged of the usual metaphysical overtones, through which Wittgenstein similarly supports the claim of inseparability between thought and being.

Here is the plan. After introducing the ingredients for Spinoza's proof of 2p7, I examine how Della Rocca spells it out on the basis of the PSR. I show that, while Della Rocca's argument aligns with Spinoza's rationalism, it does not actually prove the identity of thought and being that Della Rocca's Spinoza envisions. A different claim is instead forthcoming, namely one of inseparability between thought and being. Not only is this the claim that actually follows from employing the PSR. It also avoids another brute bifurcation – ruled out by the PSR itself – to which Della Rocca seems committed. By elucidating

this claim of inseparability, I point out the closeness of Spinoza's claim with that of an alignment of language and world that we can find in (the later) Wittgenstein. Finally, I propose that a kind of PSR is at work even in Wittgenstein's philosophy and, in particular, in motivating that very alignment.

Andrew German: Aristotelian Shadows in Rousseau's Concept of Reason

What is the nature and role of reason in Rousseau? And how does his concept of reason differ from Aristotle, who stood in a tradition which Rousseau and his century were in the process of leaving behind? The answers would seem obvious: For Aristotle reason is our *differentia specifica* and *telos*. For Rousseau, by contrast, freedom and more specifically *perfectibilité*, the capacity for adaptation and transformation under the impact of circumstances, defines us while it is unclear if we even *have* a telos: "We do not yet know what our nature permits us to be," as the *Emile* puts it. For Aristotle, rational speech is as natural as sociality. For Rousseau, reason and speech are dormant in the pure state of nature and sociality is itself an accidental misfortune. For the one "happiness extends as far as *theôria* does." For the other, reason is the "great conveyer of all our foolishness."

This dichotomy is too simple by half, however. Close study of the *Discourse on Inequality* (along with the *Language Essay, Emile* and the *Lettres Morales)* shows how Rousseau profoundly reflected on, and transformed, Aristotelian reason in line with his commitments to "metaphysical neutrality" about nature and a "horizontal humanism", which looks for the sources of human misery and happiness entirely within us, rather than in nature or the divine. My paper studies what happens to Greek *logos* when rearticulated on this new basis.

Rousseau's commitments necessitate denying two Aristotelian contentions. First, he denies that we possess anything like intellection (*nous*), since that requires some naturally given affinity between thought and its objects, which Rousseau believes metaphysics can no longer support. Instead, reason becomes primarily a power for comparison, relation and construction almost totally undeveloped in natural man who lacks any wonder, any rational openness toward the *ordo naturae*. Secondly, just as reason lacks *nous*, it lacks *telos*. There is no activity in which reason finds its completion. This is a crucial point: while for Aristotle *energeia* is the "progress into itself" of *dynamis*, such that the latter is incomprehensible without the former, for Rousseau, nature is the source of potencies which imply no particular actualization. Reason, then, would seem demoted to one potency alongside others (sensibility, imagination, passion) – a superficial and late-born one at that. Not quite.

As I argue, Rousseau rethinks the relationship between reason, imagination and time, effectively identifying reason with the power to project new ideas, desires and fears, new ways of being into a temporally open horizon – a power with no known terminus. But this makes reason *more*, not less, central to our humanity. As Rousseau argues, animals lack the capacity to form general ideas. Reason is the capacity for comparing and constructing ideas and so without reason, no articulate speech and no general ideas. But without general ideas there is no perfectibility, our *differentia specifica*! Reason is the active agent in our humanity after all, then: not qua unifying principle of our nature, but rather qua ground of *lack* of unity, our indeterminacy.

Athanasia Giasoumi: Misology and Defective Paideia: Plato on the Educational Roots of Hatred of *Logoi*

Plato addresses misology – the hatred of *logoi* – in three dialogues: the *Laches*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. Scholarship has overwhelmingly focused on the *Phaedo* (88c–91c), interpreting misology primarily as an epistemic failure leading to scepticism or despair (e.g., Hackforth 1955; Gallop 1975; Dilman 1992; Miller 2015), and as a moral or psychological weakness or disease (e.g., Jacquette 2013; Thanassas 2017). This paper argues that such readings overlook Plato's deeper concern with the educational origins of misology and its intimate connection to *philonikia*, the love of victory in argument rather than the love of truth. I contend that the *Republic* provides a conceptual framework that clarifies misology's roots in defective *paideia*, and that reading the three dialogues together reveals a coherent account.

In the first part, I examine *Phaedo* 90e–91b, a passage often neglected in discussions of its educational significance and its link to *philonikia*. I claim that Socrates presents misology as both an epistemic failure

and a disease of the soul, arising directly from defective education. He contrasts the *philosophos* with the uncultured man, who argues solely in a contentious, victory-seeking spirit (πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως), showing how poor education fosters eristic contest at the expense of a genuine love of truth.

In the second part, I turn to the *Republic*, arguing that Plato shows how this corruption develops. At 411c–d and 548b–e, he demonstrates that when spiritedness is cultivated at the expense of reason, even those with genuine philosophical potential are diverted into contentiousness. I further show how Plato's account of *mousikē paideia* illustrates the solution: the Dorian mode strengthens spiritedness and fosters courage and endurance (*ergon*), while the Phrygian nurtures rationality through moderation, persuasion, and receptivity to argument (*logos*). I argue that these modes must be balanced; an education that exalts the Dorian alone produces precisely the condition in which misology arises – unchecked spiritedness and stunted reason.

In the final part, I return to the *Laches*, where I argue that Plato dramatizes this imbalance. Laches defines the *philologos* as one who delights in *logos* when words and deeds accord, describing this as "Dorian harmony," and the *misologos* as one who despises *logos* when that harmony is absent (188d–e). He praises this Dorian concord as the sole standard of virtue, dismissing the Phrygian and Lydian modes. Yet, under Socratic examination (193d–194b), he fails to provide an adequate account of courage; frustrated, he lapses into *philonikia* and exemplifies misology by his own standard, as his words no longer match his deeds. His transition from *philologos* to *misologos* mirrors the educational deficiency exposed in the *Republic*.

I conclude that Plato presents misology not merely as intellectual despair but as a pathology of education that distorts spiritedness and undermines reason. Across the *Laches*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, he offers a comprehensive account of misology as the predictable product of defective *paideia*, turning potential philosophers into mere lovers of victory and adversaries of *logos* itself.

Marie-Hélène Gorisse: Knowledge and liberating self-transformation in Jainism

In his entry "Kaivalya and Mokṣa" of the Brill's *Encyclopedia of Jainism* (2020), Paul Dundas chooses to examine together the history of the notion of deliverance (mokṣa) and that of complete unfettered knowledge (kaivalya) in the Jain corpus and shows how they become "points of orientation and focuses of aspiration for all Jains". In this talk, I want to further question this connection.

More precisely, the acquisition of correct knowledge has a determining position not only in Jain systematic treatise of epistemology, but also in Jain manuals that guide us towards liberation, since we are in a painful and unsustainable situation in which we *think* that we are this embodied person while each of us is in fact a pure soul only briefly embodied in such a way. As such, the Jain path is about an in-depth re-education of the ways in which we are used to conceive ourselves.

Two important textual traditions through which this classical view developed are, on one hand, the śvetāmbara and digambara lineages of interpretation of the *Tattvārthasūtra, Treatise on Categories*, a Sanskrit work attributed to Umāsvāti (350-400 CE); and, on the other hand, a group of works composed in Jain Śaurasenī and attributed to Kundakunda (from early 4th c. CE to 8th c. CE), notably including the *Samayasāra, Essence of the Self*.

In this talk, I will assess some consequences of the fact that knowledge is theorised as the natural accompaniment of unimpeded activity of the self and that, while the Samayasāra seems to promote a type of Gnosticism, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentaries conceive knowledge as indirectly acquired by means of practices that essentially secure a removal of karmic matter, like the settling of dust at the bottom of muddy waters makes it possible to see through clearer waters.

Filip Grgic: Doing Well and Making Truth: Anscombe's Aristotle

The concept of practical truth originates in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but it was Elizabeth Anscombe who revived its importance for contemporary philosophy. According to Anscombe, practical truth is truth realized in action: to bring it about, an action must make true not only the specific description under which it is intentional, but also the more general description "doing well."

Anscombe grounds her account of practical truth in a distinctive interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.2, shaped by her own theory of intentional action. Aristotle scholars, however, have almost unanimously rejected her interpretation, insisting that Aristotle is not concerned with the truth of actions or of truth-in-action, but rather with practical truth as a kind of true evaluative proposition.

I will argue that such criticism is largely misplaced. It is true that Anscombe's understanding of Aristotle's concept of practical truth rests on specific philosophical assumptions developed in her *Intention*. The same holds for her understanding of the notions central to Aristotle's account of practical truth, such as *prohairesis*, desire, pursuit, and avoidance. Nevertheless, I will argue that the most straightforward reading of Aristotle's text is precisely along Anscombean lines: practical truth is best understood as a function – i.e., the characteristic activity, or what is realized at the end of the deliberative process – of the *logistikon* part of the soul, rather than as something present throughout the entire process of deliberation. Only within this Anscombean framework does Aristotle's notion of practical truth fully retain its *practical* character, whereas alternative interpretations risk reducing it to a merely theoretical kind of truth.

Michael Griffin: Liberating Knowledge: Valentinian Gnōsis and Narrative Transformation

The second-century teacher Valentinus led a Christian-Platonist school whose distinctive claim was that self-transformation is achieved through knowledge (gnōsis, hence the label "gnostic"). One surviving fragment puts it starkly: "What liberates us is … the knowledge of who we were, what we became, where we were, whereinto we have been thrown, whereto we speed, wherefrom we are redeemed, what birth is, and what rebirth" (*Excerpta ex Theodoto* 78.2).

This eightfold schema presents salvation as knowledge, but knowledge cast in narrative form: an ordered story of origin, fall, captivity, and return. Valentinus employs the story to resonate with, and reframe, Middle Platonist and Stoic accounts of motivation and the passions. Yet the mythological discourse in which he (and other "gnostics") articulated these claims has attracted limited interest from philosophers, and even sharp criticism from some Alexandrian contemporaries.

I argue that here the medium is the message. To acquire such Valentinian knowledge is to re-describe oneself within a story and thereby to see differently and live differently. Valentinus' Platonism represents a distinctively narrative philosophy of mind and motivation, with a pedagogy of attention that makes liberation possible by changing how the world shows up and what the self takes to matter. The disciplined use of story, as a cognitive-ethical instrument, structures attention, interprets affect and salience, and reorients the will.

This is not unique to Valentinus. Yet highlighting the insistence of "gnostic" Platonists on narratively transformative knowledge may help us to appreciate similar methods in Platonism and other philosophically therapeutic traditions, including Buddhism. This emphasis also invites dialogue with modern philosophers who underscore the transformative force of narrative and attention, including Iris Murdoch's account of imaginative vision and Simone Weil's analysis of attention as the pivot of moral change.

Stephen Harrop: Personal identity and the eternity of the mind in *Ethics* V

In *Ethics* V, Benedict de Spinoza argues for a doctrine called the "eternity of the mind." The current scholarly consensus holds that whatever this eternity is, it does not include conscious persistence beyond the death of the body; hence, personal identity is not preserved. I argue that three positions Spinoza is committed to tell against this conventional wisdom. First, he is committed to the view that the more adequate ideas we have, the more conscious we are; second, he is committed to the claim that what endures past the death of the body is our adequate ideas; and third, that we are able to form adequate ideas of every affection of the human body, and hence of every mental state – in short, that we can in a sense "turn" inadequate ideas into adequate ones. Thus, on a view in which personal identity through change requires continuity of consciousness and some continuity of affective life, Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind does not undermine personal identity beyond the death of the human body.

Peter Hartman: Introspection and Retrospection: Hervaeus and Durand on State Consciousness

Durand and Hervaeus both recognize two distinct phenomena, which we will call 'pre-reflective act awareness' – an implicit, experiential awareness of a mental act (what Brentano calls "inner perception") – on the one hand, and 'reflective act awareness' – an explicit, introspective consideration of a mental act (what Brentano calls "inner observation") – on the other. Hervaeus, like Brentano, thinks that these are two distinct *kinds* of phenomena and, thus, offers two distinct accounts of them. By contrast, Durand thinks they are the same in kind and distinct only as a matter of degree and, thus, offers just one account of them. In this paper, we first lay out Hervaeus's account of pre-reflective awareness, arguing that he defends a same-order theory according to which every act has itself as a secondary object. We then turn to his account of reflective awareness, arguing that he defends a higher-order 'retrospective' theory of introspection according to which the introspecting act and the introspected act are really distinct, non-simultaneous acts such that the former is posterior to the latter. Finally, we turn to Durand, who defends a same-order theory for both, looking first at his criticism of Hervaeus's retrospective theory, and then at his own positive position.

Helen Hattab: Sixteenth-Century Views of Abstraction in Relation to Descartes' *Rules*

It has long seemed that Descartes' rejection of intelligible species, the distinction between the active and passive intellect and true knowledge of forms by abstraction represents a decisive break with Scholastic Aristotelian theories of cognition. I show that Descartes' *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* contain an alternative account of abstraction that matches a view in Protestant Scholastic works of his intellectual environment. This doctrine of abstraction appears in the academic Exercises of David Gorlaeus, a notorious theology student at the University of Leiden whose works were known to Descartes. Gorlaeus appropriates a view of abstraction found in renaissance Scholastic textbooks authored by Catholic and Protestant philosophers.

First, I establish parallels between Descartes' and Gorlaeus' views on abstraction, their rejection of intelligible species, and denial that the intellect is divided into an active and passive intellect. Both present the intellect as entirely active and able to grasp singular things and universals. I then show that Gorleaus' views, which initially seem radical, are not uncommon. They resemble the account of universals found in a popular textbook by the Protestant philosopher, Bartholomaeus Keckermann. Based on recently published studies of *De Anima* lecture notes I trace the account of abstraction common to Keckermann, Gorlaeus and Descartes back to unpublished lectures of Professors at the Jesuit College in Paris in the late 16th century.

I draw several conclusions from my examination. First, Descartes' 'modern' view of cognition borrows elements of a renaissance Aristotelian view that appears to originate in Parisian Jesuit teachings. Second, late 16th-century Jesuits developed innovative doctrines of abstraction and universals that influenced Protestant philosophers. Finally, more research is needed on renaissance Scholastic philosophers from a variety of confessions and institutional contexts and their interconnections.

Giora Hon: What Keeps the Earth in its Place? Misinterpreting Classical Arguments Bearing on Stability

In the geocentric picture of the world the arguments offered by the Greeks for the state of rest of the earth in the center were usually based on the principle of sufficient reason: considerations of symmetry show that the earth 'lacks sufficient reason' to move from its central position with regard to the surrounding heavens." This claim of Shmuel Sambursky, the renowned philosopher of science and classicist, is widespread. I submit that Plato and Aristotle developed categorically different kinds of argument to explain the perceived stability of the Earth. While both invoked *likeness*, Plato further depended on the concept of equal balance, whereas Aristotle depended on the concept of natural place. In neither case did they appeal to symmetry and sufficient reason.

Chris Izgin: Aristotle's Account of Philosophy in the *Protrepticus*

In the *Protrepticus*, Aristotle asserts that "philosophy is […] the acquisition and use of wisdom" (*Fragments* R 52, *Protrepticus* 6, 40.2–3 Pistelli). Given Aristotle's tendency to define terms by identifying their proximate genus and specific difference, his account can be read as an incomplete definition; philosophy is the *science* whose specific character lies in the acquisition and use of wisdom. On this reading, philosophy differs from all other sciences in that it uniquely concerns itself with both attaining and exercising wisdom. But what precisely does this mean? This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle's account by arguing that 'wisdom' in this context should be understood as encompassing both *theoretical* and *practical* wisdom – a distinction not made explicit in the *Protrepticus* itself, but familiar from Aristotle's esoteric works, particularly the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Aristotle defines *theoretical* wisdom as "scientific knowledge combined with understanding of the things that are by nature most estimable" (*NE* VI.7, 1141b2–3). These 'most estimable' things include both divine beings (the subject of theology) and the human good, i.e., happiness (the subject of political science, *NE* I.2) (for god and happiness as estimable items among goods, see Alexander of Aphrodisias, *in Top.* 242.3–8, Wallies *Fragments* R110, R113). Thus, to acquire and use theoretical wisdom is to become an expert in theology and political science and to actively engage in these disciplines. In contrast, *practical* wisdom is defined as "a true disposition accompanied by rational prescription, relating to action in the sphere of what is good and bad for human beings" (*NE* VI.5, 1140b5–6). To acquire and use practical wisdom, then, is to cultivate this disposition and apply it in one's life. On this interpretation, the philosopher is not merely a contemplative thinker but someone who embodies and enacts both theoretical and practical wisdom.

This reconstruction sheds new light on Aristotle's conception of philosophy in the *Protrepticus*. Notably, it stands in contrast to his mature conception of philosophy in the *Metaphysics*, which he variously specifies as the science dealing with the primary starting-points and causes (A.2, 982b7–10), the science of truth (α.1, 993b19–20), or the science that deals with what is insofar as it is and with what belongs *per se* to what is (Γ.1, 1003a21–22), among others. I also hope to contribute to ongoing debates on the nature and interrelation of theoretical and practical wisdom in Aristotle. Since the paper addresses broader philosophical questions, it is intended to engage not only specialists in Aristotle but also philosophers and historians of philosophy more generally.

Dino Jakusic: (Not) Teaching Medieval Philosophy in the UK: an Empirical Perspective

In *The Philosopher and Theology*, Étienne Gilson recollects about his time studying at the University of Paris in the first decade of the 20th century. He describes encountering historiographical positions: "so commonly received that they were almost dogmas," one of them being that "there was first a Greek philosophy, then a modern philosophy came; between these two, nothing, except perhaps a theology based on faith and authority, which are the very negation of philosophy." He credits these positions to, amongst others, Victor Cousin's philosophical and historiographical influence who, according to Gilson, stated that: "There are only two really distinct periods in the history of philosophy as well as in the history of the world: Antiquity and Modern Times… the philosophy that had preceded Descartes was theology."

While few philosophers would explicitly endorse this position today, I will argue that it still functionally survives in the way philosophical curriculum is conceptualised, at least in the UK. In 2024/2025, I have led an interdisciplinary project that consisted in surveying undergraduate philosophy modules on offer, as well as conducting qualitative interviews with senior academic staff who either taught Medieval philosophy or had some institutional curricular influence within UK philosophy departments. In this talk, I will present the theoretical framework, methodology, and results of our empirical research.

Our research shows that the way history of philosophy is taught in the UK tends to align very closely with Cousin's historiography, with core historical modules consisting almost universally of Ancient Philosophy (Plato and Aristotle), followed by a direct jump to Descartes, and then to the rest of the standard (Early) Modern canon (Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant). However, rather than seeing this gap as justified, our interviewees have lamented the lack of provision of medieval philosophy and cited various institutional and societal pressures that prevent including medieval philosophy within the

standard undergraduate curriculum, as well as pressures hindering teaching history of philosophy in general.

After presenting the results, I will conclude the talk with an attempted at reconstructing potential historiographical traditions that could have influenced the current state of pedagogy when it comes to undergraduate history of philosophy.

Preedanant Jareonsettasin: Bradwardinian Modal Contextualism to the Rescue: Reconciling Divine Determinism with Creaturely Freedom by Distinguishing Sorts of Contingency

Is man free in a world created by God and upon which God exercises providence? The fourteenth-century logician-mathematician-theologian Thomas Bradwardine has, for seven centuries, been accused of having sacrificed human freedom upon the altar of divine providence. The way he saw things, the 'Pelagians' of his day were extolling human freedom at an unacceptable theological cost: the denial of the metaphysical dependence of creature on Creator, and the denial of divine providence over future events. By contrast, Bradwardine argued that every event occurs, by unstoppable divine will, of necessity. Yet he is committed to non-divine moral agents *contingently* determining their actions. His divine determinism needs a complementarily credible account of contingent action.

The main aim of this paper is to exposit Bradwardine's account of (the modal notion) *contingency* and trace its consequences for understanding freedom of action. This has not been done before: current medieval scholarship both lacks an account of Bradwardine's modal thought and how he originally uses his distinction between types of contingency to reconcile a deterministic worldview with the intuition that moral responsibility requires an agent possess the power to *contingently* determine the occurrence of alternative outcomes.

I first set up the reconciliation problem and show three claims: that Bradwardine

(1) was, like David Lewis, a modal contextualist: he takes our everyday usage of modal concepts (e.g. contingency, necessity) to be implicitly indexical; their meaning depends on an implicit context (relevant causal facts, including facts about causal preconditions).

(2) defines contingency as a causal concept. Calling an action contingent relates it to its causal circumstances: E is contingent iff given the obtainment of E's causal preconditions, E does not inevitably occur.

(3) distinguishes between two types of contingency: E is contingent *secundum-quid* and contingent *simpliciter*, depending on whether given the obtainment of *all* or *some* of E's causal preconditions, E inevitably occurs. E is contingent *simpliciter* iff *all* of E's causal preconditions obtain and E is evitable. E is contingent *secundum-quid* iff *some* of E's causal preconditions obtain and E is evitable.

I then argue Bradwardine successfully solves the reconciliation problem, based on the following (Bradwardinian) insight: our everyday moral-responsibility-relevant use of modal terms is implicitly indexicalised to a domain of causal facts *restricted* to *exclude* the causal fact of God's unstoppable causation of all events. And assuming that a free action won't inevitably occur given the obtainment of its non-divine causal preconditions, in the everyday (*secundum-quid*) sense of *contingent*, free action is contingent. When our actions are considered to be up to us, we don't consider God as their causal agent (even though He is).

A significant upshot is that the seven-century-old accusation that Bradwardine's commitment to theological fatalism entails an error-theoretic account of creaturely freedom is unfounded. Successfully holding the widely shared principle that an action is free iff there are alternative possibilities for action, his deterministic worldview does not entail holding a proto-Hobbesian/Calvinist/Frankfurtian view of freedom. The future is (metaphysically, not merely phenomenologically) open, because our fellow creatures cannot compel us to freely act.

Dominic J. Kearney: Monism and Motivation: Schopenhauer's Theory of Intention

For strict, naturalistic determinists about physical phenomena – a group containing Arthur Schopenhauer, after his predecessor in Kant – there is a puzzle surrounding how to account for certain intuitions about intentional action. That is, it is difficult to make sense of how our intentional bodily actions can be both a) utterly determined by physical causes following fixed scientific rules, and b) meaningfully *our own*, in that our *intentions* are what fundamentally cause our actions. Primarily, this is because our intentions seem to be inner, mental phenomena, *rather than* outer, physical ones.

As an idiosyncratic sort of transcendental idealist, Schopenhauer has two ways of resolving this puzzle. The first rests on an adaptation of Kant's doctrine of 'intelligible character'. This proposed resolution, however, is at best poorly explained and consequently elusive. At worst, it generates serious incompatibilities with other parts of Schopenhauer's system. Consequently, I discuss an alternative resolution to the puzzle, available to Schopenhauer through what we might call his 'Two-aspect Monism'. This latter solution is highly plausible, and sufficient to render commitments to the 'intelligible character' superfluous to Schopenhauer's theory of action.

The solution I expound from Schopenhauer's work turns on the sense in which, in his words, motivation is "causality that proceeds through the medium of cognition". This phrase might lead us to infer a Cartesian, two-way causal relationship between mental and physical phenomena. On the contrary, Schopenhauer's posits the relationship between inner and outer cognitions as one of *numerical identity*: the procedures of the intellect which condition our immediate representations (*Vorstellungen*) are numerically identical with those functions of our brains which correlate to them. For some mental property, **P**, and its correlate brain state, **Q**, **P** *is* **Q**. We observe the same object from a "subjective" and an "objective" epistemic standpoint in each case, respectively. Applied to a familiar example, we really could then say that pain *is* C-fiber firing. Moreover, though, it might be more informative to say that firing C-fibers are the *outer presentation of* what, for inner self-consciousness, is an experience of pain.

Importantly, this two-aspect approach permits that mental phenomena, for Schopenhauer, have an inalienable physical *aspect*, allowing them to fit unproblematically into the naturalistic causal nexus. Meanwhile, my intentions – viewed familiarly through self-consciousness, rather than through MRI scans – present themselves as the result of my decisions, generating actions in accordance with my own will. Under this self-conscious aspect, I experience my actions as *my own* in an intuitive sense, but a sense compatible with naturalistic Determinism – since the latter describes the world only in its physical mode of presentation.

Preferably to today's popular physicalist theories of mind, this account avoids the intractable question of how physical properties *explain* consciousness. For Schopenhauer, it is rather the immediately cognizable intellect which conditions *both* mental *and* physical kinds of representations. So, Schopenhauer's account of the world as representation admits a plausible, naturalistic solution to the problem of mental causation – with uniquely transcendental idealist advantages.

Yael Kedar: Natural and Mathematical Centers: Grosseteste, the *Summa philosophiae*, and Roger Bacon

Aristotle defined place as "the inner boundary of the containing body." While this account works well for ordinary cases of containment, it raises significant problems when applied to the two extremities of the cosmos: the earth at the center and the outermost heaven. For earth, Aristotle's definition seems to imply that its place is the concavity of the sphere of water. Yet this creates a difficulty, since the "natural place" of earth could also be interpreted as the center, the mathematical point equidistant from the circumference of the universe. Can such a point – without dimensions – qualify as a "place"? For the outermost heaven the opposite problem arises: it is not contained by any body, and thus appears to lack a place altogether. Could the center of the cosmos resolve both puzzles by serving as the "place" of the earth and simultaneously of the outermost sphere? Such a proposal would require a revision of Aristotle's definition of place, shifting the focus from containment to geometrical relations.

These questions fueled a rich medieval debate on the relation between natural and mathematical centers and the very coherence of the Aristotelian conception of natural place. This paper examines how Robert

Grosseteste, the anonymous author of the *Summa philosophiae*, and Roger Bacon engaged with these issues. I argue that all three thinkers sought to harmonize the mathematical and natural centers of the cosmos. One of their strategies was to rework the Aristotelian definition of place. In doing so, they clarified the conceptual tensions inherent in "natural place," and refined its meaning.

Tobias Keiling: Transcendental Arguments in Heidegger's Being and Time

The aim of this paper is to describe the form of transcendental reasoning Heidegger uses in *Being and Time*. Heideggerian transcendental arguments both determine metaphysically necessary conditions and identify different modes in which the necessary can be instantiated. Heidegger uses such arguments to advance the existential analytic by identifying necessary features and conceptual connections between the possibilities of Dasein specifically. These are the existential conditions and existential modes characterizing existence as Dasein's way of being. I characterize the epistemic value of Heidegger's arguments as conceptual enrichment and their justificatory structure as phenomenological. Heidegger's arguments develop a transcendental ontology by identifying different existential conditions and their modes. But these conditions are not a priori. They derive their justification from how well they make sense of phenomena. I conclude by indicating how the explanatory structure of Heidegger's arguments deviates from Kant's. Unlike Kant's, Heidegger's transcendental arguments do not track the conditions of intelligibility of the world back to a transcendental subject.

Antonio Kerstenetzky: *Hubris* in Plato's *Phaedrus*: Rethinking the Psychology of Vice

In the palinode in Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates likens the soul to a winged chariot driven by a charioteer and pulled by a good and a bad horse. Many interpreters map this onto the tripartition of the soul in the *Republic*, identifying reason with the charioteer, spirit with the good horse and appetite with the bad horse. However, this reading lacks textual support and wrongly assumes that appetite is always bad and spirit is always good. More recently, Carelli (2015) proposed that the horses represent the "power to opine" and the charioteer, the "power to know". But this account fails to explain a central feature of the bad horse: its violent resistance to the charioteer's control.

This paper argues that the defining trait of the bad horse is *hubris* – the term Socrates most frequently uses to characterize it (253e2, 254c3, 254e3, 254e6). According to the LSJ, *hubris* denotes rejection of authority, wanton violence, lewdness, and sexual violence. The bad horse, I argue, does not represent a desire for a specific kind of object or an epistemic power. Instead, it embodies a constant reactive drive to the attempts of the charioteer to impose order on the soul, including attempting to destroy and defile whatever the charioteer perceives to be the objects a soul should pursue.

This interpretation reveals a sharper contrast between the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. In the *Republic*, even the appetitive part of the soul can be educated to accept the rule of reason, enabling psychic harmony. In the *Phaedrus*, by contrast, the bad horse is presented as deaf and unresponsive to reason (253e). When the soul is confronted with a beautiful boy – an image of Beauty itself and one of the most valuable things to a soul – the bad horse can only be subdued into fear and submission by repeated use of the whip (254e). But even then, the text doesn't provide any reason to believe that this submission will transfer to the next time the soul is confronted with something valuable.

By focusing on the bad horse's *hubris*, this paper presents a new view on the psychology of vice in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Vice erupts because of an innate and ineducable drive towards violence and disorder, one that awakens in the presence of what is most valuable to a soul. Even the best people cannot eliminate these violent impulses; they can merely repress them when they arise. Plato's vision here is darker than in other middle-period dialogues; the soul is depicted as perpetually fractured in a conflict over what is most valuable to it.

Chiara Lalli: Rethinking Cicero's *Voluptas*: Philosophical Depth Behind a Roman Polemic

The aim of my contribution is to reconsider Cicero's engagement with Epicurean hedonism in *De Finibus* I–II by arguing that his critique of *voluptas* should be recognized as a philosophically significant challenge

to the coherence of the Epicurean system. In fact, Cicero's opposition to Epicurus is often explained by reference to the incompatibility between the austere *mos maiorum* and the Greek pursuit of pleasure. Yet this view oversimplifies the debate. Cicero, far from being ignorant or uncharitable, knew Epicureanism thoroughly and, in *De Finibus*, treats it with a seriousness that transcends cultural prejudice. His criticisms, I argue, illuminate genuine tensions in the Epicurean conception of pleasure, particularly the distinction between pleasures *in motu* (kinetic) and pleasures in *stabilitate* (katastematic).

Cicero acknowledges that Epicurus did not equate the highest good with vulgar or excessive bodily delights, but with the absence of bodily and mental pain (*aponia* and *ataraxia*). Nevertheless, he questions whether such a condition can truly be called "pleasure." For Cicero, the very phenomenology of pleasure implies sensory stimulation, something felt as positively delightful. If katastematic pleasure is merely painlessness, it risks collapsing into a neutral state, lacking the experiential quality that makes pleasure recognizable as such. Thus, a point I would like to stress, Cicero suspects that Epicurus equivocates between two conceptions of pleasure: the immediately perceptible enjoyment recognized by infants, and the rationally mediated state of tranquility pursued by adults.

The crux of Cicero's objection lies in fact in this oscillation. Torquatus, Cicero's Epicurean spokesman, insists that both kinds of pleasure fall under the same category, appealing to *variatio* – the idea that pleasure may vary in kind without increasing in degree. But Cicero finds this unconvincing: either pleasure is sensory stimulation, in which case Epicurus fails to justify excluding kinetic pleasure from the *summum bonum*; or pleasure is mere painlessness, in which case the Epicurean position resembles that of Hieronymus of Rhodes, who identified the highest good with freedom from pain (*non dolere*), or even the Cyrenaics, who pursued kinetic pleasure. In either scenario, Cicero concludes, Epicurus' claim to originality is undermined.

Cicero's sensitivity to linguistic nuance reinforces his critique. His translation of *hedone* as *voluptas* is deliberate, reflecting the pejorative associations of *voluptas* in Roman culture – sensual excess, weakness, moral corruption. While scholars often accuse Cicero of bias for this choice, I'd be inclined to argue that it reveals his philosophical strategy: to expose the tension between Epicurus' technical redefinition of pleasure and common linguistic intuitions about what pleasure is. By exploiting this dissonance, Cicero highlights the obscurity and potential incoherence of the Epicurean doctrine.

In sum, Cicero's analysis is valuable as it draws attention to an implicit transition in Epicurean thought: from the sensory-driven pleasures of infancy to the rationally mediated tranquility of adulthood. Recognizing this developmental trajectory aligns Epicureanism with other Hellenistic systems, such as Stoicism, in which early natural impulses evolve into rationally structured ends.

Lilith Lee: A Slavery that Liberty Creates and Conceals: Recovering TAN Teck Soon's Anglo-Chinese Critique of Colonialism and Confucianism

The Chinese population in the Straits Settlements (British Malaya) was of outsized philosophical, political, and economic interest for British and Qing Empires at the turn of the 20th century. In this paper, I attend to how the philosophical traditions of both were hybridised by the Anglo-Chinese philosopher TAN Teck Soon (one of the only two non-European members of the Straits Philosophical Society in Singapore). I focus on Tan's critique of both the British Liberalism and Qing Confucianism that dominated the region, seeking to progress beyond them in a synthesis of (German) Idealism and Daoism.

In face of the inter-imperial violence of the coolie and flesh trade across the British and Chinese empires, Tan offers a Daoist-Idealist response, developing the concept of Daoist immortality alongside that of the 'historical immortality' of the German Idealists (Rosen 2022). Critically reinterpreting the *Zhuangzi*, Tan proposes that (i) the progressive ideals of a nation's spirit are to be found rather in popular expressions, where its growth is otherwise constrained by imperial artifices (cf. Kwek 2019); and that (ii) *wuwei* should be thus understood as a possible means for an agent to act beyond their individual lifespan, by contributing to a hermeneutical pool of possible ideals for developing a global humanity. Emerging from this is a critical-cosmopolitan presentation of the *Zhuangzi* (cf. Wong and Hourdequin 2019), one in transnational solidarity with the anti-imperialist readings of the *Zhuangzi* by Oscar Wilde and Qing Dynasty commentators.

Ironically, while traces of Tan's intellectual labours then might still be discerned in the national progress of Singapore more than a hundred years later, his philosophical contributions have been otherwise damned to oblivion – by those who inherit both philosophy's colonial legacy as well as the legacy of *fin-de-siècle* Confucianism. Tan's philosophical beacon light for the Straits Chinese in the region has been overshadowed precisely by a 'liberal Confucianism' based on scientific materialism, betrayed by his frequent collaborator and philosophical counterpart in the colony: Lim Boon Keng.

Xingding Liu: How to name the nameless: A typological analysis of signifiers in WANG Bi's philosophy of language

Scholarly debates on the ineffability of *dao* have long been dominated by inquiries into the metaphysical nature of *dao* and its elusiveness. This is due in part to the influence of Wang Bi's (王弼, 226–249 CE) commentary on the *Daodejing* (道德經, *Text of the Way and Virtues*). This paper proposes an understanding of Wang Bi's philosophy that has been eclipsed by this dominant metaphysical interpretation. From the angle of philosophy of language, I argue that Wang Bi has in mind two ways in which words such as "*dao*" signify. One type of signifier maps to distinguishing features and operates within coherent systems (such as official titles). They are known as "*ming*" (名). The second type of signifier has a focal function: they enable about-ness or sayability without committing to definite or distinguishing features. These are known as "*cheng*" (稱). Both are available in Wang Bi's philosophy and, on the basis of their different functions, I demonstrate the dual modality of the word "*dao*," which may function as a *ming* or as a *cheng*. As *ming*, "*dao*" is used, for example, to establish a conceptual structure that maps the generative aspect of the myriad things. As *cheng*, "*dao*" operates in a higher-order, reflexive mode, complementing the discourse about the ineffable that marks the limits of *ming*-s. This distinction clarifies the apparent tension between the necessity of names for discourse and the claim that dao exceeds naming. Ultimately, this analysis reframes the *dao*-discourse as a dynamic linguistic strategy rather than a metaphysical puzzle with a given answer. It offers a new solution to ineffability, grounded in the pragmatic usage of signifiers.

Ana Lomadze: What is the Act of the Intellect: Knowing or Co-existing with an Object? Duns Scotus on the Human Intellect

For the scholastic tradition, differentiating intuitive and abstractive sensible cognitions is a common practice. The sight intuitively sees the colour; in this act of seeing, the power co-exists with the colour without mediation. Later, the imagination abstracts from the existence of the colour and imagines it through the mediacy of species. Duns Scotus, additionally, discusses intuitive intellectual cognition; not only colours, sounds, smells, etc., but intelligible beings (including common nature and singular substances) might be cognised in their existence. Theoretically, it is possible to co-exist with the essences of horseness and Bucephalus. For example, angels possess such intellectual powers; their perfect intellectual cognition implies not knowing beings through the intelligible content but co-existing with them. From this point of view, acts of the intellect are more ontological than epistemological processes. The intellect, in its perfect manifestation, is not the tool to know but the mode of being (*esse*). According to this context, every type of knowledge is a manifestation of an intellectual act's deficiency, as knowledge implies the mediacy of intelligible content and a co-existence not with intelligible beings but with their intelligible species.

The description of the angel's intellect is a fruitful thought experiment for exposing the limits of the human intellect. Unlike angels, humans *in via* can have such acts only if the objects of the cognition are their mental acts (i.e., their thoughts and desires). In other cases, ideally, their intellect co-exists not with the intelligible species. Additionally, the human intellect in this life not only lacks perfect cognition but also partially knows some intelligible beings. It knows what is common between the singulars under the same intelligible species, but does not know their unique part, i.e., grade of singularity. For example, it can know horseness *per se* but not Bucephalus *per se*. In Scotus's philosophy, this is a serious deficiency of intellectual cognition, because, for him, singular substances have the highest ontological status.

Taken together, these points indicate that, according to Scotus, even though humans physically live with other singular beings, they do not have the power to be with them intelligibly or know them *per se*. The

human intellect *in via*: 1. cannot be with intelligible beings, but only know some of them; 2. cannot know ontologically prior beings *per se*, but only their common nature.

Ian MacLean-Evans: Neither Male nor Female: Anti-Essentialism in Poulain de la Barre

Early modern feminist François Poulain de la Barre (1647–1723) is perhaps best known for his Cartesian conclusion that "the mind has no sex". In this sense Poulain is anti-essentialist about mental sex. But I argue that Poulain is strongly anti-essentialist about bodily sex too. In §1, I define *secondary* biological sex essentialism and articulate Poulain's secondary anti-essentialism. Poulain thinks sexed physical and behavioural traits are socially developed, and sex does not determine appropriate social roles. In §2, I define *primary* biological sex essentialism and articulate Poulain's primary anti-essentialism. I argue that Poulain deploys conceptualist strands of Cartesianism to render universals like "male" and "female" mere mind-dependent concepts. For the Cartesian conceptualist, universals are mind-dependent abstractions, and particular corporeal bodies do not themselves partake in universals absent our ideas. This explains Poulain's approval of the claim that God does not see humans as sexed and that sexes exist only in human minds. In §3, I address textual evidence that might *prima facie* suggest my reading is mistaken. In the conclusion, I briefly compare elements of Poulain's views to contemporary philosophical views of sex.

Giulia Martina: Dawes Hicks on the Genesis of Judgement

This contribution focuses on George Dawes Hicks' account of the relationship between perception and judgement, and especially his puzzling claim that the two are merely different in degree. Realist Dawes Hicks rejects the accounts of judgement of both Bradley (1883, 1887) and Russell (1912) as incapable of explaining how judgement could amount to knowledge of a mind-independent reality. We instead need to adopt a 'genetic' approach, uncovering 'the evolution and growth' of our mental life so as to explain how judging is possible (1905: 271–72). All cognition, Dawes Hicks argues, must be understood as a mental activity of essentially the same kind, from perception to conceptual thinking (1905, 1913, 1916). Only then can we explain how judgement can have objectivity, i.e. reference to a reality beyond itself. Underlying Bradley's and Russell's theories is a conception of perception which is either subjectivist – the objects of perception are not mind-independent – and/or atomistic – perception is awareness of 'detached and isolated sensibilia' such as colours and shapes, rather than material things (1913: 37; 1905, 1912). Dawes Hicks conceives of perception, even in its basic forms, as 'discriminating, comparing, and relating', directed at real, 'whole things' (1913: 24-25, 34-37; 1916). While this view may explain the objectivity of judging, as originating in the objectivity of perception, it remains puzzling that the difference between perceiving and judging should be just one of 'degree of complexity'. Dawes Hicks' first paper on the topic (1905) offers, I suggest, a twofold answer. On the one hand, self-conscious subjects experience thinking and judging differently from perceiving. On the other hand, we can find in perceiving a 'rudimentary' form of the processes that explain the other key feature of judging, i.e. its generality. Analysis, abstraction, and recognition of differences and similarities are already part of sense apprehension of particular real things.

Jelena Milosavljevic: Aristotle on the Satisfaction of Human Appetites

In *Nicomachean Ethics* III.10, Aristotle remarks that the sense of touch belongs to us 'not insofar as we are human beings, but insofar as we are animals' (III.10, 1118b2). For this reason, he suggests, touch and the activities which arise from it 'would seem to be most justly a matter of reproach' (1118b3). A certain interpretation takes this to mean that human appetites for bodily pleasures are continuous with those of nonhuman animals: we enjoy eating, drinking and sex not *qua* human beings but *qua* animals. Accordingly, temperance is thought to consist in learning to silence, manipulate or restrain appetite so that it may submit to the prescriptions of reason.

In contrast, this paper proposes a view on which human appetites for bodily pleasures are distinct from their counterparts in nonhuman animals. Drawing on *NE* I.13, I suggest that the presence of reason shapes the constitution of the human soul not only in the part which has reason 'within itself' but also in the appetitive faculty, which shares in reason 'by listening to it as to a father' (I.13, 1103a1–3). Building

on this account, I argue that the temperate person's enjoyment of bodily pleasures denotes a uniquely human activity. For Aristotle, human appetite is essentially reason-responsive: it requires the guidance of reason for its satisfaction, since it is by the employment of reason that we discover the measure appropriate for the fulfilment of our appetites. Consequently, when the temperate person enjoys that which temperate activity consists in – namely, the moderate consumption and pursuit of bodily pleasures – she does so insofar as she is a rational being. This does not entail that she recognises her behaviour as temperate or enjoys it on account of appreciating its fineness, as some interpretations suggest (Frede 2009, Coope 2012, Gottlieb 2021). Rather, it is the very fact of possessing an appetite, the needs of which are satisfied by the measures and comportment prescribed by reason, which constitutes an agent's temperance.

This view has two significant consequences for our understanding of human appetite in Aristotle's moral psychology. First, it explains why only human comportment towards bodily pleasures can be properly described as temperate, even when the sense from which these pleasures arise is shared with nonrational animals. Second, it reconciles Aristotle's claim that human appetites are particularly unrestrained and savage (*Politics* I.2, 1253a31–33) with his natural teleology, on which an organism's psychic constitution is appropriate to its biological needs. Thus, the proposed view explains how human appetite goes far astray in the absence of reason, such that it causes humans to be 'the worst with respect to sex and nourishment' amongst the animals (1253a35–37), while remaining compatible with Aristotle's teleological commitments.

Matyáš Moravec: James, Bergson, Mrs Piper, and the Ghost of Richard Hodgson

William James was widely known for his interest in "psychical research," the study of "psychic phenomena" including telepathy, clairvoyance, apparitions, or communication with spirits of the dead. For over a decade, James, together with his colleague Richard Hodgson, studied the Boston trance medium Mrs Piper, publishing hundreds of pages of records regarding her ability to access information about séance-sitters seemingly via supernatural means. James and Hodgson were both particularly interested in the question of spirit survival, since Mrs. Piper, when in trance, claimed to be possessed by various spirits of the dead communicating this information to her. When Hodgson died in 1905, he joined their ranks, seemingly getting in touch with his (ex)colleague James from the beyond in séances with Mrs. Piper.

James scholars have systematically studied James' interest in psychical research and the way in which it shaped his views in psychology. However, the suggested links between psychical research and his *philosophy* remain rather tenuous and are usually confined to comments on the role of psychical research in the *Varieties of Religious Experience* and James' opposition to scientific naturalism. My paper, appealing to recent archival research, will suggest intricate links between James's work on Mrs. Piper (and the purported spirit of Richard Hodgson) and his doctrine of radical empiricism. I will do so by looking at two areas. First, I will argue that James's emphasis on "pure experience" in the *Essays on Radical Empiricism* is closely linked to his struggle between refusing to postulate an independently existing soul or consciousness on the one hand, and the evidence for the presence of Hodgson in the séances with Mrs Piper on the other hand. Second, I will demonstrate a new route through which James' philosophy was influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, also involved in psychical research. A curious letter from Bergson suggests that whatever was happening in the séances with Mrs Piper was a hidden vector behind James and Bergson's discussions about consciousness and its relation to the brain.

Noa Naftalovich: Christopher Alexander's Luminous Ground: Centers and Wholeness in the Theatre of Dionysius at Athens

In his morphogenetic theory, Christopher Alexander defines *luminous ground* as a metaphysical field of connectedness, unity and radiance underlying all phenomena in nature, thought, and society (*The Nature of Order*, Vol. 4, 2004). It arises from the coherence of "centers" – whether geometric points, physical objects, or field-like region of integration within a whole – which he regards as entities that reinforce one another through recurring properties of *wholeness*. While Alexander does not specify the exact "degree"

of *wholeness* required for the *luminous ground* to emerge, he identifies fifteen properties that shape it, including gradients, levels of scale, and boundaries. In my talk, I will examine these properties as they manifest in the Theatre of Dionysus at Athens (c. fifth century BCE), drawing on the cosmological perception of Vitruvius (first century BCE), the Roman architect, for whom the circle and its center serve as a key principle reflecting the structure of the universe and the dynamics of natural phenomena. I will assess the "degree" of *wholeness* embodied in the Theatre, its functions, and its environment, and propose a model of concentric physical and metaphysical centers linking earthly order to the cosmos, thereby considering the extent to which the Theatre at Athens may be regarded as an instance of *luminous ground*.

Tilke Nelis: *Quot Translationes, Tot Variae Lectiones*: Textual Fluidity in Latin Versions of Aristotle's *De Anima*

Around the mid-twelfth century, Aristotle's *De anima* was translated into Latin by James of Venice. Through this word-for-word translation from the Greek (called *translatio vetus*), Latin scholars in the Medieval West gained access to the treatise for the first time. Consequently, they faced the challenge of combining the "new" insights with their accepted (Platonic) views on the soul. Around 1230, Michael Scot made a new Latin translation, from the Arabic (called *translatio alia*). This text circulated together with Scot's Latin translation of Averroes's *Long Commentary on De anima*. The latter work helped Latin scholars with the integration of the newly discovered concepts and formed an important source for commentaries on the *vetus*, such as Albert the Great's.

Today, we know five (thirteenth-century) manuscripts combining, on the same folia, the *vetus* with both the *alia* and Scot's translation of Averroes's commentary (as well as Albert's commentary, in one of these manuscripts). Given that *vetus* and *alia* have completely different source texts – in different languages – and are transmitted in manuscripts, these translations and their copies are expected to vary remarkably. In my paper, I will examine this textual fluidity. Within the scope of a case study, I will investigate the discussion of the sense of hearing (II, 8), specifically as transmitted in these five manuscripts. In what respect do the texts in the copies differ from one another? Are Aristotle's examples still the same in Latin translation? And which version does Albert follow in case of clear divergence: *vetus* or *alia*?

Fridolin Neumann: Heidegger's Realism and his Appropriation of Kant

In this paper, I explore Heidegger's relation to Kant's transcendental philosophy by focusing on his conception of what I call 'ontological failure' – experiences in which the transcendental conditions of experience prove inadequate to the entities they pertain to. While Heidegger follows Kant in rejecting metaphysical realism and grounding ontology in an analysis of a transcendental subject, this conception of ontological failure allows for entities to exert feedback on our transcendental conditions of experiencing them. This, I argue, reveals Heidegger's commitment to a stronger and non-Kantian form of 'realism' about entities. Following Keiling (2015, 2019), I suggest cashing this as Heidegger's 'phenomenological realism', defined by granting entities a 'metametaphysical role' or ontological normativity.

Section 1 outlines the Kantian commitments of *Being and Time* (BT), focusing on Heidegger's claim that every encounter with entities is enabled by an *understanding of their being*. As a conscious continuation of Kant's transcendental turn, this claim makes the subjective conditions for accessing entities foundational for ontology, and ties Heidegger's notions of *entities* and *being* to his conception of the subject. Unsurprisingly, many interpreters (e.g., Blattner 1999, Lambeth 2023) read BT as a form of transcendental idealism.

Section 2, however, provides the counterpart by examining Heidegger's central though underexplored commitment to ontological failure: though necessary for encountering entities, our understanding of being is not fixed and stable but can fail. (Haugeland 2013, Schear 2013) Moreover, such failure occurs not merely contingently (contra Pippin 2007), but can be triggered when entities expose a mismatch with the understanding of being an agent endorses. In particular, drawing from the vice epistemology sketched in Heidegger's analysis of *inauthenticity*, I argue that Heidegger expects epistemically virtuous agents to continuously adapt their understanding of being to entities by being responsive to such experiences – for

instance, if the understanding of being leave entities underdetermined, or results in contradictory experiences.

Section 3 sketches the implications for Heidegger's transcendental philosophy. Given certain epistemic virtues on the side of the agent, Heideggerian transcendental conditions not only determine entities but are responsive to feedback they assert, thus indicating a normativity that is reciprocal rather than unilateral between the two poles. Despite his commitment to Kant's transcendental turn, Heidegger thereby advances a phenomenological realism that makes encounters with entities the focal point of ontology.

Lia Nordmann: Kant on Animals as Analogues of Humanity

In his *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant is recorded to have said that we bear indirect duties to animals "since animals are an analogue of humanity" (27:469; cf. 27:710). I begin by offering reasons to take seriously the idea that an analogy between humans and animals underwrites Kant's account of duties to animals; we find this view expressed in different lecture notes, and Kant did not take it from Baumgarten's *Ethica Philosophica* (1740), the textbook he based his lectures on. Moreover, it fits with Kant's treatment of duties regarding animals in the *Doctrine of Virtue*. Even though Kant does mention analogy there, he writes that sometimes we should treat animals 'as if' they were human (6:443). So, what does this analogy consist in and what role does it plays in Kant's ethics?

In §1, I briefly introduce Kant's account of analogical judgements. Based on his characterisation of analogies in general, I show that the specific human-animal analogy he describes in the *Lectures* cannot consist in shared capacities. For Kant, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, for instance, is a similarity between animals and human beings, not an analogy.

In §2, I argue that the human-animal analogy must also be different from the analogy between reason and nature that Kant develops in the third *Critique*. While the analogy between reason and nature might bear ethical implications (as Breitenbach (2009) suggests) it can only yield duties that do not discriminate between plants and animals. This is because the analogy between reason and nature applies to all organised beings, animate or inanimate. However, in both the *Lectures* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant carefully distinguishes duties concerning animals from duties concerning (beautiful) plants through the idea of a human-animal analogy.

In §3 I suggest that this analogy must be one between human reason and the cognitive capacity that underlies those animal behaviours that we cannot explain by immediate inclination, such as a spider's web-weaving (28:690), a beaver's dam-building (5:464), or the cooperative behaviour of pets (6:443). As Kant argues in the third *Critique*, we are permitted to judge that animal possess an analogue of rationality because we can observe complex behaviours in both animals and humans and we know that in the human case, such behaviour requires reason. He writes that "in comparing the artistic actions of animals with those of human beings, we conceive of the ground of the former, which we do not know, through the ground of similar effects in humans (reason), which we do know and thus as an analogue of reason." (5:464). Since our epistemic insight into animal minds is limited, Kant seems to take this analogy with human reason as the condition of the possibility of thinking about animals as living, non-rational beings. This proposal fits with recent analogical readings of Kant's account of animal minds (e.g. Callanan 2020; Browning 2024), but expands on the role it plays in Kant's ethics: the analogy allows us to think of animals as different from human beings on the one hand and plants on the other, and explains why we bear specific, indirect duties to animals.

Kenneth Novis: Democracy and Human Nature: A Puzzle for Spinoza

Spinoza is remembered today as one of the leading early modern proponents of democracy. This paper explores a tension in Spinoza's philosophy between his democratic aspirations and his understanding of the fluidity of human nature. This tension is of further significance, as democracies are often lauded for their ability to accommodate individual difference. To understand this tension, I focus on Spinoza's concept of *ingenium,* which denotes the variable, imaginative character of individuals and peoples. Chapter 14 of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* outlines 7 dogmas on which society may be founded, even assuming the variability of people's *ingenia*. Much has been written on these 'dogmas of universal faith.' A common

recent interpretation has it that the dogmas themselves should vary between sufficiently different societies, in order to exert the most effective control over people based on their *ingenia*. This introduces a potential affinity between Spinoza and Montesquieu, and poses a significant challenge for Spinoza's theory of 'natural democracy.' Like Spinoza, Montesquieu believed that people's characters may vary to a great degree. In Montesquieu's case, this is due to differences in people's geographical settings, which might make them hardy or leisurely, secretive or trustful. Furthermore, for both authors, what counts as the ideal political arrangement is dependent on character, both individual and national. In Montesquieu's case, this variability influences political arrangements at the deepest level, causing democracy to be the preferable form of government only among some people, whose natures agree with it because of their environments. However, Spinoza defends the view that democracy is the most natural form of government for all peoples. This raises the following question: given that Spinoza allows *ingenium* to vary, how can he maintain that one system of government is the most natural for all peoples? I propose an answer to this question by considering the relation between *ingenium* and nature in Spinoza's work. Through his account of psychology and its corresponding *conatus* doctrine, Spinoza erects a barrier within human nature that prevents *ingenium* from varying to the extent that Montesquieu allows. In particular, according to Spinoza, all humans strive to both persevere in existence and to perfect their natures. While this aspect of human nature is invariant, *ingenium* denotes the multitude of ways in which people seek out perseverance and perfection, given the imaginative ideas imbued in them by their particular circumstances. Consequently, democracy is the most natural political system for all, because it best serves the aims of all human lives. This explains how Spinoza can claim that i) *ingenium* is variable, ii) the variability of *ingenium* influences what counts as the ideal political arrangements for a people, and iii) democracy is the ideal political arrangement for all peoples.

Colette Olive: How Disinterested Is Murdochian Love?

For Iris Murdoch, both art and love involve an exercise in unselfish attention, or "perception without reverie" (MGM 247). Exercising loving or aesthetic attention requires practice in 'unselfing', which involves silencing our own judgements and desires in order to pay full attention to something outside of ourselves. Murdoch draws heavily on Kant's account of aesthetic judgement – particularly the notion of disinterest – to articulate her conception of unselfish desire. Murdoch is drawn to Kantian disinterest as a model for love on the grounds that it illustrates the kind of "unpossessive" (MGM 346) attachment that is characteristic of loving attention. Murdoch's reading of the *Third Critique* is by no means orthodox. She firmly rejects Kant's thesis that the aesthetic is without concept, whilst maintaining that what is important in aesthetic appreciation is that attention is directed toward something that is valuable independently of our desires toward it. It is crucial that the object of our admiration remains "independent and for-itself" (EM 210). Beyond that, it's unclear what Murdoch is really inheriting from the *Third Critique* in her account of loving relationships. More worrying, for the Murdochian, is that disinterested appreciation seems like a poor fit for an account of love. Afterall, we care deeply about the continued existence of our loved ones without thinking this undermines the validity of our love.

Perhaps surprisingly, Murdoch admits that a significant difference between our relationships with artworks and our relationships with people is that we are more strongly attached to people we love. To what extent – if at all – is Murdochian love disinterested? How much is Murdoch really borrowing from Kantian aesthetics? The goal of this paper is to delineate Murdoch's inheritance from the *Third Critique* as it pertains to her account of love. Once we have a better grip on Murdoch's interpretation of Kantian disinterest, we see that Murdoch is wrestling with a tension: how can our attachments be personal without being selfish? How can a desirous self be in play without some appearance from selfish interest? The analogy between aesthetic disinterest and genuine love turns out to be apt, not because we ought not to care about our loved ones' continued existence, but because love involves an imaginative engagement with a reality outside of ourselves that is valuable for its own sake. In §1, I set out Murdoch's *Third Critique* by reconstructing her own sense of Kantian aesthetics. In §2 I canvass the objection that disinterest seems out of place in an account of loving relationships. §3 responds by drawing on recent scholarship on Kantian disinterest to show that the disinterested appreciation of beauty has more in common with love than we might think. The final section shows that Murdochian love can still be a plausible account of interpersonal attachments without us needing to jettison her inheritance to Kant.

Anna Ortín Nadal: Cordemoy on Secondary Causation as Prejudice

This paper examines an argument that the Cartesian Géraud de Cordemoy offers in favour of occasionalism with the objective of determining the status of the common belief in the efficacy of secondary causes. In a thoroughgoing occasionalist picture, finite bodies and minds are causally inefficacious and God is the only true cause that realizes causal interactions continuously. Seventeenth-century occasionalism, however, is not a uniform theory and authors respond differently to questions about what constitutes our experience of secondary causation. I claim that, for Cordemoy, the belief in causal powers in nature is a prejudice in the technical Cartesian sense: it is an illegitimate judgment that has not been informed either by the pure intellect nor by the considered representations of perception. I proceed in three steps. *First*, Cordemoy supplements his axiomatic argument for occasionalism with an argument that I call "Experience versus Conjecture": experience reveals only successions of events and causal transference of properties is speculated. *Second*, from this, I show that Cordemoy operates with Descartes' account of epistemic error and that he broadens it in a distinctive way. For Descartes, epistemic prejudice typically applies to beliefs about the senses as revealing the "true nature" of things. Cordemoy goes further and claims that our belief in secondary causation is also conjectured and not experienced by the senses or discerned intellectually. *Third*, this analysis clarifies a confusion in the literature on Cordemoy: the experience of secondary causation should not be classified as a perceptual error nor as an element of a domain of law-like appearances that needs the correction of reason. Rather, the notion of secondary causation is akin to the obscure qualities that the Cartesian project aims to eliminate from explanation. In sum, this paper uncovers Cordemoy's original contribution to the rich pre-Humean debate on the justification of causal beliefs. This sets him apart from Descartes and Malebranche and provides new nuance to the connection between occasionalism and Humean causal reductivism.

Peter Osorio and Máté Veres: The Stoic Theory of Trust

We reconstruct, for the first time, core components of the Stoic theory of trust, present already in Zeno and traceable across Stoic discussions of ethics and epistemology. On the view that emerges, trust typically involves cases in which a trusting agent, A, assents to *p* on the grounds that (i) a testimonial source, B, asserts that *p* and (ii) A judges B trustworthy. We argue that, from Zeno onwards, trust under the right circumstances is an appropriate action, that the resulting mental state is a forceful belief (*hypolêpsis*), and that forceful belief is in principle acceptable even to the sage. Our view is controversial insofar as we argue that appropriate trust falls short of apprehension (*katalêpsis*). We will focus on defending this claim by appealing to manuscript consensus (and countering arguments for emendation), responding to apparent counterevidence, and arguing for confirmation in the Stoics' account of reliably true but non-demonstrative inferences. Trust is an important component of the Stoic theory of knowledge, and interpretations that focus strictly on the epistemic autonomy and autarchy of the sage fail to account for important aspects of the Stoic life, such as the sage teaching the fool as well as the division of labor among sages in a Stoic utopia, made necessary by the inherent limitations of human life.

Stefano Parrinello: Panaetius of Rhodes and Biological Cosmology in Later Stoicism

The cosmology of early Stoicism is distinctive for its unique blend of demiurgic and biological causation models, which presents the cosmos as a divinely crafted yet fully organic living being (Salles 2021; Piazzalunga 2023). The universe is thus conceived as a rational, ensouled living being that, like all mortal creatures, undergoes a cycle of generation, growth, and eventual destruction in a cosmic conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*); only to be reborn and begin the cycle again. Although this biological model is pervasive and well-attested from the early Stoa (Cic. *De Natura Deorum* 2.29–30), its theoretical appeal appears to diminish in later Imperial Stoicism. In authors such as Seneca and Epictetus, biological concepts, once serving as foundation to core cosmological views, are either completely absent from cosmological discussions (e.g., Seneca *Ep.* 65), or relegated to the status of mere analogies devised for ethical (e.g., Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.9.4–7) or psychological purposes (e.g., Seneca *Ep.* 102). This shift in Stoic philosophy, which has not yet been fully addressed in scholarship, raises crucial questions as to the theoretical motivations behind it and its consequences.

In this paper I explore the thesis that the loss of appeal of biological features essential to earlier Stoic cosmology in later Imperial Stoicism reveals a new way of thinking about divine providence and its manifestation in the structural features of reality. Furthermore, I propose that Panaetius of Rhodes played a key role in this shift, arguing that Panaetius had theologically grounded motives to turn away from a biology-informed cosmological model. Specifically, I suggest that Panaetius may have shifted towards a different causal model because he recognised that the biological model, with its defining features, stood in open contrast to the notion of a strong divine providentialism.

In this sense, my contention is twofold. First, I argue that, in line with Cicero's reports (*De Natura Deorum* 2.118), Panaetius rejected the doctrine of cosmic conflagration on the grounds that a providentially ordered cosmos could not contain in its structure any internal physical flaws that would cause its own destruction – such as the progressive, unavoidable transformation of the whole of cosmic matter into fire. Accordingly, for Panaetius, I suggest, a truly perfect and provident divine principle such as the Stoics' one would necessarily create a cosmos immune to aging and destruction.

Second, based on Philo's reports (*De Aeternitate Mundi* 76), I argue that Panaetius' rejection of cosmic mortality is grounded on a revised conception of what Stoic divine providence requires. If the cosmos is perfect, it cannot be "alive" in the same manner of other mortal biological organisms. This theological commitment forces a reconceptualization of cosmic life, divorcing it from mortality and aligning it with an eternalist, corporeist cosmological framework – a position that finds few parallels in the whole Stoic tradition.

By severing the link between the cosmos and mortality, Panaetius' doctrinal revision effectively proposes a new, streamlined account of the providential structure of the cosmos, stripping the biological model of its core explanatory function and allowing for its more metaphorical use in later Stoicism.

Mahdi Ranaee: Wilfrid Sellars' Inverted Antinomy: How his Kantianism Overcomes the Clash of the Images

Wilfrid Sellars addresses the challenge of reconciling two seemingly contradictory conceptions of the world: The 'manifest image', populated by observable entities such as trees and tables, and the 'scientific image', composed of unobservable theoretical entities such as sub-atomic particles. Contemporary scholarship often asserts that these perspectives cannot be fully reconciled, leading to the assumption that one image must be subsumed under or eliminated in favour of the other. This has led either to a rejection of Sellars' commitment to scientific realism, or to a denial of the reality of observable objects in the manifest image.

This paper demonstrates that Sellars' adaptation of Kantian transcendental idealism offers a distinctive approach. By presenting the conflict as a Kantian 'antinomy', where two opposing positions offer equally compelling yet mutually exclusive arguments, Sellars mirrors Kant's method of resolving such contradictions. He assigns the scientific image to the noumenal realm ('things in themselves') and the manifest image to the phenomenal realm ('appearances'). However, Sellars reverses Kant's solution: whereas Kant places freedom in the noumenal realm and determinism in the phenomenal realm, Sellars places causal determinism in the noumenal realm and freedom in the phenomenal realm.

This approach preserves the integrity of both images while addressing some long-standing challenges to Kantian transcendental idealism, particularly with regard to the nature of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. However, it introduces a new challenge: Sellars' 'view from nowhere'. Since the manifest and scientific images exhaust the logical possibilities, there is no third standpoint from which to evaluate both images and determine which is real. This poses a serious problem for Sellars' transcendental idealism, as it lacks a framework for resolving the status of these two perspectives.

Lorenzo Sala: The Experiential Turn of Eighteenth-Century Germany and Wolff's Puzzle of Certainty

Recent work on the "experiential turn" in eighteenth-century German philosophy has revived the attention to Wolff's philosophy: in fact, Wolff appeals to experience and experiments extensively and

beyond familiar cases like natural philosophy – i.e. in logic, ontology and theology (de Boer & Prunea-Bretonnet 2021, Engelhard 2020).

This has revived the debate on a persistent issue in Wolff-scholarship. In fact, Wolff's philosophy is characterised by two seemingly incompatible traits: on the one hand, Wolff repeatedly resorts to experience to justify his positions, and even describes his philosophy as a "*philosophia experimentalis universalis*"; on the other, he also claims that philosophy needs to be absolutely certain (DP§33).

The literature offers two main resolution to this puzzle (call it the "puzzle of certainty"). On the one hand, (1) one has what could be called 'deflationist' readings (e.g., Anstey & Vanzo 2023; Vanzo 2015; Cataldi Madonna 2001), which solve the puzzle by downplaying the force of Wolff's claims about absolute certainty by treating them as rhetorical overstatements, with "moral certainty" being what Wolff really means. (2) A second group of works, which could be called 'ontological readings' argue instead that some features of Wolff's ontology – e.g. the fact that nature is for Wolff strictly regular (Frketich 2017) – would explain why, for him, empirical knowledge can be certain (Demarest, & van den Berg, 2022 and van den Berg, H., & Demarest, B. (2024).).

In my paper I begin by arguing that both available readings are unsatisfactory. Deflationist readings are ruled out by textual evidence: Wolff repeatedly uses the *Cogito* as the example for the kind of certainty that philosophy must attain (see PE ON DM). Ontological readings suffer instead from a fundamental philosophical failure: explaining how, for Wolff, the word has some feature that makes it amenable to a certain conception of knowledge does not in fact amount to explain how, for him, we can in fact attain a knowledge of that kind.

The answer to the puzzle of certainty must thus be *epistemological* and must thus be based on Wolff's account of cognition.

To provide it, I first examine Wolff's account of notions and intuitive judgements in his *Psychologia Empirica*, to explain how, for him, single experiences can afford access to universal contents (as in his treatment of air's elasticity in the *Logica*) and present some of their contents as *necessarily connected* (as in the *Cogito*'s case of thinking and existing).

On these grounds, I then turn to the *Psychologia rationalis*' treatment of the connection between cognitions (§§440 ff.) to show how (1) the necessity in the connection *of our representations* grounds certainty even when not accompanied by a cognition of the reasons of such a connection; how (2) this framework allows us to treat cases as diverse as the *Cogito*, geometrical axioms, and scientific experiments as belonging to a single genus of experience – their difference is their complexity, which explains the different difficulty in attaining certainty.

I conclude by briefly indicating the historical stakes: I explain how acknowledging Wolff's specifically epistemological route opens a path to make understandable some otherwise puzzling features of the reshaping of experiential method in 1760s–70s Germany (de Boer & Prunea-Bretonnet 2021, Part IV).

Tobias Sandoval: 'What Is Natural Is a Constant Habit or Custome': Cavendish on Habits and Procedural Memory

Margaret Cavendish defines 'remembrance', or remembering, as a voluntary repetition of a past motion. In a recent paper, Sandoval (2025) argues that Cavendishian remembrances take a representational and nonrepresentational form. Representational remembrances occur when an animal creature voluntarily repeats past mental representations that were originally stored in memory via rational matter in sense perception and conception. These remembrances account for our contemporary notion of declarative memory, or the remembering of past experiences and facts. However, he additionally argues that Cavendish allows for remembrances that are nonrepresentational and not grounded in any storage of memories. Examples of nonrepresentational remembrance include repeated motions performed by custom or habit in a creature such as respirating, circulating, digesting, photosynthesis, etc., all of which stem directly from what Cavendish calls the creature's "self-knowledge" rather than stored memories. This appears to leave Cavendish with a very broad and undemanding account of remembrance. That is, in what sense should we understand the claim that circulation and digestion are kinds of remembrance?

In this paper, I bridge the gap between representational and nonrepresentational remembrance in Cavendish. First, I develop an understanding of nonrepresentational remembrance as Cavendish's version of *procedural* memory, which not only encompasses actions such as riding a bike and typing on a keyboard but also actions such as respiration, circulation, photosynthesis, etc. A creature's customs and habits are *learned* through the process of memory (storage) and consistent remembrance (recall). I then connect this account to the growing literature on Cavendish's notion of creaturely self- knowledge. Cavendish claims that all creatures have a 'fixt' self-knowledge that is responsible for the creature's knowing how to perform actions that are natural for it. Theorists debate about how to understand this self-knowledge and, particularly, how creatures know which actions are natural. Using my account of procedural memory in Cavendish, I argue that often times creatures do not start with this knowledge but arrive at it through the process of learning via memory and remembrance. This explains Cavendish's claim that "what is natural is a constant Habit or Custome" as well as her insistence that what distinguishes things in nature are their customs and habits.

In understanding habit as a version of procedural memory, not only do we arrive at a more unified notion of remembrance in Cavendish but also how creatures arrive at their knowledge of motions that are natural.

Mario Schärli: Baumgarten's Actualist Modal Epistemology

This paper shows that Baumgarten's response to a problem in natural theology – what explains God's omniscience regarding mere possibilities? – leads him to develop an actualist modal epistemology, according to which modal knowledge is partly grounded in knowledge about the actual world together with counterfactuals. Thereby, Baumgarten can be said to anticipate Williamson's (2007) idea of reducing modal epistemology to the epistemology of counterfactuals. Expounding this innovation unrecognised in recent discussions of middle knowledge between Leibniz and Kant (Hogan 2014) and Baumgarten's philosophical theology (Stang 2016; Fugate 2018; Abaci 2019; Newlands 2022) will contribute to the emerging efforts of honouring Baumgarten's philosophy in its own right. The plan is as follows. Section 2 presents a tension flowing from Baumgarten's modal metaphysics that plausibly motivates his actualist modal epistemology. Section 3 unfolds Baumgarten's positive proposal, which extends the role of middle knowledge beyond free actions. Section 4 contrasts Baumgarten's and Leibniz's view, thereby bringing its innovative aspect into relief.

Baumgarten's counterfactual-based modal epistemology for God responds to a difficulty flowing from his own modal metaphysics. For Baumgarten holds that the modal status of an object is a function of its internal determinacy. According to this view, merely possible objects are partly indeterminate. (§54-51) This, in turn, entails that God does not know all the properties an object would have, if it were actual, unless he creates it. This leads to a tension with God's omniscience (§889), which seems to entail that God must know all possibilities in their full determinacy. How can this tension be resolved?

Baumgarten's solution extends the role of middle knowledge – introduced in the 16th century to render God's foreknowledge consistent with creaturely freedom (Molina 2004) – to all contingent truths beyond the actual world. This yields an account (§§874-6), according to which God knows about

1. things insofar they are merely possible independently of creation,

2. things insofar as they are actual by creation,

3. the determinations of merely possible things would have, if they were actual, by applying his knowledge of counterfactual conditionals to 1. and 2.

By partially grounding God's knowledge of mere possibilities in his knowledge of actuality, Baumgarten can account for God's omniscience about the merely possible consistently with the partial indeterminacy of merely possible objects.

Baumgarten's innovation comes more sharply into focus in contrast to Leibniz's view. Leibniz (1952, I.54) has a possibilist picture of God's modal knowledge as independent of his knowledge of actuality. Baumgarten is prevented from espousing this view because he holds that mere possibilities are less determinate than actuality. Baumgarten's novel use of middle knowledge yields an anti-Leibnizian,

actualist approach to God's modal knowledge, according to which knowledge of mere possibilities partly prescinds from knowledge about actuality by counterfactuals. In so doing, Baumgarten recognises not only that counterfactuals have a large role to play in modal epistemology, but also that exploiting their potential requires giving up the idea that modal knowledge must be independent of factual knowledge.

Sonja Schierbaum: Wolff on Conscience

Although Wolff's practical philosophy has begun to receive more scholarly attention, little work has investigated his conception of conscience. This is surprising, since Wolff devotes entire chapters to conscience in prominent places of his key works on ethics. In the early *German Ethics* (1720), he discusses conscience right after presenting the 'rule' that should guide human actions, which he also calls a 'law of nature' and even a 'law of conscience' (§137). The aim of this talk is to fill this lacuna by presenting a novel interpretation of Wolff's conception of conscience that takes into account its central agency-related role. I argue that Wolff uses 'conscience' to cover practical reason and judgment spanning the full range of considerations relevant to moral action, from the agent's perspective.

I first outline the general relationship between cognition and judgment (§1), before focusing on conscience as moral judgment (§2). I thereby show that conscience is both action-guiding and action-evaluating. I first examine its action-guiding function in greater detail (§3) before turning to the examination of the action-evaluating function by discussing error cases (§4). Against this backdrop, it is possible to see in what sense the moral 'law of nature' is also a 'law of conscience': the judgments of conscience either 'exculpate' or 'accuse' the agent and, accordingly, cause pleasure or displeasure. Since pleasure is a kind of good, and displeasure a kind of evil, the judgments of conscience thus motivate the agent to avoid the 'accusation' of his own conscience and strive for 'exculpation'. In general, it is by using conscience that the moral 'law of nature' is practically implemented and becomes effective, namely insofar as an agent applies the moral law to their own actions.

Carlina Schreiber: Kant on Inner Morality and Political Obligation

Readers of Kant's legal philosophy have been perplexed by his strict rejection of resistance and revolution ever since the publication of the *Doctrine of Right* in 1797 (Maliks 2014, 112). Kant insists on a duty to obey even unjust rulers (TP 8:299; DoR VI: 320, 11–25), arguing that any right to resist or revolt against the state is incompatible with the concept of a legal system because only a public legal order, however imperfect, can provide the conditions for equal external freedom among individuals (DoR VI 319, 19–29).

Yet, in response to Friedrich Bouterwek's critique of the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant writes: "*Obey the authority* (in whatever does not conflict with inner morality)" (DoR VI 371, 21–23). This parenthetical remark is surprising because it seems to limit the duty of obedience. However, Kant neither elaborates on this remark nor refers to it elsewhere in the *Doctrine of Right* (Maliks 2014, 137). What does "inner morality" mean, and what implications does it have for Kant's account of political obligation?

Despite the extensive literature on Kant's legal philosophy, these questions remain unresolved. Commentators who mention the remark on "inner morality" do so only in passing, typically interpreting it as a moral permission for passive resistance (Kersting 1984, 330–34; Mulholland 1990, 338–40; Maliks 2014, 137f.; Unruh 2016, 330f.; Hirsch 2017, 348–50; Ludwig 2024, 157–59). One exception is Waldron, who cautions against reading it as "any general suggestion of a right of conscientious refusal" (2008, 195).

Nevertheless, neither Waldron nor other commentators fully develop an account of what Kant means by "inner morality" or thoroughly assess its implications for political obligation in Kant's legal philosophy. Given that the potential for abuse of power within a state, as described by Kant, is a central concern in the literature on Kant's legal philosophy (see Williams 1983; Kersting 1984; Ripstein 2009; Byrd and Hruschka 2012), this is a significant omission.

My aim in this paper is to interpret Kant's remark on "inner morality". First, I will argue that "inner morality" refers to perfect duties because only such duties possess the normative strength to constrain obedience. Second, I will demonstrate that this remark establishes a moral limit to political obligation,

permitting passive resistance to laws and commands that require violating perfect duties. Third, I will contend that the resulting account of passive resistance is narrow, and that its political function is ambiguous. This makes it necessary to examine what, in Kant's legal philosophy, renders laws, and, ultimately, the state itself, legitimate.

Section 1 outlines Kant's account of political obligation. Section 2 examines the remark on "inner morality" and illustrate that it likely means perfect duties. Section 3 considers examples from Kant's texts in which obedience would require violating universal moral law and argues that in such cases, universal moral law prevails. Section 4 discusses the account of passive resistance as implied by "inner morality".

Jinesh Sheth: On the Method of *Anekāntavāda* and its Therapeutic Paradigm

Given the inclusive approach of the Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* (non-one-sidedness) that reconciliates the opposing views, which often resembles *as if* it solves a philosophical – to be precise, metaphysical – problem, one may ask, does *anekāntavāda* have a therapeutic value? If so, what does it mean to say that it is therapeutic? Which *diseases* does it cure, if any? *How* does it proceed in its endeavour? Who can effect such a therapeutic transformation? Can the therapy go wrong? These are some of the questions that this paper is motivated by. While my primary aim in this paper is to argue *for* the therapeutic project that is embedded in *anekāntavāda* – in the sense that it can serve as a medicine to cure the ills of absolutism (*ekāntavāda*), thereby resulting in a state of equanimity (*samatā*) – it would be much more effective if I first substantiate the claims that (a) *anekāntavāda* embodies a *philosophical method* and that (b) it *can* be applied to problems of philosophy that are not restricted to metaphysics alone. The need for this long detour – the first half of the paper – will become evident in the course of the paper. The paper takes a textual-philosophical approach that is based on a wide-range of Jain philosophical texts, and particularly Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* (Examination of an Authority). The paper also reflects on some of the major therapeutic projects that are witnessed in the history of philosophy, mainly Pyrrhonian, Nāgārjunian, and Wittgensteinian, vis-à-vis the *anekāntavāda*.

Karim Shoaib: God's Huwiyya in al-Kirmānī's Rāḥat al-ʿAql

I argue that the eleventh-century Ismāʿīlī philosopher Hamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī developed a novel and philosophically interesting conception of God's *huwiyya* in response to the accusation of *taʿṭīl* (denial of God) levelled against Ismāʿīlī apophaticism by Kalām theologians.

In *Rāḥat al-ʿAql*, al-Kirmānī develops a thoroughgoing apophatic theology, arguing that God transcends all attributes and cannot be described by predicates. He then addresses the charge of *taʿṭīl* often made against Ismāʿīlī apophaticism, namely that it is impossible to affirm a God who cannot be described. Al-Kirmānī's response is that there is a mode of affirmation (*ithbāt*) which does not presuppose description of God's attributes (*ṣifāt*). In particular, in a negative statement like 'He is not this (*huwa lā hādhā*)', we *affirm* God's *huwiyya* while *negating* His attributes. Thus, al-Kirmānī posits that God's *huwiyya* transcends descriptive content.

Al-Kindī and his circle of translators introduced the term '*huwiyya*' into the Arabic language to mean 'being', likely deriving this meaning from the use of '*huwa*' as a copula, and used the term interchangeably with other philosophical neologisms such as '*ays*'. Al-Kindī argued that God's being (*huwiyya*, *ays*, *anniyya*) is simple in that it transcends all predicates. Crucially, however, al-Kirmānī *cannot* mean 'being' by '*huwiyya*' since, like the Greek Neoplatonists but unlike al-Kindī, he closely associates being with predication and thus *denies* being (*ays*, *mawjūd*, *wujūd*) of God.

Instead, I argue that al-Kirmānī's usage of '*huwiyya*' in reference to God builds upon the use of '*huwa*' as a simple pronoun meaning 'he' or 'it' rather than its role as a copula. Being a substantification of the pronoun, by God's '*huwiyya*' al-Kirmānī literally means God's 'he-ness' or 'it-ness', and he uses the term to affirm God as the subject of apophatic negations of attributes *and* being. To explain the philosophical

significance of al-Kirmānī's innovation, I make a brief comparison with Kaplan's theory of 'direct reference', namely that 'indexical' terms such as pronouns and demonstratives can be used to refer directly to an object without mediation by description: for example, when I point to something and say

'It is there', my reference to 'it' does not depend on me describing it in any specific terms. Al-Kirmānī's response to the charge of *taʿṭīl* is therefore best explained if we take him to be making a similar point, that the pronoun '*huwa*' can refer to or affirm God's *huwiyya* 'directly' without positively describing Him.

As such, al-Kirmānī's concept of *huwiyya* is historically significant because he severs *huwiyya* from being. It is philosophically interesting because it suggests the independence of pronoun reference from descriptive content, using this to affirm an apophatic conception of God as beyond being and beyond all attributes.

Andrea Sola: The Vindication of Self-Love in Renaissance Erotology

A standard view in the history of philosophy holds that the Platonic conception of love conveys a theory of desire marked not only by the hope for fullness, but above all by the emphasis on limitation and lack. After all, in the context of the Renaissance Philosophy of Love initiated by Marsilio Ficino (b. 1433 – d. 1499), the 'daemonic' nature of love as proposed by Diotima in Plato's *Symposium* undoubtedly shaped the very first reconfiguration of *Eros* within Western culture. In Ficino's *De amore*, erotic feeling is almost always oriented towards the pursuit of what the lover does not possess, and thus towards the love of the 'other-than-self '. Amid the 16th century's reception of erotology, however, a renewed engagement with the philosophical theme of *self-love* emerges. To love others well, is it necessary first and foremost to love oneself well? Is truly disinterested love possible?

Building on some of the gaps noted in recent scholarship on the topic (Vasoli 1988; Russell 2002), this paper aims to offer an answer to these questions by providing an overview of the rediscovery of *amor sui* as promoted by the Italian Cinquecento's Love-treatises. To this end, I will move from the close-reading of three works focused on shedding light both on the key-features and on the historical sources that gave rise to this rediscovery. In fact, Mario Equicola's *Libro de natura de amore* [1525] constitutes the first recorded defence of self-love in Philosophy of Love's afetrlife. Here, the extension of *amor platonicus* to the narcissistic dimension of desire is enabled by the use of the ninth book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1166a, 1168a–b) and of the fifth book of Cicero's *De finibus*. Inspired by the 'secular' Aristotelianism of Pietro Pomponazzi, the views expressed by the courtesan Tullia d'Aragona in Sperone Speroni's *Dialogo d'amore* [1542] instead serve as the most radical apology of self-love attested during the same century. Finally, in Francesco Patrizi's *Amorosa filosofia* [1577], thanks to its combination with the doctrines set out in Bernardino Telesio's *De rerum natura* and the *nova philosophia* it disseminated, the reflection on φιλαυτία reaches its apex: in the Chersino's dialogue, we witness an unprecedented 'ontological' and 'universal' theorisation of the concept.

Three different works, therefore, for three different philosophical strategies; three approaches defined by a contentious link with Ficino's masterpiece. In all of them, still, a constant persists: *contra hypocritas*, a bold treatment of Love's definition, as well as the ambiguity of its portrayal. The prominence of the vindication of self-love found in sixteenth-century erotology, indeed, lies precisely in the unique blend of diverse and almost opposing elements. Elements culturally *heterodox*, as produced by the interplay between Philosophy of Love's *Fortleben* and theoretical concerns drawn from Renaissance naturalism; on the other hand, elements paradoxically *orthodox*, as rooted in medieval philosophical theology, which consistently emphasized – in both scholastic and monastic contexts – the egotistic nuance of the Gospel's precept: «Diliges proximum tuum *tamquam teipsum*».

Lorenzo Spagnesi: Maxims of Inquiry: A Zetetic Solution to Kant's Antinomy of Mechanism and Teleology

Organized beings elicit a special response in us. When confronted, for example, with a blooming plant, our usual way of approaching nature breaks down, and something else seems required to grasp this phenomenon. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (CPJ), Kant addresses this peculiar experience. Organized beings appear to call for special treatment, distinct from the mechanistic principle that governs our understanding of the rest of nature. This gives rise to a well-known antinomy involving two principles: a thesis affirming the necessity of mechanical explanation, and an antithesis introducing final causation into our conception of nature – the antinomy of teleological judgment.

What should we, as inquirers, do when two equally compelling principles, each rooted in a distinct mode of judging nature, conflict? Drawing on recent work in contemporary philosophy (Friedman 2020; Thorstad 2021; Haziza 2023), I propose a new solution to the antinomy focused on the *entire activity of inquiry*. On this view, thesis and antithesis are *zetetic maxims* – deontic principles aimed at figuring out a question (*What are the empirical laws of nature?*). Though they conflict, they are reconciled as ideal norms based on a shared epistemic interest (*systematic cognition of empirical laws*).

This approach resolves a longstanding problem in Kant scholarship, which has been split between two main camps: the traditional view (E. Cassirer 1921; Ewing 1938; Walsh 1947; for a contemporary defense, Hamid 2019), which claims there is no conflict between methodological principles, and a more recent interpretation (McLaughlin 1990, 162; Cohen 2004, 189; Breitenbach 2008, 364–367; Watkins 2009, 218; Halper 2019, 214–15), which treats the conflict as purely epistemic and between contradictory ways of judging. Reading the thesis and antithesis as zetetic maxims of inquiry that conflict precisely as deontic principles opens up a new perspective and offers a model for navigating similar tensions in inquiry.

I proceed as follows. I begin by situating my zetetic approach within the existing literature. I then analyze the key features of maxims, with particular attention to Kant's practical philosophy. I then apply these insights to the antinomy. I argue that the thesis and antithesis can be read as deontic principles of action, based in the epistemic interest of cognizing empirical laws of nature – thus, as zetetic maxims, which presuppose a limitation of human reason in realizing this interest. The content of these maxims gives rise to two distinct conflicts:

Conflict 1 raises a classic deontic problem: an apparent violation of the ought-implies-can principle (OIC). I argue that Kant resolves this conflict by qualifying OIC, blocking contraposition through a background condition – the supersensible.

Conflict 2 concerns reconciling two principles of action. Since both maxims are grounded in the same epistemic interest – systematic cognition of empirical laws – they are not in tension but jointly support a coherent research program.

As the resolutions to each conflict are jointly applicable, I conclude that resolving each independently yields a unified solution to the antinomy. I support my solution with textual evidence, formal analysis, and engagement with the scholarship.

Ioannis Spiliopolous: Hume on Miracles

I will concentrate on David Hume's Section X of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and argue that Hume's position does not preclude the possibility of justified assent to the descriptions of the miracles contained in Scripture. Hume's critical remarks will be seen as directed against a specific understanding of Scripture, one that treats it as a historical text corroborated by human testimony: If Scripture is seen in such a way, Hume argues, our assent to the descriptions of the miracles it contains is unjustified – since the falsehood of such descriptions is much less miraculous (much more probable) than the occurrence of the miracles recounted in them. It will be shown that Hume sets this theoretical understanding of Scripture in contrast with viewing it as a book on "easy and obvious philosophy", i.e., as a book that aims at influencing our passions and conduct (Scripture as "the word or testimony of God"). In the former case, the understanding of Scripture is theoretical and takes place at the level of ideas whereas in the latter case it is practical and takes place at the level of impressions (since for Hume the passions are kinds of impressions). Thus, in the latter case, the falsehood of the same descriptions can indeed appear more miraculous than the occurrence of the events described in them - since the impressions (passions) these descriptions give rise to are evidentially more forceful than the evidence against the occurrence of miracles -, and we can justifiably assent to them. In this way, Hume's concluding positive remarks about faith and religion in "Of Miracles", as well as in other places in his writings, will be presented in a more nuanced light and in accord with the more general principles of his philosophy - in contrast to the ironical understanding of them that is prevalent in the secondary literature.

Samuel Stevens: Plato's Divided Line and the Practice of Greek Mathematics

A central puzzle in the study of Plato's philosophy of mathematics is to explain what Plato did not say. Aristotle tells us that Plato held mathematical objects to be ontologically intermediate between sensible and Forms because mathematical objects, like forms, are eternal and unmoving but also, like sensibles, multiple (Metaph. 987b14–18, 1028b19–21). But Plato never gives this argument. Indeed, he writes nothing direct about either the ontology or logical structure of mathematics. Into this silence, nearly every possible interpretation has been suggested, yet none are able to ground an interpretation firmly in the text. Ultimately, scholars either have to convict Plato of incoherence, argue that he withheld his true doctrines, or suggest that he intentionally underdetermined a central part of his argument to spark us to inquire for ourselves.

I will suggest that this difficulty arises because we are asking the wrong question. If we do not assume that Plato was concerned with mathematical ontology but instead take him to be doing something similar to what has recently come under the name "the philosophy of mathematical practice," then we will see his explicit arguments are coherent and complete. I will develop this through a reading of the Divided Line in Plato's Republic. His point there is primarily epistemological. He is interested in the way that we can come to know, in the process of being led to truth. Geometry enters as an example to show how this process can be successful. Key here, I argue, are a series of characteristics of ancient geometry that have been lost in modern mathematical practice. Ancient geometry proved propositions by constructing a diagram. As others have shown, these diagrams were often non-metrical. They were often drawn to suggest the relationships between lines rather than accurately represent them. This was sometimes a technological necessity – the techniques of perspective were still rudimentary, constructing complex figures with only a straightedge and compass can be overwhelmingly time- consuming, and much ancient mathematical work was done with chalk or in sand – but this disregard for exact construction seems to have been a broader feature even of diagrams that could have been constructed exactly. Further, the diagram was accompanied by the text of a proof, but neither diagram nor text alone contain all of the logical information required for the proof. It is only the conjunction of the two that allows the student to understand the proof. The consequence of this, and what makes geometry such a useful example for Plato, is that it is impossible for the student to mistake the proof to the diagram. Working through the proof, and confronting the limits of the diagram, forces one to recognize that the true object of the proof is something incorporeal, abstract, and only partially represented in the image. This is, as is widely recognized, precisely the dynamic that Plato suggests holds more generally between Forms and the images of Forms. Geometry is a natural way for Plato to display this dynamic.

Foivos Syrigos: Natural Law and Miracles in Leibniz

Leibniz is well known for his efforts to reconcile seemingly opposing viewpoints. Among the most significant of these is his attempt to integrate his Christian theological commitments with the scientific worldview of his time – particularly mechanistic philosophy and developments in mathematics. A central tension within this framework concerns Leibniz's account of miracles: while central to Christian theology, miracles defy scientific explanation.

For Leibniz, miracles are extraordinary events that exceed the capabilities of created beings. These include acts such as Creation, Annihilation, Incarnation, and extraordinary interventions such as Peter's walking on water. However, Leibniz firmly rejects the notion of "perpetual miracles," wherein God would constantly intervene in nature. He argues that such a view diminishes God's wisdom in designing the world and is a key reason for his opposition to occasionalism. In addition, Leibniz's metaphysical framework maintains that whatever has happened, happens and it's going to happen on a substance is already included in its complete concept. This raises a challenge: miracles seem to entail a form of interactionism, which Leibniz also opposes, and appear incompatible with the idea that all future states of a monad are already written in own essence.

This talk explores Leibniz's strategies for addressing these tensions and evaluates the implications for his broader metaphysical system. Key questions include: Are miracles contrary to natural laws? Can God alter these laws, and how do such alterations align with Leibniz's principles of pre-established harmony

and the best of all possible worlds? If Leibniz restricts miracles in the strict sense to four – Creation, Conservation, Incarnation, and Annihilation – while considering other extraordinary events as merely surpassing the understanding and subordinate maxims of created beings, how does this align with his critique of occasionalism for relying on "perpetual miracles"? Finally, how do miracles fit within his notion of concurrentism and his principle of sufficient reason?

Nathaniel Taylor: Avicenna and the Many Ways by which the Many Senses of Being are Said

Thanks to the work of authors like Treiger, De Haan, Janos, and Candy, the topic of the equivocity and/or univocity of Avicenna's theory of being has received renewed interest and some much needed clarification. The above authors have aimed to settle controversies concerning the precise meaning of "*tashkik*," whether Avicenna envisions the *tashkik al-wujūd* to be more like equivocity or univocity, and whether Avicenna's thoughts on this matter are continuous with Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentary tradition. But all of these studies adopt a shared assumption: that the 'being' to which Avicenna refers when he says that there is a single notion of 'being' common to the categories and that 'being' is said of the categories according to priority and posteriority is the same sense of 'being.' However, in this study I present textual evidence to suggest that this is not the case. On my view, the way by which the term 'being' is said, either equivocally or univocally, depends on what sense of 'being' is being using. Following his own division of 'being' as it signifies a thing's essence and 'being' as it signifies that the thing is established, affirmed, or existent, I argue that Avicenna follows Aristotle in treating 'being' as a sort of equivocal when 'being' signifies 'essence' but treats 'being' as univocal when he uses it to signify 'affirmative being.' Thus the mistake in the contemporary literature is that they have confused two distinct doctrines in the Aristotelian tradition regarding how "*to on legetai pollachōs*": first, concerning the *pros hen* equivocity of 'being' as said of the ten categories and, second, concerning the four senses of 'being' enumerated in *Metaphysics* Δ.7. Avicenna, I show, has made no such confusion.

Mark Textor: Herbart Helps Bradley

In his *Principles of Logic* Francis H. Bradley criticised views according to which judgement is a synthetic act. Judgement is supposed to be the act that 'refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act'. This is suggestive, but, on the face of it, unsatisfactory. According to Cook Wilson (1926, 285), Bradley owes us an explanation of what kind of reference is meant, and either there is no informative answer or we go in a tight circle. Robinson (1931, 15) and Wimmer (2024, 134–5) have clarified and defended Cook Wilson on this point. In my talk I want to push back against this criticism. Bradley's positive account starts from the observation that there are judgements without 'any copula and with but one idea' (1883, 49). While Bradley (1883, 42–3) criticised Johann Friedrich Herbart's view of categorical judgements, this idea that drives Bradley's positive view is taken from Herbart (see 1813, 48ff). Thie judgement that it is raining, argued Herbart, has no copula, no subject, no predicate. It absolutely posits [setzt] rain. In my talk I will argue that Bradley's theory of judgement develops and generalises Herbart's theory of positing and that Cook Wilson's objection can be disarmed when we make this clear.

Tzuchien Tho: Euler and the Architectonic Refoundation of Newtonianism

The aim of this presentation is to outline Euler's uniquely "metaphysical" foundations for emergent Newtonianism based on his critique of much of the basis of Newton's own views undergirding his mechanics. The goal is to demonstrate that the Eulerian synthesis of Cartesian plenism, Newtonian laws, and Leibnizian theological metaphysics allows for a new foundation of physical laws in metaphysical notions.

While Euler expresses his belief that only mathematics can guide science, the appropriate employment of mathematical formulas and their objectivity and scientific appropriateness is repeatedly justified through metaphysical discourses. This engagement with purely speculative 'hypotheses' is shaped by Leibnizian ideas, both in regard to the method and to the metaphysical notions employed, such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the belief in an efficient or economic universe. Euler uses these ideas to argue for the universality and validity of at least some of his mechanical and dynamical ideas.

Euler criticizes Newton's theory of gravity as action over distance and hence strives reevaluate the principles that govern the changes in bodies and motion in terms of local causality. Euler also rejects Newton's force dualism in the distinction between *vis impressa* and *vis insita*. Such a force dualism would endanger the unity of mechanics, as irreconcilable forces require not only separate laws, but also disjointed deductions of said laws. He also rejects the Leibnizian distinction between active and passive forces on similar grounds. Instead, Euler proposes a unified account of force in terms of impenetrability that also serves as a metaphysical ground for the deduction of Newton's laws. This effectively inverts Newton's tacit assumption that laws are governed by forces and instead suggests that laws follow from the nature of force, which, in turn, adheres to the simplicity and efficiency of the universe as general metaphysical properties

Recent scholarship by Brading and Stan has already drawn attention to this particular brand of philosophical mechanics, as here Euler responds to the problem of how to conceive of bodies at the intersection of matter theory and in terms of natural laws. In this presentation, we intend to expand this argument. Euler's speculative conception of forces and the deduction of Newton's laws from it has important implications for the method and scope of science. It can be understood as an attempt to shift away from Newton's (Euclidean) axiomatic science that defines itself in separation from metaphysics toward a more Leibniz-inspired architectonic, in which principles of metaphysics or natural philosophy are employed to deduce or justify the necessity, certainty, and universality of scientific methods and formulas. The subsequent verification of said deduction through its explanatory success is not a vicious, but a virtuous circle. This lays bare not only a distinct tension between Euler and Newton, but also within Euler's own oeuvre, as the method to which he explicitly commits himself does not always neatly match the method that he actually employs.

Emily Thomas: Letters of Women Philosophers 1902–1951: Sexism and Shadow Networks

This talk explores connections between six philosophers: E. E. Constance Jones, May Sinclair, Karin Costelloe-Stephen, Hilda Oakeley, Susan Stebbing, and Margaret Macdonald. They worked within seemingly disparate movements (British idealism, Bergsonism, early analytic) yet I'll use archival letters to show they belonged to criss-crossing philosophical networks. These letters are due to be published in May 2026 (*Letters of English Women Philosophers 1902–1951*, OUP). Having briefly introduced all six figures, this talk will explore two issues arising from their correspondence.

Challenges

The correspondence shows all six figures faced significant challenges - including sexism. Whereas nineteenth-century women could contribute (anonymously, if they preferred) to philosophical debates via periodical culture, the turn of the twentieth century saw philosophy become increasingly professionalised: to be a 'philosopher' meant to hold academic credentials and a university position, publishing within academic journals. As universities were only just starting to admit women – let alone confer degrees on them – this posed problems for aspiring women philosophers. For example, when Jones writes to Bertrand Russell for permission to attend his 1910 logic lectures, she was conscious of the need to bring a chaperone. In 1937, Macdonald reports she has not applied for a position at Swansea for the university council would not 'contemplate appointing a woman'. In 1939, Gilbert Ryle commented on Stebbing's suitability for Moore's soon-to-be vacant Cambridge chair, 'Of course, everyone thinks you are the right person to succeed Moore, except that you are a woman'.

Shadow networks

The correspondence also shows that our six figures belonged to interconnected philosophical networks. Some of these networks were powered by high profile, prolific letter-writing men such as Russell, Henri Bergson, and Samuel Alexander. But there were others too. Many of our six philosophers knew each other well, yet not a single letter has survived between them. This is probably because their philosophic correspondence has not been preserved in a conscious way. Jones, Oakeley, and Macdonald do not have dedicated archives. Costelloe-Stephen's surviving letters are largely addressed to family members, not philosophers. Sinclair and Stebbing deliberately destroyed many of their missives. Nonetheless, what does survive of their correspondence reveals shadowy personal links between them. They wrote employment

references for each other, attended each other's talks, visited one another. Going beyond their correspondence, the records of the Aristotelian Society show many discussions through which they interacted. This talk will detail the personal connections between our six women and – going further – sketch the broader women's networks they belonged to. Heart-warmingly, we'll see that these women philosophers used their interpersonal networks to address some of the challenges they faced.

Oliver Toth: Spinoza on Love of Finite Beings

In this paper, I argue that Spinoza's notion of affective love toward finite beings is categorically different from his notion of intellectual love of God. I proceed in three steps.

In the first step, I bring three systematic arguments for the claim that the two notions of love are categorically different. First, affective love is a species of joy and as such entails a change in the lover's power of acting, but Spinoza states that intellectual love of God is devoid of such a change (E5p17c, E5p36). Second, affective love can be defeated by more powerful contrary affects, but there is nothing contrary to the intellectual love of God (E5p37). Third, affective love, as all affects are, is an idea of an affection of the body, whereas the intellectual love of God belongs to the eternal part of the mind and thus can be conceived without considering the present state of the body (E5p34c).

In the second step, I present a contextual argument. Spinoza cites almost verbatim Descartes's definition of love in E3defaff6e, which he rejects by reinterpreting it. Spinoza only accepts Descartes's definition of love as a definition of a necessary property of love and only if the volition involved in it is understood as a species of joy, as *acquiescentia*. This indicates that the effects of love are assessed from the prudential perspective of the lover's *conatus* (Carlisle 2017). By contrast, effects of the intellectual love of God are assessed from the perspective of eternity (E5p18cs). This doctrine resembles Descartes's notion of love, who argued that the lover conceives themselves as a part of a whole formed with the loved one and transfers the care they took of themselves to the whole (PA §§79–83, AT IV 609–12).

In the third step, I argue that distinguishing the two notions of love leaves room for a notion of love of finite beings that has different properties than the intellectual love of the infinite being but can still be considered as prudentially good. In the literature, it has been argued that only God is the appropriate object of love because (1) no one can be weary of loving him, (2) loving him is not tainted by jealousy, (3) he is a reliable source of joy (Rorty 2009; Kambouchner 2019; Alanen 2016; cf. Sangiacomo 2020). It was also argued that a purely intellectual love is insufficient for life because affects play an indispensable role in human life (James 2020). There is room for a notion of affective love that acknowledges the finitude of its object but is still prudentially good because the intellectual love of God is based on an adverbial and the affective love on a derivative use of the term "good" (Renz 2022). Idolatrous love, i.e., bad affective love, is prudentially bad only because it attempts to relate to a finite being in a way that is only proper for the relation to God, i.e., by assuming that its object is adverbially and not merely derivatively good.

Luigi Valletta: Roland of Cremona: Dominican Cosmology between Anti-Cathar Polemic and Opposition to Heterodoxy

This paper explores the cosmology of Roland of Cremona († c.1259), the first Dominican to consciously integrate scientific and philosophical learning into theology and the Order's earliest Parisian master (1229–1230). It argues that Roland's reflection on the natural world was deeply shaped by the Order's polemical battles against heresy, above all Cathar dualism.

Cathar theology claimed that matter and the body were the creation of an evil principle, while God created only spiritual beings. Dominicans attacked this view vigorously, but the philosophical dimension of their polemic has received little attention. Roland offers a striking case: in his *Summa* (c. 1230s) and massive, still unpublished *Commentary on Job*, he mobilized Aristotelian natural philosophy and Ptolemaic astrology in a strongly anti-dualist framework. Sublunary phenomena, he argued, are not the work of an evil creator, but the natural effects of secondary causes ultimately deriving from God. At the same time, Roland distanced himself from heterodox forms of naturalism that identified God with the heavens, thus defending divine transcendence while affirming the order and intelligibility of the cosmos.

This dual strategy – rejecting Cathar dualism on one side and radical naturalism on the other – made Roland a pioneer of Dominican cosmology. His approach anticipated the later integration of Aristotelian science by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, even though at the time it faced resistance within the Order.

The paper is structured in three parts: Roland's biography and polemical targets; his cosmological positions in the *Summa* and the *Commentary on Job*; and the close textual ties between his writings and those of Moneta of Cremona and Humbert of Romans. By situating Roland's cosmology within anti-heretical controversy, the paper highlights the crucial role of polemic in shaping Dominican intellectual identity and in opening the way for the reception of Greco-Arabic philosophy in the thirteenth century.

Máté Veres: Sagehood and Expertise in Early Stoicism

Two claims in Didymus' account of early Stoic ethics bear on the relationship between sagehood and expertise (*technê*). First, the disposition of virtue which is characteristic only of the sage is itself 'the expertise concerned with the the whole of [human] life' (*Ecl.* 2.7.5b10). Second, for a range of specialized *technai*, only the sage can be a genuine expert (2.7.5b12). These claims belong to the Socratic backbone of Stoicism, but the distinct position that emerges from their combination is not yet well enough understood.

The appeal of the idea of virtue as an expertise derives from the attainable ideal of the expert agent: the master practitioner who is able, within the confines of a specialized domain, to reliably bring about the specific goal associated with their expertise due to their ability to perform correct technical action. The expert has a theoretical grasp of what their expertise consists in, and can therefore recognize what the appropriate action is from the point of view of the *technê* in question. Similarly, the sage possesses the knowledge that is constitutive of virtue, and is able to arrive at the correct decision about what is appropriate to do, all-things-considered.

The second Stoic claim above presumably has its origin in the Socratic tenet that only knowledge is unconditionally good, so that only an agent with the relevant form of knowledge can make use of other things in such a way as to confer eudaimonic value on them. Together with the Stoic stricture that only the sage has knowledge, this yields the vision of specialized *technai* as themselves indifferent (D.L. 7.106) and such that only the sage can practice them impeccably, i.e., unfailingly in service of the genuine good.

I shall argue that the Stoics are committed to the view that an overall excellent life requires the harmonious integration of one's specialized abilities into a life guided by virtue. I shall reconstruct this view by looking at the relation between virtue as a *technê* and the specialized *technai*, attributing the following claims to the Stoics:

ANALOGY. Virtue and the specialized *technai* share a psychological, epistemic, and telic structure: they are states of the leading part of the human mind made up of systems of kataleptic appearances that are aimed at some goal considered advantageous to human beings.

HIERARCHY. Specialized *technai* are systems of weak apprehensions, available to fools, but their recommendations are defeasible. By contrast, any *technê* practised by a sage is a system of strong apprehensions, and as such epistemically superior to its foolish counterpart, which turns out to be not a genuine *technê* after all.

Marco Vorcelli: Does Being *supra passiones* Equal Being *sine passiones*? Albert the Great on the Passions of "Heroes"

In *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 1, 1145a15-30, Aristotle conceives of a higher state of character than the moral virtue treated in books II-V, namely, "a certain heroic and divine virtue". Aristotle's remarks on this excellent virtue, however, are rather uninformative, with the result that his exegetes have been left with the hermeneutical challenge of fleshing out his rather scanty picture. Among the Philosopher's interpreters is the 13th-century scholastic Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280). Albert elaborates on the concept of heroic virtue both in his two commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Super Ethica* and the *Ethica*, and in his biblical exegesis, notably in the commentary on the beatitudes of Mt 5:3-12. With this

presentation, I would like shed light on Albert's account of heroic virtue with a focus on the role of the passions in the life of the "hero". In particular, I intend to provide textual evidence in support of the thesis – at times unacknowledged in the literature – that the hero's capacity to rise above the passions does not amount for Albert to a form of Neoplatonic and Stoic apathy, since in the Dominican's Aristotelian and Christian moral framework, insensitivity to the passions is never a value. Further, focusing specifically on heroic virtue will enable us to gain another vantage point for a more general consideration on the different personalities of Albert and his disciple and confrère Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, as it will emerge, while Albert works on the concept of heroic virtue in the guise of the philosopher, Thomas tackles it with the posture of the theologian.

Steven Waldorf: Francisco de Vitoria on the Political Good and the Supernatural End

This paper analyzes whether for Francisco de Vitoria the promotion of the human person's supernatural end of eternal beatitude is an intrinsic element of the political good that states exist to promote. According to the predominant scholarly interpretation, Vitoria held that the political good is purely natural, consisting solely in the promotion of natural virtue among citizens, and that the Church alone has responsibility for bringing about the human person's supernatural end. I argue that this interpretation needs substantial revision. While Vitoria does maintain such a position in early writings, I show that his thinking on this question gradually shifted later in his career, culminating in a full reversal of his earlier view in his *relectiones* on Spanish colonization of the Americas in the late 1530s. Thus, contrary to the scholarly consensus, Vitoria's mature position is that promoting the supernatural end is indeed a constitutive element of the properly political good, and that the state therefore possesses independently of the Church the right to make laws it regards as conducive to its subjects' salvation (for example, forcibly repressing heresy). I conclude by arguing that this re-evaluation of Vitoria's understanding of the political good and the supernatural end should prompt a broader reappraisal of the place of the School of Salamanca – of which Vitoria was one of the most important thinkers – in the history of political thought. Vitoria's position suggests that Salamancan political philosophy does not, as historians commonly hold, represent the establishment of a scholastic consensus that politics is confined to the domain of pure nature. On the contrary, his view that the state's proper end includes promoting salvation suggests that Salamancan political thought is better understood as the continuation of a medieval debate about the place of the supernatural in political life that still remained unsettled by the sixteenth century.

Michael Walschots: Duties to Self, Others, and God in Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius

In this presentation I survey how three major eighteenth-century German philosophers understood the division between duties to self, others, and God. I argue that despite grounding the obligatory force of morality in different ways, they all assign a priority to duties to self.

In Section (1) I explain that Wolff assigns priority to duties to self for systematic reasons: because we necessarily will that which we cognize to be best, Wolff holds that the acquisition and improvement of knowledge (a duty to self) necessarily take priority. On this view, fulfilling duties to God merely makes it easier to perform our other duties, and what we owe to others is "identical" to what we owe ourselves.

In Section (2) I show that Baumgarten holds that our duties are binding by means of both nature (as is the case for Wolff) *and* God's authority simultaneously, and that duties to God are ordered first in his system. I argue, however, that given Baumgarten's subscription to a Wolffian conception of willing, duties to God nonetheless remain a means to perfecting oneself, resulting in duties to oneself maintaining priority.

Finally, in Section (3) I show that Crusius holds that morality is obligatory in virtue of being commanded by God, to whom we are indebted and owe obedience. I argue, however, that duties to God are not primary: Crusius explicitly treats duties to self first because they are "preparation of the mind for the remaining virtues" and thus the means by which "the fulfillment of such duties is first made possible."

I therefore conclude that, despite the varying role that God plays in morality's obligatory force for these figures, they all assign a priority to duties to self.

Simon Wimmer: Judgement and Knowledge in Bradley, Cook Wilson, and Stout

Bradley (1883, 10) defines judgement as "the act which refers an ideal content … to a reality beyond the act". Although this ideal content is a 'logical' idea – not a datable mental event or 'psychological' idea, but a type of mental event that distinct datable mental events fall under – the content of Bradley's judgement is distinct from the reality it refers to. I reconstruct and compare how two British Realists, Cook Wilson and Stout, respond to Bradley. Both claim that judgements that are knowledge are immediate relations to reality, and do not refer an ideal content to it. And both base their claim on versions of the idea that reference to reality presupposes that knowledge, rather than just perception, as Bradley (1883, 72) assumes, is an immediate relation to reality (Cook Wilson 1926, 287–88; Stout 1910, 189). (Cook Wilson also argues that Bradley cannot explain what it is to refer an ideal content to a reality; see contribution 1.) However, I also document and explain where Cook Wilson and Stout disagree. For Stout (1908, 24), knowledge and mere beliefs belong to the same fundamental kind – cognition – , and so have the same kind of relatum: knowledge and mere true belief actualised possibilities, false belief non-actualised ones. By contrast, Cook Wilson rejects the existence of a kind like cognition (1926, 39): knowledge and mere belief differ in fundamental kind, and whilst knowledge relates one to facts, neither true nor false belief are relations (Robinson 1931, 35). I argue that this disagreement between Cook Wilson and Stout is at least partly explained by a disagreement about modality: Cook Wilson (1926, 224) argues against non-actualised possibilities, and so cannot maintain both that knowledge is an immediate relation to reality and that knowledge and mere belief have the same kind of relatum.

Boxiang Yu: Descartes on *Imago Dei* and Knowledge of God

Descartes famously subscribed to the doctrine of *imago Dei* that the finite mind is "somehow made in [God's] image and likeness". Commentators contend that the likeness obtains between the divine and human will but understand its nature differently. Marion (1991) and Schmaltz (2000) suggest that Descartes' *imago Dei* is in tension with his theory of eternal truth, insofar as divine and human volition are disanalogous. Ragland (2006, 2016) insists that the likeness between two volitions is analogical. More recently, Jayasekera (2018) rejects the analogical likeness and favours an Augustinian view, in which the human volition is an imperfect imitation (*imitatio*) of God's volition.

Against this backdrop, I first argue that Descartes' *imago Dei* doctrine is close to that of Aquinas: the likeness is analogical, and it is not based on a specific faculty of mind, but on a shared intellectual nature between the whole finite mind and God. I then argue that Descartes' *imago Dei* suggests the way we know God is close to introspection, insofar as the mind's knowledge of God is epistemically mediated by the knowledge of itself.

This paper proceeds as follows: the first part illustrates that Descartes' and Aquinas' *imago Dei* doctrine shares four core claims: [A] *Intellectual Homogeneity*: The mind exclusively shares the intellectual nature with God, i.e. they are different in degree but same in kind. [B] *Agent Causation*: the intellect is actively transmitted from God to the mind, insofar as what is contained in the effect is also contained in its primary and efficient cause. [C] *Analogical Predication*: the intellect and other attributes are predicated of God and the mind analogically, namely, the meaning of "intellectual" in "God is intellectual" and "human mind is intellectual" are not the same, but still related through causation. [D] *Conceptual Priority*: The intellectual nature of the mind is defined by the intellectual nature of God.

In the second part, I propose that the *imago Dei* doctrine figures crucially in Descartes' theory of the finite mind's knowledge of God. [A] and [B] suggest that the intellectual nature formally contained in God is also formally contained in the mind through divine creation. As Descartes claims, the divine intellect is represented by the intellect of the finite mind, which is known through introspection. Hence, knowing God and divine attributes is to amplify the finite attributes of the mind by introspection. [C] guarantees that the mind knowing God by introspection does not lead to the assimilation of the two. Owing to his divine simplicity, God's volition and understanding are identical. Hence, unlike the finite mind, the intellectual nature is contained in him perfectly. [D] preserves Descartes' claim that the idea of God is prior to the idea of the finite mind. The innate idea of God (infinity) is the prerequisite for the finite mind

to think of created beings, which cannot be measured or compared by the finite mind without the idea of infinity as the paradigm.

Rossana Zanetti: Serving the God in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*: An Echo of Plato's *Timaeus* 87c–90d?

Until very recently, the *Eudemian Ethics* was among the most neglected of Aristotle's works. The persistent conviction that its sibling, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, represented the most mature expression of his ethical thought, together with the desperate state of its manuscript tradition, long diverted scholarly attention away from it. As a result, many sections still demand closer scrutiny, and its final chapter (VIII.3) is certainly among them.

After addressing, in a dense and enigmatic section, the problem of the principle of rationality and concluding that this principle resides in "the divine within us", Aristotle turns to *kalokagathia*, the most complete virtue, the sum of all virtues discussed throughout the treatise. He distinguishes the *kalokagathos* from the merely *agathos* by their different attitudes toward what he calls the "natural goods," such as wealth, power, and fortune, which must be possessed in due measure. In 1249b16–23, the standard for the virtuous person's selection and possession of natural goods is articulated in terms of speculative activity: whatever promotes it is deemed good, and whatever impedes it is deemed bad. This activity is described with the expressions "contemplation of the god" (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν) and "contemplating and serving the god" (τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν). Scholars have long debated what exactly Aristotle meant by these two formulations, and whether we are still dealing with "the divine within us", the subject of speculation (subjective genitive), or the god of the *Metaphysics*, the object of speculation (objective genitive). Anthony Kenny, in his edition (2011), concludes: "admittedly, what Aristotle meant by the service of God is anyone's guess".

In this paper, I defend a rather traditional reading of the text, though I rely on a strong intertextual reference which has gone unnoticed until now. I argue that what Aristotle had in mind in writing these lines is one of the closing sections of Plato's *Timaeus* (87c–90d), devoted to the virtue of the compound of soul and body, namely the virtue of "who rightly and deservedly wishes to be called both *kalos* and *agathos*" (88c). Here, Timaeus emphasizes the importance of caring for the rational part of the soul, assigned to us by the gods as our "guiding daemon" and representing "the divine within us". Such care is realized through φιλομαθία and reflection on immortal and divine things. Thus, "whoever always serves the divine" (θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον) and keeps in good condition the guiding daemon dwelling within him must necessarily be happy. By reading Aristotle's argument against this Platonic background, I defend the objective genitive interpretation of the first expression, "contemplation of the god", and argue that Aristotle here means nothing other than Plato's "reflection on immortal and divine things", namely engaging in metaphysical investigation. Moreover, I show that with the second expression, "serving the god", Aristotle deliberately creates ambiguity: while he echoes the *Timaeus*' ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον, referring to the divine within us, he simultaneously conveys that philosophical speculation about the causes and first principles of reality constitutes a way of 'serving' the god.

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The winner of the 2025 Rogers Prize is **Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) for her paper Du Châtelet's causal idealism** (British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 33 (4), 816–837).

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